




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THE

# DIVINE LEGATION

OF *Saint Miller.*

# M O S E S

DEMONSTRATED.

IN NINE BOOKS.

The FOURTH EDITION, Corrected and Enlarged.

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*✓ Warburton, B Y*

WILLIAM, Lord Bishop of GLOUCESTER.

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VOL. II.

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T H E  
DIVINE LEGATION  
O F  
*M O S E S*  
DEMONSTRATED.

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B O O K II.

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S E C T. V.

**H**I THERETO we have shewn the Magistrate's care in PROPAGATING the belief of a God, --- of his providence over human affairs, --- and of the way in which that providence is chiefly dispensed ; namely, by rewards and punishments in a *future state*. These things make the essence of Religion, and compose the body of it.

His next care was for the SUPPORT of Religion, so propagated. And this was done by UNITING it to the State, taking it under the civil protection, and giving it the rights and privileges of an ESTABLISHMENT. Accordingly we find all states and people in the ancient world had an ESTABLISHED RELIGION ; which was under the more immediate

protection of the civil magistrate, in contradistinction to those that were only TOLERATED.

How close these two interests were united in the egyptian Policy, is notorious to all acquainted with antiquity. Nor were the politest republics less solicitous for the common interests of the two Societies, than that sage and powerful monarchy, the nurse of arts and virtue ; as we shall see hereafter, in the conduct both of Rome and Athens, for the support and preservation of the *established* worship.

But an *established religion* is the voice of nature ; and not confined to certain ages, people, or religions. That great voyager and sensible observer of men and manners, J. Baptiste Tavernier, speaking of the kingdom of Tunquin, thus delivers himself concerning this universal policy, as he saw it practised, in his time, both in the East and West : “ I come now to the political description of this kingdom, under which I comprehend the religion, which is, *almost every where, in concert with the civil government, for the mutual support of one another* <sup>a</sup>. ”

That the magistrate *established* religion, united it to the state, and took it into his immediate protection for the sake of civil society, cannot be questioned ; the advantages to Government being so apparent.

But the necessity of this union for procuring those advantages, as likewise the number and extent of them, are not so easily understood. Nor indeed can they be understood without a perfect knowledge of the nature of an *established religion*,

<sup>a</sup> Je viens à la description politique de ce royaume, dans laquelle je comprens la religion, qui est presque en tous lieux de concert avec le gouvernement civil pour l'appuy reciproque de l'un et de l'autre. Relation nouvelle du Royaume de Tunquin, c. x. à la fin.

and of those principles of equity, on which it ariseth. But as this master-piece of human policy hath been of late, tho' but of late, called in question, after having from the first institution of society, even to the present age, been universally practised by the magistrate, and as universally approved by philosophers and divines ; and as our question is the conduct of lawgivers, and legitimate magistrates, whose institutions are to be defended on the rules of reason and equity ; not of tyrants, who set themselves above both, it will not be improper to examine this matter to the bottom ; especially as the enquiry is so necessary to a perfect knowledge of the civil advantages, resulting from an *established religion.*

We must at present then, lay aside our ideas of the ancient modes of civil and religious societies ; and search what they are, in themselves, by nature ; and thence deduce the institution in question.

I shall do this in as few words as possible ; and refer those, who desire a fuller account of this matter, to a separate discourse; intituled THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE.

In the beginning of the first book, where we speak of the origin of civil society, the reader may remember we have shewn the natural deficiency of its plan ; and how the influence and sanction of *religion* only can supply that defect.

*Religion* then being prov'd necessary to society, that it should be so used and applied, and in the best way, and to most advantage, needs no proof. For it is as instinctive in our nature to improve, as to investigate and pursue any particluar good : and with regard to the improvement of this in question, there is special reason why it should be studied. For the experience of every place and age informs us, that the coacticity of *civil laws* and *religion*, is little enough

to keep men from running into disorder and mutual violence.

But this improvement is the effect of art and contrivance. For all natural good, every thing constitutionally beneficial to man, needs man's industry to make it better. We receive it at the provident hand of heaven, rather with a capacity of being applied to our use, than immediately fit for our service. We receive it indeed, in full measure, but rude and unprepared.

Now, concerning this technical improvement of moral good, it is in artificial bodies as in natural ; *two* may be so essentially constituted, as to be greatly able to adorn and strengthen one another : But then, as in this case, a mere *juxta-position* of the parts is not sufficient ; so neither is it in that : some union, some coalition, some artful insertion into each other will be necessary.

But then again, as in natural bodies the artist is unable to set about the proper operation, till he hath acquired a reasonable knowledge of the nature of those bodies, which are the subject of his skill ; so neither can we know in what manner religion may be best applied to the service of the state, till we have learned the real and essential natures both of a *state* and a *religion*. The *obvious* qualities of both sufficiently shew, that they must needs have a good effect on each other, when properly applied ; as our artist, by his knowledge of the obvious qualities of two natural bodies, we suppose, may discern ; tho' he hath not yet got sufficient acquaintance with their nature to make this proper application.

It behoves us therefore to gain a right knowledge of the nature both of a *civil* and of a *religious* society.

I. To

I. To begin with *civil society*: It was instituted either with the purpose of attaining all the good of every kind, it was even accidentally capable of producing; or only of some certain good, which the institutors had in view, unconcerned with, and unattentive to, any other. To suppose its end to be the vague purpose of acquiring all possible accidental good, is, in politics, a mere solecism; as hath been sufficiently shewn by the writers on this question<sup>b</sup>. And how untrue it is in fact, may be gathered from what hath been said in the beginning, of the origin of society. Civil society then, I suppose, will be allowed to have been instituted for the attainment of some certain end or ends, exclusive of others: and this implies the necessity of distinguishing this end from others. Which distinction arises from the different properties of the things pretending. But again, amongst all those things, which are apt to obtrude, or have, in fact, obtruded upon men, as the ends of civil government, there is only this difference in their properties, as ends; *That, one of them is attainable by civil society only, and all the rest are easily obtained without it.* The thing then with that property must needs be the genuine end of *civil society*. And this end is no other than **SECURITY TO THE TEMPORAL LIBERTY AND PROPERTY OF MAN**. For this end (as we have shewn) civil society was invented; and *this*, civil society alone is able to procure. The great, but spurious rival of this end, the **SALVATION OF SOULS**, or the security of man's future happiness, belongs therefore to the other division. For

<sup>b</sup> See *Locke's Defences of his Letters on Toleration*. This appears too to have been Aristotle's opinion — φυσις παν διώρισαι τὸ θῆλυν, καὶ τὸ δεῖλον ἐδὲν γὰρ οὐ φύσις τοιμήτων, οἷον χαλκούποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν πενήντας, ἀλλ' ἐν πρᾶσι ἔν, etc. *Po-lit.* l. i. c. 1.

this not depending on outward accidents, or on the will or power of another, as the body and goods do, may be as well attained in a state of nature, as in civil society ; and therefore, on the principles here delivered, cannot be one of the causes of the institution of civil government ; nor, consequently, one of the ends thereof. But if so, the promotion of it comes not within the proper province of the magistrate.

II. Secondly, as to religious society, or a Church, This being instituted to preserve purity of faith and worship, its ultimate end is the **SALVATION OF SOULS** : From whence it follows,

i. That *the religious society must needs be SOVEREIGN, and INDEPENDENT ON THE CIVIL.* Natural dependency of one society on another, arises either from the *law of nature*, or of *nations*. Dependency by the *law of nature*, is from *essence* or *generation*. Dependency from *essence* there can be none. For this kind of dependency being a mode of natural union and coalition ; and coalition being only, where there is an agreement in *eodem tertio* ; and there being no such agreement between two societies essentially different, as these are, there can possibly be no dependency. Dependency from *generation* is where one society springs up from another ; as corporations, colleges, companies, and chambers, in a city. These, as well by the conformity of their ends and means, as by their charters of incorporation, betray their original and dependency. But *religious society*, by ends and means quite different, gives internal proof of its not arising from the state ; and we have shewn by external evidence <sup>c</sup>, that it existed before the state had any being. Again, no dependency can arise from the *law of na-*

<sup>c</sup> See Book iii. sect. 6.

tions, or the *civil law*. Dependency by this law is, where one and the same people composing two different societies, the *imperium* of the one clashes with the *imperium* of the other. And, in such case, the lesser society becomes, by that law, dependent on the greater ; because the not being so, would make that absurdity in politics, called *imperium in imperio*. But now *civil* and *religious* society, having ends and means entirely different ; and the means of *civil* society being *coercive power*, which power therefore the *religious* hath not ; it follows, that the administration of each society is exercised in so remote spheres, that they can never meet to clash : And those societies which never clash, necessity of state cannot bring into dependency on one another.

2. It follows, *That this independent religious society hath not, in and of itself, any coercive power of the civil kind* : Its inherent jurisdiction being in its nature and use entirely different from that of the state. For if, as hath been proved, *civil society* was instituted for the attainment of one species of good (all other good, requisite to human happiness, being to be attained without it) and that *civil society* attains the good, for which it was ordained, by the *sole* mean of coercive power ; then it follows, that the good, which any other kind of society seeks, may be attained without that power ; consequently, *coercive power* is unnecessary to a *religious society*. But that mean, which is *unnecessary* for the attainment of any end, is likewise *unfit* ; in all cases, but in that, where such mean is rendered *unnecessary* by the use of other means of the same kind or species. But *religious society* attains its end by means of a different kind ; therefore *coercive power* is not only *unnecessary*, but *unfit*. Again, Ends in their nature different, can never be attained by one and the same mean. Thus in the case before

us : *coercive power* can only influence us to outward practice ; by outward practice only, is the good which *civil society* aims at, immediately effected ; therefore is *coercive power* peculiarly fit for *civil society*. But the good, which *religious society* aims at, cannot be effected by outward practice ; therefore *coercive power* is altogether unfit for *that society*.

Having thus by a diligent enquiry found,

I. First, *That the care of the civil society extends only to the body, and its concerns ; and the care of the religious society only to the soul* : it necessarily follows, that the civil magistrate, if he will improve this natural influence of religion by human art and contrivance, must seek some UNION OR ALLIANCE with the church. For his office not extending to the *care of souls*, he hath not, in himself, power to enforce the influence of religion : and the church's province not extending to the *body*, and consequently being without coactive power, she has not, in herself alone, a power of applying that influence to *civil purposes*. The conclusion is, that their joint powers must cooperate thus to apply and inforce the influence of *religion*. But they can never act conjointly but in *union and alliance*.

II. Secondly, having found that each society is sovereign, and independent on the other, it as necessarily follows, that such union can be produced only by FREE CONVENTION AND MUTUAL COMPACT : because, whatever is sovereign and independent, can be brought to no act without its own consent : but nothing can give birth to a *free convention*, but a sense of mutual wants, that may be supplied ; or a view of mutual benefits, that may be gained by it.

Such

Such then is the nature of that union which produceth a RELIGION BY LAW ESTABLISHED : and which is, indeed, no other than *a public league and alliance for mutual support and defence.* For the state, not having the care of souls, cannot inforce the influence of religion ; and therefore seeks the concurring aid of the church : and the church having no coercive power (the consequence of its care's not extending to bodies) as naturally flies for protection to the state : this being of that kind of alliance which Grotius calls FOEDUS INÆQUALE --- “ Inæquale  
“ fœdus (says he) hic intelligo quod ex ipsa vi pac-  
“ tioni manentem prælationem quandam alteri do-  
“ nat : hoc est, ubi quis tenetur alterius impe-  
“ rium ac majestatem conservare UT POTENTIORI  
“ PLUS HONORIS, INFIRMIORI PLUS AUXILII DEFE-  
“ RATUR <sup>d</sup>. ”

An alliance, then, by free convention, being in its nature such that each party must have its motives for contracting ; our next enquiry will be,

I. What those motives were, which the state had for seeking, and the church for accepting the offers of an union : And,

II. The mutual benefits and advantages thereby arising.

The motives the magistrate had to seek this alliance, were these :

- I. To preserve the essence and purity of religion.
- II. To improve its usefulness, and apply its influence in the best manner.

III. To prevent the mischief that, in its natural independent state, it might occasion to civil society.

I. The magistrate was induced to seek it, 1. As the necessary means of preserving the being of religion. For though (as hath been shewn in the treatise of

\* De Jure Belli et Pac. l. i. c. 3. § 21.

*the Alliance*<sup>c</sup>) religion constitutes a society; and tho' this society will indeed, for some time, support the existence of religion, which, without it, would soon vanish from amongst men; yet, if we consider that religious society is made up of the same individuals which compose the civil; and destitute likewise of all coercive power; we must needs see, that a society, abandoned to its own fortune, without support or protection, would, in no long time, be swallowed up and lost. Of this opinion was a very able writer, whose knowledge of human nature will not be disputed: "Were it not, says he, for that sense of virtue, which is principally preserved, so far as it is preserved, BY NATIONAL FORMS AND HABITS OF RELIGION, men would soon lose it all, run wild, prey upon one another, and do what else the worst of savages do."<sup>f</sup>

2. But of whatever use an *alliance* may be thought, for preserving the *being* of religion, the necessity of it, for preserving its *purity*, is most evident: for if *truth*, and *public utility* coincide, the nearer any religion approaches to the truth of things, the fitter that religion is for the service of the state. That they do coincide, that is, that truth is productive of utility, and utility indicative of truth, may be proved on any principles but the atheistic; and therefore we think it needless, in this place, to draw out the argument in form<sup>g</sup>: Let us then consider the danger religion runs of deviating from truth, when left, in its natural state, to itself. In those circumstances, the men of highest credit, are such as are famed for greatest sanctity. This *sanctity* hath been generally understood to be then most per-

<sup>c</sup> Book i. § 5. <sup>f</sup> Wollaston's *Religion of Nature delineated*, p. 124. Quarto Edit. 1725.

<sup>g</sup> See Book iii. § 6.

fect, when most estranged from the world, and all its habits and relations. But this being only to be acquired by secession and retirement from affairs; and that secession rendering man ignorant of civil society, and of its rights and interests; in place of which will succeed, according to his natural temper, the destructive follies either of superstition or fanaticism, we must needs conclude, that religion, under such directors and reformers, and God knows these are generally its lot, will deviate from truth; and consequently from a capacity, in proportion, of serving civil society. I wish I could not say we have too many examples to support this observation. The truth is, we have seen, and yet do see religious societies, some grown up, and continuing unsupported by, and ununited with the state; others, that, when supported and *united*, have by strange arts brought the state into subjection, and become its tyrants and usurpers; and thereby defeated all the good that can arise from this *alliance*; such societies, I say, we have seen, whose religious doctrines are so little serviceable to civil government, that they can prosper only on the ruin and destruction of it. Such are those which teach *the holiness of celibacy and asceticism, the sinfulness of defensive war, of capital punishments, and even of civil magistracy itself.*

On the other hand, when religion is in *alliance* with the state, as it then comes under the magistrate's direction, those holy leaders having now neither credit nor power to do mischief, its purity must needs be reasonably well supported and preserved: for truth and public utility coinciding, the civil magistrate, as such, will see it for his interest to seek after, and promote truth in religion: and, by means of public utility, which his office enables him so well to understand, he will never be at a loss

loss to know where such truth is to be found : so that it is impossible, under this civil influence, for religion ever to deviate far from truth ; always supposing (for on such supposition this whole theory proceeds) a LEGITIMATE government, or civil policy, established on the principles of the natural rights and liberties of man : for an unequal and unjust government, which seeks its own, not public utility, will always have occasion for error ; and so, must corrupt religion both in principle and practice to promote its own wrong interests.

II. Secondly, the magistrate was induced to seek this alliance, *as the necessary means to improve the usefulness, and to apply in the best manner, the influence of religion for his service.* And this an alliance does by several ways.

1. *By bestowing additional reverence and veneration on the person of the civil MAGISTRATE, and on the LAWS of the state.* For, in this alliance, where the religious society is taken into the protection of the state, the supreme magistrate, as will be shewn hereafter, is acknowledged HEAD of the religion. Now nothing can be imagined of more efficacy for securing the obedience of the people. Those two great masters in politics, Aristotle and Machiavel, as we have seen, thought it of force enough to gain reverence and security to a tyrant. What then must we suppose its efficacy in a legitimate magistrate ? The same veneration will extend itself over the laws likewise : For while some of them are employed by the state for the support of the church, and others lent to the church to be employed in the service of the state, and all of them enacted by a legislature, in which churchmen have a considerable share (all these things being amongst the conditions of alliance<sup>b</sup>) laws, under such di-

<sup>b</sup> See the Alliance between Ch. and St. B. ii. c. 3.  
rection,

rection, must needs be regarded with greatest reverence.

2. *By lending to the church a coactive power* --- It may be remembred, that, in speaking of the innate defects of civil society, we observed, that there were several sorts of duties which civil laws could not inforce ; such as the duties of IMPERFECT OBLIGATION; which a religious society, when endowed with *coercive power*, to invigorate the influence of religion, is capable of exacting : and such likewise of the duties of PERFECT OBLIGATION ; whose breach is owing to the intemperance of the sensual appetites ; the severe prohibition of which threatens greater and more enormous evils : for while these unruly passions overflow, the stopping them in one place is causing them to break out with greater violence in another : as the rigorous punishment of fornication hath been generally seen to give birth to unnatural lusts. The effectual correction therefore of such evils must be begun by moderating and subduing the passions themselves. But *this*, civil laws are not understood to prescribe<sup>i</sup> ; as *punishing* those passions only when they proceed to act ; and not *rewarding* the attempts to subdue them : it must be a tribunal regarding irregular intentions as criminal, and good desires as meritorious, that can work this effect ; which is no other than the tribunal of religion. When this is once done, a coactive power of the civil kind may be applied to good purpose ; but not till then : And who so fit to apply it as that society, which prepared the subject for its due

<sup>i</sup> These were the considerations, doubtless, which induced the excellent author *De l'esprit des loix* to say, Il est aisé de régler par des loix ce qu'on doit aux autres ; il est difficile d'y comprendre tout ce qu'on se doit à soi-même. Vol. i. p. 167.  
4to.

application and reception ? <sup>k</sup> Again, it hath been observed<sup>l</sup>, that the state punishes deviations from the rule of right as *crimes* only ; and not as *such* deviations, or as *sins* ; and, on the idea of crimes, proportions its punishments : by which means some very enormous deviations from the rule of right, which do not immediately affect society, and so are not considered as *crimes*, are overlooked by the civil tribunal : yet these, being, tho' *mediately*, very pernicious to the state, it is for its interests they should be brought before some capable tribunal. But, besides the civil, there is no other than the ecclesiastical, endowed with coactive power. Hence may be deduced the true, and only end and use of SPIRITUAL COURTS. A church tribunal then, with coactive power, being necessary in all these cases ; and a religious society having, in itself, no such power, it must be borrowed from the state : but a state cannot lend it, without great danger to itself, but on the terms of an *alliance* ; a state therefore will be induced to seek this alliance, in order to improve the natural efficacy of religion.

3. By conferring on the state the application of the efficacy of religion, and by putting it under the magistrate's direction. --- There are certain junctures when the influence of religion is more than ordinarily serviceable to the state : and these the civil magistrate only knows. Now while a church is in its

<sup>k</sup> A jurisdiction somewhat resembling this we find in the famous court of AREOPAGUS at Athens : which city was once the model of civil prudence as well as of religion, to the improved part of mankind. Isocrates speaking of this branch of jurisdiction in the Areopagus, says, " It was not exerted to PUNISH crimes, but to PREVENT them --- ἐτέτοι περίτων ἐσκόπευεν, δι' ὃν κολασσεῖ τὰς αἰσχύνας, ἀλλ' εἰς ὃν ἀν κατασκεψεστι μηδὲν αὐτὸς ἀξίος ξερίζει βελήσεως αἱματάρσειν. ἡγεμόνος γάρ τέτοι μὲν αὐτῶν ἔργων ἔσθι. ΑΡΕΙΟΠ. ΛΟΓ.

<sup>l</sup> See the Alliance, Book i. § 4.

natural state of independency, it is not in his power to improve those conjunctures to the advantage of the state, by a proper application of religion: but when the *alliance* is made, and consequently the church under his direction, he hath then authority to prescribe such public exercises of religion, and at such times and in such manner as he finds the exigencies of state require.

4. *By engaging the church to apply its utmost endeavours in the service of the state.* For an alliance laying an obligation on the state to protect and defend the church, and to provide a settled maintenance for its ministers, such benefits must needs produce the highest love and esteem for the benefactor: which will be returned, out of motives both of gratitude and interest, in the most zealous labours for the service of civil government.

III. Lastly, *the state was induced to seek this alliance, as the only means of preventing the mischiefs, which, the church in its natural independent condition, might occasion to civil society.* For, in this state the church having, of itself, a power of assembling for religious worship, factious men may commodiously, under that cover, hatch and carry on designs against the peace of civil government: and the influence which popular and leading men gain over the consciences of such assemblies, by the frequency of public harangues, may easily ripen these contrivances into act, when strengthened with the specious pretext of religion: all which evils are effectually remedied by this *alliance*. For then, the civil magistrate being become protector of the church, and, consequently, supreme head and director of it, the ministry is mostly in his power; that mutual dependency, between the clergy and people, being, by means of a settled revenue, quite broken and destroyed. He admits and excludes to the

the exercise of their function, as he sees fit ; and grants it to none, but such as give a previous security for their allegiance to him : by which means, all that influence, which the ministers and leaders in a church had over it before the alliance, *as the protectors of religion*, is now drawn off from them, and placed solely in the civil magistrate.

Another mischief there is in this *unallied* condition of the church, still more certain and fatal, whenever above one religion is found in a state.

- For in these latter ages, every sect thinking itself the only *true* church, or, at least, the *most perfect*, is naturally pushed on to advance its own scheme upon the ruins of the rest : and where argument fails, civil power is brought in, as soon as ever a party can be formed in the *public administration* : and we find, they have been but too successful in persuading the magistrate that his interests are concerned in their religious differences. Now the most effectual remedy to the dangerous and strong convulsions, into which states are so frequently thrown by these struggles, is an *alliance*, which establishes *one church*, and gives *a full toleration to the rest* ; only keeping *sectaries* out of the *public administration* : From a heedless admission into which, these disorders have arisen.

Having now shewn the principal motives which engaged the state to seek an *alliance* with the church,

I come, in the next place, to consider the motives which the church had to *accept* of it. For this being, as is observed, a *FREE CONVENTION*, unless the church, as well as state, had its proper views, no *alliance* could have been formed. To discover these motives, we must recollect what hath been said of the nature and end of a *religious society* :

for the benefits adapted to that nature and end, must be her legitimate motive : but if so, this benefit can be no other than SECURITY FROM ALL EXTERIOR VIOLENCE. The state indeed could not justly offer it, had no alliance been made : but this is no reason why the church should not think it for its interest to secure its natural right by *compact* ; any more than that one state should not stipulate with another not to do it violence, though *that other* was under prior obligations, by the law of nature and nations, to forbear.

But by this *alliance* between the two societies, the state does more : it not only promises not to injure the *church* confederated, but to serve it ; that is, to protect it from the injuries of other religious societies, which then exist, or may afterwards arise in the state. How one religious society may be injuriously affected by another, we have shewn just before ; how great those injuries may prove, will be shewn hereafter. It must needs then be the first care of a church, and a reasonable care, to preserve itself, by all lawful ways, from outward violence. A state then, as hath been said, in order to induce the church's acceptance of this offer, must propose some benefit by it : and because this is the only legitimate benefit the church can receive, it must propose *this* : which, therefore, being considerable, will be the church's *motive for alliance*.

There are only two other considerations that can be esteemed motives : the one, *to engage the state to propagate the established religion by force* : and the other, *to bestow honours, riches, and powers upon it*. Now, on recurring to the nature and end of the two societies, the *first* motive will be found *unjust* ; and the *second*, *impertinent*. It is *unjust* in the church to require the engagement ; because the performing it would be violating the natural right every man

hath of worshiping God according to his own conscience. It is *unjust* in the state to engage in it ; because, as we have shewn, its jurisdiction extendeth not to opinions.

It is *impertinent* in a church to aim at riches, honours, and powers, because these are things which, as a church, she can neither use nor profit by ; for they have no natural tendency to promote the *ultimate* end of this society, *salvation of souls* ; nor the *immediate* end, *purity of worship*. “ *Nihil ecclesia sibi nisi fidem possidet<sup>1</sup>*,” says St. Ambrose. We conclude, therefore, that the only legitimate motive she could have, was *security and protection from outward violence*.

On these mutual motives was formed this **FREE ALLIANCE** ; which gave birth to a **CHURCH BY LAW ESTABLISHED**.

Now as from the nature of the two societies we discovered what kind of union only they could enter into ; so from that consideration, together with the motives they had in uniting, may be deduced, by necessary inference, the reciprocal **TERMS** and conditions of that union.

From the mutual motives inducing thereunto, it appears, that the great *preliminary and fundamental article of alliance* is this, **THAT THE CHURCH SHALL APPLY ITS UTMOST INFLUENCE IN THE SERVICE OF THE STATE ; AND THAT THE STATE SHALL SUPPORT AND PROTECT THE CHURCH.**

But in order to the performance of this agreement, there must be a *mutual communication of their respective powers* : for the province of each society being naturally distinct and different, each can have to do in the other's, but by mutual concession.

<sup>1</sup> *Epist. contra Symmachum.*

But again, these societies being likewise as naturally independent one on the other, a mutual concession cannot be safely made, without one of them, at the same time, giving up its independency: from whence arises what Grotius, we see, calls *MANENS PRÆLATIO*: which, in his *Fædus inæquale*, the more powerful society hath over the less.

Now from these two conclusions, which spring necessarily from *the great fundamental article of union*, we deduce all the terms, conditions, mutual grants, and concessions, which complete this *alliance*.

For from this obligation on the church *to apply its influence in the service of the state*, arise a SETTLED MAINTENANCE FOR THE MINISTERS OF RELIGION; and an ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION with *coactive power*: which things introduce again, on the other side, the DEPENDENCY OF THE CLERGY ON THE STATE. And from the state's obligation *to support and protect the church*, ariseth the ECCLESIASTICAL SUPREMACY OF THE CIVIL MAGISTRATE; which again introduceth, on the other hand, the right of CHURCHMEN TO PARTAKE OF THE LEGISLATURE.

Thus are all these rights and privileges closely interwoven and mutually connected by a necessary dependence on each other.

But to be more particular in the grounds and reasons of each grant and privilege, we will now, in a different and more commodious order for this purpose, examine,

- I. What the church RECEIVES from the state.
- II. What it GIVES to it.

Which will present us with *a new view of the two societies, as they appear under an establishment*; and leave nothing wanting to enable us to form a perfect judgment of their natures.

I. What the church receives from the state by this alliance, is,

I. First, *A public and settled endowment for its ministers.* The reasons of it are, 1. To render the religious society, whose assistance the state so much wants, more firm and durable. 2. To invite and encourage the clergy's best service to the state, in rendering those committed to their care, virtuous. But 3, and principally, in order to destroy that mutual dependency between the clergy and people, which arises from the former's being maintained by the voluntary contributions of the latter; the only maintenance the clergy could have, before the two societies were allied; and which dependence, we have shewn to be productive of great mischiefs to the state. Add to all this, that as the clergy are now under the magistrate's direction, and consequently become a public order in the state, it is but fit and decent, that the state should provide them with a public maintenance.

2. The second privilege the church receives from this alliance is, *a place for her representatives in the legislature.* For, as it necessarily follows, (as we shall see presently) from that fundamental article of alliance of the state's supporting and protecting the church, that the church must, in return, give up its independency to the state, whereby the state becomes empowered to determine in all church matters, so far as relates to it as a society; as this, I say, necessarily follows, the church must needs have its representatives in the legislature, to prevent that power, which the state receives in return for the protection it affords, from being perverted to the church's hurt: for the giving up its independency, without reserving a right of representation in the legislature, would be making itself, instead of a subject, a slave to the state. Besides, without

without these representatives no laws could be reasonably made concerning the church : because no free man, or body, can be bound by laws, to which they have not given their consent, either in person, or by representative. So that, as the church when she entered into alliance, cannot *justly*, we may presume she did not *willingly*, give up her independency without the reservation of such a privilege.

3. The third and last privilege is, *a jurisdiction, inforced by civil coactive power, FOR REFORMATION OF MANNERS.* It is one of the *preliminary articles* of this *alliance*, that *the church should apply its best influence in the service of the state.* But there is no way in which it can be so effectually inforced as by a jurisdiction of this kind. It hath been shewn above, that there are a numerous set of duties, both of *imperfect obligation*, which civil laws could not reach ; and several of *perfect obligation*, which, by reason of the intemperance of the sensual passions, from whence the breach of those duties proceeds, civil laws could not effectually inforce ; as their violence yielded only to the influence of religion ; both which, however, the good of community requires should be inforced ; and which an ecclesiastical tribunal, intrusted with coactive power, is only able to inforce. And, indeed, the sense of those wants and defects, which these courts do supply, was the principal motive of the state's seeking this *alliance*. On the other hand, the church having now given up her supremacy, she would without the accession of this authority, be left naked and defenceless, and reduced to a condition unbecoming her dignity, and dangerous to her safety.

II. Let us now see what the church *gives* to the state. It is, in a word, this : *The resigning up her independency ; and making the civil magistrate her supreme head, without whose approbation and allow-*

ance she can administer, transact, or decree nothing. For as the state, by this alliance, hath undertaken the protection of the church; and as no society can safely afford protection to another over which it hath no power, it necessarily follows that the civil magistrate must be supreme. Besides, when the state, by this convention, covenanted to afford protection to the church, that contract was made to a particular church of one denomination, and of such determined doctrine and discipline. But now, that protection, which might be advantageous to the state in union with such a church, might be disadvantageous to it, in union with one of a different doctrine and discipline: therefore, when protection is given to a church, it must be at the same time provided, that no alteration be made in it, without the state's approbation and allowance. Farther, the state having endowed its clergy, and bestowed upon them a jurisdiction with coercive power, these privileges might create an imperium in imperio, had not the civil magistrate, in return, the supremacy of the church. The necessity of the thing, therefore, invests him with this right and title.

Thus have we shewn the mutual privileges given and received by church and state, in entering into this famous convention: the aim of the state being, agreeably to its nature, UTILITY; and the aim of the church, agreeably to its nature, TRUTH. From whence we may observe, that as these privileges all took their rise, by necessary inference, from the fundamental article of the convention, which was, *that the church should serve the state; and the state protect the church;* so they receive all possible addition of strength from their mutual connection with, and dependency on, one another. This we have cause to desire may be received as a certain mark that our plan  
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of alliance is no precarious arbitrary hypothesis, but a theory, founded in reason, and the invariable nature of things. For having, from the real essence of the two societies, collected the *necessity* of allying, and the *freedom* of the compact; we have, from the *necessity*, fairly introduced it; and from its *freedom*, consequentially established every mutual term and condition of it. So that now if the reader should ask, *where this charter or treaty of convention for the union of the two societies, on the terms here delivered, is to be met with*; we are enabled to answer him. We say, it may be found in the same archive with the famous ORIGINAL COMPACT between magistrate and people, so much insisted on in the vindication of the common rights of subjects. Now, when a sight of this compact is required of the defenders of civil liberty, they hold it sufficient to say, that it is enough for all the purposes of fact and right, that such original compact is the only legitimate foundation of civil society: that if there were no such thing formally executed, there was virtually: that all differences between magistrate and people, ought to be regulated on the supposition of such a compact; and all government reduced to the principles therein laid down: for, that the happiness, of which civil society is productive, can only be attained, when formed on those principles. Now something like this we say of our ALLIANCE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE.

Hitherto we have considered this alliance as it produceth an establishment, under its most simple form; i. e. where there is but one Religion in the state: but it may so happen, that, either at the time of convention, or afterwards, there may be more than one.

i. If there be more than one at the time of convention, the state allies itself with the largest of the reli-

gious societies. It is fit the state should do so, because the larger the religious society is (where there is an equality in other points) the better enabled it will be to answer the ends of an *alliance*; as having the greatest number under its influence. It is *scarce possible* it should do otherwise; because the two societies being composed of the same individuals, the greatly prevailing religion must have a majority of its members in the assemblies of state; who will naturally prefer their own religion to any other. With *this Religion* is the *alliance* made; and a full **TOLERATION** given to all the rest; yet under the restriction of a **TEST LAW**, to keep them from hurting that which is *established*.

2. If these different religions spring up *after* the alliance hath been formed; then, whenever they become considerable, a *test law* is necessary, for the security of the *established church*. For amongst diversities of sects where every one thinks itself the *only true*, or at least the *most pure*, every one aims at rising on the ruins of the rest; which it calls, *bringing into conformity* with itself. The means of doing this, when reason fails, which is rarely at hand, and more rarely heard when it is, will be by getting into the public administration, and applying the civil power to the work. But when one of these Religions is the *established*, and the rest under a *toleration*; then envy, at the advantages of an *establishment*, will join the *tolerated* churches in confederacy against it, and unite them in one common attack to disturb its quiet. In this imminent danger, the *allied church* calls upon the state, for the performance of its contract; which thereupon gives her a **TEST-LAW** for her security: whereby, the entrance into the administration (the only way, the threatened mischief is effected) is shut to all but members of the *established church*.

Thus

Thus a TEST-LAW took its birth, whether *at* or after the time of *alliance*. That the state is under the highest obligations to provide the church with this security, we shall shew,

1. By the *alliance*, the state promised to protect the church, and to secure it from the injuries and insults of its enemies. An attempt in the members of any other church to get into the administration, in order to deprive the *established church* of the covenanted rights which it enjoys, either by sharing those advantages with it, or by drawing them from it, is highly injurious. And we have shewn that, where there are diversities of religions, this attempt will be always making. The state then must defeat the attempt : but there is no other way of defeating it, than by hindering its enemies from entering into the administration : and they can be hindered only by a *test-law*.

2. Again, this promise of protection is of such a nature as may, on no pretence, be dispensed with. For protection was not only a condition of *alliance*, but, on the church's part, the *sole condition* of it. We have shewn, that all other benefits and advantages are foreign to a church, as such, and improper for it. Now the not performing the *sole condition* of a contract, virtually breaks and dissolves it : especially if we consider that this sole condition is both *necessary* and *just*. *Necessary*; as a free convention must have *mutual conditions*; and, but for this condition, one side would be without any : *Just*, as the convention itself is founded on the laws of nature and nations ; and *this* the only condition which suits the nature of a church to claim. If it be pretended that debarring good subjects from *places of honour and profit*, in the disposal of the magistrate, is *unjust*; I reply, that the assertion, tho' every where taken for granted, is false ; it being founded on the principle

principle, that *reward is one of the sanctions of civil laws*, which I have shewn to be a mistake<sup>m</sup>, and and that all, a member of society can *claim*, for the discharge of his duty, is *protection*. So that, farther reward than this, no subject having a *right to*, all *places of honour and profit* are free donations, and in the absolute disposal of the magistrate.

3. But again, the church, in order to enable the state to perform this *sole condition* of protection, consented to the giving up its supremacy and independency, to the civil sovereign: whence it follows, that, whenever the enemies of the *established church* get into the magistrature, to which, as we have said, the supremacy of the church is transferred by the *alliance*, she becomes a prey, and lies entirely at their mercy; being now, by the loss of her supremacy, in no condition of defence, as she was in her natural state, unprotected and independent: so that the not securing her by a *test law*, is betraying, and giving her up bound to her enemies.

4. But lastly, had no promise of protection been made, yet the state would have lain under an indispensable necessity of providing a *test law*, for its own security. It hath been observed, that wherever there are diversities of religion, each sect, believing its own the true, strives to advance itself on the ruins of the rest. If this doth not succeed by dint of argument, these partisans are apt to have recourse to the coercive power of the state: which is done by introducing a party into the public administration. And they have always had art enough to make the state believe that its interests were much concerned in the success of their religious quarrels. What persecutions, rebellions, revolutions, loss of civil and religious liberty, these intestine struggles

<sup>m</sup> See Book i. sect. 2.

between sects have occasioned, is well known to such as are acquainted with the history of mankind. To prevent these mischiefs was, as we have shewn, one great motive for the state's seeking *alliance* with the church : for the obvious remedy was the *establishing one church*, and giving a *free toleration to the rest*. But if, in administering this cure, the state should stop short, and not proceed to exclude the *tolerated* religions from entering into the public administration, such imperfect application of the remedy would infinitely heighten the distemper : for, before the *alliance*, it was only a mistaken aim in propagating truth, which occasioned these disorders ; but now, the zeal for opinions would be out of measure inflamed by envy and emulation ; which the temporal advantages, enjoyed by the established church, exclusive of the rest, will always occasion : And what mischiefs this would produce, had every sect a free entry into the administration, the reader may easily conceive. If it be said, that, would men content themselves, as in reason they ought, with enjoying their own opinions, without obtruding them upon others, these evils, which require the remedy of a *test law*, would never happen. This is very true : and so, would men but observe the rule of justice in general, there would be no need to have recourse to civil society, to rectify the violations of it.

In a word, an *established religion with a test law* is the universal voice of Nature. The most savage nations have employed it to civilize their manners ; and the politest knew no other way to prevent their return to barbarity and violence.

Thus the city of ATHENS, so humane and free, exacted an oath of all their youth for the security of the established religion : for, Athens being a democracy, every citizen had a constant share in the admi-

administration. A copy of this oath, the strongest of all *tests*, is preserved by Stobæus, who transcribed it from the writings of the Pythagoreans, the great school of ancient politics. It is conceived in these words : “ I will not dishonour the *sacred arms* ”, nor desert my comrade in battle : “ I will DEFEND AND PROTECT MY COUNTRY AND MY RELIGION, whether alone, or in conjunction with others : I will not leave the public in a worse condition than I found it, but in a better : “ I will be always ready to obey the supreme magistrate, with prudence ; and to submit to the established laws, and to all such as shall be hereafter established by full consent of the people : “ and I will never connive at any other who shall presume to despise or disobey them ; but will revenge all such attempts on the sanctity of the republic, either alone or in conjunction with the people : and lastly, I WILL CONFORM TO THE NATIONAL RELIGION. So help me those gods who are the avengers of perjury .”

Here we see, that after each man had sworn, *to defend and protect the religion of his country*, in consequence of the obligation the state lies un-

“ Οπλα τὰ ιερά, the *sacred arms*, by what follows, seem to mean those which the lovers presented to their favourite youths. Concerning this institution, see what is said in the explanation of Virgil’s episode of Nisus and Euryalus, in sect. iv. of this book.

Οὐ καίσατον ὅπλα τὰ ιερά, εἴδ’ ἵγκαλα λείψω τὸν πόλεμον ὄπεις ἀν τοιχίσω. AMYNΩΣ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ΥΠΕΡ Ι· ΡΩΝ, εἴ περ ιστών καὶ μένθη, καὶ μελα ωλλῶν τὸν παλέοντα δὲ οὐκ ιδίωσα παραδώσω, πλειστὸν δὲ καὶ αργεῖσι, ὃντων αὖ παραδίξομαι. καὶ δύποντος τῶν αἵτινων ἐμφέρονται, καὶ τοῖς θιστρῖταις τοῖς ιδευμένοις πεισωμαι, καὶ εἴς τινας αὖ ἀλλαγής τὸ πινθετό ιδευτην δημ φέρειας. καὶ αὖ τοῖς ἀντιτεθεῖσι θιστρῖταις οὐ μὴ πεισθῆται, οὐκ ἐπιτίγησθαι, αρματῶν δὲ καὶ μόνθης, καὶ μελα πανθην. καὶ ΗΡΑ ΤΑ ΠΑΤΡΙΑ ΤΙΜΗΣΩΣ. Μεροες Θεοὶ τυτων.

Joan. Stobæi de Rep. Serm. xli. p. 243. Lugd. Ed. 1608.

der to protect the *established worship*, he concludes, *I will conform to it*: the dire&test and strongest of all *tests*.

But a test of conformity to the established worship, was not only required of those who bore a share in the civil administration, but of those too who were chosen to preside in their religious rites. Demosthenes hath recorded the oath which the priestesses of Bacchus, called Γεραιρες, took on entering into their office. “ I observe a religious “ chastity, and am clean and pure from all other “ defilements, and from conversation with man : “ AND I CELEBRATE THE THEOINEIA AND IO-“ BACCHIA TO BACCHUS, ACCORDING TO THE “ ESTABLISHED RITES, AND AT THE PROPER “ TIMES P.”

Nor were the ROMANS less watchful for the support of the *established religion*, as may be seen by a speech of the consul Posthumius in Livy, occasioned by some horrid abuses committed, through the clandestine exercise of foreign worship. “ How “ often, says he, in the times of our fathers and “ forefathers, hath this affair been recommended “ to the magistrates ; to prohibit all foreign wor-“ ship ; to drive the priests and sacrificers from “ the cirque, the forum, and the city ; to search “ up and burn books of prophecies ; and to abo-“ lish all modes of sacrificing, differing from the “ Roman discipline ? For those sage and prudent “ men, instructed in all kind of divine and human “ laws, rightly judged that nothing tended so “ much to overthrow religion, as when men cele-

P Ἀγιστῶν, καὶ εἰμὶ καθηρᾶ, καὶ αἴγιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ καθαροῦ-  
σιν, καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνθερῶν συνεσίας, καὶ τὰ Θεοῖνα, καὶ Ἰοβακχῖα γε-  
γείων τῷ Διονύσῳ KATA ΤΑ ΠΑΤΡΙΑ, καὶ εὐ τοῖς καθίκεσθι χρόνοις.  
Orat. cont. Necessam.

" brated the sacred rites, not after their own, but  
" foreign, customs <sup>q.</sup>."

But when I say all regular policed states had an *established religion*, I mean no more than he would do, who, deducing society from its true original, should, in order to persuade men of the benefits it produceth, affirm that all nations had a civil policy. For, as this writer could not be supposed to mean that every one constituted a free state, on the principles of public liberty (which yet was the only society he proposed to prove was founded on truth, and productive of public good) because it is notorious, that the far greater part of civil policies are founded on different principles, and abused to different ends ; so neither would I be understood to mean, when I say all nations concurred in making this UNION, that they all exactly *discriminated the natures*, and fairly *adjusted the rights* of BOTH SOCIETIES, on the principles here laid down ; tho' an ESTABLISHMENT resulting from this discrimination and adjustment, be the only one I would be supposed to recommend. On the contrary, I know this union hath been generally made on mistaken principles ; or, if not so, hath degenerated by length of time. And as it was sufficient for that writer's purpose, that those societies, good or bad, proved the sense, all men had of the benefits resulting from civil policy in general, tho' they were oft mistaken in the application ; so it is sufficient

<sup>q</sup> Quoties hoc patrum avorumque ætate negotium est magistratibus datum, ut sacra externa fieri vetarent ; sacrificulos, vatesque foro, circō, urbe prohiberent ; vaticinos libros conquirerent, comburerentque ; omnem disciplinam sacrificandi, præterquam more Romano, abolerent ? Judicabant enim prudenterissimi viri omnis divini humanique juris, nihil æque dissolvendæ religionis esse, quam ubi non patrio, sed externo ritu sacrificaretur. *Hist. lib. xxxix.*

for ours, that this universal concurrence in the two societies to unite, shews the sense of mankind concerning the utility of such union. And lastly, as that writer's principles are not the less true on account of the general deviation from them in forming civil societies; so may not ours, though so few states have suffered themselves to be directed by them in *practice*, nor any man, before, delivered them in *speculation*.

Such then is the *theory* we have offered to the world; of which whoever would see a full account, and the several parts cleared from objections, may consult the treatise mentioned before, intituled, *The alliance between church and state*; in which we pretend to have discovered a plain and simple truth, of the highest concernment to civil society, long lost and hid under the learned obscurity arising from the collision of contrary false principles.

But it is now time to proceed with our main subject. We have given a short account of the true nature of the *alliance between church and state*; both to justify the conduct of the ancient lawgivers in establishing religion; and to shew the infinite service of this institution to civil society. Another use of it may be the gaining an exacter knowledge of the *nature* of the established religions in the *pagan world*: for, having the true *theory* of an establishment, it serves as a straight line to discover all the obliquities to which it is applied.

I shall therefore consider the *causes*, which facilitated the *establishment of religion* in the ancient world: and likewise those causes which prevented the *establishment* from receiving its due form.

I. Ancient pagan religion consisted in the worship of local tutelary deities; which, generally speaking, were supposed to be the authors of their civil institutes. The consequence of this was, that  
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the state, as well as *particulars*, was the SUBJECT of religion. So that this religion could not but be *national and established*; that is, protected and encouraged by the civil power. For how could that religion, which had the *national god* for its *object*; and the *state*, as an artificial man, for its *subject*, be other than *national and established*?

II. But then these very things, which so much promoted an *established religion*, prevented the union's being made upon a just and equitable footing.  
 1. By giving a wrong *idea of civil society*. 2. By not giving a right *form to the religious*.

1. It was nothing strange, that the ancients should have a wrong *idea of civil society*; and suppose it ordained for the cognizance of *religious*, as well as *civil matters*, while they believed in a local tutelary deity, by whose direction they were formed into community; and while they held that society, as such, was the subject of religion, contrary to what has been shewn above, that the *civil society's* offer of a voluntary alliance with the *religious*, proceeded from its having no power in itself to inforce the influence of religion to the service of the state.

2. If their *religion* constituted a proper society, it was yet a society dependent on the state, and therefore not *sovereign*. Now it appears that no voluntary alliance can be made, but between two independent sovereign societies. But, in reality, Pagan religion did not constitute any society at all. For it is to be observed, that the unity of the *object* of faith, and conformity to a formula of dogmatic theology, as the terms of communion, are the great foundation and bond of a religious society<sup>1</sup>. Now these things were wanting in the several national religions of Paganism: in which

<sup>1</sup> See *The alliance between church and state*, Book i. §. 5.

there was only a conformity in public ceremonies. The *national Pagan* religion therefore did not properly compose a *society*; nor do we find by antiquity, that it was ever considered under that idea; but only as *part of the state*; and in that view, indeed, had its particular societies and companies, such as the colleges of priests and prophets.

These were such errors and defects as destroyed much of the utility, which results from *religious establishments*, placed upon a right bottom. But yet *religious establishments* they were; and, notwithstanding all their imperfections, served for many great purposes: such as *preserving the being of religion*: --- *bestowing additional veneration on the person of the magistrate, and on the laws of the state*: --- *giving the magistrate the right of applying the civil efficacy of religion*: --- and *giving religion a coercive power for the reformation of manners*. And thus much for ESTABLISHMENTS.

## S E C T. VI.

**T**H E last instance to be assigned of the magistrate's care of religion, shall be that universal practice, in the ancient world, of religious TOLERATION; or the permitting the free exercise of all religions, how different soever from the *national* and *established*. For tho' the very nature and terms of an *established* religion implied the magistrate's peculiar favour and protection; and tho' in fact, they had their *test laws* for its support, wherever there was diversity of worship; yet it was ancient policy to allow a large and full *toleration*.

Two principal causes induced the *ancient law-givers* to this sage and reasonable conduct.

I. They considered that religion seldom or never makes *a real impression* on the minds of those who are *forced* into a profession of it: and yet, that all the service religion can do to the state, is by working that *real impression*<sup>a</sup>. They concluded, therefore, that the profession of religion should be FREE.

Hence may be understood the strange blindness of those *modern politicians*, who expect to benefit the state by forcing men to outward conformity; which only making hypocrites and atheists, destroys the sole means religion hath of serving the State. But here, by a common fate of politicians, they fell from one blunder to another. For having first, in a tyrannical adherence to their own scheme of policy, or superstitious fondness for the established scheme of worship, infringed upon religious liberty; and then beginning to find, that diversity of Sects was hurtful to the State, as it always will be, while the rights of religion are violated; instead of repairing the mistake, and restoring religious liberty, which would have stifled this pullulating evil in the seed, by affording it no further nourishment, they took the other course; and endeavoured, by a thorough discipline of conformity, violently to rend it away: and with it they rooted up and destroyed all that good to society, which so naturally springs from religion, when it hath once taken fast hold of the human mind.

<sup>a</sup> In specie autem fictæ simulationis, sicut reliquæ virtutes, ita PIETAS inesse non potest; cum qua simul et sanctitatem et religionem tolli necesse esse: quibus sublatis, perturbatio vitæ sequitur et magna confusio. Atque haud scio, an PIETATE adversus deos sublata fides etiam, et societas humani generis, et una excellentissima virtus, justitia tollatur. Cic. *De nat. deor.* I. i. c. 2.

II. This was the most legitimate principle they went upon, and had the most lasting effect. They had another, which, tho' less ingenuous, was of more immediate influence; and this was the keeping up the warmth and vigour of religious impressions, by the introduction and toleration of new religions and foreign worship. For they supposed <sup>b</sup> that "piety and virtue then chiefly influence the "mind while men are busied in the performance of "religious rites and ceremonies<sup>c</sup>;" as Tully observes, in the words of Pythagoras, the most celebrated of the Pagan lawgivers. Now vulgar Paganism being not only false, but highly absurd, as having its foundation solely in the fancy and the passions; variety of worships was necessary to suit every one's taste and humour. The genius of it inclining its followers to be inconstant, capricious, and fond of novelties; weary of long-worn ceremonies, and immoderately fond of new. And in effect we see amongst the same people, notwithstanding the universal notion of tutelary deities, that, in *this* age, one God or mode of worship, in *that*, another had the vogue. And every new God, or new ceremony, rekindled the languid fire of superstition: just as in modern Rome, every last Saint draws the multitude to his shrine.

For here it is to be observed, that in the Pagan world, a *tolerated religion* did not imply *dissension* from the *established*, according to our modern ideas

<sup>b</sup> Nor does this at all contradict the Roman maxim, as delivered by Posthumius in Livy. [see p.29, 30.] for that maxim relates to *public religion*, or the religion of the state; *this*, to *private religion*, or the religion of particulars.

<sup>c</sup> — Siquidem et illud bene dictum est a Pythagora, doctissimo viro, tum maxime et pietatem et religionem versari in animis, cum rebus divinis operam dætemus. *De Leg.* 1. ii. c. 11.

of toleration. Nor indeed could it, according to the general nature and genius of ancient idolatry. Tolerated religions were there rather subservient to the established, or supernumeraries of it, than in opposition to it. But then they were far from being on a footing with the established, or partaking of its privileges.

But men going into antiquity under the impression of modern ideas, must needs form very inaccurate judgments of what they find. So, in this case, because few tolerated religions are to be met with in Paganism, according to our sense of toleration, which is the allowance of a religion opposed to the national ; and consequently, because no one is guarded against with that vigilance which ours demand, but all used with more indulgence than a religion, disavowing the established, can pretend to; on this account, I say, a false opinion hath prevailed, that, *in the Pagan world, all kinds of religion were upon an equal footing, with regard to the state.* Hence, we hear a noble writer perpetually applauding <sup>4</sup> wise antiquity, for the full and free liberty it granted in matters of religion, so agreeable to the principles of truth and public utility ; and, perpetually arraigning the UNSOCIAL MUMOUR of CHRISTIANITY for the contrary practice ; which, therefore, he would insinuate, was built on contrary principles.

On this account, it will not be improper to consider, a little, the genius of Paganism, as it is opposed to, what we call, *true religion* : Which will shew us how easily the civil magistrate brought about that toleration, which he had such great reasons of state to promote ; and at the same time, teach these objectors to know, that the good ef-

<sup>4</sup> See the Characteristics, passim.

fect of this general tolerance, as far as the genius of religion was concerned in its promotion, was owing to the egregious falsehood and absurdity of Paganism: and that, on the other hand, the evil effects of intolerance under the Christian religion, proceeded from its truth and perfection; not the natural consequence, as these men would insinuate, of a *false principle*, but the abuse of a *true one*.

Ancient Paganism was an aggregate of several distinct religions, derived from so many pretended revelations. Its abounding in these, proceeded in part from the great number of Gods of human invention. As these religions were not laid on the foundation, so neither were they raised on the destruction of one another. *They were not laid on the foundation of one another*; because, having given to their Gods, as local tutelary deities<sup>c</sup>, contrary natures

<sup>c</sup> See Book iv. — Nay, so fond were they of this notion, of local tutelary deities, that they degraded even Jupiter himself, their *Father of gods and men*, into one of them, as appears by his several appellations of *Jupiter Ammon*, *Olympicus*, *Capitolinus*, etc. This deceived Dr. Bentley, who finding Jupiter, in the popular theology, to be a local deity, concluded him not to be *one but many*. So that in the last edition of his *Remarks* on that foolish book, called *A discourse of free-thinking*, he reproves the translator of Lucan for calling Jupiter Ammon, *this greatest of the gods, this mighty chief*: — “A Roman would never have said that *Juppiter Ammon* was as great as *Juppiter Capitolinus*; tho’ the translator took it for granted that all *Jupiters must needs be the same*. But a known passage in *Suetonius* may correct his notion of the heathen theology. --- *Augustus* had built a temple to *Juppiter Tonans*, within the area of the capitol: whereupon he had a dream, that *Capitolinus Juppiter* complained his worshipers were drawn away: *Augustus*, in his dream, answered, that he had dedicated *Tonans* there, only as the other’s porter; and accordingly, when he waked, he hung (as a porter’s badge) that temple round with bells. — Now if *Capitolinus* would not bear the very *Thunderer* by him, but in quality of his porter; much less would he have suffered poor beggally *Ammon* (for all

and dispositions, and distinct and separate interests, each God set up upon his own bottom, and held

" he was his name-sake) to be styled the *mighty chief*." p. 281. Here he had *one* poet to contradict ; who " thought (he says) " all Jupiters the same." When he wrote his notes on Milton he had *another* on his hands, who, it seems, did not think them the same, and he contradicts him likewise.

" Ammonian Jove, or Capitoline, was seen

" He with Olympias, this with her who bore

" Scipio —

*Par. Loft*, Book ix. ¶ 508.

On which, the critic observes with some contempt — " Then " he brings more stories — and (something strange) two Jupi- " ters." However in his former humour he will have it, that according to the popular theology " all Jupiters were not the " same." This will deserve to be considered. The ancients, in excess of folly and flattery, were sometimes wont to worship their good kings and benefactors under the name of *Jupiter, the Father of gods and men*, who, by thus lending his titles, received, in a little time, from posterity all that worship which was first paid to the borrowers of his name ; all their particular benefactors being swallowed up in him. And this was one principal reason of Jupiter's being a tutelary deity. But the philosophers, searching into the original of the Pagan theology, found out this lost secret. That their kings had given occasion to the worship of this local tutelary Jupiter ; whom, therefore, they regarded, as different Jupiters ; that is, as so many kings who had assumed his name. Hence Varro in Tertullian reckons up no less than three hundred. The result of all this was, that in the popular theology there was but *one* Jupiter ; in the philosophic history there were *many*. Just, as on the contrary, in the popular mythology there were *many Gods* ; in the philosophic physiology, but *one*.

What shall we say then to the story from Suetonius, which is brought to prove that, according to the popular theology, *all Jupiters were not the same*? But surely the Romans regarded the Capitoline Jupiter, and the Thunderer as the same person : if it be asked, Why they had different names ? Suetonius will inform us : who relates that Augustus consecrated this temple to Jupiter Tonans, on his being preserved from a dreadful flash of lightning, in his Cantabrian expedition. And so Minucius Felix understood the matter, where he thus addresses the Pagan idolaters : — *Quid ipse JUPITER vester? modo imberbis statuitur, modo barbatus locatur: & cum HAMMON DICITUR, habet cornua; et cum CAPITOLINUS, tunc gerit fulmina.*" Cap. 21.

little in common with the rest<sup>f</sup>. They were not raised on the destruction of one another; because, as

And Eusebius, who was perfectly well acquainted with the Pagan theology, says expressly, that Ammon was one of the Surnames of Jupiter --- ἐπί δὲ Δία τὸν ὑπό τινων ΑΜΜΩΝΑ προσαγορεύουσά τοις. *Præp. Evang.* l. iii. c. 3. However, this must be confessed, that Capitolinus and Tonans appear to Augustus in a *dream*, as two different persons, and are so considered by him when *awake*. The true solution of the difficulty is this: The Pagans worshiped their gods under a material visible image. And their statues, when consecrated, were supposed to be informed by an intelligence, which the God, to whose worship they were erected, sent into them, as his vicegerent. See *Mede's Works*, B. iii. ch. 5. This general notion furnished Lucian with a very pleasant incident in his *Jupiter Tragicus*, who calling a grand synod of the gods, is made to summon all those of gold, silver, ivory, stone, and copper. Now, in Augustus's dream, it was the intelligence, or vicegerent in the statue of Jupiter Capitolinus, that complained of his new brother, in that of Tonans, as getting all the custom from him. This being the whole of the mystery, Jupiter's popular unity remains unshaken.

But what shall we say to the critic? He censures Row, for not saying what Milton had said; and afterwards Milton for not saying what Row had said: and is yet so unlucky as to be doubly mistaken. The case is this, Where Milton speaks of two Jupiters, he is delivering the sense of the *philosophers*; where Row says there is but one, he is delivering the sense of the *people*; and both were right. But the critic being in a contradicting humour will have both to be in the wrong.

<sup>f</sup> Denique et antequam commerciis orbis pateret, & antequam gentes ritus suos moresque miscerent, unaquæque natio conditorum suum, aut ducem inclytum, aut reginam pudicam sexu suo fortiorum, aut alicujus munieris vel artis repertorem venerabatur, ut civem bonæ memoriae. Sic et defunctis præmium, et futuris dabatur exemplum. *Mimuc. Fel.* c. xx. Hence may be seen the falsehood, both in *fact* and *right*, of the foundation-principle of the book called — *The grounds and reasons of the Christian religion*; that “ it was a *common* and *necessary* method for “ new revelations to be built and grounded on precedent re- “ velations.” Chap. iv. p. 20---26. See this position confuted more at large in the second vol. of the *Div. Leg.* Book vi. Sect. vi.

hath been observed, the several religions of Paganism did not consist in matters of belief, and a dogmatic theology, in which, where there is a contrariety, religions destroy one another ; but in matters of practice, in rites and ceremonies ; and in these, a contrariety did no harm. For having given their gods different natures and interests, where was the wonder if they clashed in their commanded rites ; or if their worshipers should think, this no mark of their false pretensions ?

These were horrible defects in the very essence of Pagan theology : and yet from these would necessarily arise *an universal toleration* : for each religion admitting the other's pretensions, there must needs be a perfect harmony and *INTERCOMMUNITY* amongst them ; no room being left for any other disputes, but whose God was most powerful ; except where, by accident, it became a question between two nations inhabiting the same country, who was truly the *TUTELAR* deity of the place. As once we are told happened in Egypt, and broke out into a religious war :

<sup>5</sup> Julian makes this the distinguishing character of the Pagan religion. For, writing to the people of Alexandria, and upbraiding them for having forsaken the religion of their country, the Emperor, in order to aggravate the charge, insinuates them to be guilty of ingratitude, as having forgotten those happy times when *all Egypt worshiped the gods IN COMMON*, — καὶ εἰς εἰσ-έχοντας μηδικὸν τὸ παλαιόν ὑμᾶς ἔκεινος εὐδαιμονίας, οἵνα καὶ ΚΟΙΝΩ-ΝΙΑ μὲν πρὸς Θεοὺς Αἰγύπτῳ τῇ πατη, πελλῶν δὲ ἀπελαύνουσιν αγαθῶν. And, in his book against the Christian religion, he says, there were but two commands in the decalogue, that were peculiar to the Jews, and which the Pagans would not own to be reasonable, namely, the observation of the Sabbath, and the *having no other gods but the Creator of all things*. Ποιῶν ιδιός ἐστι (says he) πρὸς τὴν θεῶν ἴξω τὴν, οὐ προσκυνήσεις Θεοῖς ἐπέργεις, καὶ τὰ, Μηδὲν τῷ συβεβίτω, δὲ μὴ τὰς ἄλλας οἴδαι χρῆναι φυλαττεῖν ἵλας. Ap. S. Cyril. cont. Julian. l. v. The first Cause of all things, we see, was acknowledged by the Gentile Sages : what stuck with them was the not worshiping other gods in common,

Inde furor vulgo, quod numina vicinorum  
 Odit uterque locus, cum SOLOS CREDIT HABENDOS  
 Esse deos, quos ipse colit <sup>h</sup>.

Here the question was not, which of the two worshiped a phantom, and which a God, but whose God was the *tutelar* God of the place.

But from this instance a noble author would persuade us <sup>i</sup>, that intolerance was of the very nature and genius of the Egyptian theology, from whence all Paganism arose. “ The common heathen religion (says he) was supported chiefly from that sort of enthusiasm, which is raised from the external objects of grandeur, majesty, and what we call august. On the other hand, the Egyptian or SYRIAN religions, which lay most in mystery and concealed rights, *having less dependance on the magistrate*, and less of that decorum of art, politeness, and magnificence, ran into a more puerile, frivolous, and mean kind of superstition : the observance of days, the forbearance of meats, and the contention about traditions, seniority of laws, and priority of godships.

“ Summus utrimque

“ Inde furor vulgo, etc <sup>k</sup>.

Well might he say, he suspected “ that it would be urged against him, that he talked at random and without book <sup>l</sup>. ” For the very contrary of every thing he here says, is the truth. And his supposing the Egyptian and Syrian religions had less dependence on the magistrate than the Roman ; and that the Egyptian, and Syrian (as he is pleased to call the Jewish) were the same, or of a like genius, is such an instance of his knowledge

<sup>h</sup> Juvenal, Sat. xv.      <sup>i</sup> Characteristics, vol. iii. Miscel. 2.

<sup>k</sup> Vol. iii. p. 41,      <sup>l</sup> P. 82.

or ingenuity, as is not easily to be equalled. However, since the noble writer hath made such use of the Satirist's relation, as to insinuate that the Ombites and Tentyrites, acted in the common spirit and genius of the Egyptian theology, and became the model of *intolerance* to the Jewish and Christian world, it may not be amiss to explain the true original of these religious squabbles as antiquity itself hath told the story: whereby it will appear, they had their birth from a very particular and occasional fetch of civil policy, which had no dependence on the general superstition of the Pagan world.

The instance stands almost single in antiquity. This would incline one to think that it arose from no common principle: and if we enquire into the *nature* of the Egyptian theology, it will appear impossible to come from *that*. For the *common* notion of local and tutelary deities, which prevents all intolerance, was originally, and peculiarly, Egyptian, as will be seen hereafter. It may then be asked how this mischief came about? I believe a passage in Diodorus Siculus, as quoted by Eusebius, will inform us. A certain king of Egypt finding some cities in his dominions apt to plot and cabal against him, contrived to introduce the distinct worship of a different animal into each city; as knowing that a reverence for their own, and a neglect of all others, would soon proceed to an **EXCLUSION**, and so bring on such a mutual aversion, as would never suffer them to unite in one common design. Thus was there at first, as little of a religious war on the principles of intolerance in this affair of the Ombites and Tentyrites, as in a drunken squabble between two trading companies in the church of Rome about their patron saints. But Diodorus deserves to be heard

in his own words : who when he had delivered the fabulous accounts of the original of brute-worship subjoins what he supposed to be the true. " But some give another original of the worship of brute animals : for the several cities being formerly prone to rebellion, and to enter into conspiracies against monarchical government, one of their kings contrived to introduce into each city the worship of a different animal : so that while every one reverenced that which itself held sacred, and despised what another had consecrated ; they could hardly be brought to join cordially together in one common design, to the disturbance of the government <sup>m</sup>."

<sup>m</sup> Αἰτίας δὲ καὶ ἄλλας φασί τινες τῆς τοῦ ἀλόγων ζώων τιμῆς· τὰ γάρ ταλάνθες τὸ παλαιὸν ἀφίτιαμέρα τῶν βασιλέων, καὶ συμφρονεῖνθε εἰς τὸ μηκέτι βασιλεύεσθαι, ἐπινοῆσαι τινα διάφορα σεβάσματα αὐτοῖς τῶν ζώων πασασχεῖν, ὅπως ἔκαστων τὸ μὲν παρ' αὐτοῖς τιμώμενον σεβομένων· τὰ δὲ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀφιεξαμένα καλαφρονεῖν, μηδὲποτε δμονοῦσαι διώνται πάλις οἱ κατ' Αἴγυπτον. Euseb. Praep. Evangel. p. 32. Rob. Steph. ed. Plutarch gives us an account of another of these squabbles (if indeed it was not the same with Juvenal's) which happened much about the same time, between the Oxyryncitæ and the Cynopolitæ ; and confirms what is here said of the original of this mutual hatred. — "Αλλοι δὲ τῶνδε τῶν δεινῶν τινα καὶ πανέργων βασιλέων ἴσορροι, τὸν Αἴγυπτον; καλαμαθόντα τὴν μὲν φύσει κέφας καὶ πρὸς μελανοὺς καὶ τειλερισμὸν ὁξυζεύπτης ὄντας, ἀμάχον δὲ καὶ δυσκαθεῖτον ὑπὸ ταλάνθες δύναμιν ἐν τῷ σωφρονεῖν καὶ κοινοπραγγεῖν ἔχοντας, αἵδιον αὐτοῖς ἐν καλαπορᾷ διέξαντα δεισιδαιμονίαν διαφορᾶς ἀπανύτην περιφασιν· τῶν γάρ δηρίων ἡ προσέταξεν ἄλλοις ἄλλα τιμῆν καὶ σέβεσθαι δυσμενῶς καὶ πολεμικῶς ἄλλήλοις προσφερούσιν, καὶ τροφὴν ἐτέραν ἐτέρης προσέδαιται πεφυκέταις, ἀμύνοντας ἀπὸ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἔκαστοι καὶ καλεπῶς ἀδικέμενοι φέροντες, ἐλεύθερον τὴν τῶν δηρίων ἔχοντας συνελκέμενοι καὶ συνεκπολιμεύμενοι πρὸς ἄλλήλας· μόνοι γάρ ἔτι ἕνν Αἴγυπτον Λυκοπλῖται πρόσθιον ἐσθίεσσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ λύκοι, ἐν θεόν νομίζεσσιν· οἱ δὲ Ὁξυευζῆται καθ' ἡμᾶς τῶν Κυνοπλιτῶν τὸν ὁξύρυζαν ἰχθυαν ἐσθίοντας, καύματα συλλαβόντες καὶ θύσαις, ὡς ιερεῖον καθέφαγον· ἐκ δὲ τέττας καλασάλες εἰς πόλεμον, ἄλλήλας τὴν διέβηκαν κακῶς, καὶ ὑγερον ὑπὸ Ρωμαίων κολαζόμενοι διείθησαν. Περὶ 1Σ. καὶ ΟΣ. 676, 677. Steph. ed.

But to return : such then was the root and foundation of this *SOCIABILITY* of religion in the ancient world, so much envied by modern infidels. The effect of their absurdities, as *Religions* ; and of their imperfections, as *Societies*. Yet had universal custom made this principle of *intercommunity*, so essential to Paganism, that when their philosophers and men of learning, on the spreading of Christianity, were become ashamed of the grossness of polytheism, and had so refined it by allegorical interpretations of their mythology, as to make the several Pagan deities but the various attributes of the one only God ; they still adhered to their darling principle (for Paganism still continued to be without a dogmatic theology, or formulare of faith) and contended that this diversity was harmony, a musical discord, well pleasing to the God of heaven and earth. “ It is but reasonable for us ” (says Symmachus<sup>n</sup>) to suppose, that it is one and ” the same BEING whom all mankind adores. We ” behold the same stars ; we live under the influ- ” ence of one common heaven ; we are incom- ” passed by the same universe. What matters it, ” what device each man uses in his search after ” truth ? ONE road is plainly too narrow to lead ” us into the initiation of so GRAND A MYSTERY.” ” The great lord and governor of the earth (says ” Themistius) seems to be delighted with these ” diversities of religions. It is his will that the ” Syrians worship him one way, the Greeks ano- ” ther, and the Egyptians yet another<sup>o</sup>. ” The

<sup>n</sup> *Aequum est, quicquid emnes colunt unum putari; eadem spectamus astra; commune cœlum est; idem nos mundus involvit: Quid interest quā quisque prudentiā verum requirat? UNO itinere non potest perveniri ad tam GRANDE SECRETUM.* Lib. x. Ep. 61. ad Valent. Theod. et Arcad. Augg.

<sup>o</sup> Ταῦτη ἡμεῖς γίνοσθαι τὴν πενικήν τὸν τε πατλὸν Ἀγγρυπίτων  
reader

reader sees that the foundation of this way of thinking, was the old principle of *intercommunity* in the worship of local tutelary deities. But, what is remarkable, it appears even to this day, to be essential to Paganism. Bernier tells us, that the Gentiles of Hindoustan defended their religion against him in this manner : “ They gave me “ (says he) this pleasant answer ; that they did “ not at all pretend that their law was universal — “ that they did not in the least suspect that *ours* “ was false : it might, for what they knew, be a “ good law for us, and that GOD MAY HAVE “ MADE MANY DIFFERENT ROADS TO LEAD TO “ HEAVEN ; but they would by no means hear “ that *ours* was general for the whole world, and “ *theirs*, a mere fable and invention.” Bernier indeed speaks of this as a peculiar whimsy that had

ἄλλως Σύρος ἴθελε θεοποδίαν, ἄλλως Ἑλληνας, ἄλλως Αἰγυπτίος.  
Orat. XII.

P Ils me donnaient cette réponse assez plaisante ; qu'ils ne pretendoient pas que leur Loi fut universelle — qu'ils ne pre-tendoient point que la nôtre fut fausse ; qu'il se pouvoit faire qu'elle fut bonne pour nous, et que DIEU POUVOIT AVOIR FAIT PLUSIEURS CHEMINS DIFFERENS POUR ALLER AU CIEL ; mais ils ne veulent pas entendre que la nôtre tant generale pour toute la terre, la leur ne peut être que fable et que pure invention. *Voyages de Fr. Bernier*, tom. ii. p. 138. Friar William de Rubruquis, a French Minorite, who travelled into Tartary in the year 1253, tells us, c. xlivi. that Mangu Chan, Emperor of Tartary, talking to him of religion, said, “ That “ a God hath given unto the hand divers fingers, so he hath “ given many ways to men to come unto him ; he hath giv- “ en the Scriptures unto you ; but he hath given unto us “ soothsayers, and we do that which they bid us, and we live “ in peace.” The Jesuit Tachard tells us, that the king of Siam made much the same answer to the French ambassador, who moved him, in his master's name, to embrace the Christian religion — Je m'étonne que le roy de France mon bon ami s'intéresse si fort dans une affaire qui regarde Dieu, où il semble que Dieu même ne prenne aucune intérêt, et qu'il a entièrement laissé à notre discretion. Car ce vray Dieu, entered

entered the head of this Brachman. But had he been as conversant in history and antiquity, as he was in modern philosophy, he would have known that this was a principle which accompanied Paganism thro' all its stages.

Let us now see the nature and genius of those religions which were built, as we say, on true revelation. The first is the JEWISH ; in which was taught the belief of one God, the maker and governor of all things, in contradistinction to all the false gods of the Gentiles : which necessarily introduced a DOGMATIC THEOLOGY. So that the followers of this religion, if they believed it true, in the sense it was delivered to them, must needs believe all others to be false. But it being instituted only for themselves, they had, *directly*, no further to do with that falsehood, than to guard themselves

qui a créé le ciel et la terre et toutes les creatures qu'on y voit et qui leur a donné des natures et des inclinations si différentes, ne pouvoit-il pas, s'il eût voulu, en donnant aux hommes des corps et des ames semblables, leur inspirer les mêmes sentimens pour la religion qu'il faloit suivre, et pour la culte qui luy étoit le plus agreable, et faire naître toutes les nations dans une même loy ? Cet ordre parmi les hommes et cette unité de religion dependant absolument de la Providence divine, qui pouvoit aussi aisement introduire dans le monde que la diversité des sectes qui s'y sont établies de tout tems ; ne doit-on pas croire que le vray Dieu prend autant de plaisir à estre honoré par des cultes et des ceremonics différentes, qu'à estre glorifié par une prodigieuse quantité de creatures qui le louent chacune à sa maniere ? Cette beauté et cette variété que nous admirons dans l'ordre naturelle, feroient elles moins admirables dans l'ordre furnaturel, ou moins dignes de la sagesse de Dieu ? *Voyage de Siam*, I. v. p. 231, 232. Amst. ed. 1688. The Abbé de Choisi, a coadjutor in this embassy, tells us, that the people were in the same way of thinking with their king. --- Jusques ici ils [les missionnaires] n'ont pas fait grand chose dans le royaume de Siam. Les Siamois sont des esprits doux, qui n'aiment pas à disputer, et qui croient la plupart de toutes les religions sont bonnes. *Journal du Voyage de Siam*, p. 200. ed. Amst. 1688.

from the contagion of it, by holding no fellowship or communion with the Gentiles.

Yet so strong was this general prejudice of *intercommunity*, that all the provisions of the Law could not keep this brutal people from running into the idolatries of the nations : for their frequent defections, till after the Babylonish captivity, were no other than the joining foreign worship to the worship of the God of Israel.

After this religion, comes the CHRISTIAN, which taught the belief of the same God, the supreme Cause of all things : and being a revelation, like the other, from heaven, must needs be built upon that *other* ; or on the supposition of its truth. And, as this latter was not national, like the other, but given to all mankind, For that reason, but especially for some others, which will be fully considered in their place, it had a MORE COMPLETE system of dogmatic theology. The consequence of which was, that its followers must not only think Paganism false, and Judaism abolished, and so refuse all fellowship and communion with both ; but must endeavour to propagate their religion throughout the world, on the destruction of all the rest. And their dogmatic theology teaching them that Truth, and not utility <sup>q</sup>, (as the Pagans, who had only public rites and ceremonies, supposed) was the end of religion ; it was no wonder, their aversion to falsehood should be proportionably increased. And so far all was right. But this aversion, cherished by piety, unhappily produced a blind, ungovernable zeal ; which, when arguments failed, hurried them on to all the unlawful exercise of force

<sup>q</sup> For this the reader may see Dion. Harlicarnassus's discourse of the religion which Romulus introduced in his republic ; and for his reason, see Book iii. and iv.

and compulsion. Hence the evils of persecution, and the violation of the laws of humanity, in a fond passion for propagating the law of God<sup>r</sup>.

This is a true representation of the state of things, both in the Pagan, and in the believing world. To give it the utmost evidence, we will

<sup>r</sup> M. Voltaire, in his *Le Siecle de Louis XIV*, having spoken of this persecuting spirit amongst the followers of Christ, and observed that it was unknown to Paganism, says very gravely that after having long searched for the cause of this difference between the two religions, both of which abounded with dogmatists and fanatics, he at length found it in the REPUBLICAN SPIRIT of the latter. — This was only mistaking the effect for the cause; and was no great matter in a writer, who in the same place can tell us, not as problematical, but as a known and acknowledged truth, that both the Jews and Gentiles offered HUMAN sacrifices. — Cette fureur fut inconnue au Paganisme. Il couvrit la terre de ténèbres, mais il ne l'arroso gueres que du sang des animaux; et si quelquefois CHEZ LES JUIFS, et chez les Païens on d'voa des viétimes humaines, ces devoumens, ne causérent point de guerres civiles. — J'AI RECHERCHE LONG-TEMS comment et pourquoi cet esprit dogmatique qui divisa les ecoles de l'antiquité païenne sans causer le moindre trouble, en a produit parmi nous de si horribles. Ne pourrait-on pas trouver peut-être l'origine de cette nouvelle peste qui a ravagé la terre, DANS L'ESPRIT REPUBLICAIN qui anima les premières églises. Tom. ii. chap. 32. *Du Calvinisme*, p. 223. What is strange is, that he should ramble thus when he had the true cause almost in view, as he certainly had when he made the following observation: La religion des Païens ne consistait que dans la morale et dans des fîtes. The question is, how he came by the observation? and how the Christians came by their republican spirit? The latter question only is worth an answer. And we say, that without doubt it was the SPIRIT OF THEIR RELIGION which gave it to them, when the followers of Paganism had it not. Christianity consists in the belief of certain propositions necessary to salvation; which peculiarity virtually condemns all other religions. So that these having the civil power on their side, would endeavour to suppress so inhospitable a novelty. And this directly violating conscience, produced the republican spirit, or the spirit of resistance; whose natural aim goes no further than liberty; not to dominion. Agreeably hereto, as is observed above, the first persecution for religion was borne, not inflicted, by the Christian church.

next consider the reception true religion met with amongst idolaters.

The Pagan world having early imbibed this inveterate prejudice concerning intercommunity of worship, men were but too much accustomed to new revelations, when the Jewish appeared, not to acknowledge its superior pretences. Accordingly we find by the history of this people, that it was esteemed a *true one* by its neighbours. And therefore they proceeded, in their usual way, to join it, on occasion, with their own: as those did, whom the king of Affyria sent into the cities of Israel in the place of the ten tribes. Whereby it happened (so great was the influence of this principle) that in the same time and country, the Jews of Jerusalem added the Pagan idolatries to their religion; while the Pagans of Samaria added the Jewish religion to their idolatries.

But when these people of God, in consequence of having their dogmatic theology more carefully inculcated to them after their return from the captivity, became rigid in pretending not only that their religion was true, but the only true one; then it was, that they began to be treated by their neighbours, and afterwards by the Greeks and Romans, with the utmost hatred and contempt for this *their inhumanity and unsociable temper*. To this cause alone we are to ascribe all that spleen and rancour which appears in the histories of these latter nations concerning them. Celsus fairly reveals what lay at bottom, and speaks out for them all: “ If the “ Jews on these accounts adhere to their own law, “ it is not for *that*, they are to blame: I rather “ blame those who forsake their own country reli-“ gion to embrace the Jewish. But if these people “ give themselves airs of sublimer wisdom than the “ rest of the world, and on that score refuse all

" COMMUNION with it, as not equally pure; ---  
 " I must tell them that it is not to be believed  
 " that they are more dear, or agreeable to God,  
 " than other nations ." Hence, amongst the Pa-  
 gans, the Jews came to be distinguished from all  
 other people by the name of GENUS HOMINUM IN-  
 VISUM DEIS<sup>t</sup>, and with good reason<sup>v</sup>.

This was the reception the Jews met with in the world: but not pretending to obtrude their religion on the rest of mankind, as it was given properly to the posterity of Abraham, they yet for the most part escaped persecution.

When Christianity arose, tho' on the foundation of Judaism, it was at first received with great complacency by the Pagan world. For they were such utter strangers to the idea of one religion's being built, or dependent on another, that it was a long time before they knew this connection between them. Even Celsus himself, with all his sufficiency, saw so little how this matter stood, that he was not satisfied whether the Jews and Christians worshiped the same God; was sometimes inclined to think they did not. This ignorance, which the propagators of our religion were not too forward to remove<sup>w</sup>, for fear of hindering the pro-

<sup>s</sup> Εἰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ταῦτα πολὺ-έλλομεν ἴεραῖς οὐ τιδίου νόμου, οὐ μεμπλεῖ  
 αὐτῶν ἐκείνων οἱ μᾶκλει τῷν καθαλιπόνιαιν τὰ σφέτερα, οὐ τὰ ἴεραῖς  
 προστιερίνων εἰ δὲ ὁ; τι σεφύτερον εἰδότες σεμνώνται τε, ηγήτην ἀλ-  
 λαγ κονικαίς εἴκεισθαι τοῖς καθαροῖς ἀπορείσθαι — οὐ μηδεὶς δύσκον-  
 μεῖν ταχεῖ τῷ θεῷ οὐ σύγενοθαι Διαφόρως τι τῶν ἀλλων τάτες εἴκεισθαι.

Orig. cont. Celsum, l. v. p. 259.

<sup>t</sup> Facit Hist. l. v. <sup>v</sup> See Note (<sup>b</sup>) p. 55.

<sup>w</sup> To this old Pagan blindness, some modern Christians, seem to have succeeded. They pretend, that what is said in Scripture of the dependency and foundation of Christianity on Judaism, is said by way of accommodation to the prejudices of the Jews; but that when the preachers of the Gospel applied themselves to the Gentiles, they preached up Jesus simply,

gress of the Gospel, prevented the prejudice, the Pagans had to Judaism, from indisposing them to Christianity. So that the Gospel was favourably heard. And the superior evidence, with which it was informed, inclined men, long habituated to pretended Revelations, to receive it into the number of the established. Accordingly we find one Roman emperor introducing it amongst his closet religions\*; and another proposing to the senate<sup>x</sup>, to give it a more public entertainment<sup>y</sup>. But when it was found to carry

as a divine messenger, omitting the Jewish characters of the Messiah. Now, though nothing can be more false, or extravagant; yet the method employed by the first Preachers of the Gospel, to introduce Christianity amongst the Gentiles, gives this foolish opinion the little countenance it hath.

\* Alexander Severus. *Lampridii c. 29,*

<sup>x</sup> Tiberius retulit ad senatum ut INTER CETERA SACRA reperetur. *Hier.* This, the Father says on the authority of Tertullian and Eusebius. M. Le Clerc, in his *Hist. Eccl. ann. xxix.* rejects the whole story, tho' it be as strongly supported as a civil fact can well be. What he urges against it is fully obviated by the principles here delivered. Indeed the chief force of his objection arises from several *false additions* to the fact: A circumstance, which may be found in, and hath been brought to the discredit of, the best attested facts of antiquity.

<sup>y</sup> The not attending to the genius of Paganism, hath betrayed some of the best Critics into an iniquitous judgment on the first Apologists; who, they pretend, have unskilfully managed, in employing all their pains to evince what was so easy to be done, the falsehood of Paganism, rather than to prove the truth of their own religion. For, say these critics, was Paganism proved false, it did not follow that Christianity was true; but was the Christian religion proved true, it followed that the Pagan was false. But the matter, we see, was just otherwise; and the Apologists acted with much good judgment. The truth of Christianity was acknowledged by the Pagans: they only wanted to have the compliment returned. As this could not be done, there was a necessity to assign the reasons of their refusal. And this gave birth to so many confutations of idolatrous worship. It is true, when their adversaries found them persist in their *unscrupulous* pretences, they paid this harsh treatment in kind; and accused Christianity, in its turn, of falsehood: but this was not

its pretensions higher \*, and to claim, like the Jewish, the title of the ONLY TRUE ONE, then it was that it began to incur the same hatred and contempt with the Jewish. But when it went still further, and urged a necessity for all men to forsake their national Religions, and embrace the Gospel, this so shocked <sup>z</sup> the Pagans, that it soon brought upon itself the bloody storms which followed. Thus you have the true origin of persecution for religion : (tho' not of the *intolerant principle*, as we shall see before we come to the end of this section.) A persecution not committed, but undergone, by the Christian church.

till afterwards, and then faintly, and only by way of acquit. For want of due reflection on these things, both FABRICIUS and L'ENFANT have been betrayed into this wrong judgment. Facilius subscribo judicio viri celeberrimi atque eruditissimi Jacobi L'enfant, in Diario Londinensi, *Hist. of the works of the learned*, A. 1709. p. 284. Il y a long tems, qu'on a eu lieu de remarquer, que la religion Chrétienne est une bonne cause, qui de tout tems a été sujette à être aussi mal defendue, que mal attaquée. Ses PREMIERS APOLOGISTES la soutinrent mieux par leur zèle, par leur pieté, et par leurs soufrances, que par les Apologies, qu'ils nous en ont laissées.—*Delectus argum. et syllabus script. qui relig. Chrift. affér.* p. 209.

\* This was not understood immediately by the Pagans, as appears from a remarkable passage of Lampridius in his life of Alexander Severus—*Christo templum facere voluit [Alex. Severus] eumque inter deos recipere—Sed prohibitus est ab iis qui, consulentes sacra, repererant omnes Christianos futuros si id optato evenisset, et tempora reliqua deferenda.* Now those who rested this conclusion on an oracle, or divine premonition, could have no knowledge of the nature of Christianity.

<sup>z</sup> The reader will not be displeased to hear a curious story, from the life of St. Anscharius, which tends much to illustrate what we say, concerning the genius of Paganism, and the reason of its aversion to Christianity. This Saint travelling amongst the people of the North, fell into the following adventure : — *Pervenit ad Byrcam, ubi invenit regem et multitudinem populi nimio errore confusam. Instigante enim Diabolo, contigit, eo ipso tempore, ut quidam illo adveniens di-*

Hence

Hence we see how it happened, that such good emperors as Trajan and M. Antonine came to be found in the first rank of persecutors. A difficulty that hath very much embarrassed the enquirers into ecclesiastical antiquity; and given a handle to the Deists, who empoison every thing, of pretending to suspect that there must be something very much amiss in primitive Christianity, while such wise magistrates could become its persecutors. But now the reason is manifest: the Christian pretences overthrew a fundamental principle of Paganism, which they thought founded in nature; namely, *the friendly intercommunity of worship*. And thus the famous passage of Pliny the younger becomes intelligible. “ For I did not in the least

ceret, se in conventu deorum, qui ipsam terram possidere credabantur adfuisse, et ab iis missum, ut haec regi et populis nuntiaret: Vos, inquit, nos vobis propitios diu habuistis, et terram incolatus vestri cum multa abundantia nostro adjutorio in pace et prosperitate longo tempore tenuistis. Vos quoque nobis sacrificia et vota debita persolvistis. At nunc et sacrificia solita subtrahitis, et vota spontanea segnus offertis, et, quod magis nobis displicet, alienum deum super vos introducitis. Si itaque nos vobis propitios habere vultis, sacrificia omissa augete, et vota majora periolvite. Alterius quoque dei culturam, que contraria nobis docetur, ne apud vos recipiatis, et ejus servitio ne intendatis. Porro si etiam plares deos habere desideratis, et vobis non sufficiimus, Ericum quondam regem vestrum nos unanimis in collegium nostrum adsciscimus, ut sit unus de numero Deorum. Mabillon Act. SS. Ord. S. Bened. Sac. iv. p. 2. And how little these Pagans doubted of Christianity's being a real revelation from a God, we may see in another place of the same *Life*, where one of their piratical kings proposes, according to their custom, to enquire by divination what place they should next invade: — Interim rex prefatus cum Denis ageret cœpit, ut forte perquirerent, utrum voluntate deorum locus ipse ab eis devastandus esset. Multi, inquit, ibi sunt dii potentes et magni, ibi etiam olim ecclesia constructa est, et cultura Christi à multis Christianis ibi excolitur, qui fortissimus est Decreum, et potest sperantibus in se quomodo vult auxiliari — Quæstum est igitur fortibus, etc. Cap. xvi.

“ hesitate, but that whatever should appear, on confession, to be their faith, yet that their frowardness and *inflexible obstinacy* would certainly deserve punishment.” What was this *inflexible obstinacy*? It could not be in professing a *new religion*: that was a thing common enough. It was the refusing all communion with Paganism; refusing to throw a grain of incense on their altars. For we must not think, as is commonly imagined, that this was at first enforced by the magistrate to make them renounce their religion; but only to give a *test* of its *hospitality* and *sociableness* of temper. It was indeed, and rightly, understood by the Christians to be a renouncing their religion; and so, accordingly, abstained from. The misfortune was, that the Pagans did not consider this *inflexibility* as a mere *error*, but as an *immorality* likewise. The *unfriendly, uncommunicable* temper, in matters of religious worship, was esteemed, by the best of them, as a *hatred and aversion to mankind*. Tacitus, speaking of the burning of Rome: “ Haud perinde in crimine incendii quam ODIO HUMANI GENERIS convicti sunt<sup>a</sup> [Christiani].” Convicted, he says, of *hate to all mankind*. But how? The confession of the Pagans themselves, concerning the purity of the Christian morals, shews this could be no other than a *conviction* of their rejecting all *intercommunity of worship*; which, so great was their prejudice, they thought could proceed from nothing but *hate to mankind*. The like character the same historian gives of the Jews: “ Apud ipsum FIDES OBSTINATA, sed ad-

<sup>2</sup> Neque enim dubitabam, qualemque esset quod faterentur, certe, pertinaciam et inflexibilem obstinationem debere puniri. Lib. x. Ep. 97.

<sup>a</sup> Ann. xv. Sect. 44.

“versus omnes alios HOSTILE ODIUM<sup>b</sup>. ” Now the Jews and Christians had nothing in common but this unsociable uncommunicable temper in religious matters, this *obstinata fides* which gave so much offence to Paganism. We are not to imagine, these excellent Pagan moralists so blind as not to see all the merit of a firm and fixed resolution of keeping a good conscience. They did see and own it, as appears by the famous “*Justum et tenacem propositi virum*,” etc. of one of their moral poets. But, unluckily for truth, they did not see the *pervicacia et inflexibilis obstinatio* of the Christians in that light. Tho’ it was nothing more than such a *fixed resolution*, as one who most severely censured them for it, the good emperor Marcus Antoninus, fairly confesses. In his book of *Meditations*, speaking of a wise man’s readiness to die, he says, “He should be so prepared, that his readiness may be seen to be the effect of a well-weighed judgment, not of MERE OBSTINACY, like that of the Christians.” This is a very heavy charge on the primitive martyrs. But he himself removes it in his constitution to the community of Asia, given us by Eusebius. “I know, says he, the gods are watchful to discover such sort of men. For it is much more fit that they themselves should punish those who

<sup>b</sup> *Histor.* lib. v. c. 5. St. Paul tells us in what this *hostile odium*, consisted, where speaking of their obstinate adherence to the *Law* against all the conviction of the *Gospel*, he says, *And they please not God, and are CONTRARY TO ALL MEN, 1 Thess. ii. 15.* They were not contrary to all men in their having different rites: for each nation had rites different from one another: but in their condemning and reprobating all rites but their own: which being, till the coming of Christianity, peculiar to themselves, was ascribed to their *hated of mankind*.

<sup>c</sup> — τὸ δὲ ἔτοιμον τέτο, ἵνα ἀπὸ μηκός κρίσεως ἐγχώραι, μὴ νῷ φιλην παρατάξῃ, οὐδὲ ξενισταν. Lib. xi. § 3.

"REFUSE TO WORSHIP THEM, than that we should interfere in it<sup>d</sup>." Why then was it called *mere obstinacy*? The reason is seen above: universal prejudice had made men regard a refusal of this *inter-community* as the most brutal of all dissociability. And the emperor Julian, who understood this matter the best of any, fairly owns, that the Jews and Christians brought the execration of the world upon them by their aversion to the gods of Paganism, and their refusal of all communication with them<sup>e</sup>.

Thus have we endeavoured to explain the true origin of that universal TOLERATION (as far as religion influenced it) under *Paganism*; and the accidental causes of its violation under *Christianity*. The account will be further useful to many considerable purposes, as will be seen hereafter. At present I shall only take notice how well it obviates one specious objection against Christianity. "If it were, say the Deists, accompanied with such illustrious and extraordinary marks of truth, as is pretended; how happened it, that its truth was not seen by more of the best and wisest of those times? And if it were seen, (as it certainly was) how could they continue Pagans?" The answer is easy. The conviction of the truth of a *new* religion was not deemed a sufficient reason, by men overrun with the general prejudice of *intercommunity*, to quit their *old* ones.

The case indeed was different in a Jew, who

<sup>d</sup> Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπικεῖται εἰς μὴ λαυδάνειν τὰς τοιότητας· πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐκεῖνοι κατάσταται ἀν τὰς μὴ βελοφένες αὐτές; ἀρεσκυνεῖν η ὑμεῖς. Euseb. Eccl. Hist. 1. iv. c. 13.

<sup>e</sup> Αλλὰ τί, οὐτε προσκυνοῦσι θεοῖς ἐπέρχοις ὃ δὲ μέγα τῆς περὶ τὸ Θεόν φυσι διαβεβλῆται· Θεοῖς γαρ ἔνδιλλής φυσι — αφέτε τέτταν τὸν λῆσσον. καὶ μὴ τυλικαύτην οὐτε ιμᾶς αὐτές; ἔλαττε βλασφημίας. Apud Cyrill. cont. Jul. 1. v,

held none of this intercommunity. If such a one owned the truth of Christianity, he must needs embrace it. We conclude, therefore, that the passage of Josephus (who was as much a Jew as the religion of Moses could make him) which acknowledges, *Jesus to be the Christ*<sup>f</sup>, is a rank forgery, and a very stupid one too<sup>g</sup>.

We have now seen the motives, the civil magistrate had to tolerate: --- Of what nature that toleration was: --- And how easily it was brought about.

But then, lest the people should abuse this right of worshiping according to their own will, to the detriment of the state in private and clandestine conventicles; which right the magistrate supported for the benefit of it; He took care, the worship should have the public approbation and allowance, before it was received on the footing of a tolerated religion.

So, by the laws of ATHENS, no *strange god*, or *foreign worship* was permitted till approved and licensed by the court of AREOPAGUS. This is the reason why St. Paul, who was regarded as the bringer in of *foreign gods*, ΖΕΝΩΝ ΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΩΝ, was had up to that tribunal. Not as a criminal<sup>h</sup>, but ra-

<sup>f</sup> — Ἰησος, σοφος αινης. ειγε "Ανδρας αυτὸν λέγειν χρην" ον γιχε παραδοξων εργων παιηνης. Διδάσκαλος ανθρωπων, τῶν ηδενη ταληνη δεχομένων. — Ο ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ ΟΥΤΟΣ ΗΝ. — Εφαν γαρ αυτοῖς τείτην εχων ιμιέσαν πάλιν ζῶν τῶν θείων προφητῶν ταῦτα, καὶ ἀλλα μυρια θαυματα πει αὐτες εἰσηκότων. *Antiq.* xviii. 3. 3.

<sup>g</sup> See a further proof of it, Vol. ii. Book v. Sect. 4.

<sup>h</sup> St. Chrysostom supposed, the apostle was convened before the Areopagus as a CRIMINAL: and this is become the general opinion. I would rather think, that the *philosophers*, who encountered him, invited him thither as a PUBLIC BENEFACTOR, who had a new worship to propose to the people. My reasons are these:

i. St. Paul was taken up to this court by the *philosophers*.

ther as a public benefactor, who had a new worship to propose to a people, religious above all others,

Acts xvii. 19. — But the philosophers, of that time, abhorred the character of delators or persecutors for religion: this was a temper which sprung up amongst them with the progress of Christianity. The worst opinion they had of Paul was his being a babbler, as the Epicureans called him; tho' the Stoicks thought more reverendly of his character, as a setter forth of strange gods, ξένων διαποσιών καλαγχεός, a discoverer of some foreign gods; for their hospitality extended to all strangers, whether gods or men; and this could not but be a welcome office to a people disposed to raise altars even to gods unknown, § 23.

2. Their address to him, when they had brought him thither, [may we know what this doctrine whereof thou speakest is, § 19.] implies rather a request to a teacher than an interrogatory to a criminal.

3. At least, the reason they give for their request goes no further than a desire to be satisfied concerning a doubtful matter — For thou bringest certain strange things to our ears, § 20. ξένησις τινα, certain foreign ceremonies or customs. And Strabo, as we see, tells us, the Athenians were most addicted to foreign worship.

4. The very words of the sacred historian seem to shew that this was the whole of the matter. — For all the Athenians, and strangers which were there [i. e. such as resided there for education, or out of love for the Athenian manners] spent their time in nothing else but either to tell or to hear some new thing. Had the historian understood the citation to be of the criminal form, he would surely have given a more pertinent reason for the Athenians' conduct; such as their jealousy of danger to the state, or the established religion.

5. St. Paul's speech to the court has not the least air of an apology suiting a person accused; but is one continued information of an important matter, such as befitted a teacher or benefactor to give.

6. Had he appeared as a criminal, the charge against him would have been simply, *The setting forth of strange gods.* Now this charge of less importance he declines to answer; and yet confesses a much greater crime, of which he was not accused, namely a condemnation of their established worship — *And the times of this ignorance God winked at, etc.* § 30.

7. The behaviour of the court towards him shews he was not heard as a criminal. He is neither acquitted nor condemned; but dismissed as a man, *coram non iudice.* — *And when*

ΩΣ ΔΕΙΣΙΔΑΙΜΟΝΕΣ ΤΕΡΟΙ, most addicted, as Strabo tells us, to the recognition of foreign wor-

they heard of the resurrection of the dead, some mocked: and others said, We will hear thee again of this matter, § 32.

8. He left the court, as one thus dismissed. — So Paul departed from amongst them, § 33. A strange way of intimating a juridical acquittal: but very naturally expressing the resentment of his flighted mission. For as some mocked, and others referred him to an indefinite time of audience, nothing was left him but to depart; and, according to his master's direction, to shake the dust from his feet.

9. The historian's reflection on the whole supports all the foregoing reasons — Howbeit, certain men clave unto him, and believed, etc. § 34. A very natural conclusion of the story, if only a transaction within the sphere of his Mission; for then, having related its ill success in general, some mocking, and others putting off the hearing, he adds, that however it was not altogether without effect, for a few converts he did make, etc. But if we suppose it a narrative of a juridical process, we shall not find in it one circumstance of a proper relation. We are not so much as told whether he was acquitted or censured, or whether he gave caution for a new appearance: But, as if so illustrious a prosecution (where the most learned of the Apostles was the Criminal, the Greek Philosophers his Accusers, and the Court of Areopagus his Judges) was below the historian's notice, we are told a thing quite foreign to the matter,—That he made but few converts.

In a word, take this history in the sense here explained, and the whole narrative is simple, exact, and luminous: Take it in the other, and it scarce affords us one single quality of a pertinent relation, but is obscured from one end to the other, both by redundancies and omissions.

But had the interpreters not overlooked a plain fact, they would have given a different sense to this adventure. When Christianity first appeared, its two enemies, the Jews and Gentiles, had long administered their superstitions on very different principles. The Jews employed *persecution*; but the Gentiles gave a free *toleration*. And tho', soon after, the latter went into the *intolerant* measures of the other, yet, at this time, they still adhered to the ancient genius of Paganism. So that, of the many various persecutions of the Christian Teachers, recorded in *The Acts of the Apostles*, there is not one but what was begun and carried on by Jewish magistrates, or at least excited by their emissaries; if we except that at Philippi, which too was

ship,

ship<sup>i</sup>, and “ of all the Greeks, as Julian observes, “ most devoted to religion, and most hospitable to “ strangers <sup>k</sup>. ” Tully<sup>l</sup> makes Solon the founder of this court. But the Arundel marbles and Plutarch in his life of that lawgiver <sup>m</sup>, contradict this opinion ; and the latter, in support of his own, quotes a law of Solon’s, which makes mention of the Areopagus as already existing. The difficulty is how to reconcile these accounts. I imagine this might be the case : Solon, we know, was employed by the Athenians to new-model their commonwealth, by reforming the ill constitutions, and supplying such as were defective. So that in the number of his regulations, this might be one ; The adding, to the court of Areopagus, the peculiar jurisdiction in question ; as of great moment to public utility. And having thus enlarged and ennobled its jurisdiction, he was afterwards regarded as its founder. A passage in Æschylus seems, at first sight indeed, not to favour this opinion ; but to insinuate, that the jurisdiction in question was coeval with the court. In the fifth act of his *Eumenides*, he makes the worship of the furies, or the venerable goddesses, as they were called, to be received and recognized in Athens, by a decree of Minerva, as head of the college of Arcopagus, which the poet feigns she had just then instituted. But this plainly appears to have been contrived only for the sake of a

on pretence of an injury to private property. — See the well-reasoned tract, intituled, *Observations on the conversion of St. Paul*, p. 71. in the note.

<sup>i</sup> Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ὥσπερ ποτὶ τὰ ἀλλα φιλοξενεῖς διδίλλουν, οὐταντὶ τὰς θεάς. πολλὰ γὰρ τῷ ξενικῷ ιερῶν παριστέαντο. Geogr. 1. x.

<sup>k</sup> — ὡς καὶ φιλόθεοι μάλιστα πάντων εἰσὶ, καὶ δέξιοι πρὸς τὰς ξένια. *Misopog.*

<sup>l</sup> *De Officiis*, lib. i. c. 22.

<sup>m</sup> *Vita parall.* vol. i. p. 194. edit. Bryan.

poetical embellishment: and Æschylus seems to employ one circumstance in this scene, designedly to inform us of the order of time, in which the court received its two different jurisdictions. It is, where he makes the *criminal* cause of Orestes, the first which was judged at that tribunal; and the *religious* one, of the reception of the Eumenides, but the second. However this be, the Areopagus was, by far, the most formidable judicature in the republic. And it is observable, that Aristophanes, who spares neither the fleets, the armies, the courts of justice, the person of the supreme magistrate, the assemblies of the people, or the temples of the gods themselves, does not dare to hazard the least injurious reflection on that venerable body.

The ROMANS had a law to the same purpose; which, as often as it was violated, was publicly vindicated by the authority of the state: as appears from the words of Posthumius in Livy, quoted in the last section: “Quoties hoc patrum “avorumque ætate negotium est magistratibus da-“tum, ut sacra externa fieri vetarent, sacrificulos “vatesque foro, circo, urbe prohiberent, vaticinos “libros conquirerent<sup>n</sup>? ” etc. Which shews their care to have all *tolerated* religions under the magistrate’s inspection. And, if I am not much mistaken, Tully, in his *Books of laws*, the substance of which is taken from the *Twelve tables*, gives us that very law; whereby, as we said, all foreign and clandestine worship, unauthorized by the civil magistrate, was forbid. SEPARATIM NEMO HABESSIT DEOS: NEVE NOVOS, NEVE ADVENAS, NISI PUBLECE ADSCITOS, PRIVATIM COLUNTO<sup>o</sup>.

<sup>n</sup> Lib. xxxix. *Hijſt.*

<sup>o</sup> Lib. ii. c. 8. Thus, I think, the words ought to be read

" No man shall worship the Gods clandestinely, or  
 " have them separately to himself: nor shall any  
 " new or foreign God be worshiped by particulars,  
 " till such God hath been legally approved of, and  
 " tolerated by the magistrate." The comment,  
 as concise, and consequently as obscure as the text,  
 follows in these words: *SUOSQUE DEOS, AUT NO-*

and pointed. The common reading is, *separatim nemo habeffit deos neve novos: sed ne advenas, nisi publice adscitos, privatim colunto:* which is absurd and unintelligible. The manuscript quoted by Manutius reads, *neve novos sive advenas.* In a word, this Law seems not to have been understood by the critics, from their not apprehending the nature of Paganism, and the distinction between their *tolerated* and *established* religions. By the first branch, *separatim nemo habeffit deos*, is meant that the gods in general should not be worshiped in private CONVENTICLES, or be had, as it were in propriety. *Suos deos*, says the comment. And by the second branch, *neve novos, neve advenas, nisi publice adscitos, privatim colunto*, is meant that PARTICULARS should not worship any new or foreign god without licence and authority from the state. For we must remember what hath been said, in the first section of this book, concerning the two parts of Pagan religion; the one public, and the other private; the one, which had the state for its subject; the other, *particulars*. Now the state, as such, worshiped only the country gods; and this was properly the *established religion*. The *particulars*, as such, frequently grew fond of new and foreign gods, and modes of worship: and these, when allowed by the state, were their *tolerated religions*. *Privatum* therefore signifies [by *particulars*] not [privately] which latter sense would make a contradiction in the sentence: *Nisi publice adscitos, privatim colunto:* " Let them not worship them PRIVATELY, unles they be PUBLICLY allowed." For how could those be said to be *privately* worshiped, that were *publicly* owned? By *deos novos*, both here and in the comment, I suppose, is meant *gods newly become such*: which in another place he calls — *quasi novos et adscriptios cives in cælum receptos*. — *De nat. deorū* l. iii. c. 15. For the *dii minorum gentium* were a kind of every-day manufacture: such as Tully in the words immediately following thus describes: *Ollos quos eundo cælo meritæ vocaverint*; or, *those who had newly discovered themselves to men*. And by *ADVENAS*, the known local gods of other countries.

VOS, AUT ALIENIGENAS COLI, CONFUSIONEM HABET RELIGIONUM, ET IGNOTAS CEREMONIAS: NON A SACERDOTIBUS, NON A PATRIBUS ACCEP-  
TOS DEOS, ITA PLACERET COLI, SI HUIC LEGI PA-  
RUE RANT IPSI P. "For each man to have his  
" Gods in peculiar, whether new or stranger Gods,  
" without public allowance, tends to defeat and

P Lib. ii. c. 10. Thus I venture to correct the passage. The common editions have it — *Non a sacerdotibus, non a patribus acceptos deos, ita placet coli, si huic legi paruerunt ipsi.* Gruter says: Ita me Deus amet, vix intelligo: hæreo, adhuc hæreo. --- And none of the critics have pretended to make sense of it, but Petit, in his comment on the Attic laws: *De advenis Diis* (*says he*) *sibi facit objici Tullius, an non liceat acceptos a sacerdotibus aut a patribus alienigenas Deos colere?* Respondet Cicero, licere, si, prout hac cavebatur lege, publice sint adsciti, non priva patrum aut sacerdotum auctoritate. Hic igitur verborum Tullii sensus est, qui latet et lectores fugit, qui excidit interrogationis nota, loco suo restituenda et repone nenda ad hunc modum: *Susque deos, aut novos aut alienigenas coli, confusionem habet religionum, et ignotas ceremonias. Non a sacerdotibus, non a patribus acceptos deos? Ita placet coli, si huic legi paruerint ipsi.* But as plausible as this appears, it cannot, I think, be the true interpretation: For 1. Tully is made to object impertinently: for who, from the words *neve novos, neve advenas, nisi publice adscitos, privatim colunto,* could form any suspicion that, by this law, *the gods received by the priests or their forefathers, or by any else,* were forbid to be worshipped, were they but publicly allowed? And those not so allowed, were forbid, from whatever quarter they were brought in. 2. This interpretation does not well agree with the cast and design of the work. Tully says of it, *Non enim populo Romano, sed omnibus bonis populis leges damus.* So that an objection respecting only the city of Rome was from the purpose. On the other hand, the propriety of the sense, given above, is seen from hence: 1. That the observation is of the nature of an example to a precept. He delivers a *law* concerning the licensing new religions by the magistrate; and then takes notice that, had it been well observed in Rome, it had prevented a great deal of superstition. 2. The frequent *breach* of this *law* in Rome was a notorious fact; as appears by the speech of Posthumius in Livy, quoted above; and therefore very likely to be taken notice of by Tully, when he was upon

"confound

" confound all religion, and introduce clandestine  
 " worship : and had the priests and our forefathers  
 " had a due regard to this law, we should never  
 " have approved of that kind of worship which  
 " we now pay to the Gods they introduced a-  
 " mongst us."

But notwithstanding all this, Mr. Bayle, from the words above quoted from the speech of Posthumius in Livy, would persuade us<sup>q</sup>, that the Romans did not admit or tolerate foreign worship ; and that the care of the magistrate, there taken notice of by the consul, was to prohibit all religions, but the *established* : an opinion which the whole Roman history discredits ; where we find the magistrate, from time to time, tolerated all foreign religions with the utmost facility. The

this subject. And what St. Austin says, in his second book of the *City of God*, concerning the actions told of the gods in their public worship at Rome, and the lubricity of that worship, shews the seasonableness of this animadversion. Further, as the general sense of the *law* justifies the emendation in the *Comment* ; so the words, *aut novos, aut alienigenas*, in the *Comment*, confirm the correction in the *law*. — By, *confusionem religionum*, I suppose Tully meant, such a confusion of ceremonies, as would leave no distinction between the established and tolerated worship ; and thereby reduce Religion to so impotent a state, as to render it useless to civil society : And by, *ignotas ceremonias*, rites, which the magistrate, by reason of their celebration in private conventicles, could not take cognizance of : which might hurt the morals of society, by their lewdness, as happened in the Bacchanals at Rome ; or endanger its peace by cabals and factions, which their secrecy might support and encourage. In the remaining words, the author gives a plain intimation, that, had this law been observed, many superstitions both in the established and tolerated religions had been avoided ; which he intimates their ignorant forefathers and interested priests had introduced, without warrant from the State. To conclude, the neglect of this law in Rome was very notorious : and, probably, owing to their having no standing judicature, as at Athens, for that purpose.

<sup>q</sup> Pens. div. c. 221.

care then Posthumius meant was surely that of preventing all clandestine worship, unlicensed by the magistrate: which appears even from that other passage brought by Mr. B. from Livy to support his assertion: “*Nec corpora modo affecta tabo,*  
 “*sed animos quoque multiplex religio et pleraque*  
 “*externa invasit, novos ritus sacrificando, vatici-*  
 “*nando inferentibus in domos, quibus questui sunt*  
 “*capti superstitione animi*.” But more particularly from the very affair Posthumius was here engaged in. At the time this speech was made, the State was above measure exasperated by the monstrous enormities committed in the clandestine rites of Bacchus: yet it is observable, that, in the edict passed in the very height of their resentment, the right of toleration was preserved inviolate: the decree of the Senate providing, “That there should be no *Bacchanals* celebrated either in Rome or Italy. If any one should be possessed with a belief that this sort of rite was due by custom, and necessary; and that he could not omit the celebration of it without irreligion and impiety, he should lay his case before the city pretor; the pretor should consult the Senate, when there was not less than an hundred in council, to know if they approved of it. These cautions observed, the rites might be celebrated, provided that not more than five assisted at the sacrifice, that they had no *common purse*, no *priest*, nor a *master of the solemnities*.<sup>s</sup>”

<sup>r</sup> Lib. iv. *Hist.*

<sup>s</sup> — Ne qua Bacchanalia Romæ, neve in Italia essent. Si quis tale sacrum solenne et necessarium duceret, nec sine religione et piaculo se id omittere posse apud Prætorem urbanum profiteretur; Prætor senatum consulueret, si ei permisum esset, quum in senatu centum non minus essent, ita id sacrum faceret, dum ne plus quinque sacrificio interessent, neu qua pecunia communis, neu quis magister sacrorum, aut sacerdos esset. Lib. xxxix.

As here, the magistrate's care in expelling foreign religions was to prevent clandestine worship amongst the *tolerated*; so at other times, the same care was employed in preventing those foreign religions from mixing with the *established*, as we are informed by Valerius Maximus<sup>t</sup>. But neither in that case, nor in this, was the liberty of *particulars*, to worship as they thought fit, at all infringed, or impaired.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus plainly distinguishes between their *established* and *tolerated* religions. The passage is curious; and will not only serve to confute Mr. B.'s notion, but to furnish us with an opportunity to explain what is further wanting on this matter. The words of this diligent enquirer into the roman constitution, are as follows: "What, above all things, raised my admiration was, that, notwithstanding the vast multitudes which throng from all parts to Rome, who must there, consequently, worship their own country Gods, according to their country rites; yet the city never adopted any of these foreign worships into the PUBLIC religion; as hath been the custom for many other states to do." Whence it appears, 1. That all strangers might freely worship in Rome according to their own way; That such *particulars* as were so disposed, might join with them; and that, besides these *tolerated* religions, there was one *public*, and *established*, which admitted of no foreign mixtures. 2. We are not to understand the author as if his wonder

<sup>t</sup> Lib. i. c. 3.

<sup>v</sup> Καὶ ὁ παῖς μάλιστα ἔγαγε τιθεμάναι, καίπερ μυρίων ὅσων εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐπεληλυθότας, οὐδὲν, οἵ τοις αὐλαὶ αὐτούχη σέβειν τὰς πατρίους θεὺς τοῖς οἰκοθεν νομίμους, οὐδεὶς εἰς Γῆλον ἐλήλυθε τῶν ξενικῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων οὐ τόλις δημοσίᾳ, ὃ τοιλαῖς πότην συνέσθι παθεῖν.

was caused by the Romans having an *established* religion distinct from the *tolerated*; but, for that they mixed, or introduced into the *established* few or no foreign rites; which was the custom in the cities of Greece: for those are the *other states*, which the historian means. But modern writers not adverting to this, When they saw the Roman practice of admitting no *foreign* worship into their *public* religion, concluded wrongly, that they allowed no *toleration*: and when they saw the Greek practice of naturalizing *foreign* religions, by adopting them into their *public* worship, concluded, as wrongly, that they had no *establishments*. 3. The words, Η ΠΟΛΙΣ ΔΗΜΟΣΙΑ, are remarkable: He does not say, the city rejected foreign worship, but, that it admitted not of it *PUBLICLY*; that is, did not bring it into the *public* religion of the State. For, as we observed before, Paganism had two parts, the one *public*, the other *private*: the *state*, as such, was the subject of the one; and *particulars*, as such, of the other. But they admitted of foreign rites *privately*; that is, allowed *particulars* to use them, after the magistrate's licence had been obtained for that purpose. So that the *established* religion, every where, related to the *public* part of Paganism; and the *tolerated*, to the *private* part. 4. The historian observes, that in this conduct Rome differed from many other cities, meaning the Grecian. And indeed, it was less a wonder than he seems to make it: For Rome, rising on her own foundation, independent on, and unrelated to any other state, and early possessed with the high enthusiasm of distinction and empire would naturally esteem her tutelary Gods as her own peculiar; and therefore would reject all foreign mixtures. On the contrary, the Grecian states, related to, and dependent on one another,

would more easily admit of an association and combination amongst their national Deities.

Such was the nature of TOLERATION in the Pagan world ; and this the wise provision of ancient policy, while civil liberty could keep its own. But when now government began to degenerate, and *All*, preposterously to submit to the will of *One* ; when the magistrate came to have a good, distinct from that of the people ; and civil peace was estimated, not by the blessings it produced, but by the degree of subjection it imposed ; then the fashionable scheme of politics began to turn solely on the maintenance of a Tyrant's power : and He having observed, that, though the *toleration* of religion, under the regulations above described, was evidently for the advantage of society ; yet, as those regulations were too apt to be neglected, he thought it best, by an absolute *intolerance*, and a thorough *uniformity*, to cut off all occasions and opportunities of mischief to himself, from private conventicles and conventions.

Agreeably to this system of power, we find Mæcenas, in Dion Cassius<sup>w</sup>, dissuading Augustus from allowing any *toleration* of religion at all : as, an indulgence, in this matter, would indispose men towards the magistrate, and make them less fond of the civil and religious constitutions of their country ; from whence factions, and confederacies against the State would unavoidably arise. He concludes his advice against *toleration* in these remarkable words : ΑΠΕΡ ΗΚΙΣΤΑ ΜΟΝΑΡΧΙΑ ΣΥΜΦΕΡΕΙ ; “as a thing by no means agreeing with “arbitrary power.” And Tacitus informs us<sup>x</sup>, the usurper followed it. Thus, we see, that the

<sup>w</sup> *Lib. Hist.* 52.

<sup>x</sup> *Actum et de sacris Aegyptiis Judaicisque pellendis : fac-*  
*famous*

famous declaration of, ONE KING AND ONE RELIGION, is not a new maxim, for which we are indebted to modern policy.

So noble an original had the principle of INTOLERANCE: and so iniquitous are the adversaries of our holy religion, to throw it upon the *christian Faith*; when it appears to have been the pure offspring of *civil Tyranny*; how well soever it may have been afterwards brought up and nurfed by some Fathers of the Church.

Thus have I attempted to give a plain account of the general methods used by ancient Policy to inculcate and support Religion. Was I to speak, as I once intended, of those which particular Lawgivers and Magistrates employed for the use of their proper societies, I should have it in my power to throw great light upon the argument. But this, tho' the most curious part of the subject, must be omitted at present, by reason of its length. In the mean time, I presume, more than enough hath been said, even in those places which only shew the Legislator's care for religion in general, to prove the truth of the proposition, *That, in the opinion of ancient policy, the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments was indispensably useful to civil society.* For having shewn that the doctrine of a future state was an inseparable part of Pagan religion, and indeed the sole support of it, the proving their care for religion, in general, proves their care for this doctrine in particular. Where, it is worth observing, that, tho' the ancient Lawgivers deviated from truth, and differed from one an-

tumque patrum consultum, ut quatuor millia libertini generis ea superstitione infecta, quis idonea ætas in insulam Sardiniam verherentur, coercendis illic latrociniis, et si ob gravitatem cœli interfissent, vile damnum: ceteri cederent Italia, nisi, certain ante diem profanos ritus exuissent. Tac. *Annal.* 1. ii. c. 85.

other, even in the most important points, concerning *property, marriage, dominion, etc.* yet they unanimously agreed in owning the use, and propagating the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments: And what stronger proof would any one desire of the *necessity* of that doctrine to Religion and Society?

We now see the close connection between *Civil government* and *Religion*. The following observation will still further explain the necessity of this union.

That benevolent spirit of Antiquity, described above, which set their Heroes upon polishing the barbarous manners of their fellow creatures, and imparting to them the blessings of *civil life*, as divine as it appears, hath yet been far exceeded by the charity of these ages, which sends MISSIONARIES into the furthest regions of the east and west, with that inestimable blessing, *the glad tidings of the Gospel*. But nothing is matter of more grief to serious men than the constant ill success of so charitable an undertaking. Something sure must have been greatly amiss, to defeat a design which all nature conspires to advance. This would be accounted for. *Catholic* (as they call themselves) and *protestant* Missionaries go promiscuously to either India. The *Catholics* have laboured most in countries civilized; but, giving a commentitious system for the gospel of Christ, it is no wonder the Pagans should not be greatly disposed to change old fables for new. And tho' the *protestant* Missionaries carry the *genuine Gospel* with them into America, yet they preach it to Savages, with no better success. The reason seems to be because they are *Savages*, without Government or Laws; and consequently of very rude, uncultivated minds. Now Christianity, plain and simple as it is, and fitted in its nature for what it was designed by its author,

author, requires an intellect above that of a mere Savage to understand<sup>y</sup>. Something then must be previous to it. And what is that something but CIVIL SOCIETY? This is not at all to its dishonour. And if it hath sometimes happened, thro' the indefatigable labours of these Missionaries, both of the one and the other communion, that numbers of savage converts have been made, they could never long preserve, or propagate amongst their tribes, the Christianity they had been taught: but their successors have always found the work was to begin anew, and in a little time, nothing left of the other's labours to advance upon. And if what we have said in this book be true, *That religion cannot long subsist without the aid of civil government,* we are not to wonder at it: for, from hence we conclude, they began at the wrong end: and that to make our holy religion rightly understood, much more to propagate

<sup>y</sup> An intelligent missionary seemed to see where the thing stuck, when he says, *Pour ce qui est des conversions, qu'on peut faire de ces gens la touchant l'Evangile, on ne sauroit faire aucun fond sur eux.* Ces sauvages, de même que tous ceux de l'Amerique sont fort peu disposez aux lumieres de la foi, parce qu'ils sont *brutaux et stupides*, et que leurs *mœurs sont extremement corrompues*, et opposées au Christianisme. *Nouvelle Decouv. dans l'Ameriq. Sept. par le R. P. Louis Hennepin Missionnaire Recollect et Notaire Apostolique*, à Utr. 1697. p. 221. The corrupt manners of the savages here complained of, as indisposing them to the Gospel, we find, from this writer and others, are of such a kind as arise only from the want of civil government; and which civil government every where rectifies; such as *rapines, cruelty, and promiscuous mixtures*. Hans Egede, a Danish missionary, who had been five and twenty years in Greenland, in his description of that country, speaks to the same effect: "It is a matter which cannot be questioned (says this sensible writer) that, if you will make a man a Christian out of a mere savage and wild man, you must first make him a reasonable man. --- It would contribute a great deal to forward their conversion, if they could, by degrees, be brought into a settled way of life," etc. p. 211, 12.

and perpetuate it, they should first have taught these Savages the arts of life: from whence (besides the advantages of that previous knowledge abovementioned) would have resulted this further benefit, that men so sensibly obliged, would have given a more favourable attention to their benefactors. As it is, I am afraid these Savages observing in the Missionaries (and they have sense enough to observe that the Europeans keep many things from them which it would be useful for them to know) a total disregard of their temporal concerns, will be hardly brought to think the matters pressed upon them of much importance, or the teachers greatly in earnest. The civilizing a barbarous people is in itself a work of such exalted charity, that to see it neglected, when a far nobler end than the arts of life may be procured by it, is matter of the utmost astonishment<sup>z</sup>. But it is partly owing to this, that many of both missions have had too much of that *enthusiasm* in their temper, which disposes men to an utter contempt of worldly things: they are therefore so far from preaching up the advantages of society, and recommending civil manners, that they are more disposed to throw aside their own; and comply with the dried skins and parched corn of the Savages. While others of them, of a colder turn, and lower form of *superstition*, having taken it into their heads, that the vices of improved life would more *indispose* the Indians to the *precepts* of the

<sup>z</sup> This justice is due to the JESUITS, That they have been wiser in their attempts on Paraguay, and on the coast of California; where they have brought the savage inhabitants to a love of agriculture and the mechanic arts. The mission in California was founded at the expence of a certain marquis de Valero; for which, the reverend person, whose name is to the account of Lord Anson's voyage round the world, calls him a most magnificent bigot.

Gospel, than their present brutality *incapacitates* them from comprehending the *doctrines* of it, have concluded it best, upon the whole, to keep their eyes shut to the advantages of civil life<sup>a</sup>. But without doubt so fatal a conduct arises chiefly from the false and inhuman policy of the European colonies, a policy common to every sect and profession, which makes them do all in their power to keep the natives in a savage state; as suspecting that the neighbourhood of a civilized people would be too unfriendly to their private interests. However, this policy, as bad as it is, has yet something less diabolic in it than that other part of COLONY-RELIGION, which robs the opposite Continent of so

<sup>a</sup> This is the system of *Charlevoix* in the following passage; which is well worth the reader's notice: After having spoken of the shocking miseries attending the uncivilized condition of the Canadian savages, he goes on thus: Il faut néanmoins convenir que les choses ont un peu changé sur tous ces points, depuis notre arrivée en ce pays; J'en ai même vu chercher à se procurer des commodités, dont ils auront peut-être bientôt de la peine à se passer. Quelques-uns commencent aussi à prendre un peu plus leurs précautions pour ne pas se trouver au dépourvu, quand la chasse leur manquera; et parmi ceux, qui sont domiciliés dans la colonie, il y a bien peu à ajouter pour les faire arriver au point d'avoir un nécessaire raisonnable. Mais qu'il est à craindre que, quand ils en feront là, ils n'ail-  
lent bientôt plus loin, et ne donnent dans un superflu, qui les rende plus malheureux encore, qu'ils ne sont présentement dans le sein de la plus grande indigence. Ce ne sera pas au moins les missionnaires, qui les exposent à ce danger; persuadés qu'il est moralement impossible de bien prendre ce juste milieu, et de s'y borner, ils ont beaucoup mieux aimé partager avec ces peuples ce qu'il y a de pénible dans leur manière de vivre, que de leur ouvrir les yeux sur les moyens d'y trouver des adoucissements. Aussi ceux-mêmes, qui sont tous les jours témoins de leurs souffrances, ont-ils encore bien de la peine à comprendre comment ils y peuvent résister, d'autant plus qu'elles sont sans relâche, et que toutes les fois ont leurs incommodités particulières. *Journal Histor. d'un voyage dans l'Ameriq. Septent.* vol. vi. p. 57, 58.

many thousands of our species, for a yearly sacrifice to their great idol, GAIN. Be this as it will, I dare venture to foretell, that no great good will ever come of these missions, till the two projects of *civilizing* and *saving* be joined in one.

As the matter stands at present, the forests of north and south America are good for little but to be made nurseries for FREE-THINKERS. The inhabitants, by following simple nature, are already in possession of that blessing, vainly wish'd for by this Theologico-political-philosophy at home ; namely the removal of all religious prejudices from the education of their children. A learned voyager, who has been lately on a mathematical mission to the Equator, describes this happy and envied condition in very emphatic terms ; which the reader may find below <sup>b</sup>. What crops of *Free-thinking* may not be expected from so happy a climate ! But our philo-

<sup>b</sup> — J'ai cru reconnoître dans tous [les Indiens Américains, quoique différentes en langues, mœurs, et coûumes] un même fonds de caractère. L'insensibilité en fait le base. Je laisse à décider si on la doit honorer du nom d'apathie ; ou l'avilir par celui de stupidité. Elle naît sans doute du petit nombre de leurs idées, qui ne s'étend pas au delà de leurs besoins. Gloutons jusqu'à la voracité, quand ils ont de quoi se satisfaire ; sobres, quand la nécessité les y oblige, jusqu'à se passer de tout, sans paroître rien désirer ; pusillanimes et poltrons à l'excès, si l'ivresse ne les transporte pas ; ennemis du travail, indifférens à tout motif de gloire, d'honneur, ou de reconnaissance ; uniquement occupés de l'objet présent, et toujours déterminés par lui ; sans inquiétude pour l'avenir ; incapables de prévoyance et de réflexion ; se livrant, quand rien ne les gêne, à une joie puerile, qu'ils manifestent par des sauts et des éclats de rire immodérés, sans objet et sans dessein ; ils passent leur vie sans penser, et ils vieillissent sans sortir de l'enfance, dont ils conservent tous les défauts — on ne peut voir sans humiliation combien l'homme abandonné à la simple nature, privé d'éducation et de société, diffère peu de la bête. *Relation d'un voyage dans l'Amerique meridionale, par M. de la Condamine, p. 51, et seq.*

sophers perhaps on reflection may think their favourite maxim here pushed a little too far. However, this pure state of it may be of use to dispose them to consider further whether the maxim, in the extent they themselves recommend it to be inforced, be perfectly well founded. It is true, a superstitious education is productive of great evils. But what then? If thro' these prejudices the *Omaguas* of the southern continent think it piety at the birth of their children, to flatten their heads, like a cheese, between two boards, that their faces may resemble their Deity, the *full moon*, Should the ridicule of this custom make it thought absurd in us, to bring up our children in the love of justice, of purity, and benevolence, that they may resemble the God of the Christians, whom we adore? Our philosophers will say, so far they are not unwilling to go. What they want, is to have the infant-mind kept free from the deformed impressions of POSITIVE RELIGION. But they must pardon us if we think, that in such minds, precepts are best inforced by *example*; and that the best example is that of the Deity in his dispensations to mankind as delivered by positive religion.

Was the full definition of *man*, a GOOD PHILOSOPHER, and his only business, speculative truth, something might be said in favour of preserving his mind a *rāsa tabula*, till he was himself able to judge what was fit to be written on it. But as he was sent into the world to make a GOOD CITIZEN, in the observance of all the relations of civil, social, and domestic life; as he was born for practice and not for speculation, I should think that virtues, so necessary for the discharge of those relations, could not be insinuated too soon, or impressed too frequently; even tho' the consequence might happen to be, the acquiring

On the whole, then, we see, that the ancient Lawgivers were as much superior to the modern Missionaries in the *execution*, as These are to Them in the *design*. Those sages saw plainly that religion and civil policy were inseparable ; and therefore they always taught them together. The experience of all ages justified their conduct ; and the *truth*, on which they acted, gives us the most transcendent idea of Divine goodness, which hath so closely united our *temporal* to our *spiritual* happiness. The sum of all is this, that whoever would secure Civil government, must support it by the means of Religion ; and whoever would propagate Religion, must perpetuate it by the means of Civil government.

## B O O K III.

## S E C T. I.

**I**N the beginning of the last book, I entered upon the proof of my second proposition ; namely, THAT ALL ANTIQUITY WAS UNANIMOUS IN THINKING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS WAS NECESSARY TO THE WELL BEING OF SOCIETY : And the method I laid down for it, was, 1. To shew the conduct of legislators, and the founders of civil policy. 2. The opinions of the wisest and most learned of the ancient sages.

THE CONDUCT OF THE LEGISLATORS hath been fully examined in the last book.

II. THE OPINION OF THE ANCIENT SAGES, is the subject of the present.

THEY too, as well as the Lawgivers, were unanimous in this point, how discordant soever and at variance amongst themselves, in other matters. Whatever train of Policy the historian followed ; whatever system of Nature the philosopher espoused ; THIS always remained an unquestioned principle. The favourer of arbitrary power deemed it the strongest bond of blind obedience ; and the friend of civil liberty, the largest source of virtue and a public spirit. The atheist, from the vastness of its social use, concluded religion to be but an invention of state ; and the theist, from that confessed utility, laboured to prove it of divine original.

To

To give the reader a detail of the passages, where this truth is owned and supported, would be to transcribe all antiquity : for, with *this* begins and ends every thing they teach and explain of morals, politics, human nature, and civil actions. I shall therefore content myself with two or three passages, as a specimen only of the general voice of ancient Wisdom.

Timæus the Locrian, a very early Pythagorean, well practised in affairs, and, in Plato's opinion, of consummate knowledge in philosophy, discoursing on the remedies to moral evil, after having spoken of the use of philosophy to lead well tempered minds to happiness, by teaching the measures of just and unjust, adds, that, for intractable spirits civil society was invented ; which keeps men in fear by the coercions of Law and Religion : “ But “ if we come (says he) to a perverse ungovernable “ disposition, there, punishments should be ap-“ plied ; both those which civil laws inflict, and “ those which the terrors of religion denounce “ against the wicked from above and from below : “ as, that ENDLESS PUNISHMENTS attend the shades “ of unhappy men ; and all those torments, which “ I highly applaud the Ionic poet for recording “ from ancient tradition, in order to cleanse and “ purify the mind from vice<sup>a</sup>. ”

That sage historian, Polybius, (whose knowledge of mankind and civil society was so celebrated, that Rome preferred him to the august employment of composing laws for Greece, now become a province to the republic,) speaking of the ex-

<sup>a</sup> — Εἰ δὲ καὶ τις σκλαβός καὶ ἀπειθής, τέτω δὲ ἐπέδω κόλασις, ἢ τὸ εἰς τὸν νόμον καὶ ἡ εἰς τὸν λόγον σύνοια ἐπάγοσι δείματά τε ἴπωργία καὶ τὰ καθ' ἄδεια, ὅτι κολάσιες ἀπαραιτητοι απόκενται δυσδαιμονοι νερζέροις· καὶ ταῦλα ἵσται ἐπανέω τὸν λαϊκὸν ποιῆσαι, ἐκ πα-  
λαιᾶς ποιεῦνται τὰς ἐπαγγέλιας. Περὶ φυχᾶς κόσμου:

cellence of the Roman constitution, expresseth himself in this manner : " But the superior excellence " of this policy, above others, manifests itself, in " my opinion, chiefly in the religious notions " the Romans hold concerning the Gods: that " thing, which in other places is turned to abuse, " being the very support of the Roman affairs; " I mean THE FEAR OF THE GODS, or what the " Greeks call *superstition*; which is come to such a " height, both in its influence on particulars, and " on the public, as cannot be exceeded. This, " which many may think unaccountable, seems " plainly to have been contrived for the sake of " the community. If, indeed, one were to frame a " civil policy only for wise men, it is possible this " kind of institution might not be necessary. But " since the multitude is ever fickle and capricious, " full of lawless passions, and irrational and vio- " lent resentments, there is no way left to keep " them in order, but by the terrors of FUTURE " PUNISHMENT, and all the pompous circumstance " that attends such kind of fictions. On which " account the ancients acted, in my opinion, with " great judgment and penetration, when they con- " trived to bring in these notions of the Gods, " and of a FUTURE STATE, into the popular be- " lief; and the present age as inconsiderately, and " absurdly, in removing them, and encouraging " the multitude to despise their terrors. For see " now the difference: in Greece, the man who is " entrusted with the public money (to pass by " other matters) tho' it be but of a single talent, " and tho' he give a ten-fold security in the most " authentic form, and before twice the number " of witnesses, cannot be brought to discharge his " engagements; while, amongst the Romans, the " mere religion of an oath keeps those, who have " vast

“ vast sums of money pass thro’ their hands, either in the public administration or in foreign legations, from the least violation of their trust, or honour. And whereas, in other places, it is rare to find a man, who can keep his hands clean, or forbear plundering his country ; in Rome it is as rare to take any one offending in this kind. That every thing which exists is subject to mutation and decay, we need not be told ; the unalterable nature of things sufficiently informs us of this truth. But there being two ways, whereby every kind of policy is ruined and dissolved ; the one from WITHOUT, and the other from WITHIN ; that destruction, which cometh from without, cannot be constantly avoided by any human provision : but then, there are known and efficacious remedies <sup>b</sup> for those evils which arise from within.”

<sup>b</sup> Polybius says literally, There are two ways by which a state is brought to dissolution, from without and from within : that from without is uncertain and little known ; that from within is known and certain. By which words he must mean what I make him to say, as appears by what he immediately subjoins, where he shews how the power of the Great, when degenerated into tyranny, may be checked by the people : whose opposition to power produces, as it happens to be well or ill managed, either the best or worst form of government, a Democracy or Ochlocracy.

<sup>c</sup> Μεγίστην δέ μοι δοκεῖ διαφορὰν ἔχει τὸ Ρωμαίων πολίτους περὶ τὸ βέλτιον, ἐν τῇ τοῦ θεῶν διαλήψει. Καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τὸ ὀφέλος τοῖς ἀλλοις ἀνθρώποις ὀνειδίζομενον, τέτοιο συνέχειν τὰ Ρωμαίων πολιτῶν λόγῳ δὲ τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν ἐπὶ τοφῆτὸν γὰρ ἐπτείραγώδηται καὶ παρεποκῆται τέτοιο τῷ μέρῳ πατρὸς αὐτοῖς εἰς τε τὰς κατιδίας βίες καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὡς μὴ καταλιπεῖν ὑπερβολὴν. δὲ καὶ διέξειν ἀν πολλοῖς ἦν θαυμάσιον ἐμοὶ γε μηδὲ δοκέστε τὰ πλήθες χάριν τέτοιο πεποιηκέναι. Εἴ μὲ γὰρ ἦν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν πολίτευμα συναγαγεῖν, ἵσως ἀδέν πᾶν ἀναγκαῖον ὁ τοιότερος τρέπετος ἐπεὶ δὲ πῶν πληθύς ἐστι ἐλαφρὸν καὶ πληρὺς ὀπιθεμιῶν παρασόμων, ὅργης ἀλόγος, θυμῷ βίαιος, λεπτὸς τοῖς ἀδηλοῖς φύσεις, καὶ τῇ ποιαύτῃ τραχυδίᾳ τὰ πλήθες συνέχειν. Διόπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ δοκεῖσθαι μετά ταῖς τοῖς θεῶν ἐνοίσαις, καὶ τὰς περὶ τῶν ἐχόντων διαλήψεις ἐπὶ εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν εἴς

This

This long passage deserves our attention, and for many reasons. Polybius was a Greek, and, as all good men are, a tender lover of his country, whose ancient glory and virtue were then fast on the decline, and the Roman mounting to its meridian. The melancholy reflections, arising from this view of things, were always uppermost in his thoughts: so that speaking here of the great influence which religion had on the minds of the Romans, he could not forbear giving his countrymen a lesson, and instructing them in what he esteemed the principal cause of their approaching ruin; namely, a certain libertinism, which had spread amongst the people of condition who piqued themselves on a penetration superior to their ancestors and to the people, of regarding, and preposterously teaching others to regard, the restraints of religion as illusory and unmanly. This he confirms by shewing the strong influence religion hath on the morals of men. But to understand what follows, *of the two ways by which a state comes to ruin, from without and from within*, which seems to be brought in a little abruptly, we must suppose, that those, to whom the historian addresses himself, had object-

τὰ τωλήθι ταξισταγαργάν· τοιλὺ δὲ μᾶλλον οἱ τῶν εἰκῆ καὶ ἀλόγως ἐκβάλλειν αὐτά. Τοιγχέθι χρήσις τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ τοι κοινὰ χειρίζονται, πᾶς δὲ μὲν τοῖς Ἑλλησι, ἐδὲ τάλαντον μόνον τισθῶσιν, αἰσχυνγαφεῖς ἔχοντες δέκα, καὶ σφραγίδας τοσαύτας, καὶ μαρτυρεῖς διπλασίας, καὶ δύνανται τησεῖν τὴν τίσιν· πᾶς δὲ Ρωμαῖος οἱ κατά τε τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἀρεσκείας τοιλὺ τι τωλήθει χειρίζονται δι' αὐτῆς τῆς κατά τὸν ὄργον τίσισε, τηρεῖσι τὸ καθήκον. Καὶ πᾶς δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις σπάνιον ἔσιν οὔρενται ἀπεχόμενον ἄνδρα τὸν δημοσίαν, καὶ καθαρεύσασια πᾶσι ταῦτα πᾶς δὲ τοῖς Ρωμαῖοις σπάνιον ἔσι τὸ λαβεῖν τινα πιστεύειν ποτε τοικαύτην πράξει. Ὅτι δὲ τὴν τίσιν τοῖς ἔχοντις πόχειναι φθορὰ καὶ μελανολή, συζέδον εἰς προσδεῖ λόγος· ικανὴ γάρ η τοῦ Φύσεως ανάγκη πᾶσας τὴν τοικαύτην τίσιν· δυοῖν δὲ τέσσαρα διλων καθ' ἓς φθείρεσθαι πέντε τὰ τοικαύτην ἔχειν συμβαῖται τῷ θεωρίαν· τὰ δὲ οἱ αὐτῶν τελεγμένων.

E Polyb. Historiarum lib. vi. c. 54, 55.

ed, *That it was not the want of piety, but the force of the Roman arms, which had broken the power of Greece; and that this they were to submit to, because all empires have their stated periods.* Let us suppose this, and the political reflection on the fall of states, will have a high propriety, and close connection with what preceded. It is to this effect: I agree with you, says Polybius, that evils, coming suddenly on a State from without, cannot be easily warded; but then, those arising from within, as they are commonly foreseen, have their remedies at hand. Now I take our misfortunes to have proceeded from *these*: for had not a neglect of religion depraved the manners of the Greeks, Rome had wanted both pretence and inclination to invade us; and therefore your trite aphorism of *the mutability of human things* is altogether misapplied.

But had this great man lived only one age later, he would have found large occasion of addressing this very admonition to the Romans themselves; when the same libertine spirit forerun and contributed to the destruction of *their* liberties; and religion had so lost its hold of those, whom, in the time of Polybius, it entirely possessed, that Cæsar could dare, in full senate, with a degree of licence unexampled in antiquity, to declare, that the doctrine of a *future state of rewards and punishments* was all a groundless notion. This was a dreadful prognostic of their approaching ruin.

If this great politician then, may deserve credit, it would be worth while for our *people of condition* to look about them, and compute their gains by such a conduct: those of them I mean, if any such there be, who profess to love their country, and yet as publicly despise the religion  
of

of it. One of them, who did both in an eminent degree, and who would substitute a TASTE, instead of a *future state*, for the government of the world, thus expresseth himself: “Even conscience, “I fear, such as is owing to *religious discipline*, “will make but a slight figure, where this TASTE “is set amiss. Amongst the vulgar perhaps it “may do wonders: a *devil* and a *hell* may pre-“vail, where a *jail* and a *gallows* are thought “insufficient. But such is the nature of the li-“beral, polished, and refined part of mankind; “so far are they from the *mere simplicity of babes and sucklings*, that, instead of applying the “notion of a future reward or punishment to their “immediate behaviour in society, they are apt “much rather, through the whole course of their “lives, to shew evidently that they look on the “pious narrations to be indeed no better than “children’s tales and the amusement of the mere “vulgar<sup>d</sup>.” I will not now ask, Where was the *religion*, but where was the *civil prudence* of this great patriot? For if it be indeed true, as he confesses, that *amongst the vulgar a devil and a hell may prevail, where a jail and a gallows are thought insufficient*; why would this *lover of his country* take off so necessary a restraint on the manners of the multitude? If he says he would not, I ask, why then hath he publicly ridiculed it? Or was it indeed his intention to make all his fellow-citizens MEN OF TASTE? He might as well have thought of making them all LORDS.

So absurd, and pernicious is the conduct of the free-thinkers, even admitting them to be in the right. But if, instead of removing the rubbish of superstition, they be indeed subverting the grounds of true

<sup>d</sup> *Characteristics*, vol. iii. p. 177. edit. 3.

religion, what name must be given to this degree of madness and impiety ?

On the whole, I fear we are in no right way. Whether in the public too we resemble the picture this sage historian hath drawn of degenerated Greece, I leave to such as are better skilled in those matters to determine.

The great *Geographer*, whose knowledge of men and manners was as extensive as the habitable globe, speaks to the same purpose : “ The multitude in society are allured to virtue by those enticing fables, which the poets tell of the illustrious achievements of ancient heroes, such as the labours of Hercules and Theseus ; and the rewards conferred by the Gods for well-doing. So again, they are restrained from vice by the punishments the Gods are said to inflict upon offenders, and by those terrors and threatenings which certain dreadful words and monstrous forms imprint upon their minds ; or by believing that divine judgments have overtaken evil men. For it is impossible to govern women and the gross body of the people, and to keep them pious, holy, and virtuous, by the precepts of philosophy : this can be only done by the FEAR OF THE GODS ; which is raised and supported by ancient fictions and modern prodigies.

\* Strabo's words are — Καὶ φόβος, καὶ απειλὴς, ἢ διὰ λόγων, ἢ διὰ τύπων ἀώρων, “ Fears and threatenings either by words or dreadful forms.” Casaubon, who corrected the last word very justly, has given us no explanation of the allusion in this obscure sentence. I am persuaded, the author had in his mind the dreadful words spoken, and the representations exhibited in the *mysteries*, for the very purpose the author here mentions : οἱ απειλῆς refers to λόγων, and φόβος to τύπων ἀώρων. The reader, who remembers what has been said in the section of the *mysteries*, in the foregoing book, concerning this matter, will be inclined to believe this to be the true explanation.

“ The Thunder therefore of Jupiter, the Ægis of  
 “ Minerva, the Trident of Neptune, the Thyrus  
 “ of Bacchus, and the Snakes and Torches of the  
 “ Furies, with all the other apparatus of ancient  
 “ theology, were the engines which the Legislator  
 “ employed, as bugbears, to strike a terror into the  
 “ childish imaginations of the Multitude.”

Lastly, Pliny the elder “ owns it to be expedient  
 “ for society, that men should believe, that the Gods  
 “ concerned themselves in human affairs; and that  
 “ the punishments they inflict on offenders, tho'  
 “ sometimes late indeed, as from governors busied  
 “ in the administration of so vast an universe, yet  
 “ are never to be evaded.” Thus He, though an  
 Epicurean; but an Epicurean in his senses: from  
 whom we hear nothing of the mad strains of Lu-  
 cretius, “ That all religion should be abolished, as  
 “ inconsistent with the peace of mankind.”

<sup>f</sup> ΟἽ τε πολλοὶ τῶν τὰς πόλεις οἰκεῖων εἰς μὲν προστοπίαν ἀγοῦσαι  
 τοῖς ἡδεῖσι τῶν μύθων, ὅταν αἰκάσωσι τῶν ποιηῶν ἀνδραγαθήματα μεταδί-  
 διηγεμένων· οἷον Ἡρακλέους ἀθλεῖς, η̄ Εὐτέλεως, η̄ τιμᾶς πρᾶξις τῶν θεῶν  
 γεμομένας, — εἰς ἀποδεσπότην δὲ, ὅταν κολάσεις πρᾶξις θεῶν, καὶ φρεσεῖς, καὶ  
 ἀπειλαῖς, η̄ διὰ λόγων, η̄ διὰ τύπων σάρων τινῶν προσδέχωνται, η̄ καὶ  
 πιεσθεῖσι πειρασμοῖς τινας. Οὐ γάρ ὅχλον τε γυμνισμῶν, καὶ παῖδος  
 χρυσαίς πλῆθες ἐπαγγεγεννημένη λόγῳ· διναιὸν φιλοσόφῳ, καὶ προσκαλέ-  
 σαծαι πρὸς βοσκεῖαν, καὶ διστόπηλα, καὶ πίτιν, ἀλλὰ δὲν καὶ διὰ δειπ-  
 θαιμονίας· τέτο δὲν ἀλλοι μυθοποίεις, καὶ περιτίσσαις. Κεραυνὸς γάρ,  
 αἴγις, καὶ τείαινα, καὶ λαμπαδεῖς, καὶ δρακονῖς, καὶ θυρσολογῆται τῶν  
 θεῶν ὄπλα, μύθοι· καὶ πάσα θεολογία ἀρχαῖην ταῦτα δ' αποδέξαντα  
 οἱ τὰς πολιτείας καλαποτάμενοι μοριωδούς τηλες πρᾶξις τές ηπιτίθρονας.

Strabo, Geogr. l. i.

<sup>g</sup> Verum in his Deos agere curam rerum humanarum credi,  
 ex usu vitae est; pœnasque maleficiis aliquando seras, occu-  
 pato Deo in tanta mole, nunquam autem irritas esse. Hist.  
 Nat. l. ii. c. 7.

## S E C T. II.

**B**UT to give this matter its full evidence, it will be proper to set together the PUBLIC PROFESSIONS, and the PRIVATE SENTIMENTS of the anti-ent THEISTICAL PHILOSOPHERS: who, notwithstanding they were for ever discoursing on the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, to the people, yet were all the while speculating in private on other and different principles. A conduct which could proceed from nothing, but a full persuasion that this *doctrine* was the very vital part of piety; and the only support of that influence, which religion hath on the minds of the Multitude.

Now, tho' after reading their *history*, reflecting on their *characters*, and examining their *writings* with all the care I was able, it appeared to me, that these men believed nothing of that *future state* which they so industriously propagated in the world; and therefore on this, as well as other accounts, deserved all the asperity of language with which they are treated by the *sacred writers*; yet the contrary having been long and generally taken for granted, and their real opinions often urged by our ablest divines, as conformable and favourable to the Christian doctrine of a future state; I suspect that what I have here said, will be exclaimed against as an unreasonable and licentious *paradox*.

But, for all this, I do not despair of proving it a real, tho' an unheeded, *truth*: and then I shall hope my reader's pardon for the length of this enquiry, as it is of no small moment to shew the sense antiquity had of the use of a *future state* to society; and as, in shewing that use, I shall be able to clear up a very important point of antiquity,

quity, doubly obscured, by length of time and perversity of contradiction.

But, before I enter on the matter, I shall, in order to abate the general prejudice, explain what is meant by that FUTURE STATE, which, I suppose, the THEISTICAL PHILOSOPHERS did not believe. And this the rather, because the contrary opinion has continued the longer unquestioned, through the lax and ambiguous use of the term. Thus, because it was evident, that all, or most of the theistical philosophers believed, as well as taught, the *immortality*, or rather the *eternity* of the soul, men tied down to the associations of modern ideas concluded that they believed, as well as taught, the doctrine of a *future state of rewards and punishments*.

To make the reader, therefore, master of the question, it will not be unfit, just to distinguish the several senses, in which the ancients conceived the PERMANENCY of the human soul; and to reserve the explanation and assignment of them to their proper authors, for another place.

This permanency was either,

- I. A SIMPLE EXISTENCE after this life: or,
- II. EXISTENCE IN A STATE OF REWARD AND PUNISHMENT, according to men's behaviour here.

Each of these was two-fold.

*Simple existence* was either,

- I. AN IMMEDIATE REFUSION OF THE SOUL, ON DEATH, INTO THE UNIVERSAL NATURE OR TO'EN, FROM WHENCE IT PROCEEDED:

Or, II. A CONTINUANCE OF ITS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT EXISTENCE, ON DEATH, FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD, BEFORE ITS REFUSION INTO THE TO'EN, IN A SUCCESSIVE TRANSITION

THROUGH VARIOUS ANIMALS, BY A NATURAL AND FATAL, NOT MORAL DESIGNATION.

*Existence in a state of rewards and punishments was either,*

I. A STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, IMPROPERLY SO CALLED; WHERE HAPPINESS AND MISERY WERE THE NATURAL AND NECESSARY CONSEQUENCES OF VIRTUE AND VICE; NOT POSITIVELY SO, OR BY THE FREE DESIGNATION OF WILL:

Or, II. A STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, PROPERLY SO CALLED; WHERE THE HAPPINESS AND MISERY CONSEQUENT ON VIRTUE AND VICE, WERE THE POSITIVE AND FREE DESIGNATION OF WILL, AND NOT THE NECESSARY CONSEQUENCES OF THINGS.

The LAST is that notion of a future state, so useful to society, which all the lawgivers, priests, and philosophers publicly taught and propagated; and which the people throughout the whole earth universally believed. Of this, the METEMPSYCHOSIS was an inseparable part; and, what is more, continues to be so to this very day, amongst all the civilized Gentiles of the East.

It is A FUTURE STATE, then, OF REWARDS and PUNISHMENTS IN GENERAL, and particularly the second and proper notion of it, (for as to the first, it was peculiar to the Platonists) which I pretend to prove the ancient philosophers did not believe.

But before I proceed to explain the principles of each sect, it will not be improper to premise those GENERAL REASONS, which induced me to think that the philosophers did not always believe what they taught: And that they taught this doctrine without believing it. And as the reader's chief prejudice, on this

this point, ariseth from the philosophers' having talked and written so much in behalf of a future state of rewards and punishments ; the three first of the following general reasons will shew, 1. That they all thought it allowable to say one thing, and think another. 2. That they perpetually practised what they thus professed to be lawful. And 3. That they practised it on the very point in question.

I. My first general reason was, that *the ancient sages held it lawful, for the public good, to say one thing when they thought another.*

We have described the times of antiquity very ill, if it does not appear, from what is here said, that each people had the most religious regard to the laws and constitutions of their country. What raised this veneration (natural to all men, accustomed to a form of policy) to such a height, was the popular prejudice in favour of their original. For, we have seen, the founders pretended to receive their respective institutions from some PATRON GOD. At the same time, with the *civil policy*, they established the *national religion*; whose principal rites were objective to the *patron God*; which gave occasion to the PUBLIC PART OF RELIGION, explained above : whereby, the State, as such, became the subject of religious worship.

This making the *national religion* one of the most necessary and essential parts of *civil government*, it would become a general maxim, not only of mere politicians, but of all the best and wisest of those times, THAT EVERY ONE SHOULD CONFORM TO THE RELIGION OF HIS COUNTRY. We see, by the behaviour of Socrates himself how much men were possessed with the fitness and importance of this rule. That excellent man, who made it the business of his life to search out, and expose

the errors of human conduct, was most likely to detect the folly of this general prejudice. Yet when he comes to his defence before his judges ; a defence, in which he was so scrupulous that he rejected what his friends would have added of confessed utility to his service, because not strictly conformable to that truth, by which he squared the rectitude of his life ; when he comes, I say, to answer that part of the charge which accuses him of attempting to overturn the *popular divinities*, he declares it, in the most solemn manner, as his opinion, that *every one should adhere to the religion of his country*<sup>a</sup>. If it should still be suspected, that this was only said, as it made best for his defence, let us follow him in his last moments, retired amidst his philosophic friends and followers ; and there we shall find him still true to this *great principle*, in a circumstance which hath much distressed, and still distresses, modern critics to account for ; I mean the requesting his friends to sacrifice a cock to Æsculapius : a piece of devotion, on some account or other, no matter what, due from him, according to the customs of his country, which he had neglected to perform<sup>b</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> And, without doubt, this was amongst the reasons for his declining, throughout the whole course of his life, the study and teaching of *physics*, or *natural philosophy*, which had a direct tendency to shake and overturn one half of the national religion, namely the worship of, what were called, the *celestial Gods*.

<sup>b</sup> We have, indeed, been told of late, that, to his *Cock* he might have added a *Pull*; for that the philosopher was now in a delirium, occasioned by the cicuta, to which, Scribonius I argus attributes this effect. But I apprehend, the eminent persons who then attended the last moments of the expiring philosopher (and must have been well apprised of the nature of a draught, whose legal application to criminals of state had made its effects familiar to every one) would have been the first to observe this symptom, if, indeed, the drug had any such property. Whereas they speak of Socrates as perfectly in

But

But for all this, no one the least conversant in antiquity, will, I suppose, take it into his head that these sages, because they held *every one should adhere to the religion of his country*, did not therefore see the gross errors of the national religions. Why then (it may be asked) this strange violation of truth amongst men who employed all their studies to evince the importance of it, in general, to happiness?

The explanation of the riddle is easy: the GENIUS of their national religions taught them to conclude, THAT UTILITY AND NOT TRUTH WAS THE END OF RELIGION. And if we attentively consider those religions (formed in subserviency to the State) as is occasionally explained in the several parts of this work, we shall not much wonder at their conclusion. And then not rightly distinguishing between particular and general UTILITY; between that which ariseth from the illegitimate and the legitimate, administration of civil policy, they universally embraced this other false conclusion, THAT UTILITY AND TRUTH DO NOT COINCIDE<sup>c</sup>. From this latter principle, a third necessarily arose, THAT IT WAS LAWFUL AND EXPEDIENT TO DECEIVE FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD. This all the ancient philosophers embraced: and Tully, on the authority of Plato, thinks it so clear, that he calls the doing otherwise NEFAS, a horrid wickedness. The famous Scævola, the Roman pontiff, frankly declares his opinion, as St. Austin tells us, "that

his senses when he made this request; and I think *They* are rather to be relied on who understood what related both to the sacrifice and the drug, than *They* who know so little of either; especially as we find this rite was exactly suitable to the foregoing declaration of CONFORMITY, in his defence before his judges.

<sup>c</sup> See the contrary proposition proved towards the begining of the sixth section of the third book.

" societies should be deceived in religion <sup>d</sup>." The last mentioned author goes on : " Varro, speaking of religions, says plainly, that there are many TRUTHS which it is not EXPEDIENT the vulgar should know ; and many FALSHOODS which yet it is useful for the people to receive as truths <sup>e</sup>." Upon which the Father remarks, " Here you have the whole arcana of state <sup>f</sup>." As we go along, we shall find this maxim universally received by the theistical philosophers.

I would only observe, that it appears from hence, that the principles, which induced the ancient sages to deem it lawful to LYRE or deceive for the public good, had no place in the nature, or in the consonant propagation of the JEWISH and CHRISTIAN religions.

II. My second general reason was, that the ancient sages did actually say one thing when they thought another. This appears from that general practice in the Greek philosophy, of a TWOFOLD DOCTRINE ; the EXTERNAL and the INTERNAL ; a vulgar and a secret <sup>g</sup>. The first openly taught to all ; and the second confined to a select number. Nor were they different doctrines or subjects, but one and the

<sup>d</sup> Expedire existimat falli in religione civitates. *De Civ. Dei*, I. iv. c. 10.

<sup>e</sup> Varro de religionibus loquens, evidenter dicit, multa esse VERA, quæ vulgo scire non sit UTILE ; multaque, quæ tametsi falsa sint, aliter existimare populum expediat.

<sup>f</sup> Hic certe totum consilium prodidit SAPIENTIUM, per quos civitates et populi regerentur.

<sup>g</sup> If this truth had not the direftest proof, or needed any other than what is given above, it might be supported by the very language used in speaking of the philosophers — οἱ τὸν Πλάτωνα ἡγεμόνη μυσταγογίαι. Marinus in *Vita Procli*. — ἐπὶ τὸν Αριστοτέλης τοῖς μυστήσιαι. Themist. in *Patr. ob.* Now what initiation or what mystery could there be in a fact that had nothing to hide, and to communicate, with discretion ? And how was this management to be carried on but by presenting one thing for another ?

same that was handled thus differently ; viz. popularly and scientifically, according to OPINION, or according to TRUTH<sup>h</sup>.

PARMENIDES, we are told, had two doctrines concerning the nature of the universe ; one, in which he taught that the world had been *made* and would be *destroyed* ; another, in which he said, it was *ungenerated*, and would never be *dissolved* ; and that the first was his PUBLIC and the second was his PRIVATE teaching<sup>i</sup>.

<sup>h</sup> Duplex enim erat doctrinæ genus apud antiquas gentes, ὅποις καὶ ἀπόρεξιστοι, doctrina vulgaris & doctrina arcana ; idque non tantum ob diversitatem materiæ, sed eandem sœpe materiam dupli modo tractabant, populari & philosophica. *Archæol. Phil.* 1. i. c. 8.—See this matter explained at large by the very learned author of the *Critical inquiry into the opinions and practice of the ancient philosophers*, etc. second edit. Chap. xi, xii, and xiii.

<sup>i</sup> “ The author of the philosophical piece commonly ascribed to Origen, says, *That he sometimes complied with the popular opinion, and declared that the universe would be one day destroyed.* Καὶ Παρμενίδης ἐν μὲν τῷ πᾶν ὑποτύπῳ, ΑΙΔΙΟΝ ΤΕ, καὶ αὐγέντοις, καὶ σφυροῖδες· εἰδὲ αὐτὸς ΕΚΦΕΥΓΩΝ ΤΗΝ ΤΩΝ πολλῶν ΔΟΞΑΝ, τῷρ λέγων καὶ γῆν ΤΑΣ ΤΟΥ ΠΑΝΤΟΣ ΑΡΧΑΣ, τὴν μὲν γῆν, ὡς ἔλην τὸ δὲ τέλος, ὡς αἴτιον, καὶ τοιοῦ ΤΟΝ ΚΟΣΜΟΝ ΕΙΠΕ ΦΘΕΙΡΕΣΘΑΙ. It appears too from this passage that he spoke popularly, when he said that the world was made, or had a beginning ; and that this doctrine was merely popular may be seen too from the following words of Themistius. Καὶ γὰρ ὁ Παρμενίδης ἐν τοῖς ἀρὸς δόξαι, τὸ Σεργίου ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ φυχεῖν ἀεράς, ὃν τὸ μὲν πῦρ, τὸ δὲ γῆν προσαγορεύει. It is then evident from these passages that, in his exoterics, he gave the world both a beginning and an end. But then in his other writings he denied that it had either. I need not quote Cicero, Plutarch, or Eusebius to prove this ; the following verses of his own are sufficient for my present purpose.

“ Αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητοι μεγάλων ἐν πείραστοι δεσμοῖς

“ Εγιν ΑΝΑΡΧΟΝ, ΑΠΑΥΓΣΤΟΝ, ἐπεὶ ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ καὶ ΟΛΕΘΡΟΣ

“ Τῆς μαζὸς ἐπλακήθησαν, ἀπώτε δὲ τίσις αἰλυτής.

See the *Critical enquiry into the opinions and practice of the ancient philosophers*, p. 225. 2d edit.

That

That PLATO followed the same practice, we learn from his own words, who, in a letter to his friends, says, according to Dr. Bentley's translation <sup>k</sup>, " As for the symbol or private note you desire, to know my serious letters, and which contain my real sentiments, from those that do not, know and remember that GOD begins a serious letter, and GODS one that is otherwise!" Now had not Plato used the *exoteric* doctrine, or delivered things not corresponding to the real sentiments of his mind, what occasion had his friends to desire this private mark or symbol to know when he was in earnest?

GALEN says, " Plato declares that animals have constantly a soul, which serves to animate and inform their bodies: as for stones, wood, and what we commonly call the inanimate parts of the creation; all these, he says, are quite destitute of soul. And yet in his Timæus, where he explains his principles to his disciples and selected friends, he there gives up the common notion, declares that there is a soul diffused thro' the universe, which is to actuate and pervade every part of it. Now we are not to imagine that in this case he is INCONSISTENT with himself, or maintains contrary doctrines, any more than Aristotle and Theophrastus are to be charged with contradiction, when they delivered to their disciples their acroatic doctrines, and to the vulgar, principles of another nature <sup>m</sup>." And, in the communication

<sup>k</sup> See the Doctor's Remarks on the disc. of free-thinking, etc.

<sup>l</sup> Περὶ δὲ ὅν τὴν ἔνδον τῆς περὶ τὰς ἐπιστολὰς, ὅσας τε ἀν ἐπιστολῶν ΣΠΟΙΔΗ ΚΑΙ ΟΣΑΣ ΑΝ ΜΗ, οἵματα μὲν σε μόρφωσιν ἔμας δ' ἐνοῖσι, τῇ τάντον περισσεψέ τὸν νέντην πλάνον γὰρ οἱ κολαύνοντες γεάφειν, οἷς δ' ἔχοντο φανεῖσας διαθεῖσται τὰς μὲν γὰρ σπερδαίας ἐπιστολῆς Θεοῖς σέργει, Θεοῖ δὲ τῆς ἡπτετοκτονίας.

<sup>m</sup> Πλάτων μὲν αὐτὸς ἔμβλυχα μηδὲ λέγει τὰ ξύλα, τὰ ξύλας δὲ,

of their *acroatics* or *arcane* opinions, the philosophers were as cautious as the teachers of the *mysteries* were in theirs: and set about it with the same solemnity<sup>n</sup>.

SYNESIUS, a thorough Platonist, and scarce more than half a Christian, who perfectly well understood all the intrigues of Pagan philosophy, delivers it as the plain consequence of the practice of the *double doctrine*, that “philosophy, when it has “attained the truth, allows the use of **LIES AND FCTIONS**.”

After this, it will hardly need to be observed, That their *external* doctrine was, either the invention of fables, or the propagation of what they held to be false: and their *internal*, the delivery of what they held or discovered to be the truth: Yet because a remarkable passage of MACROBIUS will, together with the proof of this point, tend to the further illustration of the general subject we are upon, I shall give it at large. — “ Yet it is “to be understood (says this author) that the PHILOSOPHERS did not admit into every kind of “disputation, the false and fabulous, whether of “their own invention or of public allowance<sup>p</sup>,

ἡ τὰς πλαστὰς καὶ τὰ ξύνα, καὶ καθίκε φάσις τὰ φύτα πάλιν τὰν αὐθοχῶν σαρπιτῶν ἐῇ φυτῶν αὐλή ὅταν ἐν Πιμαίῳ τὸν φυσικὸν διεργίαν ἀπορρίψῃς, καλανδεῖν ἐπιτηρουντεῖς, λόγοις διαμένουσι, διαχωρίσας τὴν τοῦτον δοκεῖσθαι, εἰς ἔλον τὸν κίσμον ἐπέτρεψας λέγει τὸν φυρκῶν αὐτῆς Σφραγίαν, ἐν γένει τότο νηρίζειν ἐῇ ταῦτας ἑκατὸν τριακοσία λέγοιτο, ὡστε τὸν Ἀριστοτέλης ή Θεορεῖσθαι, τὰ μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς γεγαφίστα, τὰς δὲ αἰρεσίστας τοῖς ἵταιροις. Galeni De substantia naturalium facilitation fragmentum.

“ And in the same form of words :

Φεγγόματι δὲ θέμις ἐστι, Συζητεῖ δὲ ἐπίθεσις βιβλίοις.

So Porphyry in Eusebius introduces his internal doctirines.

<sup>o</sup> Νῦν ἐν φιλόσοφοι ἐποίησεν ἀντανθέτες συντιχωσεῖ τῇ ξενίᾳ τῷ ΦΕΥΔΕΣΘΑΙ. Epist. cv.

<sup>f</sup> The text says, *fabulosa vel licita*. The two last words are found in all the old editions : the more modern, for an obvi-

“ but

“ but only in those which treated of the SOUL, or  
 “ of ETHERIAL POWERS, or of the OTHER GODS <sup>q</sup>.  
 “ But when their discourse ventured to raise itself  
 “ to GOD, the origin and principle of all things,  
 “ Him whom the Greeks call the GOOD and the  
 “ FIRST CAUSE ; or to MIND <sup>r</sup>, which the Greeks call  
 “ ΝΟΥΣ, the offspring of the supreme God, which  
 “ contains the original species of things called  
 “ IDEAS, when these things, I say, MIND and the  
 “ SUPREME GOD, are the subjects, then all fable  
 “ and falsehood is banished from the discourse.  
 “ But still let us observe, that if, on these sub-  
 “ jects, their discourse leads them to inculcate  
 “ DOCTRINES, which not only exceed the power of  
 “ speech, but even human ideas and cogitations,  
 “ they then fly to allusions, similitudes, and fi-  
 “ gures. — But then again, on the other hand,  
 “ when the discourse is of the first kind, that is,  
 “ concerning the GODS and the HUMAN SOUL,  
 “ where fable and falsehood are employed, the phi-  
 “ losophers have had recourse to this method, not  
 “ out of an idle or fantastic humour, or to please

ous reason, dropt them. Gronovius takes notice of the fraud, and restores them to their place ; but, in order, finally, to degrade them, on a fair hearing : which he does, and puts *vel ficta* in their place. But *licita* is, I believe, Macrobius's own word, and signifies, those theological fables allowed of by public authority. So that *fabulosa vel licita* means, either such fables as the philosophers invented; or such as they borrowed from the popular belief.

<sup>q</sup> The text says — *de acriis & etheriisve potestatibus*; by which the author means, the first natural Gods of Gentilism, the heavenly bodies ; as by — *vel de ceteris Dis*, he means, the second class of false gods, *dead men deified*.

<sup>r</sup> — *ad mentem*. By mind, the author here means the third hypostasis of the Platonic trinity, called *νοῦς*; or *λόγος*. For he takes his example, of what he says, of the conduct of the philosophers, from Plato ; and illustrates an observation of his own, in this place, by a passage in that philosopher.

“ their

" their audience by an agreeable amusement; but  
 " because they know that a naked and open ex-  
 " position of NATURE<sup>s</sup> is injurious to her; who,  
 " as she hides the knowledge of herself from  
 " gross and vulgar conceptions, by the various  
 " covering and disguise of Forms, so it is her  
 " pleasure, that her priests, the philosophers,  
 " should treat her secrets in fable and allegory.  
 " And thus it is even in the sacred *mysteries*,  
 " where the secret is hid, even from the ini-  
 " tiated, under figurative and scenical repre-  
 " sentations<sup>t</sup>. And while princes and magi-  
 " strates only, with Wisdom<sup>v</sup> for their guide, are  
 " admitted to the naked truth<sup>w</sup>; the rest may be  
 " well content with outside ornaments, which, at the  
 " same time that they excite the beholder's rever-  
 " ence and veneration<sup>x</sup>, are contrived to secure  
 " the dignity of the secret, by hiding it under  
 " that cover from the knowledge of the Vulgar<sup>y</sup>."

<sup>s</sup> — *quia sciunt inimicam esse naturæ apertam nudamque expositionemque sui.* He alludes here to the danger of explaining openly the physical nature of the heavenly bodies, because it would unsettle one half of vulgar polytheism. So Anaxagoras was accused, and some say convicted, of a capital crime for holding the sun to be a mere material mass of fire.

<sup>t</sup> — *figurarum cuniculis operiuntur*, i. e. *cuniculis figurarum ad representationem aptis.* It alludes to the allegorical shews of the *mysteries* represented in subterraneous places.

<sup>v</sup> — *Sapientia interprete*; *Wisdom* is here put into the office of *hiereophant* of the *mysteries*, who instructed the initiated in the *secret*.

<sup>w</sup> — *summatibus tantum viris veri arcani consciis.* By these Macrobius means, heroes, princes, and legislators: alluding to their old practice of seeking initiation into the greater *mysteries*.

<sup>x</sup> *Contenti sint reliqui ad venerationem figuris etc.* is equivalent to *Contenti sint reliqui aptis venerationi figuris.*

<sup>y</sup> *Sciendum est tamen non in omnem disputationem philosophos admittere fabulosa vel licita, sed his uti solent, vel cum de ANIMA, vel de aëriis ætheriisve potestatibus, vel de ceteris Dis, loquuntur.* Ceterum cuin ad *summum et principem omnium Deum*,

The first observation I shall make on this long passage is, that the SAME SUBJECT, namely, the *nature of superior beings*, was handled in a TWO-FOLD manner: *exoterically*; and then the discourse was of the *national gods*: *esoterically*; and then it was of the *first cause of all things*. 2. That the *exoteric* teaching admitted fable and falsehood, *fabulosa vel licita*: the *esoteric*, only what the teacher believed to be true, *nihil fabulosum penitus*. 3. That what was taught the Vulgar concerning the *HUMAN SOUL* was of the *exoteric* kind. 4. That the teaching *of fables* was one thing; and the teaching *in fables*, or by figurative expressions, quite another: the first being the cover of *error*; the second the vehicle of *truth*: that the passions and prejudices of men made the *first* necessary; that the *latter* became unavoidable thro' the weakness of human conception. This distinction was useful and seasonable, as the not attending to it, in those late times, in which Macrobius wrote, was the occasion of men's confound-

qui apud Græcos ταγχθον, qui περιτον αιτιον nuncupatur, tractatus se audet attollere; vel ad mentem quam Græci νηυ appellant, originales rerum species, quæ ιδεαι dictæ sunt, continentem, ex summo natam et profectam Deo: cum de his, inquam, loquuntur, summo Deo et mente nihil fabulosum penitus attingunt. Sed si quid de his assignare conantur, quæ non sermonem tantummodo, sed cogitationem quoque humanam superant, ad similitudines et exempla configuiunt — De *Dīs* autem, ut dixi, *ceteris*, et de *anima* non frustra se, nec, ut oblectent, ad fabulosa convertunt; sed quia sciunt inimicam esse naturæ apertam nudamque expositionem sui: quæ sicut vulgaribus hominum sensibus intellectum sui vario rerum tegmine operimentoque subtraxit; ita a prudentibus arcana sua voluit per fabulosa tractari. Sic ipsa mysteria figurarum cuniculis operiuntur, ne vel hæc adeptis nuda rerum talium se natura præbeat: sed summatibus tantum viris, Sapientia interprete, veri arcani consciis; contenti sint reliqui ad venerationem figuris defendantibus a vilitate secretum. In *Somn. Scip.* lib. i. c. 2.

ing these two ways of teaching, with one another.

From all this it appears, that a right conception of the nature of the DOUBLE DOCTRINE was deemed the TRUE KEY to the ancient Greek philosophy.

On which account several writers of the lower ages composed discourses ON THE HIDDEN DOCTRINES OF THE PHILOSOPHERS<sup>2</sup>. But as these, which would have given much light to the subject, are not come down to us, we must be content to feel out our way to the original and end of the *double doctrine* as well as we are able. For it is not enough, that this method of teaching was general amongst the Greek philosophers : to bring it to our point, we must prove it was invented for the *good of society*.

The original is little understood. It hath been generally supposed owing either to a barbarous love of mystery ; or a base disposition to deceive. Toland, who made it the study of a wretched life, to shed his venom on every thing that was great and respectable, sometimes<sup>3</sup> supposes this *double doctrine* the issue of craft and roguery ; at other times, a grave and wise provision against the bigotry and superstition of the Vulgar. And a different sort of man, the celebrated Fontenelle, when he calls *mystery*, which is the consequence of the double doctrine, *the apanage of barbarity*, does as little justice to antiquity.

I shall shew first, that those, from whom the Greeks borrowed this method of philosophising, invented it for the service of Society. And secondly,

<sup>2</sup> Zacynthus scripsit τὰ ἀπόξενα τῆς φιλοσοφίας, referente Laertio, Porphyrius τῶν φιλοσόφων τὰ ἀπόξενα, teste Eunapio in ejus vita.

<sup>3</sup> See his *Tetradymus*, in what he calls, *Of the exoteric and esoteric philosophy*.

that those who borrowed it, employed it for that purpose; however it might at length degenerate into craft and folly<sup>b</sup>.

First, then, it is confessed by the Greeks themselves that all their learning and wisdom came from Egypt; fetched from thence either immediately by their own philosophers, or brought round to them by the eastern Sages by the way of Asia. In this, the Greeks are unanimous. Now Herodotus, Diodorus Siculus, Strabo, Plutarch, all te-

<sup>b</sup> One of the *Answerers* of the *Divine Legation* says, “ What “ a noble field would have been here opened for the FATHERS, “ could they have charged the Pagan sages and philosophers “ with the dissimulation which Mr. W. has here done? Could “ they have loaded them with the crime of *believing one thing* “ and *teaching another*, with LYING, with imposing on the credulity of the people; what a display of rhetoric should we “ have had? could there have been a more fit occasion for “ *satire or declamation* — BUT THEY NEVER REPROACH THEM “ ON THAT ACCOUNT.” — Dr. Sykes’s *Exam.* p. 88. Now, reader, cast thine eye upon the following passages from the FATHERS.

ARNOBIUS, speaking of this custom of *believing one thing and teaching another*, says: Nunc vero, cum ALIUD CREDITIS et ALIUD FINGITIS, et in eos estis contumeliosi, quibus id attribuitis, quod eos, confiteimini non esse: et irreligiosi esse monstramini, cum id adoratis quod fingitis, non quod in re esse, ipsaque in veritate censetis. L. iii. p. 109. Lugd. ed.

EUSEBIUS reproaches Plato on this very account: charges him with mean dissimulation for teaching doctrines which he believed to be false, merely out of reverence to the laws of his country. Καὶ τὸ ἀλλό γνώμην δὲ ταῦτα λέγειν τῶν νόμων ἔνεκα διαρρήσθαι παρίσην οὐδολογίας, ὅτι δέοι ἀπομένεις τῷ νόμῳ πιστεύειν αὐτοῖς. Præp. Evang. xiii. c. 1. — ἀλλὰ γαρ τάτων δὲ χάριν ἀποδειπλίσθαι ημῖν ἔτι, δέοι θαύματα τὸν Ἀθναίων δῆμον καθυποχειράπειρον. c. 15.

LACTANTIUS reproves Cicero for the same practice: Cum videamus etiam doctos et prudentes viros, cum religionum intelligent vanitatem, nihilominus tamen in iis ipsis, quæ dominant, colendis, NESCIO QUA PRAVITATE, perfare. Intelligebat Cicero falsa esse, quæ homines adorarent: nam cum multa dixisset, quæ ad eversionem religionum valerent; ait tamen

stify that the Egyptian priests, with whom the learning of the place resided, had a TWOFOLD PHILOSOPHY, the one hidden and sacred, the other open and vulgar<sup>c</sup>.

To know their end in this way of teaching, we must consider their character. Aelian tells us<sup>d</sup>, that in the most early times, the priests, amongst the Egyptians, were judges and magistrates. So that the care of the people must needs be their chief concern under both titles: and as well

*non esse illa vulgo disputanda, ne susceptas publice religiones disputatio talis extinguat: Quid ei facies, qui, cum errare se sentiat, ultro ipse in lapides impingat, ut populus omnis offendat? Ipse sibi oculos eruat, ut omnes cæci sint? Qui nec de aliis bene mereatur, quos patitur errare; nec de seipso, qui alienis accedit erroribus; nec utitur tandem sapientiae suæ bono, ut factis implete, quod mente percepit.* *Div. Instit.* l. ii. c. 3.

St. AUSTIN's account of Seneca is not at all more favourable. Sed iste quam philosophi quasi liberum \* fecerunt, tamen quia illustris populi Romani Senator erat, colebat quod reprehendebat; agebat, quod arguebat; quod culpabat, adorabit. — *Eo* *damnabilius*, quod illa quæ MENDACITER agebat sic ageret, *ut* *populus veraciter agere existimaret.* *De civ. Dei*, l. vi. c. 10.

But this Father concludes all the Pagan sages and philosophers under the same condemnation, for IMPOSING (as Dr. Sykes expresses it) ON THE CREDULITY OF THE PEOPLE, and with satire and declamation enough of conscience, if that will satisfy the Doctor. — *Quod utique non aliam ob causam factum videtur, nisi quia homines velut prudentium et sapientium negotium fuit, POPULUM IN RELIGIONIBUS FALLERE*, et in eo ipso non solum colere, sed *imitari etiam Dæmones*. Sicut enim Dæmones nisi eos quos fallendo deceperint, possidere non possebant, sic et *homines principes* non sane justi sed *Dæmonum similes*, ea quæ vana esse noverant, religionis nomine populis tanquam vera suadebant, hoc modo eos civili societati velut arctius alligantes. *De civit. Dei*, l. iv. c. 132.

<sup>c</sup> Οἱ ἱερῆς — ΔΥΟ ΛΟΓΟΥΣ ἔχομεν, ὃν τὸν μὲν ἱερὸν καὶ προστίθενται —

οἱ δὲ ἐνθυμῆς καὶ πρόχειροι. — Περὶ Ἰστιδῶν καὶ Ὀστεῶν.

<sup>d</sup> *Var. Hist.* l. xiv. c. 34.

\* Alluding to the Stoical wise man.

what they divulged, as what they concealed, must be equally for the sake of Society. Accordingly we find them to have been the first who taught intercourse with the Gods, a future state of rewards and punishments, and initiation into MYSTERIES, instituted for the support of that belief: The *Σπόρητα* of which were the doctrines of the UNITY.

But Plutarch assures us of this truth where he tells us, that it was chiefly to their kings and magistrates, to whom the SECRET doctrines of the college were revealed. “ The kings were chosen “ (says he) either out of the priesthood, or the “ soldiery: as *this* order for their valour, and “ *that* for their wisdom, were had in honour and “ reverence. But when one was chosen out of “ the soldiery, he was forthwith had to the college of the priests, and instructed in their secret philosophy; which involves many things “ in fables and allegories, where the face of truth “ is seen, indeed, but clouded and obscured.”

And in the same manner, and with the same view, the MAGI of Persia, the DRUIDS of Gaul, and the BRACHMANS of India, the genuine offspring of the Egyptian priests, and who, like them, shared in the administration of the State, had all their external and internal doctrines<sup>f</sup>.

What hath misled both ancient and modern writers to think the *double doctrine* to be only a barbarous and selfish art of keeping up the repu-

<sup>e</sup> Οἱ δὲ βασιλεῖς ἀπεδίκυνθο μὴ ἐπ τῶν ιερέων ἢ τῶν μαχίμων, τὰ μὴ δὶς αἰδεῖσαν, τῷ δὲ διὰ σοφίαν, γῆρας ἀξίωμα, καὶ τιμων ἔχοντο. οἱ δὲ ἐπ μαχίμων ἀποδιδεγμένοις οὐδὲν ἐγένετο τῶν ιερέων, καὶ μετεῖχε τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπικεκρυμμένος τὰ πολλὰ μυθοις καὶ λόγοις αἰμοδεξίαις μαρτύροις τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ Διαφάσεις ἔχεσσιν. Περὶ Ι. καὶ ΟΣ.

Steph. ed.

<sup>f</sup> Orig. cont. Cæsium, l. i.

tation of the teacher, was a prevailing opinion, that moral and natural truths were concealed under the ancient fables of the gods and heroes. For then, these fables must have been invented by the ancient sages; and invented for the sake of explaining them, and nothing more. So the learned Master of the Charter-house, taking it for granted that the sages were the inventors of the ancient mythology, concludes that one of these two things was the original of the double doctrine: "It arose either from the genius of antiquity, especially of the orientalists; or else from the affectation of making important things, difficult, and not easily understood at first sight<sup>s</sup>." But that way of allegorizing the ancient fables was the invention of the later Greek philosophers. The old Pagan mythology was only the corruption of historical tradition; and consequently arose from the people; whose follies and prejudices gave birth to the *double doctrine*, to be employed for their service. But what it was that facilitated its use, we shall see hereafter, when we come, in the fourth book, to speak of the Egyptian HIEROGLYPHICS.

*Secondly*, We say, the Greeks, who borrowed this method of the *double doctrine*, employed it, like the Egyptians, who invented it, TO THE USE OF SOCIETY.

1. The first who went out of Greece to learn Egyptian wisdom, were the LEGISLATORS: Or such as, projecting to reduce the scattered tribes, which then over-ran Greece, into civil society, travelled thither to learn the ART OF LAWGIVING, from a people the most celebrated for that know-

<sup>s</sup> Sive id factum fuerit pro ingenio prisorum hominum, maxime orientalium; sive ut ea, quae pulchra erant, difficilia redderent, neque primo intuitu discernenda. *Archæol. Plat.* l. i. c. 3.

ledge. These, as Orpheus, Rhadamanthus, Minos, Lycaon, Triptolemus, and others, concerned themselves with nothing of the Egyptian wisdom, but this only: and received the *double doctrine* along with it; as appears from their instituting the MYSTERIES (where that doctrine was practised) in their several civil establishments.

2. The next sort of men who went from Greece to Egypt for instruction (though the intercourse of the lawgivers with Egypt was not interrupted, but continued down to the times of Draco, Lycurgus, and Solon) were the NATURALISTS; who, throughout their whole course, bore the name of SOPHITS. For now Greece being advanced from a savage and barbarous state, to one of civil policy, the inhabitants, in consequence of the cultivation of the arts of life, began to refine and speculate. But physics and mathematics wholly engrossed the early sophists, such as Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Leucippus. For as these studies were managed systematically and fitted to the vain and curious temper of that people, this, as the post of honour, would be first seized upon. Besides Greece being at that time over-run with petty TYRANTS<sup>b</sup>, the descendants of their ancient HEROES, it was found unsafe to turn their speculations upon *morals*; in which *politics* were contained, and made so eminent a part. All then that this second class of adventurers learnt of the Egyptians, was PHYSICAL AND MATHEMATICAL KNOWLEDGE: and as in the cultivation of this there was little occasion for, so their character, of mere naturalists, made them

<sup>b</sup> Δυνατιστέρας δὲ γνωμένης τῆς Ἑλλάδος, καὶ τῶν χειριάτων τὸν κῆπον ἔτι μᾶλλον ἡ πρότερον παιδεύειν, τὰ πολλὰ τυραννίδες ἐν ταῖς εὐθεστα καθίσασθο, τῶν προσσόδων μετέχοντα γνωμήσαν. Hist. 1. i.

have less regard to, the *double doctrine*. And in effect, we find little mention of it amongst the first Greek sophists, who busied themselves only in these enquiries.

3. The last sort of people, who went to Egypt for instruction, were the PHILOSOPHERS, properly so called. A character exactly compounded of the two preceding, the *lawgiver* and the *naturalist*. For when now, after various struggles, and revolutions, the Grecian states had asserted, or regained their liberties, MORALS, public and private, would become the subject most in fashion. From this time the Grecian sages became violently given to Legislation, and were actually employed in making laws for the several emerging common-wealths: hence Aristotle observed, that, “the best law-givers in ancient Greece, were amongst the middle rank of men.” The first (as well as most famous) of this class, and who gave *philosophy* its name and character, was PYTHAGORAS. He, and Plato, with others, travelled into Egypt, like their predecessors. But now having joined in one, the two different studies of lawgiving and philosophy, a slight tincture of Egyptian instruction would not serve their purpose: to complete their character, there was a necessity of being thoroughly imbued with the most hidden wisdom of Egypt. Accordingly, the ancients tell us<sup>i</sup>, of their long abode there, their hard conditions of admittance into the sacred colleges, and their bringing away with them all the secret science of the priesthood. The result of all was, and it is worth our observation, that, from this time, the *Greek sophists*, (now called *philosophers*) began to cultivate the

<sup>i</sup> Porph. *De vita Pythag.* — Strabo *de Platone*, l. xvii. *Geogr.*  
— Origen *Comm. in Ep. ad Rom.* c. iii.

belief of a future state of rewards and punishments, and, at the very same time, the practice of the double doctrine : which two principles were the distinguishing badges of their character.

Thus, by an intimate acquaintance with the Egyptian priesthood, the Greeks, at length, got amongst themselves a new species of SAGES, whose character much resembled that of their masters. But with this difference, that amongst the Egyptian priests (and so amongst the Magi, the Brachmans, and the Druids) philosophy was an appendix to legislation ; while amongst the Greeks, legislation was but the appendix to philosophy. For philosophy was the *first* acquirest of the Greek sages ; and legislation, of the Egyptian. There was yet another difference ; which was, that, in the *Greek sophist*, the two characters of LEGISLATOR and PHILOSOPHER were always kept distinct, and conducted on contrary principles : whereas in the *Egyptian priest*, they were incorporated, and went together. So that in Greece, the *hidden doctrines* of the *mysteries*, and the *doctrines* of the schools, though sometimes founded by one and the same person, as by Pythagoras, were two very different things ; but in Egypt, still one and the same.

Greece was now well settled in popular communities ; and yet this legislating humour still continued. And when the philosophers had no more work, they still kept on the trade ; and from practical, became speculative lawgivers. This gave birth to a deluge of visionary *Republics*, as appears from the titles of their works preserved by Diogenes Laertius ; where, one is always as sure to find a treatise *De legibus*, or *De republica*, as a treatise, *De deo*, *De anima*, or *De mundo*.

But

But of all the sects, the Pythagoreans and Platonists continued longest in this humour. The Academics and Stoics, indulging to the disputatious genius of the Greek philosophy, struck out into a new road; and began to cultivate the last great branch of philosophy, LOGIC; especially the Stoics, who, from their great attachment to it, were surnamed *dialectici*.

The reader hath here a short view of the progress of the GREEK PHILOSOPHY; which Plato aptly divided into PHYSICS, MORALS, and LOGIC<sup>k</sup>. We have shewn that this was the order of their birth: the study of *physics* and *mathematics* began while Greece groaned under its petty tyrants: *moralis* public and private arose with their civil liberties: and *logic*, when they had contracted a habit of disputation and refinement.

But when now the liberties of Greece began to be again shaken by tyrants of greater form and power, and every nobler province of science was already possessed and occupied by the sect above mentioned; some ambitious men, as EPICURUS, attempted to revive the splendor of ancient PHYSICS by an exclusive cultivation of them; rejecting LOGIC, and all the *public* part of MORALS, *politics* and *legislation*: and, with *them*, in consequence, (which deserves our notice) the use of the DOUBLE DOCTRINE<sup>l</sup>, as of no service in this reform. An evident proof of its having been employed only for the sake of *society*: for were it, as To-

<sup>k</sup> Μέρη δὲ φιλοσοφίας τέσσα, ΦΥΣΙΚΟΝ, ΗΘΙΚΟΝ, ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΙΚΟΝ. Diog. Laert. Proem. § 18.

<sup>l</sup> Clemens Alex. indeed, Strom. 5. says, that “the Epicureans bragged they had their *secrets*, which it was not lawful to divulge;” but this was plainly only arrogating to themselves a *mark* of philosophy, which those, to whom it really belonged, had made venerable.

land pretends, for *their own*, it had found its use chiefly in *physics*; because the celestial bodies being amongst the popular Gods, enquiries into their physical essence would hardly escape the public odium: Plutarch tells us how heavily it fell both upon Protagoras and Anaxagoras<sup>m</sup>. Notwithstanding this, the *first* and the *last* of the *Sophists*, who dealt only in *physics*, equally rejected the *double doctrine*. While on the other hand, the *legislating* philosophers employed *this* very doctrine even in natural enquiries. We are told, that Pythagoras's popular account of earthquakes was, that they were occasioned by a synod of ghosts assembled under ground<sup>n</sup>. But Jamblichus<sup>o</sup> informs us, that he sometimes predicted earthquakes by the taste of well-water<sup>p</sup>.

<sup>m</sup> Ο γὰς τεῶται σαφίσαλόν γε τούτων καὶ θαρράλεωτάλον τοῖς Σελήνης καλανγασμῶν καὶ σκιᾶς λόγων εἰς γραφὴν καταθέρμω. Αὐταξαγόρεας, ἐπ' αὐτὸς ἦν παλαιός, ἔπει ὁ λόγως ἐνδοξώς, ἀλλ' ἀπόρρητος ἔτι, καὶ δὲ ὀλίγων, καὶ μετ' ὀλαβεῖας τινὸς ἡ πίεσις βαθίζων· καὶ γὰς πρεσίχοιο τῆς Φυσικῆς καὶ μελεωδολέσχας τότε καλλιμένης ὡς εἰς αιτίας ἀλόγης καὶ δυνάμεις ἀπεινοῦτες καὶ κατηνακασμένα πάθον Διοτει-  
σοῖς τῷ θεῖον ἀλλὰ καὶ Περιλαγόρεας ἕφυγε καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας εἰρχθέντα  
μόλις πελεποιήσασθε Περικλῆς. *Vit. Niciae.*

<sup>n</sup> *Elian. Hist. l. iv. c. 17.*

<sup>o</sup> *Jamblicus Vit. Pythag. l. i. c. 23.*

<sup>p</sup> One scarce meets with any thing in antiquity concerning Pythagoras's knowledge in *physics*, but what gives us fresh cause to admire the wonderful sagacity of that extraordinary man. This story of his *predicting earthquakes*, has so much the air of a fable, that I believe it has been generally ranked (as it is by Stanley) with that heap of trash, which the enthusiastic Pythagoreans and Platonists of the lower ages have raked together concerning him. Yet a late relation, which I am about to quote, will shew, that altho' posterity could not profit by his knowledge, it has at least confirmed the veracity of this part of his history. Paul Dudley Esq. in the *Philos. Transact. N<sup>o</sup> 437. p. 72.* speaking of an earthquake which lately happened in New England, gives this reasonable and remarkable account of it: "A neighbour of mine that has a Well thirty-six feet deep, about three days before the earthquake, was surprized

It appears then, on the whole, that the *double doctrine* was used for the sake of society ; their high notions of which made them conclude the practice not only to be innocent, but laudable : whereas, were the motive either love of *mystery*, of *fraud*, or of *themselves*, it cannot be reconciled to any of their several systems of *private morals*.

III. My third general reason was, that *the ancient sages seemed to practise the double doctrine, in the point in question.* I have observed, that those sects which joined *legislation to philosophy*, as the Pythagoreans, Platonists, Peripatetics, and Stoics, always professed the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments : while those, who simply philosophised, as the Cyrenaic, the Cynic, and the Democritic, publicly professed the contrary. And just as those of the legislating class were more or less in the practice of that art, so were they more or less in the profession of a future state : as on the one hand, the Pythagoric and Platonic ; and on the other, the Peripatetic and Stoic. Nay in one and the same sect, as the Peripatetic, and the Stoic, when a follower of it studied legislation, he professed this belief ; when he confined himself to private morals, or abstract speculations, he rejected it. Thus Zeno, amongst the Stoics, was a great assertor of it ; while Epictetus openly denied it. And Seneca, who was but a mongrel, seems willing to expose the whole mystery. For in those parts of his writings, where he strictly philoso-

" to find his water, that used to be very sweet and limpid,  
 " stink to that degree that they could make no use of it, nor  
 " scarce bear the house when it was brought in ; and think-  
 " ing some carrion was got into the Well, he searched the  
 " bottom, but found it clear and good, though the colour of  
 " the water was turned wheyish, or pale. In about seven days  
 " after the earthquake, his water began to mend, and in three  
 " days more returned to its former sweetness and colour."

phises,

phises, he denies a future state; and in those, where he acts the preacher or politician, he maintains it; and having, in this character, said what he thought fit in it's behalf, is not ashamed to add: “*Hæc autem omnia ad MORES spectant, itaque suo loco posita sunt: at quæ a DIALECTICIS contra hanc opinionem dicuntur, segreganda fuerunt: et ideo seposita sunt*”<sup>q</sup>. As much as to say, the doctrine was preached up as useful to society, but intenable by reason. One might push this observation from sects to particulars. So Xenophon and Isocrates, who concerned themselves much in the public, declared for it; and Hippocrates and Galen, who confined themselves to natural studies, are inclined to be against it.

This totally enervates what might be urged for the common opinion, from those many professions in the writings of the theistical philosophers, in favour of a future state of rewards and punishments; as it shews that those professions only made part of the EXTERNAL or popular doctrines of such sects<sup>r</sup>. It may likewise help to explain and reconcile an infinite number of discordances in their works in general; and more especially on this point, which are commonly, tho' I think falsely, ascribed to their inconstancy. How endless have been the disputes amongst the learned, since the revival of letters, about what Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoicks held of the soul? But it was not the moderns only who found themselves at a loss; sometimes the ancients themselves were embarrassed.

<sup>q</sup> *Ep. 103.*

<sup>r</sup> Yet neither so obvious a truth, nor the notice here given of it, could prevent the numerous writers against this book from perpetually urging, one from another, those professions in the EXOTERIC writings of the philosophers, as a confutation of what is here delivered concerning their REAL SENTIMENTS.

Plutarch complains heavily of the *repugnances of the Stoicks*: and in his tract so intituled, accuses Chrysippus, now, for laughing at the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, as a Mormo, fit only to frighten women and children; and now again, for affirming seriously, that, let men laugh as they pleased, the thing was a sober truth.

IV. My fourth general reason is gathered from *the opinion which antiquity itself seems to have had of its philosophers on this point*. The gravest writers (as we see in part, by the quotations above, from Timæus, Polybius, and Strabo) are full of apologies for the national religions; that is, for what was taught in them, concerning a providence here, and especially concerning the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments hereafter. They pretend that these things were necessary to keep the people in awe; but frankly own, that, was society composed all of wise men, THE RELIGION OF THE PHILOSOPHERS, which inforces morality by considerations drawn from the excellence of virtue, the dignity of our nature, and the perfection of the human soul, would be a fitter and more excellent way to good. Now, the *national religions*, as they taught a doctrine of a future state, being here opposed to the *religion of the philosophers*, which employed other motives, I conclude, that, in the opinion of these apologists, the philosophers did not really believe *this doctrine*.

V. My last general argument against the common opinion, is collected from an extraordinary circumstance in the Roman history. CÆSAR, in his speech to the senate, to dissuade them from punishing the followers of Catiline with death, argues, "that death was no evil, as they, who inflicted it "for a punishment, imagined, and intended it  
"should

“ should be made.” And thereon takes occasion, with a licentiousness till then unknown to that august assembly, to explain and enforce the *avowed* principles of Epicurus (of whose sect he was) concerning the *mortality of the soul<sup>s</sup>*. Now when CATO and CICERO, who urged the death of the conspirators, come to reply to his argument for lenity; instead of opposing the principles of that philosophy by the avowed principles of a better, they content themselves with only saying, that “ the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments was delivered down to them from their *ancestors<sup>t</sup>*.” From this cold manner of evading the argument, by retiring under the opinion of their Forefathers, I conclude, that these two great patriots were conscious that the real opinion of ancient philosophy would not support them: for nothing was more illogical than their reply, it being evidently *that authority of their ancestors*, which Cæsar opposed with the principles of the Greek philosophy. Here then was a fair challenge to a philosophic inquiry: and can we believe, that Cicero and Cato would have been less favourably heard, while they defended the doctrine of a future state on the principles of Plato and Zeno, so agreeable to the opinions of their ancestors, than Cæsar was in

<sup>s</sup> De pœna, possum equidem dicere id quod res habet; in iuctu atque miseriis, mortem ærumnarum requiem, non cruciatum esse; eam cunæla mortalium mala dissolvere; ultra neque curæ, neque gaudio locum esse. Cæsar apud Sall. de Bell. Catilin.

<sup>t</sup> Cæsar (*says Cato*) bene et composite paulo ante, in hoc ordine, de vita et morte differuit, credo falsa existuman<sup>s</sup> ea quæ de inferis MEMORANTUR. Apud eund. Cicero's reply is to the same purpose: Itaque ut aliqua in vita formido improbis esset posita, apud inferos ejusmodi quædam illi ANTIQUI supplicia impiis constituta esse voluerunt: quod videlicet intelligebant, his remotis, non esse mortem ipsam pertimescendam. Orat. iv. in Catilin. § 4.

overthrowing it on the system of Epicurus? Or was it of small importance to the state, that an opinion, which Tully, in the words below, tells us was established by their ancestors for the service of society, should be shewn to be conformable to the conclusions of the most creditable philosophy? Yet, for all this, instead of attempting to prove Cæsar a bad philosopher, they content themselves with only shewing him to be a bad citizen. We must needs conclude then, that these two learned men were sufficiently apprized; that the doctrine of their ancestors was unsupported by the *real* opinion of *any* Greek *seet* of philosophy; whose *popular* Profession of it would have been to no purpose to have urged against Cæsar, and such of the senate as were instructed in these matters; because the practice of the *double doctrine*, and the part to which this point belonged, was a thing well known to them.

It may be true, that as to Cato, who was a rigid Stoic, this observation on his conduct will conclude only against one *seet*; but it will conclude very strongly: for Cato was so far from thinking that the principles of that philosophy should not be brought into the conclusions of state, where it could be done with any advantage, that he was even for having public measures regulated on the standard of their *paradoxes*; for which he is agreeably ridiculed by Cicero in his oration for Muræna. He could not then, we must think, have neglected so fair an opportunity of employing his beloved philosophy upon Cæsar's challenge, would it have served his purpose in any reasonable degree.

But though Cato's case only includes the Stoics; yet Cicero's, who made use indifferently of the principles of any *seet* to confute the rest, includes them all. It will be said perhaps, that the reason

why he declined replying on any philosophic principle was because he thought the opinion of their ancestors the strongest argument of all ; having so declared it, in a more evident point, the very *being of a God* itself : In QUOD, MAXIMUM EST MAJORUM NOSTRORUM SAPIENTIA, qui sacra, qui ceremonias<sup>u</sup>, &c. But it is to be observed, that this was spoken to the People, and recommended to them as an argument they might best confide in ; and therefore urged with Tully's usual prudence, who always suited his arguments to his auditors ; while the words under question were addressed in the senate ; to an audience, which had at that time as great an affectation to philosophise as Cicero himself. Hear what he says in his oration for Muræna : Et quoniam non est nobis hæc oratio habenda aut cum IMPERITA MULTITUDINE, aut in aliquo *conventu agrestium*, audacius paulo de STUDIIS HUMANITATIS quæ et MIHI et VOBIS NOTA ET JUCUNDA sunt, disputabo<sup>x</sup>.

### S E C T. III.

**H**AVING premised this to clear the way, and abate men's prejudices against a new opinion, I come to a more particular enquiry concerning each of those SECTS which have been supposed to believe the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments.

The ancient Greek philosophy may be all ranged in the ELEATIC, the ITALIC, and the IONIC lines. The Eleatic line was wholly composed of atheists of different kinds ; as the Democritic, the Pyrrhonian, the Epicurean, &c. so these come not into the account. All in the Italic line derive

\* *Orat. pro Milone.*

† Sect. 29.

them-

themselves from PYTHAGORAS, and swear in his name. All in the Ionic, till SOCRATES, busied themselves only in physics, and are therefore likewise out of the question: HE was the first who brought philosophy out of the clouds, to a clearer contemplation of HUMAN NATURE; and founded the *Socratic school*, whose subdivisions were the PLATONIC or OLD ACADEMY, the PERIPATETIC, the STOIC, the MIDDLE, and the NEW ACADEMY.

As to Socrates, Cicero gives this character of him, that *He was the first who called philosophy from heaven, to place it in cities, and introduce it into private houses*<sup>y</sup>, i. e. to teach public and private morals. But we must not suppose, that Cicero simply meant, as the words seem to imply, that Socrates was the first of the philosophers, who studied morals; this being evidently false; for the Pythagoric school had, for a long time before, made morals its principal concern. He must therefore mean (as the quotation below partly implies) that *He was the first who called off philosophy from a contemplation of nature, to fix it ENTIRELY upon morals*. Which was so true, that Socrates was not only the *first*, but the *last* of the philosophers that made this separation; having here no followers, unless we reckon Xenophon; who upbraids Plato, the immediate successor of his school, for forsaking his master's confined scheme, and imitating the com-

<sup>y</sup> Primus Philosophiam devocavit e cœlo, et in urbibus collocavit, et in domos etiam introduxit. *Tuscul. Quæst.* lib. v. And again, *Acad.* l. i. Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnes, primus a rebus occultis, et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi *occupati* fuerunt, evocavisse Philosophiam, et ad vitam communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et vitiis, *omninoque* de bonis rebus et malis quaereret; cœlestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censret, vel, si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum conferre.

mon practice of the philosophers in their pursuit of general knowledge.

However, This, which Socrates attempted in philosophy, was a very extraordinary project: and, to support its credit, he brought in those principles of DOUBT and UNCERTAINTY, which some of his pretended followers, very much abused: For while he restrained those principles of *doubt*, to *natural* things, whose study he rejected; they extended them to every thing that was the subject of philosophical inquiry. This we presume was Socrates's true character: who thus confining his searches, was (and it is remarkable) the only one of all the ancient Greek philosophers, who really believed the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. How it happened that he was so singularly right, will be considered hereafter, when we bring his case to illustrate, and to confirm the general position here advanced.

From Socrates, as we said, came the *middle* and *New Academy*, as well as the *Old*, or *Platonic*. Arcesilaus was the founder of the *middle*; and Carneades of the *New*. Between the principles of these two there was no real difference, as Cicero tells us; and we may take his word; but both, I will venture to affirm, were as real *Sceptics*, as the *Pyrrhonians* themselves: I mean in their *principles* of philosophising, though not in the *professed conclusions* each pretended to draw from those *principles*. For Academics as well as Pyrrhonians agreed in this, “ That nothing could be known; and “ that, without interfering with any sentiments of “ their own, every thing was to be disputed.” Hence the Pyrrhonians concluded, “ that nothing “ was ever to be assented to, but the mind kept “ in an eternal suspense:” The Academics, on the contrary held, “ that the PROBABLE, when found,

“ was

" was to be assented to ; but, till then, they were " to go on with the Pyrrhonians, questioning, dis- " putting, and opposing every thing." And here lay the jest : they continued doing so, all the time of their existence<sup>z</sup>, without ever finding the *probable* in any thing ; except only in what was necessary to supply them with arms for disputing against every thing. It is true, this was a contradiction in their scheme : but scepticism is unavoidably destructive of itself. The mischief was, that their allowing the *probable* thus far, made many, both ancients and moderns, think them uniform in their concessions : In the mean time they gave good words, and talked perpetually of their *verisimile* and *probabile*, amidst a situation of absolute darkness, and scepticism ; like Sancho Pancha, of his island on the Terra Firma.

This I take to be the true key to the intrigues of the Academy ; of which famous sect many have been betrayed into a better opinion than it deserved. If any doubt it, the account which Cicerò himself gives of these people, will satisfy him. He, who knew them best, and who espoused only the more reasonable part of their conduct, tells us, that they held nothing could be known, or so much as perceived : *Nihil cognosci, nihil percipi,*

<sup>z</sup> This was Lucian's opinion of the *Academics* ; and no body knew them better : For, speaking of the happy island, in his *true History*, and telling us in what manner it was stocked with the several sects of Greek philosophy ; when he comes to the *Academics* he observes with much humour, that tho' they were in as good a disposition to come as any of the rest, they still keep aloof in the confines, and would never venture to set foot upon the island. For here truly they stuck ; they were not yet satisfied whether it was indeed an island or not. Το; δὲ Ἀκαδημῶντες ἔλεγον ἐθέλειν μὲν ἐλθεῖν, ἵπέχειν δὲ ἔτι, καὶ ψευστεῖσθαι· μὴ δὲ γὰρ αὐτὸ τέτο τῷσι καλαλαμβάνειν, εἰ καὶ οἵστες τις τοιαύτη ἐγίν. *Ver. Hist.* l. ii.

nihil sciri posse dixerunt — Opinionibus et INSTITUTIS omnia teneri ; nihil VERITATI relinquere deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa esse dixerunt. Itaque *Arcesilaus* negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum<sup>a</sup> : That every thing was to be disputed ; and that the *probable* was not a thing to engage their assents, or sway their judgments, but to enforce their reasonings. Carneades vero multo uberioris iisdem de rebus loquebatur : non quo aperiret sententiam suam (*bic enim mes erat patrius Academiæ ADVERSARI SEMPER OMNIBUS in disputando*) sed<sup>b</sup>, &c.—Proprium sit Academiæ judicium suum nullum interponere, ea probare quæ simillima veri videantur ; conferre causas, et quid in quamque sententiam dici possit expromere, nulla adhibita sua auctoritate, judicium audiendum relinquere integrum et liberum<sup>c</sup>. That, though they pretended their end was to find the *probable*, yet, like the *Pyrrhonians*, they held their mind in an eternal suspense, and continued going on disputing against every thing, without ever finding the *probable* to determine their judgments. And indeed how should it be otherwise, when, as Tully tells, in the case of the same *Arcesilaus*, they endeavoured to prove, that the moment, or weight of evidence, on each side the question, was exactly equal — Huic rationi, quod erat consentaneum, faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias dies jam plerosque deduceret : [diceret] ut cum in eadem re paria contraria in partibus momenta rationum inveniarentur, facilius ab utraque parte assentio sustinerebatur. This they held to be the case, even in the most important subjects, such as the SOUL. And in the most interesting questions concerning it, as

<sup>a</sup> *Acad. Quæst.* 1. i. c. 12, 13.

<sup>b</sup> *De Orat.* lib. i. c. 18.

*De Dicin.* lib. ii. sub fin.

whether it was, in it's nature, MORTAL or IMMORTAL.—*Quod intelligi quale sit vix potest: et quicquid est, mortale sit, an æternum?* Nam utraque in parte multa dicuntur. Horum aliquid *vestro* sapienti certum videtur: *nostro* ne quid maxime quidem probabile sit, occurrit: ita sunt in plerisque contrariarum rationum PARIA MOMENTA<sup>d</sup>.

Thus it appears, that the sect was thoroughly sceptical<sup>e</sup>: And Sextus Empiricus, a master of this argument, says no less: who, though he denies the Academics and Pyrrhonians to be exactly the same, as some ancients affirmed, because, though both agreed that truth was not to be found, yet the Academics held there was a difference in those things which pretended to it (the mystery of which has been explained above) yet owns that Arcesilaus and Pyrrho had one common philosophy<sup>f</sup>. Ori-

<sup>d</sup> *Acad. Quæst.* l. iv. c. 115.

<sup>e</sup> The reader may not be displeased to see the judgment of a learned French writer on the account here given of the Academics—L'on fait voir que l'on doit exclure de ce nombre [des seutes dogmatistes] les nouveaux Academiciens, purs sceptiques, quoy qu'il y ait quelques auteurs modernes qui prétendent le contraire, et entre autres M. Middleton, auteur de la nouvelle Vie du Ciceron Anglois. Mais si l'on examine la source où il a puifié ses sentimens, l'on trouvera que c'est dans les apologies que les Academiciens eux mêmes ont faites pour cacher le scepticisme qui leur étoit reproché par toutes les autres seutes; et de cette maniere on pourroit soutenir que les Pyrroniens mêmes n'étoient point sceptiques. Qu'on se ressouvienne seulement que, suivant le rapport de Ciceron, Arcesilaus, fondateur de la nouvelle Academie, nioit que l'on fut certain de sa propre existence. Après un trait semblable, et plusieurs autres qui sont rapportés—on laisse au lecteur à décider du caractere de cette secte et du jugement qu'en porte M. Middleton. *Diff. sur l'Union de la Religion, de la Morale, et de la Politique, Pref.* p. 12.

<sup>f</sup> Φασὶ μένοι τινες ὅτι οὐ Ακαδημαϊκὴ φιλοσοφία οὐδὲν ἐστι τῇ σχέψει. Οἱ μέρι τι Αρχεσίλαος, οἱ τῆς μίστης Ακαδημίας, ἐλέγοντες εἴται προσάρτους καὶ αρχηγοὺς, τώρα μοι δοκεῖ τοῖς Πυρρωνίοις κοινωνεῖν λόγοις, οὓς μίστης συγένει, τὴν κατ' αὐτὸς ἀγωγὴν καὶ τὴν ἡμεῖς γεν-

gen, or the author of the fragment that goes under his name, seems to have transcribed the opinion of those whom Sextus hints at. “ But another sect of philosophers (says he) was called the *Academie*, because they held their disputations in the Academy. Pyrrho was the head and founder of these: From whom they were called Pyrrhonians. He first of all brought in the Ακαδημία, or incomprehensibility, as an instrument to enable them to dispute on both sides the question, without proving or deciding any thing.”

But now a difficulty arises which will require some explanation. We have represented the *Academy* as entirely sceptical: We have represented Socrates as a Dogmatist; and yet on his sole authority, as we are assured by Tully, did this sect hold its principles of *knowing nothing* and *disputing all things*. The true solution seems to be this.

1. Socrates, to deter his hearers from all studies but that of morality, was perpetually representing the obscurity, in which they lay involved: not only affirming that he knew nothing of them, but that nothing could be known; while, in morals,

*Hypot. Pyrrh.* lib. i. c. 33. Agellius, too, assures us, that the difference between the two sects amounted to just nothing. *Vetus autem quaestio et a multis scriptoribus Græcis tractata est, in quid et quantum Pyrrhonios et Academicos Philosophos interfit.* Utrique enim ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΙ. ἐφελκυοι, ἀποελκυοι, dicuntur, quoniam utriusque nihil affirmant, nihilque comprehendi putant---differre tamen inter se---vel maxime propterea existimati sunt. *Academici* quidem ipsum illud nihil posse comprehendendi, quasi comprehendunt, et nihil posse decerni quasi decernunt: *Pyrrhonii* ne id quidem ullo pacto videri verum dicunt, quod nihil esse verum videtur. l. ii. c. 5.

Ἐ' Ἀλλη δὲ αἱρεσίς φιλοσόφων ἐκλήθη Ἀκαδημαϊκή, διὸ τὸ ἐν τῇ Ἀκαδημίᾳ τὰς διδαχές αὐτὸς παιεῖται, ὃν ἀρξας ὁ Πύρρος, αἴφ' Ἑπιφέλλους ἐκλήθησαν φιλόσοφοι, τὴν ἀκαδημαϊκὴν ἀπάλιν τριῶν εἰσῆγαν, ὡς ἐπιχειρεῖν μὲν εἰς ἐκάτερα, μὴ μίντος διπλαίνεσθαι μποέν. *Orig. Philosophica.* τεξτοὶ Ἀκαδημ.

he was a dogmatist, as appears largely by Xenophon, and the less fabulous parts of Plato. But Arcesilaus and Carneades took him at his word, when he said *he knew nothing*; and extended that principle of uncertainty *ad omne scibile*.

2. Again, the adversaries, with whom Socrates had to deal, in his project of discrediting natural knowledge, and recommending the study of morality, were the SOPHISTS properly so called; a race of men, who by their eloquence and fallacies, had long kept up the credit of physics, and much vitiated the purity of morals: And These being the oracles of science at that time in Athens, it became the modesty and humility of his pretensions, to attack them covertly, and rather as an enquirer than a teacher. This produced the way of disputing by interrogation; from the inventor, called the *Socratic*: And as this could not be carried on but under a professed admiration of their wisdom, and acquiescence in their decisions, it gave birth to the famous Attic Irony<sup>h</sup>. Hence it appears, his method of confuting must consist in turning their own principles and concessions against them, and *advancing nothing of his own*.

Now Arcesilaus and Carneades having, as we say, extravagantly extended the Socratic principle of *knowing nothing*; easily mistook this other, of *advancing nothing of his own*, when disputing with the Sophists, as a necessary consequence of the former; and so made that a general rule for their school, which, in their master, was only an occasional practice.

<sup>h</sup> Socrates autem de se ipse detrahens in disputatione, plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat refellere. Ita cum aliud diceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus est ea dissimulatione, quam Græci εἰρηνίας vocant. Acad. l. ii. c. 5..

On these two mistaken principles was the *New Academy* erected. *Omnia latere in occulto, nec esse quidquam, quod cerni aut intelligi possit: quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri, neque affirmare quemquam, neque assertione approbare*<sup>i</sup>.

They of the *Old Academy*<sup>k</sup>, who came first after Socrates, with more judgment, declined

<sup>i</sup> *Acad. Quæst. lib. i. c. 12.*

<sup>k</sup> Tully assures us that those of the *Old Academy* were Dogmatists, *Quæst. Acad. lib. i. Nihil enim inter PERIPATETICOS et ACADEMIAM illam VETEREM differebat; for that the Peripatetics were dogmatists no body ever doubted.* Yet the same Tully, towards the conclusion of this book, ranks them with the sceptics, *Hanc Academiam NOVAM appellabant, quæ mihi VETUS videtur; for such certainly was the New Academy.* The way of reconciling Cicero to himself I take to be this: Where he speaks of the conformity between the Peripatetics and the *Old Academy*, he considers Plato as the founder of the *Old Academy*: this appears from the following words, *Academ. l. ii. c. 5. Alter [nempe Plato] quia reliquit perfectissimam disciplinam, Peripateticos et Academicos, nominibus differentes, re congruentes: And where he speaks of the conformity between the New Academy and the Old, he considers Socrates as the founder of the Old Academy.* For the *New*, as we here see, claimed the nearest relation to their master. Thus *De Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 5.* he says, *Ut hæc in philosophia ratio contra omnia differendi, nullamque rem aperte judicandi, profecta à Socrate, repetita ab Arceſila, confirmata à Carneade, &c.* But Tully, it may be said, in the very place where he speaks of the agreement between the *New* and *Old Academy*, understands Plato as the founder of the old: *Hanc Academiam novam adpellant; quæ mihi vetus videtur, si quidem Platonem ex illa vetere numeramus; cuius in libris nihil adfirmatur, et in utramque partem multa differuntur; de omnibus quæritur, nihil certi dicitur.* But it is to be observed, that Plato had a twofold character: and is to be considered, on the one hand, as the *Disciple* and *Historian* of Socrates; and on the other, as the *Head of a Sect* himself, and master of Xenocrates and Aristotle. As the disciple, he *affirms nothing*; as the master, he is a *Dogmatist*. Under the *first* character Socrates and he are the same; under the *second*, they are very different. Tully here speaks of him under the *first*, as appears from what he says of their

their master's method of disputation ; easily perceiving that it was adapted to the occasion : and that to make it a general practice, and the characteristic of their school, would be irrational and

him, *nihil adfirmatur, &c.* Plato, in this place, therefore, is the same as Socrates. The not distinguishing his double character, hath occasioned much dispute amongst the ancients ; as the not observing that Tully hath, throughout his writings, made that distinction, hath much embarrassed the moderns. Diogenes Laertius tells us, there were infinite disputes about Plato's character ; some holding that he did dogmatize, others that he did not, 'Εστι δὲ ἀπλῆς σάσις ἐτί, καὶ οἱ μὲν φασιν αὐτὸν δοματιζεῖν, εἰ δὲ οὐ. Lib. iii. Seg. 51. Sextus Empiricus says the same thing, τὸ Πλάτωνα δέν, οἱ μὲν δοματικὸν ὄφεσαν ἐπι, οἱ δὲ ἀπορηματικόν. He then tells you, some distinguished better. Καλὰ δέ το δοματικόν. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς γυμνασικοῖς φασὶ λόγοις, ἐνθα δὲ Σωκράτης εἰσάγεται ἡτοι παιζόντων τινας ἡ ἀγωνίζομενος ἀρετὸς σοφίσας, γυμνασικόν τε καὶ ἀπορηματικόν φασιν ἔχειν αὐτὸν χαρακτῆρα δοματικὸν δέ, ἐνθα παιδάζων, ἀποφαίνεται ἡτοι διὰ Σωκράτες, ἡ Τιμαίος, ἡ τινας τοιότατα. That Tully made the distinction, delivered above, we shall now see. In the Academic questions, he speaks of him as the *disciple and historian* of Socrates ; and, under that character, *nihil adfirmatur*, et in utramque partem multa differuntur, de omnibus queritur, *nihil certi dicitur*. In his *Offices* he speaks of him as different from Socrates, and the *founder of a sect* : and that he is a Dogmatist, and, as he says elsewhere, reliquit perfectissimam disciplinam Peripateticos et Academicos nominibus differentes, re congruentes. His words to his son are : Sed tamen nostra [nempe Academic] leges non multum a Peripateticis dissidentia, quoniam utriusque et Socrati et Platonici esse volumus, i. e. He tells his son, that he would both dogmatize like Plato, and scepticize like Socrates. But Grævius not apprehending this double character of Plato, would change Socrati to Stoici. For, says he, qui dicere potest se utrumque esse voluisse Platonicum et Socraticum ; perinde est ac si scripisset utrumque se velle esse Peripateticum et Aristoteleum. But there was a vast difference between Plato, founder of the Academy, and Socrates ; though none between Plato the disciple and historian of Socrates, and Socrates.—The fortune of this note has been very singular ; and will afford us a pleasant picture of the temper and genius of answerers and their ways. One man writing something about *Plato* and the *ancients* ; and reading what is here said of Plato's dogmatizing, abuses the author for making him a *dogmatist* : absurd.

absurd. But the *middle* and *new*, instead of profiting by this sage conduct of their predecessors, made it a handle to extol their own closer adherence to their master; and an argument that they were returned to his true principles, from which the *old* had licentiously digressed. A passage in Tully will justify these observations; and these observations will explain that passage, which, I presume, without them would not be thought very intelligible. Thus the Roman Orator expresses himself, under the character of his *seft*: *Primùm, inquam, deprecor, ne me, tanquam philosophum, putetis scholam vobis aliquam explicaturum: quod ne in ipsis quidem philosophis magnopere unquam probavi: quando enim Socrates, qui parens philosophiæ jure dici potest, quidquam tale fecit?* Eorum erat iste mos, qui tum Sophistæ nominabantur; quorum è numero primus est ausus Leontinus Gorgias in conventu poscere quæstionem, id est, jubere dicere, qua de re quis vellet audire. Audax negotium; dicerem impudens, *nisi hoc institutum postea translatum ad philosophos nostros esset.* Sed et illum, quem nominavi, et ceteros Sophistas, ut è Platone intelligi potest, lufos videmus a *Socrate*. Is enim percutando atque interrogando elicere solebat eorum opiniones, quibuscum differebat, ut ad ea, quæ ii respondissent, si quid videretur, diceret: *Qui mos cum a posterioribus non esset retentus, Arcesilaus eum revocavit, instituitque, ut ii, qui se audire vellent, non de se quærerent, sed ipsi dicerent, quid sentirent: quod cum dixissent, ille*

And another who had to do, I don't know how, with *Socrates*, and the *moderns*, and reading what relates to Plato's scepticising, is as plentiful, in his ribaldry and ill language, for making him a *sceptic*; while the author was, all the time, giving an historical relation of what others made him; and only endeavoured to reconcile their various accounts.

*contra*<sup>1</sup>. Here Cicero has gilded the false, but artful pretences of his sect: which not only represented their scepticism, as a return to the true principles of Socrates; but would have the dogmatic sects of philosophy, against all evidence of antiquity, the later product of that race of Sophists, with whom the venerable Athenian had to do. But the *Old Academy*, we may be sure, thought differently of the matter: Lucullus says of Arcesilaus, Nonne cum jam philosophorum disciplinæ gravissimæ constitissent, tum exortus est ut in optima Rep. Tiberius Gracchus, qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcesilaus, qui constitutam philosophiam everteret<sup>m</sup>.

However these bold pretensions of restoring the Socratic school to its integrity, deluded many of the ancients; and made them, as particularly Diogenes Laertius, to rank Socrates in the number of the *Sceptics*.

But this is not strange, for it was in the fashion of all the sects to pretend relation to Socrates. Proseminatæ sunt familiæ dissentientes, et multum disjunctæ et dispares, cum tamen OMNES se philosophi SOCRATICOS et dici vellent et esse arbitrarentur, says Cicero. And again, Fuerunt etiam alia genera philosophorum fere qui se OMNES SOCRATICOS esse dicebant: Eretricorum, Herilliorum, Megaricorum, Pyrrhoneorum<sup>n</sup>. The same thing, I believe, *Apuleius*, meant to express, when speaking of Socrates he says,—cum nunc etiam egregii Philosophi sectam ejus sanctissimam præoptent, et summo beatitudinis studio jurent in ipsius nomen<sup>o</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> *De Fin. Bon. et Mal.* ii. c. 1.

<sup>m</sup> *Acad.* i. ii. c. 5.

<sup>n</sup> *De Orat.* lib. iii.

<sup>o</sup> *Metam.* l. x.

On the whole it appears that the Academics, (*middle* and *new*) as distinguished from the Platonists, were mere Sceptics ; and so, like the *Pyrhoni*ans, to be thrown out of the account.

Those therefore which remain, are the PYTHAGORIC, the PLATONIC, the PERIPATETIC, and the STOIC : And if it be found that none of these four renowned schools, (the PHILOSOPHIC QUATERNION of dogmatic Theists,) did believe, tho' all sedulously taught, the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, the reader, perhaps, will no longer dispute the conclusion, THAT IT WAS NOT THE REAL OPINION OF ANY GRECIAN SECT OF PHILOSOPHY.

I. PYTHAGORAS comes first under our inspection. HE is said to have invented the name long after the existence of his profession ; and was, as we may say, the middle link that joined together the *lawgivers* and *philosophers* ; being indeed the only Greek, who was properly and truly both : though, from his time, and in conformity to his practice, not only those of his own school, but even those of the *other three*, dealt much in legislation : In which, his fortune was like that of Socrates, who was the first and last of the philosophers that confined himself to *morals* ; though, in imitation of his conduct, *morals*, from thence, made the chief business of all the subdivisions of his school.

In the science of legislation, ORPHEUS<sup>p</sup>, for whom he had the highest reverence, was his master ; and in philosophy, PHEREKYDES SYRUS<sup>q</sup>.

After he had formed his character on two so different models, he travelled into EGYPT, the fountain-head of science ; where, after a long and

<sup>p</sup> *Jamblichus de Vita Pyth.* c. 151.

<sup>q</sup> *Id. ib.* c. 184.

painful initiation, he participated of all the mysteries of the priesthood.

He had now so thoroughly imbibed the spirit of legislation, that he not only pretended his LAWS were inspired, which most other law-givers had done ; but his PHILOSOPHY likewise<sup>r</sup> ; which no other philosopher had the confidence to do.

This, we may be sure, would incline him to a more than ordinary cultivation of the DOUBLE DOCTRINE. “ He divided his disciples (says Origen) “ into two classes, the one he called the ESOTERIC, the other, the EXOTERIC. For to *Those* he “ intrusted the more perfect and sublime doctrines; “ to *These*, the more vulgar and popular<sup>t</sup>. ” And, indeed, he was so eminent in this practice, that the *secret or esoteric doctrine* of Pythagoras became proverbial. For what end he did it, Varro informs us, in St. Austin, where he says, that “ Pythagoras instructed his auditors in the science “ of legislation LAST OF ALL, when they were “ now become learned, wise, and happy.” And on what subject, appears from a common saying of the sect, that “ in those things which relate “ to the Gods, ALL was not to be revealed to “ ALL<sup>u</sup>. ”

The communities he gave laws to, the cities he set free, are known to every one. And that nothing might be wanting to his *legislative character*, He, likewise, in conformity to general practice, instituted MYSTERIES ; in which was taught, as usual, “ the unity of the divine nature. So Jamblichus : “ They say too he taught lustrations and

<sup>r</sup> *Jamblichus de Vita Pyth.* c. 1.

<sup>s</sup> Οὐτοὶ τὲς μαθῆται διεῖλε, καὶ τὰς μὲν ΕΣΩΤΕΡΙΚΟΥΣ, τὰς δὲ ΕΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΟΥΣ ἐκάλεσαν. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ τὰ τελείτερα μαθήματα εἰπίστευε, τοῖς δὲ τὰ μεῖζωτερα. *Fragm. de Philos.* περὶ Πίθηγ.

<sup>t</sup> Μὴ διὰ πρὸς τάπιας τάπιας ἔηται.

" INITIATIONS, in which were delivered the MOST  
 " EXACT KNOWLEDGE of the Gods. They say  
 " farther that he made a kind of union between  
 " divine philosophy and religious worship; having  
 " learnt some things from the ORPHIC rites; some,  
 " from the ÆGYPTIAN PRIESTS; some, from  
 " the Chaldeans and Magi; and some from the  
 " INITIATIONS celebrated in ELEUSIS, *Imbros*,  
 " Samothrace and Delos; or wherever else, as  
 " amongst the CELTS and Iberians." Nay so  
 much did his *legislative* character prevail over his  
*philosophic*, that he brought not only the prin-  
 ciples<sup>x</sup> of the *mysteries* into the *schools*, but likewise  
 many of the observances; as abstinence from Beans  
 and several kinds of animals: which afterwards  
 contributed not a little to confound the *secret doc-  
 trines* of the *schools* and the *mysteries*. This conformity  
 was, without doubt, the reason why the Crotoniates,  
 or the Metapontines (for in this authors dif-  
 fer<sup>y</sup>) turned his house or *school*, after his death, in-  
 to a TEMPLE of CERES.

Thus the fame and authority of Pythagoras be-  
 came unrivaled over all Greece and Italy. Herodotus  
 calls him, *the most authoritative of philosophers*<sup>z</sup>.

\* — Ἀγύελλαι φὲ αὐτῶν τὸν καθημένος, καὶ τὰς λεγομένας ΤΕ-  
 ΛΕΤΑΣ, τὸν ΑΚΡΙΒΕΣΤΑΤΗΝ ΕΙΔΗΣΕΙΝ ΑΥΤΩΝ (τὸν θεῖον) ἐ-  
 χοῦσα. ἔτι δέ φασι καὶ σύνθετον αὐτὸν τοιῆσα τὸν θεῖον φιλοσοφίαν  
 καὶ θεωρίαν· αἱ μὲν παντὶ τῷ τὸν ΟΡΦΙΚΩΝ, αἱ δὲ παρὰ τῶν  
 ΑΙΓΑΙΩΝ ΙΕΡΕΩΝ, αἱ δὲ παρὰ Χαλδαίων καὶ Μάγων, αἱ δὲ παρὰ  
 τῆς ΤΕΛΕΙΗΣ, τῆς ἐν ΕΛΕΥΣΙΝΙ γνωμένης, ἐν Ἰμβρῷ τε, καὶ Σαμο-  
 θεάκη, καὶ Δήλῳ, καὶ εἰ τι παρὰ τοῖς λοιποῖς, καὶ περὶ τὰς ΚΕΛΤΟΥΣ  
 καὶ τὸν Ἰόνιον. *Jambl. de Vit. Pyth.* § 151.

<sup>x</sup> See Book II. Sect. 4. p. 146, 147.

<sup>y</sup> *Diog. Laeret.* lib. viii. § 17. *Porph. de Vit. Pyth.* N° 4.

<sup>z</sup> — Οὐ τῷ ἀδικεσάτῳ σοφισῆ Πυθαγόρῃ. — lib. iv. § 95. liter-  
 rally, *not of the least authority*: a common mode of expression in  
 the ancient languages. So Homer, in the 15th Iliad, calls  
 Achilles, *ἄχαιον ἀριστοτάτον ἄχαιῶν*, *not the worst soldier of the  
 Greeks*; meaning, we know, the *best*.

Cicero say of him: Cum, Superbo regnante, in Italiā venisset, tenuit Magnam illam Græciam cum HONORE EX DISCIPLINA, tum etiam AUCTORITATE <sup>a</sup>.

And this was no transient reputation: it descended to his followers, through a long succession; to whom the cities of Italy frequently com-

<sup>a</sup> *Tusc. Disp.* l. i. c. 16.—*Honore* refers to his *philosophic* character; and *auctoritate* to his *legislative*. The common reading is, *cum honore et disciplinâ, tum etiam auctoritate*. Dr. B. in his emendations on the *Tusc. Quæst.* saw this was faulty; but not reflecting on the complicated character of Pythagoras, and, perhaps not attending to Tully's purpose (which was, not to speak of the *nature* of his philosophy, but of the *reputation* he had in Magna Græcia) he seems not to have hit upon the true reading. He objects to *Honore*, because the particles *cum* and *tum* require a greater difference in the things spoken of, than is to be found in *honos* and *auctoritas*: which reasoning would have been just, had only a *philosophic* character, or only a *legislative*, been the subject. But it was Tully's plain meaning, to present Pythagoras under both these views. So that *honos*, which is the proper consequence of succeeding in the first; and *auctoritas*, of succeeding in the latter; have all the real difference that *cum* and *tum* require; at least Plutarch thought so, when he applied words of the very same import to the Egyptian *soldiery* and the *priesthood*; to whom, like the legislator and philosopher, the one having *power* and the other *Wisdom*, *auctoritas* and *honos* distinctly belong:—τὸν δὲ αὐδεῖαν, τὸν δὲ ἀρχὴν σοφίαν, οἵσες ΑΞΙΩΜΑ καὶ ΤΙΜΗΝ ἔχουσι. *De Isid. & Osir.* Another objection, the learned critic brings against the common reading, has more weight; which is, that in *honore et disciplina*, two words are joined together as very similar in sense, which have scarce any affinity or relation to one another: on which account he would read *More et disciplina*. But this, as appears from what has been said above, renders the whole sentence lame and imperfect: I would venture therefore to read, (only changing a single letter) *tenuit Magnam illam Græciam cum honore ex disciplina, tum etiam auctoritate*: and then all will be right, *disciplina* referring equally to *honore* and *auctoritate*, as implying both his *philosophic* and civil institutions.

mitted the administration of their affairs<sup>b</sup>; where they so well established their authority, that St. Jerome tells us, very lasting marks of it were remaining to his time: *Respicce omnem oram Italiam, quæ quondam Magna Græcia dicebatur; et Pythagoreorum dogmatum incisa publicis literis æra cognoscet*<sup>c</sup>.

But there are two circumstances, that must needs give us the highest idea of Pythagoras's fame in point of legislation.

1. The one is, that almost every lawgiver of eminence, for some time before<sup>d</sup> and after, as well as during his time, was numbered amongst his disciples: for the popular opinion was, that nothing could be done to purpose in the legislating way, that did not come from Pythagoras.

2. The other is, that the doctrine of the dispensation of providence by a METEMPSYCHOSIS, or transmigration of the soul, though taught in all the mysteries, and an inseparable part of a future state in all the Religions of paganism, became, in common speech, the peculiar doctrine of Pythagoras.

And here the reader will pardon a short remark or two, not a little illustrating the point we are upon.

There is not a more extraordinary book in all antiquity, than the METAMORPHOSIS OF OVID; whether we regard the matter or the form. The subject appears, prodigiously extravagant, and the composition irregular and absurd: had it been the product of a dark age, and a barbarous writer,

<sup>b</sup> Πυθαγόρας δὲ ἀχεὶ πολλὰ καὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ὅτις ἐθαυμάζεται κύτος τε καὶ οἱ συνόντες αὐτῷ ἐτάζοι, ὡς εἴ τὰς πολιτείας τοῖς ἀπειποῦσιν τὰς πολιτείας. Porph. de Vit. Pyth. N° 54.

<sup>c</sup> *Cont. Ruf. lib. ii.*

<sup>d</sup> See the discourse on Zaleucus's laws B. II. Sect. 3.

one might have been content to rank it in the class of our modern *Oriental Tales*, as a matter of no consequence. But when we consider it as written when Rome was in its meridian of knowledge and politeness: and by an author, whose acquaintance with the Greek tragic writers, had informed him of what belonged to a work or composition, we cannot but be shocked at so grotesque an assemblage of things: Unless we would rather distrust our modern judgment, and conclude the deformity to be only in appearance: And this, perhaps, we shall find to be the case: though it must be owned, the common opinion seems supported by Quintilian, the most judicious critic of antiquity, who thus speaks of our author and his work: *Ut Ovidius LASCIVIRE in Metamorphosi folet, quem tamen excusare necessitas potest, RES DIVERSISSIMAS IN SPECIEM UNIUS CORPORIS COL-LIGENTEM*<sup>e</sup>.

But to determine with certainty in this matter, we must consider the origin of the ancient fables in general.

There are *two opinions* concerning it.

I. The *first* is of those who think the fables contrived, by the ancient sages, for repositories of their mysterious wisdom: and, consequently, that they are no less than *natural, moral, and divine* truths, fantastically disguised. Greg. Naz. characterises these allegories well, where he calls them monstrous explanations, without principles; in which there is nothing stable, but a way of interpretation which, if indulged, would enable you to make any thing out of any thing<sup>f</sup>. But what

<sup>e</sup> *Instit. Orat. lib. iv. c. 1. sub. fin.*

<sup>f</sup> Εἰτ' ἐπινοεῖσθα τέτοις ἀληγορικαῖς καὶ τεξαῖσθαι, καὶ τῶν προ-  
κειμένων ἐκπίπλων δὲ λόγοις εἰς βάρεσθαι χωρεῖσθαι καὶ κεημεῖσθαι οὐκ  
ἴχεσθαι τὸ σάσιμον. *Orat. iii.*

must eternally discredit the pretense, that the first Mythologists, were allegorists, is, that if they indeed invented these fables to convey under them *natural*, *moral*, and *divine* truths, they must have been wise and virtuous men, lovers of mankind, and the friends of society. But how will this character agree to the abominable lewdness, injustice, and impiety with which most of these popular fables abound, and which they could not but foresee would (as in fact they did) corrupt all the principles of moral practice. For both these reasons therefore we must conclude that a system which gives us nothing for the *moral*, but what, as Greg. Naz. observes, is uncertain, groundless and capricious ; or for the *fable*, but what is absurd and obscene<sup>g</sup>, must be an after invention employed to serve a purpose. However, it was well for truth, that none of these ancient allegorists did better ; that none of them entered upon their task with any thing like the spirit of our BACON<sup>h</sup>, the creative power of whose genius so nearly realized these fancies, as sometimes to put us to a stand, whether we should not prefer the riches and beauty of his imagination, to the poor and meagre truth that lies at bottom.

II. The *other opinion* of the origin of the fables, is that which supposes them to be the corruptions of civil history ; and consequently, as having their foundation in real facts ; and this is unquestionably the truth. But this system did not find so able an expositor formerly in *Palæphatus*, as the other more groundless conceit did of late in *Bacon*. It would lead me too far from my sub-

<sup>g</sup> — οἵμην δὲ εἴτε τὸ νοερόν αἰξιόπιστον εἴ τὸ προβεβλημένον ἐλέθειον.  
ib.

<sup>h</sup> *De sapientia veterum.*

ject, to shew, in this place, which of the fables arose from the *ambiguity of words*, ill translated from some eastern language; which from proper names ill understood; which, from the *high figures of poetry*, well invented to affect more barbarous minds; and which, from the *polite contrivances of statesmen*, to tame and soften savage manners: and how the *universal passion of ADMIRATION* procured an easy admittance into the mind, for all these various delusions.

But we must not omit, that the followers of this better opinion are divided into two factions; One of which would have the ancient fables the corruption of PROFANE history only; the Other, only of SACRED.

This *Last* seems unsupported by every thing but a zeal for doing honour to the *Bible*: For by what we can collect from Pagan, or even Jewish writers, the history of the Hebrews was less celebrated or known, than that of any other people whose memory antiquity hath brought down to us. But, known or unknown, it is somewhat hard, methinks, that Greece must not be allowed the honour of producing one single hero; but all must be fetched from Palestine. One would have thought the very *number* of the gentile worthies, and the *scarcity* of the Jewish, might have induced our critics to employ some home-spun Pagans, for heroes of a second rate, at least. But this, it seems, would look too like a sacrilegious compromise. So, an expedient is contrived to lessen that disparity in their number: and Moses alone is discovered to be Apollo, Pan, Priapus, Cecrops, Minos, Orpheus, Amphion, Tiresias, Janus, Evander, Romulus, and about some twenty more of the Pagan Gods and Heroes. So says the learned and judicious Mr.

Huet<sup>i</sup>: who, not content to seize, as lawful prize, all he meets within the waste of fabulous times, makes cruel inroads into the cultivated ages of history, and will scarce allow Rome its own founder<sup>k</sup>.

Nay, so jealous are they of this fairy honour paid to scripture, that I have met with those who thought the bible much disparaged, to suppose any other origin of human sacrifices than the command to Abraham, to offer up his son. The contending for so extraordinary an honour is not unlike that of certain grammarians, who, out of due regard to the glory of former times, will not allow either the great or small-pox to be of modern growth, but vindicate those special blessings to this highly favoured antiquity.

The other party then, who esteem the fables, a corruption of Pagan history, appear in general to be right. But the misfortune is, the spirit of system seems to possess these likewise, while they allow nothing to Jewish history: For that reasoning, which makes them give the Egyptian and Phenician a share with the Grecian, should consequentially have disposed them to admit the Jewish into partnership; though it might perhaps contribute least to the common stock. And he that does not see<sup>l</sup> that Philemon and Baucis is taken from the story of Lot, must be very blind: Though he<sup>m</sup> that

<sup>i</sup> *Demonstratio Evangelica,*

<sup>k</sup> Si fidem sequimur historiæ, fabulosa pleraque de eo [Romulo] narrari. *Prop. iv. c. 9. § 8.*

<sup>l</sup> La fable de Philemon et de Baucis — les personages sont inconnus, et j'en ai rien d'intéressant à en dire: car de penser avec Mr. Huet, qu'elle nous cache l'histoire des Anges qui allaient visiter Abraham, c'est une de ces imaginations hazardées dans lesquelles ce savant prélat, &c. *Banier les Metam. d'Ovid. explic. des fables 7, 8, 9, & 10. lib. viii.*

<sup>m</sup> See Lavaur, one of the best and latest supporters of this system, in his *histoire de la fable conferie avec l'histoire Sainte.* —

can discover the expedition of the Israelites from Egypt to Palestine, in the fable of the Argonauts, has certainly the gift of second-sight.

Lastly, as it is the fault of these to allow nothing to Jewish history, so it is the fault of both to allow nothing to the system of the *allegorists*: for tho' without all question the main body of the ancient fables is the corruption of civil history, yet it is as certain that some few, especially of the later of them were invented to convey, *physical* and *moral* truths.

Such was the original of the *fables* in general: But we must be a little more explicite concerning that species of them called the METAMORPHOSIS.

The *metempsychose* was the method, the religious ancients employed to explain the ways of providence; which, as they were seen to be unequal here, were supposed to be set right hereafter. But this inequality was never thought so great, as to leave no foot-steps of a superintendency: For the people of old argued thus: If there was *no* inequality, *nothing would want to be set right*; and if there was nothing *but* inequality, there would be *no one to set it right*. So that a *regular* providence, and *none at all*, equally destroyed their foundation of *a future state*.

It being then believed, that a providence was administered, though not with equal vigour, both here and hereafter; it was natural for them to suppose that the mode of it might be the same throughout. And as the way of punishing, in a different state,

Ainsi cette fable est toute composée des traditions que les Chananéens ou Pheniciens avoient répandues dans leurs voyages. On y voit des traits defigurez par ces traditions, mais CERTAINEMENT pris de l'*histoire des Israélites sous Moysé et sous Josué. Cap. Jason et les Argonautes*—à la fin.

was by a *transmigration* of the soul; so in this, it was by a *transformation* of the body: The thing being the same, with only a little difference of ceremony in the transaction: the soul in the first case going to the body; and, in the latter, the body to the soul: *This* being called the *metamorphosis*; and *that* the *metempnyrosis*. Thus, each made a part of the popular notion of providence. And it is remarkable, that wherever the doctrine of *transmigration* was received, either in ancient or modern times, there the belief of *transformation* hath prevailed likewise<sup>n</sup>. It is true, that in support of the first part of this superstition, *Reason* only suffer'd; in support of the latter, the *Senses* too were violated. But minds grossly passioned never want attested facts to support their extravagancies. What principally contributed to fix their belief of the *metamorphosis* was, in my opinion, the strong and disordered imagination of a *melancholy habit*; more than any other producing religious fear, and most affected by it when produced. There was a common distemper, arising from this *habit*, well known to the Greek physicians by the name of the *lycanthropy*; where the patient fancied himself turned into a wolf, or other savage animal. Why the disordered imagination should take this ply, is not hard to conceive, if we reflect that the *metempnyrosis* made part of the popular doctrine of providence; and that a *metamorphosis* was, as we have said, the same mode of punishment, differing only in time and ceremony. For the *religious belief*, we may be assured, would work strongly on a diseased fancy, racked by a consciousness of crimes, to which

<sup>n</sup> The modern eastern tales are full of *metamorphoses*; and it is to be noted that those people, before they embraced maho-metanism, were pagans and believers of the *metempnyrosis*.

that *habit* is naturally obnoxious ; and, as it did in the case of Nebuchadnezzar<sup>o</sup>, make the patient conclude himself the object of divine justice. And that the vulgar superstition generally gives the bias to the career of a distempered mind, we have a familiar instance. No people upon earth are more subject to *atrabilaire* disorders than the English : Now while the tales of magicians, and their transformations were believed, nothing was more symptomatic in this distemper, than such fancied changes by the power of witchcraft. But since these fables lost their terror, very different whimsies, we find, have possessed our melancholic people.

These sickly imaginations therefore, proceeding from the impressions of the religious notion of the metamorphosis, would in their turn add great credit to it ; and then any trifles would keep it up; even an *equivocal appellation*; which, I don't doubt, hath given birth to many a fable ; though to many more, it hath served only for an after-embellishment. But it is remarkable, that fabulous antiquity itself assists us to detect its own impostures. For altho', it generally represents the punishments for impiety, as *actual transformations*; yet, in the famous story of the daughters of Proetus, it has honestly told us the case that it was no more than a *deep melancholy*, inflicted by Juno, which made them *fancy* themselves turned into heifers ; so the poet.

“ Proetides implerunt FALSIS mugitibus agros.

<sup>o</sup> Daniel's *prediction* of this monarch's disgrace, evidently shews it to have been the effect of divine vengeance ; yet the account of the circumstances of his punishment, seems to shew, that it was inflicted by common and natural means.

and

and of this, Melampus cured them by a course of physic <sup>P.</sup>

Thus the *metamorphosis* arose from the doctrine of the *metempsychosis*; and was, indeed, a mode of it; and, of course, a very considerable part of the Pagan theology <sup>q</sup>: So that we are not to wonder if several grave writers made collections of them; as Nicander, Boeus, Callisthenes, Dorotheus, Theodorus, Parthenius, and Adrian the sophist. Of what kind these collections were, we may see by that of Antonius Liberalis, who transcribed from them: Thence too Ovid gathered his materials; and formed them into a poem on the most sublime and regular plan, A POPULAR HISTORY OF PROVIDENCE; carried down in as methodical a manner as the graces of poetry would allow, from the creation to his own times, through the EGYPTIAN, PHENICIAN, GREEK, and ROMAN histories: And this the elegant Paterculus seems to intimate, in the character he gives of the poet and his work <sup>r</sup>.

<sup>P</sup> Prætides, Præti, et Stenobœæ, sive Antiopæ secundum Homerum, filiæ fuerunt, Lysippe, Ipponoe, Cyrianassa. Hæ se cum prætulissent Junoni in pulchritudine; vel, ut quidam volunt, cum essent antistites, ausæ sunt vesti ejus aurum detractum in usum suum convertere: illa irata hunc furorem earum immisit mentibus; ut putantes se vaccas in saltus abirent, et plerumque mugirent, et timerent aratra; quas Melampus, Amythaonis filius, paſtâ mercede ut Cyrianassam uxorem cum parte regni acciperet, placatâ Junone, infecto fonte, ubi solitæ erant bibere, purgavit et in pristinum sensum reduxit. Servius in *Bucol. Virgilii vi.* ¶ 48.

<sup>q</sup> It plainly appears to have been in general credit by it's making the foundation of the following epigram, one of the finest in antiquity.

'Εκ ζωῆς με θεοὶ τεῦχαν λίθον ἐκ δὲ λίθου  
Ζωὴν Πρεξιτέλης ἔμπαλιν ἴεργάσατο.

<sup>r</sup> Naso perfectissimi in forma operis sui. *Hift. Rom.* 1. ii. c. 36.

Now

Now the proper introduction, as well as foundation and support, of this kind of history is a THEISTICAL COSMOGENY. Accordingly, we find our poet introduceth it with such a one. And this likewise in imitation of his Grecian Originals. Theopompus, by the account Servius gives of him, seems to have composed such a History, so prefaced; but on a more ingenious plan. He feigns that some of Midas's shepherds took the God Silenus asleep, after a debauch; and brought him bound to their master. When he came into the Presence, his chains fell from him of their own accord; and he answered to what was required of him, concerning NATURE and ANTIQUITY<sup>s</sup>. From hence, (as Servius remarks) Virgil took the hint of his SILENUS: the subject of whose song, in that eclogue, is so exact an epitome of the contents of the METAMORPHOSIS, that it is worth considering.

“ Namque canebat uti magnum per inane coacta  
“ Semina &c.

— “ et ipse tener mundi concreverit orbis.—

“ Hinc lapides Pyrrhæ jactos, Saturnia regna,  
“ Caucasiaisque refert volucres, furtumque Pro-  
“ methei—

“ Tum Phaëtontiadas musco circumdat amaræ  
“ Corticis —

“ Quid loquar aut Scyllam Nisi, quam fama se-  
“ cuta est,

“ Candida succinctam latrantibus inguina mon-  
“ stris,

“ Dulichias vexasse rates —

<sup>s</sup> Sane hoc de Sileno non dicitur fictum a Virgilio, sed a Theopompo translatum. Is enim apprehensum Silenum a Midæ regis pastoribus, dicit crapula madentem, et ex ea soporatum; illos dolo adgressos dormientem vinxisse; postea vinculis sponte labentibus liberatum de rebus NATURALIEUS ET ANTIQUIS Midæ interroganti respondisse. Serv. ad Eclog. vi. § 13.

“ Aut ut mutatos Terei narraverit artus : &c.

Here we have the *formation of the world*, the *golden age*, and the *original and renovation of man*; together with those *ancient fables* which taught the government of the Gods, and their punishment of impiety, by the *change* of human, into brutal and vegetable forms. It is evident from hence, that both the latin poets drew from one source; and particularly from Theopompus: whom Virgil hath epitomised; and Ovid paraphrased. And if the Latter neglected to borrow a great beauty from him, to adorn his own poem; the Other, (which is much more surprising) by deviating from his original, in one material circumstance, hath committed a very gross blunder. OVID in not laying the scene of his History in the adventure of Midas's shepherds; and so making SILENUS the Narrator throughout, hath let slip the advantage of giving his sacred History the sanction of a divine Speaker, and, by that means, of tying the whole composition together in the most natural and artful manner. But then VIRGIL, either in fondness to the philosophy of Epicurus, or in compliment to Varus, who was of that School, instead of making his Cosmogeny *theistical*, (as without doubt Theopompus did, and, we see, Ovid hath done) from whence the popular history of Providence naturally followed, hath made it the product of BLIND ATOMS;

— “ per inane coacta  
“ Semina,

from whence nothing naturally follows, but *Fate* or *Fortune*. And yet he talks like a Theist, (indeed, because he talks after Theists) of the renovation of Man, the golden Age, and the punishment of Prometheus. Servius seems to have had some obscure glimpse of this absurdity, as appears from his embarrass

barras to account for the CONNECTION between the *Epicurean origine* of the world, and the *religious fables* which follow. In his note on the words *hinc lapides Pyrrhae jactos*, he says,—“*quæstio est hoc loco: nam, relictis prudentibus rebus de mundi origine, subito ad fabulas transitum fecit. Sed dicimus, aut exprimere eum voluisse sectam Epicuream, quæ rebus seriis semper inserit voluptates: aut fabulis plenis admirationis puerorum corda mulceri.*”—However in other respects the eclogue is full of beauties.

But to return to Ovid. Although to adorn and enliven his poem, he hath followed the bent of his disposition, in filling it with the love-stories of the Gods, which, too, their traditions had made sacred; yet he always keeps his end in view, by taking frequent occasion to remind his reader, that those punishments were inflicted by the Gods for impiety. This appears to have been the usual strain of the writers of METAMORPHOSES. *As long as they preserved their piety to the Gods, they were happy*<sup>1</sup>, being the constant prologue to a tragic story. So that, what Palæphatus says of the mythologic poets in general may with a peculiar justness be applied to Ovid: *The poets (says he) contrived fables of this kind to impress on their bearers a reverence for the Gods*<sup>2</sup>.

But this was not all. Ovid jealous, as it were, of the secret dignity of his Work, hath taken care, towards the conclusion, to give the intelligent reader the master-key to his meaning. We have observed, that though the *metempsychosis* was universally taught and believed long before the time of PYTHAGORAS; yet the greatness of his reputation,

<sup>1</sup> "Αχει μήδε τὸν θεός εἰπών, οὐδαίμονες ἡσαν. Ant. Liberalis Met. c. xi.

<sup>2</sup> Τοὺς δὲ μύθους τούτους συνέθεσαν οἱ ποιηταὶ, ὅτι οἱ ἀνγεώμενοι μὴ ἴσχεισαν εἰς τὸ θεῖον. De incred. Hist. c. 3.

and another cause, we shall come to presently, made it afterwards to be reckoned amongst his peculiar doctrines. Now Ovid, by a contrivance, which for its justness and beauty may be compared with any thing in antiquity, seizes this circumstance to instruct his reader in these two important points: 1. *That his poem is a popular history of Providence:* And 2. *That the Metempsychosis was the original of the Metamorphosis.* For in the conclusion of his book, he introduceth Pythagoras, teaching and explaining the *transmigration* of things to the people of Crotona. This was ending his Work in that just philosophic manner, which the elegance of pure and ancient wit required.

The Abbé Banier not entering into this beautiful contrivance, is at a loss<sup>x</sup> to account for Ovid's bringing in Pythagoras so much out of course. The best reason he can assign, is that the poet having finished the *historical* metamorphosis, goes on to the *natural*; which Pythagoras is made to deliver to the Crotoniates. But this is not fact, but hypothesis: The poet had not finished the *historical* metamorphosis: For having gone through the episode of the *natural change of things*, he re-assumes the proper subject of his work, the *historical*, or moral, *metamorphosis*, through the remaining part of the last book; which ends with the change of Cæsar into a comet. Had not Ovid, therefore introduced Pythagoras for the purpose here assigned, we should hardly have found him in this place; but in the Greek *division*, to which he properly belonged. Where the famous circumstance of his *golden thigh*, and the exhibition of it at the olympic games, would have afforded the noblest and most entertaining adventure in the whole poem.

<sup>x</sup> *Met. de Ovid. &c des Expl. Hist.* tom. iii.

What

What hath been said, I suppose, will tend to give us a different and higher notion of this extraordinary work; and lessen our surprize at the author's presumption, in so confidently predicting immortality to his performance.

" Jamque opus exegi, quod nec Jovis ira, nec ignis,  
" Nec poterit ferrum, nec edax abolere vetustas.

To proceed with our subject. From what hath been said of Pythagoras's character, it appears, that he taught several doctrines which he did not believe; and cultivated opinions merely on account of their utility. And we have the express testimony of Timæus Locrus, that, in the number of *these latter*, was the popular doctrine of the *metempychosis*. This very ancient Pythagorean, after having said<sup>y</sup>, that propagating the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, was necessary to society, goes on in this manner: " For " as we sometimes cure the body with unwhole- " some remedies, when such as are most whole- " some have no effect; so we restrain those " minds by *false* relations, which will not be per- " suaded by the *truth*: There is a necessity there- " fore of instilling the dread of those FOREIGN " TORMENTS. As that the soul shifts and chan- " ges its habitation; that the coward is ignomi- " niously thrust into the body of a woman; the " murderer imprisoned within the furr of a *fa-* " *vage*; the lascivious condemned to invigorate a " boar or sow; the vain and inconstant changed " into birds; and the slothful and ignorant into " fishes. The dispensation of all these things is " committed in the second period, to Nemesis the " avenger; together with the infernal furies, her

<sup>y</sup> See the first section of this book.

" assessors,

" assessors, the inspectors of human actions; to  
 " whom God, the sovereign Lord of all things,  
 " hath committed the government of the world,  
 " replenished with Gods and Men, and other ani-  
 " mals; all which were formed after the perfect  
 " model of the eternal and intellectual ideas."

Timæus's testimony is precise; and, as this notion of the *metempsychosis* was an inseparable part of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, if the Pythagoreans disbelieved the *one*, they must necessarily reject the *other*.

But, here it may be proper to explain, and inforce a *distinction*, which by being totally overlooked, hath much embarrassed the whole matter.

The doctrine of the *metempsychosis*, as it signified a *moral designation of providence*, came originally from *Egypt*, and was, as we have said, believed by all mankind. But Pythagoras, who had it, with the rest of the world, from thence, gave it a new modification, and taught, " that the successive transition of the soul into other bodies, was physical; necessary, and exclusive of all moral considerations whatever." This is what *Diogenes Laertius* means, when he tells us " That Pythagoras was reported to be the FIRST who taught the migration of the soul, from one

<sup>z</sup> Ως γὰρ τὰ σώματα νοσῶνται: πόκα υγιάζομες, εἴκα μὴ εἰκῇ τοῖς υγιεινοτάτοις. ἔτοι τὰς φυχὰς ἀπείργομες φύσεις λέγοις, εἴκα μὴ ἀγῆλαι ἀλαθεῖσι λέγοισι δὲ ἀραβαῖνος καὶ ΤΙΜΩΡΙΑΙ ΞΕΝΑΙ, ὡς μέλεινομέναν τὰς φυχὰς, τῶν μὲν δειλῶν, ἐς γυναικέα σκάνεα, τωθ' ὕψειν ἐκδιδόμενα· τῶν δὲ μικροφόνων, ἐς θηρίων σώματα, τωσὶ κόλασιν. λαβῖνῶν δὲ ἐς συνῶν ἢ κάπερ μορφάς· κέφαν δὲ καὶ μελεώρων, ἐς τινῶν δέξιοτόρων· ἀργῶν δὲ καὶ απρακτῶν, ἀμαθῶν τε καὶ ἀνόητων, ἐς τὰν τῶν ἐντόδων ιδέαν· ἀταντία ἐταντα ἐν διώλερα περιόδῳ ἢ Νέμεσις συνδιέκοινε, σωὶς δάιμονος παλαιματίοις χθυνίοις τε, τοῖς ἐπόπλαις τῶν ἀθρεωπίνων· οἷς δὲ ταντίων ἀγεμών· θεὸς ἐπέτρεψε διοίκησιν κόσμου. συμπεπληρωμένω ἐκ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθεώπων, τῶν τε ἀλλων λόγων· οὕτω δεδουλεῦσθαι ποτ' εἰκόνα ταν ἀριστερή εἰλιθοῖς αἰωνίων καὶ νοητῶν. *De Anima Mundi*, sub fin.

' body to another, by a PHYSICAL NECESSITY <sup>a</sup>.' The doctrine was, indeed, peculiarly his, and in the number of the *esoterics*, delivered in his school, to be believed <sup>b</sup>; and perhaps, was what contributed more than any thing besides, to make the popular notion of the *metempsychosis*, in the sense of a moral designation, to be esteemed His; though it was indeed common to all; and delivered by him, as appears from Timæus, amongst the *exoteric* doctrines, whose end was utility, and not truth.

How destructive this proper *pythagoric* notion of the *metempsychosis* was to the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, Ovid, who well understood the secret of the *distinction*, evidently perceived, where he makes Pythagoras, in delivering the *esoteric* doctrine of his school to the Crotoniates, reject a future state of rewards and punishments, on the very principle of *his own metempsychosis*, tho' the general *metempsychosis* was an inseparable and essential part of that state:

O genus attonitum gelidæ formidine mortis,  
Quid Styga, quid tenebras, et nomina vanatimetis,  
Materiem vatum, falsique piacula mundi?  
Corpora, sive rogor flammâ, seu tabe vetustas  
Abstulerit, mala posse pati non ulla putetis.  
Morte carent animæ: SEMPERQUE priore relictâ  
Sede, novis domibus<sup>c</sup> habitant vivuntque receptæ.

<sup>a</sup> Περὶ τοῦτον δὲ φασὶ τοῦτον ἀποφῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν ΚΥΚΛΟΝ ΑΝΑΓΚΗΣ ΑΜΕΙΒΟΥΣΑΝ, ὅλοις ἀλλοις ἐνδεῖσθαι ζώις. L. viii. § 14.

<sup>b</sup> Seneca speaking of the proper *pythagoric* doctrine of the *metempsychosis* makes it as physically necessary as the revolution of the heavenly bodies. Non credis animas in alia corpora atque alia describi? et migrationem esse quam dicimus esse mortem? Non credis in his pecudibus ferire aut aqua meritis illum quondam hominis animum morari? Non credis nihil perire in hoc mundo, sed mutare regionem? Nec tantum coelestia per certos circuitus verti, sed animalia quoque per vices ire, et animos per orbem agi. Ep. 109.

<sup>c</sup> L. xv.

The not attending to this *distinction* hath much perplexed even the best modern writers on the subject of Pythagoras. Mr. Dacier, in his life of that philosopher, when he comes to speak of the doctrine of the *metempyschosis*, advances crudely, that all antiquity have been deceived in thinking Pythagoras really believed it. And, for his warrant, quotes the passage from *Timæus*, given above. Mr. *Le Clerc*<sup>d</sup>, scandalized at this assertion, affirms as crudely, that he did believe it; and endeavours to prove his point by divers arguments, and passages of ancient writers. In which dispute, neither of them being aware of the two different kinds of *Metempyschosis*, each of them have with much confusion, taken of the true and false in this question, and divided it between them. *Dacier* was surely in the right, in supposing *Pythagoras* did not believe the *Metempyschosis*, as delivered by his disciple *Timæus*; but as surely in the wrong to conclude from thence, that he believed none at all. And *Le Clerc* was not mistaken in thinking the philosopher did believe some sort of *Metempyschosis*; but apparently in an error in supposing that it was the *popular and moral* notion of it. In a word, the proofs which *Dacier* brings, conclude only against Pythagoras's believing a *moral* transmigration; and those, *Le Clerc* opposes, conclude only for his believing a *natural* one. While neither, as we say, apprehending there were two kinds, the one common to all, the other peculiar to that philosopher, they have both fallen into great mistakes.

Let me give an instance from *Le Clerc*; as it will contribute in general to illustrate the subject, and, at the same time, throw light on the latter part of the passage, we have but now quoted from

<sup>d</sup> *Bibl. Choise*, tom. x. Art. ii. Sect. 5.

Timæus. Dacier had urged that passage to prove, Pythagoras did not believe the *Metempsychoſis*; and Le Clerc had urged it, to prove he did; because the author in conclusion expressly affirms, that the dispensation of the *Metempsychoſis* is committed in the second period to Nemesis the avenger. "Αταῦλα ἡ ταῦτα εὐ δεῖξε πειδῶς οἱ Νέμεσις ΣΤΝΔΙΕΚΠΙΝΕ. Le Clerc says, I have translated these words verbatim, that the reader may see he talks seriously e. But whoever reads the whole passage, which expressly speaks of the doctrine as *useful* and not as *true*, will be forced to own, that by the phrase, Nemesis decrees, is meant, *it must be taught that Nemesis decrees*. But this circumstance of Nemesis is remarkable; and enough to put the matter out of question. There were two kinds, as we have said, of the *Metempsychoſis*, which the Pythagoreans taught; the *moral* and the *natural*. The latter they believed, the first they only preached. So that Timæus speaking here of the *Metempsychoſis* as a fable, useful for the people to credit; lest the reader should mistake him as meaning the *natural*, he adds the circumstance of Nemesis, the poetical Avenger of the crimes of men, to confine all he had said, to the *moral Metempsychoſis*.

To support what is here observed, it may not be improper to insert the sentiments of some of the most considerable of Pythagoras's disciples on this point: which I shall transcribe from my very learned Friend, the author of the *critical inquiry into the opinions and practices of the ancient philosophers*: where the reader may see them admirably well explained and defended from a deal of idle chicane.

e J'ai traduit ces dernières paroles de Timée mot pour mot, à-fin que l'on pût voir, qu'il parle sérieusement. *Bibl. Cheïſe*, tom. x. p. 193.

“ Plutarch tells us “that EMPEDOCLES held death to  
“ be a separation of the fiery substance from the  
“ other parts, and therefore supposed that death  
“ was common to the soul and body f.”

Sextus Empiricus says, “ it is evident that Epi-  
“ curus stole his principles from the poets. As to  
“ that famous tenet of his that *death is nothing to us*,  
“ he borrowed it from EPICHARMUS, who says, I  
“ neither look upon the act of dying, or the state  
“ that succeeds it, as of any consequence and importance  
“ to me.”

Plutarch likewise in his *consolation to Apollonius*,  
cites the following words of EPICHARMUS. “ The  
“ parts of which you are composed will be separated  
“ at death; and each will return to the place from  
“ which it originally came. The earth will be re-  
“ stored to earth, and the spirit will ascend up-  
“ wards; what is there terrible or grievous in  
“ this?”

As for this ascent of the spirit upwards, Lucretius  
will explain it.

Cedit enim retro, de terra quod fuit ante,  
In terras: et quod missum est ex ætheris oris,  
Id rursum coeli rellatum *tempora receptant.*

Lib. ii.

<sup>f</sup> Εμπεδοκλῆς τὸν θάνατον γεγονόθαι Διάχωρισμὸν τὴν περιώδειαν, εἴ τι  
ἡ σύγκρισις τῷ αἰθρίῳ συνεσάβη· ὡς κατὰ τοῦτο κονὸν εἴσι τὸν  
θάνατον σώματος ηὔψησθε. De Plac. c. 25. Cicero says, Em-  
pedocles animum esse censet cordi suffusum sanguinem. i Tusi-  
9. alluding to Empedocles's own words in that famous verse:

Ἄλιξ γὰρ αἰθρίῳ ποιεῖσθαι τοῖνα.

§ δὲ Επίκερχος φωράται τὰ πράτισα τῶν δογμάτων οὐδὲ ποιτῶν  
αἰνιγματῶν—τὸν δὲ θανάτον ἐπὶ οὐδέν εἰσι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, Επίχαρμος αὐτῷ  
περιστρεφόμενος, εἰπὼν ἀποθανεῖν η τελείναις εὶς μοι διαφέρει. ad Gram.  
§ 273.

<sup>b</sup> Καλῶς οὐδὲ οὐδὲ Επίχαρμος συνεχέσθη, φησι, διεκρίθη η ἀπῆλθεν  
ἔθετο οὐδὲ παῖδες, γὰρ μή εἰς γῆν, πονηρὰ δὲ αἱ τι τὰνδε χαλεπόντα;  
οὐδὲ εἰ.

TELES,

TELES, another follower of Pythagoras, thus addresses himself to one grieved and afflicted for the loss of a deceased friend; “ You complain (says he) that “ your friend will never exist more; but remember, “ that he had no existence ten thousand years ago, “ that he did not live in the time of the Trojan “ war, nor even in much later periods. This, “ it seems, does not move you: all your concern “ is, because he will not exist for the future<sup>i</sup>. ” Epicurus uses the very same language on the same occasion:

Respice item quam nil ad nos ante acta vetustas  
Temporis æterni fuerit, quam nascimur ante.  
Hoc igitur nobis speculum natura futuri  
Temporis exponit, post mortem denique no-  
stram.

Lucr. l. iii.<sup>j</sup>

So far, my learned friend.

II. PLATO is next in order: he likewise greatly affected the character of *Lawgiver*; and actually composed laws for several people, as the *Syracusians* and *Cretans*; but with what kind of spirit we may judge, by his refusing that employment for the *Thebans* and *Arcadians*, as soon as he understood they were averse to equality of possessions<sup>k</sup>. The truth is, his philosophic character, which was always predominant, as in Pythagoras the legislative, gave his politics a cast of refinement which made his schemes of government very impracticable, and even unnatural. So that, tho' his knowledge of mankind was indeed great and profound, and therefore highly commended by Cicero<sup>l</sup>, yet his fine-drawn

<sup>i</sup> Αλλ' ἔκειτι ἔται· οὐδὲ γάρ οὐ μυχιστὸν ἐπθ., εὖδ' εἰπὶ τῷ Τεωικῷ,  
οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰς πρωτόπηπτας σε. σὺ δ' ἐπὶ μὲν τέτων ὅντες ἀχθη, ὅτι δὲ  
εἰς ὕστερον ἵνα ἔται, δυσχερεῖνες. Stobæus Mor. Ec. c. 106.

<sup>k</sup> See *Aelian. Var. Hist.* l. ii. c. 42.

<sup>l</sup> Deus ille noster Plato in πολιτείᾳ. See B. ii. § 3.

speculations brought him at length into such contempt as a writer of politics, that Josephus tells us, notwithstanding he was so high in glory and admiration amongst the Greeks, above the rest of the philosophers, for his superior virtue, and power of eloquence, yet he was openly laughed at, and bitterly ridiculed by those who pretended to any profound high knowledge of politics<sup>m</sup>.

The only Greek masters he followed, were Pythagoras and Socrates: These he much admired. From the first, he took his fondness for geometry, his fanaticism of numbers, his ambition for law-giving, and the doctrine of the *Metempsychosis*: From the latter, the study of morals, and the mode of disputing.

This was a monstrous mis-alliance<sup>n</sup>: I mean, the incorporating into one philosophy, the discordant genius of those two schools: the first of which dogmatized in the most sublime questions of nature; the other gave up the most vulgar, as inscrutable. The Samian lawgiver aimed only at utility, and the moral Athenian laboured after truth.

We need not therefore, any longer wonder at the obscurity which Plato's frequent contradictions

<sup>m</sup> Πλάτων ἢ θεομαχίμενος τῷ τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν, οὐ καὶ σεμνότητι βίᾳ διεργκών, οὐ διναιμένοις λόγον, οὐ πειθοῖς πάντας επεράξας τές εἰ φιλοσοφία γενούστας, ὥπερ τῶν φασκόντων δεινὸν εἶναι τὰ πολιτικά, μικρῷ δεῖν χλευαζόμενος, οὐ παραδεμένος 21ατελεῖ. Cont. Ap. 1. ii. § 31.

<sup>n</sup> Geddes, or his Glasgow editors, (to mention them for once) in the *essay on the composition of the ancients*, are here very angry at the author for charging Plato with making a *monstrous mis-alliance*, merely (as they say) because he added the study of *physics* to that of *morals*; and employ six pages in defending Plato's conduct. As they could not see then, so possibly they will not now, that the term the author gave to Plato's incorporating the *Pythagoric* and *Socratic* schools, referred not to the *different subjects* of their inquiries; but to their *different genius* of philosophizing.

throw over his writings. It was caused not only by the *double doctrine*, a thing common to all the philosophers; but likewise by the joint profession of two so contrary philosophies. This effect could not escape the observation of Eusebius: *Hear then (says he) the Greeks themselves, by their best and most powerful speaker, now rejecting, and now again adopting the FABLES* <sup>o</sup>.

However it was the abstruse philosophy of Pythagoras with which he was most taken. For the sake of this, he assumed also the legislative part; and in imitation of his master, travelled into Egypt; where he was initiated into the Mysteries of the priesthood. It was this made Xenophon, the faithful follower of Socrates, say, that Plato had adulterated the pure and simple philosophy of their master; and was in love with Egypt, and the portentous wisdom of Pythagoras<sup>p</sup>. And even occasioned Socrates himself to exclaim, *Ye Gods, what a heap of lies has this young man placed to my account?*

But of all the Egyptian inventions, and Pythagoric practices, nothing pleased him more than that of the *double doctrine*, and the division of his auditors into the exoteric and soteric classes: He more professedly than any other, avowing their principles, on which that distinction was founded; such as,—*That it is for the benefit of mankind, that they should be often deceived—That there are some truths not fit for the people to know—That the world is not to be entrusted with the true notion of God;*

<sup>o</sup> Ἀκεὶ δὲ ἐν αὐτῶν Ἐλλήνων δι' ἔνδος τῆς πάντων ἀρίστης, τοτὲ μὲν ἐξαθεῖτο, τολεὶ δὲ ἐγ γε τοῖς εἰσποιεῖσθαις τὰς μυθες. Prep. Evang. p. 47. Steph. Ed. See what has been further said on this matter p. 122. Note (<sup>b</sup>.)

P. Αἰγυπτίοις ἕρεσση, καὶ τῆς Πυθαγόρεας τερατώδεις σοφίας.

q—Φασὶ δέ καὶ Σωκρατην ακεχειρία τὸν Λυτρὸν αναγνώσκοντος Πλάτωνος, Ἡράκλειος, ἐπειδὴν, ὡς πωλῶ μου καλεψύδη ὁ νεανίσκος. Diog. Laert. l. iii § 55.

and more openly philosophising upon that distinction in his writings. Thus, in his books of Laws, (which we shall see presently were of the exoteric kind) he defends the popular opinion, which held the sun, moon, stars, and earth, to be Gods, against the theory of Anaxagoras, which taught the sun was a mass of fire, the moon an habitable earth, &c. Here, his objection to the NEW PHILOSOPHY, (as he calls it) is, that it was an inlet to atheism; for the common people, when they once found those to be no Gods, which they had received for such, would be apt to conclude, there were none at all: But in his Cratylus, which was of the esoteric kind, he laughs at the ancients for worshiping the sun and stars, as Gods.

In a word, the ancients thought this distinction of the *double doctrine*, so necessary a key to Plato's writings, that they composed discourses on it. Numenius, a pythagorean and platonist both in one, wrote a treatise (now lost) of the *secret doctrines* (that is, the real opinions) of Plato<sup>r</sup>; which would probably have given much light to this question, had the question wanted it. But Albinus an old platonist, hath, in some measure, supplied this loss, by his *introduction to the dialogues of Plato*<sup>s</sup>. From which it appears, that those very books, where Plato details out the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, are all of the *exoteric* kind. To this, it hath been said, that some of these were of the *political* and *civil* kind: and so say I; but nevertheless of the *exoteric*, called *political*, from their subject, and *exoterical* from their manner of handling it. But if the nature of the

<sup>r</sup> Περὶ τῆς πλάτωνος ἀπόδειξην. Teste Euseb. l. xiii. c. 4, 5.  
Præp. Evang.

<sup>s</sup> Apud Fabric. Bibl. Græc. l. iii. c. 2.

subject will not teach them that it must needs be handled exoterically, Jamblichus's authority must decide the question ; who in his life of Pythagoras <sup>t</sup> hath used *political* in the sense of *esoterical* : And in that class, Albinus ranks <sup>v</sup> the Criton, Phædo, Minos, Symposium, Laws, Epistles, Epinomis, Menexenus, Clitophon, and Philebus.

There is an odd passage in Cicero <sup>w</sup>, which seems to regard the Phædo in the light of a mere *exoteric* composition, so far as it concerns the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. The *auditor* is advised to read the Phædo, to confirm his belief in this point; to which he replies, *Feci mehercule, & quidem sèpius: sed NESCIO QUOMODO, dum lego assentior: cum posui librum, & mecum ipse de immortalitate animorum cœpi cogitare, assensio omnis illa elabitur.* The only reasonable account I can give of this reflection, for the supposing it an imitation of something like it in the Phædo itself, applied to a very different purpose, gives, in my opinion none at all; I say the only reasonable account is, that the Phædo being an *exoteric* dialogue, and written for the people, was, amongst the learned, in the rank of a philosophical romance: but while one of these readers is very intent on such a work, a masterpiece-piece like this for composition and eloquence, he becomes so captivated with the charms and flattery of these ornaments, that he forgets, for a moment, the hidden purpose, and falls into the vulgar deceit. But having thrown the book aside, grown cool, and reflected on those principles concerning God and the soul, held in common by the philosophers (of which more hereafter) all the bright colouring disappears, the real face obtrudes itself, and the gaudy vision shrinks

<sup>t</sup> Sect. 150.

<sup>v</sup> Sect. 5.

<sup>w</sup> Tusc. Disp. l. i. c. 5.

from

from his embrace. A parallel passage in Seneca's *epistles*, will explain, and seems to support, this interpretation. *Quomodo molestus est JUCUNDUM SOMNIUM VIDENTI, qui excitat; aufert enim voluptatem, etiam si falsam, effectum tamen veræ habentem; sic epistola tua mihi fecit injuriam; revocavit enim me cogitationi aptæ traditum, & iturum, si licuisset, ulterius. Juvabat de æternitate animarum querere, imo mehercule credere. Credebam enim facile opinionibus magnorum virorum, rem gratissimam promittentium magis quam probantum! Dabam me spei tanta. Jam eram fastidio mihi, jam reliquias ætatis infractæ contemnebam, in immensum illud tempus & in possessionem omnis ævi transiturus: cum subito experrectus sum, epistola tua accepta, & tam BELLUM SOMNIUM perdidix.*

The Platonic philosophy being then entirely Pythagorean in the point in question, and this latter rejecting the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, we might fairly conclude them both under the same predicament.

But as Plato is esteemed the peculiar patron of this doctrine; chiefly, I suppose, on his being the first who brought REASONS for the ETERNITY of the soul<sup>y</sup>: on this account, it will be proper to be a little more particular.

1. First then, it is very true, that Plato has argued much for the *eternity*, or, if you will, for the *immortality* of the soul. But to know what sort of immortality he meant, we need only consider what sort of arguments he employs. Now these, which he was so famous for inventing and enforcing, were *natural* and *metaphysical*, fetched from the ef-

<sup>x</sup> Epist. 102.

<sup>y</sup> Tuscul. Disp. l. i. c. 17. *Primum de animorum æternitate non solum sensisse idem quod PYTHAGORAS, sed RATIONEM etiam attulisse.*

fence and qualities of the soul; which therefore concluded only for its permanency: and this he certainly believed<sup>z</sup>. But for any moral arguments, from which only a future state of rewards and punishments can be deduced, he resolves them all into tradition, and the religion of his country.

2. As the inventing reasons for the immortality of the soul, was one cause of his being held the great patron of this doctrine; so another was his famous refinement (for it was indeed his) of the natural *Metempsychosis*, the peculiar notion of the Pythagoreans. This natural *Metempsychosis* was, as we have said, that the successive transition of the soul into other bodies was physical and necessary, and exclusive of all moral designation whatsoever. Plato, on receiving this opinion from his master, gave it this additional improvement; that those changes and transitions were the purgations of impure minds, unfit, by reason of the pollutions they had contracted, to reascend the place from whence they came, and rejoin that substance from whence they were disperced; and consequently, that pure immaculate souls were exempt from this transmigration. Thus Plato's *Metempsychosis* (which was as peculiarly his, as the other was Pythagoras's) seemed to have something of a moral designation in it, which his master's had not; nor did it, like that, necessarily subject all to it, without distinction, or for the same length of time. In this then they differed<sup>a</sup>: But how much they agreed in excluding the notion of all future state of reward and punishment, will be seen, when in the next

<sup>z</sup> Tot rationes attulit [Plato] ut velle ceteris, fibi certè persuasisse videatur. *Civ. Tusc. Disp.* 1. i. c. 21. Καθαπέρ δὲ νόμος εἰς τατικούς λέγει, as he expresses it in his twelfth book of laws.

<sup>a</sup> We have now explained the three sorts of *Metempsychosis*; The popular; That which was peculiar to Pythagoras; and lastly That peculiar to Plato. The not distinguishing the Platonic section

fection we come to shew what a kind of existence it was, which Pythagoras and Plato afforded to the soul, when it had rejoined that universal substance, from which it had been disperced.

3. However it is very true, that in his writings he inculcates the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments: but this, always in the gross sense of the populace: that *the souls of ill men descended into asses and swine*; — that *the uninitiated lay in mire and filth*; — that *there were three judges of hell*; and talks much of Styx, Cocytus, Acheron, &c. and all so seriously<sup>b</sup>, as shews he had a mind to be believed. But did he indeed believe these fables? we may be assured he did not: for being the most spiritualized of the philosophers, had he really credited a future state of rewards and punishments, he would have refined and purified it, as he did the doctrine of the eternity of the soul, which he certainly believed. But he has as good as told us what he really thought of it, in his *Epinomis*; where, writing of the condition of a good and wise man after death, he says, *of whom, both in jest and in earnest, I constantly affirm, that when such a one shall have finished his destined course by death, he shall at his dissolution, be stript of those many senses which*

from the Pythagoric; and both, from the popular, have occasioned even the Ancients to write with much obscurity on this matter. What can be more inexplicable and contradictory than the account Servius hath given of it? “Sciendum, non omnes animas ad corpora reverti. Aliquæ enim propter vitæ merita non redeunt propter malam vitam; aliquæ propter fati necessitatem.” *In Æn. vi. § 713.* Here he has jumbled into one, as the current doctrine of the *Metempsychosis*, these three different and distinct sorts: *aliquæ propter vitæ MERITA non redeunt*, belonging to the popular notion; *aliquæ redeunt propter fati necessitatem*, belonging to Pythagoras’s; and *aliquæ propter MALAM vitam* to Plato’s.

<sup>b</sup> In his *Gorgias*, *Phædo*, and *Republic*.

be here enjoyed; and then only participate of one simple lot or condition. And, of MANY, as he was here, being become ONE, he shall be happy, wise, and blessed<sup>c</sup>. And still more plainly, in his commentary on Timæus, where he agrees to his author's doctrine of the fabulous invention of the FOREIGN TORMENTS<sup>d</sup>.

4. In confirmation of all this, (*i. e.* of Plato's disbelief of the religious doctrine of a future state, as founded on the will and providence of the Gods) we observe in the last place, that the most intelligent of the ancients regarded what Plato said of a future state of rewards and punishments, to be said only in the *exoteric* way to the people.

The famous stoic Chrysippus<sup>e</sup>, when he blames Plato, as not rightly deterring men from injustice, by frightful stories of future punishments, takes it

<sup>c</sup> Ὡν καὶ διστοχυρίζομεν παιῶν καὶ σπεδάζων ἄμα, ὅτε θανάτω τις τοιότων τῷ αὐτῷ μοῖρᾳ ἀνατλήσει, χεῖδὸν ἐξιπερ ἀποθανὼν οὐ, μάτη μείζουν ἔτι πολλῶν τότε καθάπερ νῦν αἰδήσεων, μιᾶς τε μοῖρας μετεικρότα μάνον, καὶ ἐπι πολλῶν ἔτε γεγνώστα, οὐδὲ μητέ τε ἵσταται καὶ σοφώτατον ἄμα καὶ μακάριον. Sub fin.

In this passage I understand Plato *secretly* to intimate, that, when he was *in jest*, he affirmed the future happiness of good men in a peculiar and distinct existence, which is the popular notion of a *future state*: but, when *in earnest*, that that existence was not peculiar or distinct, but a *common life* without particular sensations, a *resolution* into the τὸ οὐ. And it is remarkable that the whole sentence has an elegant ambiguity, capable of either meaning. For πολλῶν αἰδήσεων may either signify our many *passions and appetites*, or our many *cogitations*. The denying our having the *first* of these, in a future state, makes nothing against a distinct existence; but denying the *second*, does. His disciple Aristotle seems to have understood him as meaning it in this latter sense, when in earnest; and has so paraphrased it as to exclude all peculiar existence. See p. 211. There is the same ambiguity in εἰς πολλῶν οὐ, which may either signify, that of his many sensations he hath only one left, the feeling happiness; or that, from being in the *number of many individuals* of the same species, he is become *one*, by being joined to, and united with the universal nature.

<sup>d</sup> See p. 143.

<sup>e</sup> Plut. de Stoic. repug.

for granted that Plato himself gave no credit to them: for he turns his reprobation, not against that philosopher's wrong belief, but his wrong judgment, in imagining such childish terrors <sup>f</sup> could be useful to the cause of virtue.

Strabo plainly declares himself of the same opinion, when speaking of the Indian Brachmans, he says, that *they had invented fables in the manner of Plato, concerning the immortality of the soul, and a future judgment in the shades below; and other things of the same nature* <sup>g</sup>.

Celsus owns that every thing which Plato tells us of a future state, and the happy abodes of the virtuous, is an allegory. “ But what (says he) we are to understand by these things, is not easy for every one to find out. To be master of this, we must be able to comprehend his meaning, when he says, *They cannot, by reason of their imbecillity and sluggishness, penetrate into the highest region. But was their nature vigorous enough to raise itself to so sublime a contemplation, they would then come to understand, that this was the true heaven, and the true irradiation?*” These remarkable words, besides the general conclusion to be drawn from them, confirm what we have said of the peculiar Platonic *Metempsychosis*. For here Celsus resolves all Plato's meaning, in his representations of a future state of

<sup>f</sup> Ως δέννα Διαφέροντα τὸν Ἀκεῖς καὶ τὸν Ἀλφῆς, δι' αὐτὰ τὰ παιδάρια τὰ κακοσχόλειν αἱ γυναικεῖς ἀνεργύστει.

<sup>g</sup> Παραπλήκτοι ἔχουσι μύθους, ὁπερ νῦν ΠΛΑΤΩΝ, πιξί τε ἀφθαρτίς Φυχῆς, καὶ τὸν καθ' ἄδειαν κρίσεων, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. Geogr. l. xv. p. 1040. Gron. Ed.

<sup>h</sup> Τί δὲ τέτων ἐμφανίζει, οὐ πατέντι γνῶσι τοῖς διάδοσιν εἰς μὴ ὅσις ἕταῖτο, τί ποτε ἐστὶν ἐπειδὸν ὁ φυσικός ὑπὸ αἰδενίας καὶ βραδύτης ἡχής ὅτε τὸν διεξελθεῖν ἐπ' ἔσχατον τὸν αἴρετον καὶ εἰς τὸ φυσικὸν ἵκειν εἴναι αἰαστχίσθαι θεοῦσσα, γνῶσις αὐτὸν ἐπεινάς ἐστιν δὲ ἀληθῶς δεῖται, καὶ τὸ αἰλυθὺν φῶς. Orig. cont. Cels. I. vii. p. 352. Sp.. Ed. To understand the αἰλυθὺν φῶς, we must consider that light

rewards and punishments, into that Metempsycho-sis: and we shall see hereafter, that that was resolvable into the reunion of the soul with the divine nature, when it became vigorous enough to penetrate into the highest region<sup>i</sup>.

The emperor Julian addressing himself to Heraclius the Cynic, on the subject of that sect, when he comes to speak of the *double doctrine*, and the admission of *fable* into the teachings of the philosophers, observes, that it hath it's use chiefly in *ethics*, (in which he includes politics<sup>k</sup>,) and in that *part of theology relating to initiation, and the mysteries*<sup>l</sup>. To support which he presently quotes the example of Plato, who, when he writes of *theology*, or as a *Theologer*, is full of *fables* in his accounts of the infernal regions<sup>m</sup>. From hence it appears that, in the opinion of this learned emperor, Plato did not only not speak his real sentiments of those matters, but that when he treated of them, it was not as a philosopher, but as a theologer; in which character the

was one of the most important circumstances of the Pagan Elysium, as we may see in the chapter of the mysteries; where a certain ravishing and divine light is represented, as making it so recommendable; according to that of Virgil:

I argior hic campos æther & lumine vestit  
Purpureo —

<sup>i</sup> The unfairness of readers when their passions have made them become writers, is hardly to be conceived: some of these have represented the three last testimonies as given to prove that Plato believed no future state at all: tho' the author had plainly and expressly declared but a page or two before, p. 155. that there was a sort of future state which Plato did believe; he refers to it again in the note at p. 156. and, what is more, observes here, on this last passage, that Celsus alludes to this very platonick future state.

<sup>k</sup> — οὐκονομικὸν δὲ, τὸ ἀεὶ λίαν δικίαν πολιτικὸν δὲ, τὸ ἀεὶ σώμα. *Orat.* 7.

<sup>l</sup> Καὶ τὴν θεολογίην, τῷ τελεστικῷ, καὶ μυστικῷ. *Ib.*

<sup>m</sup> — εἰπεὶ καὶ Πλάτων σώμα μεμυθελιγγότας ἀεὶ τῶν ἐν φύσει πρεσβύταρων θεολογεῖν. *Ib.*

ancient sages never thought themselves obliged or confined to the truth. What these fabulous relations were, he intimates, when he previously speaks of the *fables* taught in the *Mysteries*; by which he could only mean their representations of a future state: the great *secret* of the mysteries, the doctrine of the unity, being in his opinion of a nature directly contrary to the other.

We now come to the PERIPATETICS and STOICS, who will give us much less trouble. For these having in some degree, though not entirely, thrown off the legislative character, spoke more openly against a future state of rewards and punishments. Indeed the difference in this point, between them and the Platonists, was only from less to more reserve, as appears from their all having the same common principles of philosophising<sup>n</sup>.

III. ARISTOTLE was the disciple of Plato, and his rival. This emulation, though it disposed him to take a different road to fame, in a province yet unoccupied, and to throw off the legislative character; yet it set him upon writing books of *laws* and *politics*, in opposition to his master; whom he takes every occasion to contradict.

He stuck indeed to the ancient method of the *double doctrine*, but with less caution and reserve. For, whereas the Pythagoreans and Platonists kept it amongst the secrets of their schools, he seems willing that all the world should take notice of it, by giving public directions to distinguish between the two kinds<sup>o</sup>. Accordingly, in his *Nicomachian Ethics*, he expresses himself without any ceremony, and in the most dogmatical way, against a future state of rewards and punishments. *Death* (says he) *is of all things the most terrible. For it is*

<sup>n</sup> *Acad. Quæst.* lib. i.

<sup>o</sup> See Cic. *Ep. ad Att.* lib. iv. Ep. 16.—in singulis libris  
the

the final period of existence. And beyond that, it appears, there is neither good nor evil for the dead man to dread or hope<sup>r</sup>.

And in another place he tells us, that the soul, after it's separation from the body, will neither *joy* nor *grieve*, *love* nor *hate*, nor be subject to any passions of the like nature. And lest we should suspect that this was said of the *animal life* only, he goes further, and observes, that it will then neither *remember*, *think*, nor *understand*<sup>s</sup>. It must, therefore, according to this Philosopher, be absolutely lost, as to any separate existence.

IV. ZENO the Founder of the Porch, followed the mode, in writing of *Laws*, and a *Republic*. Agreeably to this part of his character, we find, by Laetantius, that he taught a future state of rewards and punishments in the very terms of Plato: *Esse inferos Zeno Stoicus docuit; & sedes piorum ab impiis esse discretas; & illos quidem quietas ac delectabiles in clere regiones, hos vero luere panas in tenebrofis locis atque in cæni voraginibus horrendis*<sup>t</sup>. Yet, we know that he and the whole Porch held, that God governed the world only by his general providence; which did not extend either to individuals, cities or people<sup>u</sup>: And, not to insist that his follower Chrysippus laughed at these things, as the most childish of all terrors, we know too, that the phi-

[de republica] utor proœmiis, ut Aristoteles in iis, quos ἐξαφενθεῖς vocat —

<sup>r</sup> Φοβερώτατον δὲ οὐδενίστι πάντας γένη εἴτε τῷ τεθεωρτὶ δοκεῖ, εἴτε αἰσθέτη, εἴτε κακὸν οὐ. Eth. ad Nicom. lib. iii. c. 6. p. 130. Ed. Han. 1610. 8<sup>vo</sup>.

<sup>s</sup> τὸ δὲ ΔΙΑΝΟΕΣΘΑΙ, καὶ ΦΙΛΕΙΝ ἢ ΜΙΣΕΙΝ, αὐτὰς εἴτινα πάθη, αλλὰ τεθεωρτὲ ἔχοντες εἴτινα ἡ εἰδῶν ἔχει, διὸ καὶ εἴτε φθεγγόμενοι, οὐτέ ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΙΕ, οὐτέ φιλεῖ. *De anima*, i. v.

<sup>t</sup> Infr. lib. vii. sect. 7.

<sup>u</sup> Nat. Deor. 1 iii. c. 39.

Iosophic principle of his School was, *that the soul died with the body*<sup>t</sup>. Indeed to compliment their wise man, the Stoics taught that his soul held it out till the general conflagration: by which, when we come to speak of their opinion concerning the nature and duplicity of the soul, we shall find they meant just nothing.

However, it was not long before the Stoics quite laid aside the legislative character; for which their Master appears to have had no talents, as we may judge by what he lays down in his *Republic*, that *States should not busy themselves in erecting temples; for we ought not to think there is any thing holy, or sacred, or that deserves any real esteem, in the work of masons and labourers*<sup>v</sup>. The good man had forgot that he was writing Laws for a *People*; and so turned impertinently enough, to philosophise with the stoical Sage. The truth is, this sect had never any name for legislation: and therefore, as we say, in no long time, laid the study of it quite aside; after which they wrote without the least reserve, against a future state of rewards and punishments.

Thus EPICTETUS, a thorough Stoic, if ever there was any, speaking of death, says, “ But “ whither do you go? no where to your hurt: you “ return from whence you came: to a friendly con-“ sociation with your kindred elements: what there “ was of the nature of fire in your composition, “ returns to the element of fire; what there was

<sup>t</sup> Οἱ Στοῖκοι ἔξιεται τῷ σωμάτῳ ὑποφέρεσσι τῷ μὲν αἰώνιοις ὄμοι,  
τοῖς συλλημασι, γνωμῇσι (ταύτην δὲ ἡ τρίτη ἀπαιδεύτων) τῷ δὲ ισχυρότερον  
οἷς ἐστιν τὰς ΣΩΦΟΙΣ, καὶ μέχεται τὸ ἐπιπεριεστερόν. Plut. de Plac.  
Phil. lib. iv. c. 7---See the *Critical inquiry into the opinions and*  
*practice of the ancient philosophers*, p. 27---to 37. 2<sup>d</sup> Ed.

<sup>v</sup> Προδότοροι δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὅτι τὸ Ζεῦν δὲ Καθεδός ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ φρούρῳ  
ἴερά τε οἰκοδομεῖν εἰδὲν δέσσει, οἴεσθε γὰρ εἰδὲν γενῆ τοπίον, διὸ πολλαῖς  
ἄξιον καὶ ἄγνιον οἰκοδόμων τε ἔχον καὶ βασιστῶν. Apud Orig. cont.  
Cels. p. 6.

" of earth, to earth; what of air, to air; and  
" of water, to water. There is no Hell, nor Acheron,  
" Cocytus, nor Pyriphlegethon".

In another place, he says, " The hour of death  
" approaches. Do not endeavour to aggravate,  
" and make things worse than they really are; re-  
" present them to yourself in their true light. The  
" time is now come when the materials of which you  
" are compounded will be resolved into the elements from  
" which they were originally taken. What hurt or  
" cause of terror is there in this? or what is there  
" in the world that ABSOLUTELY PERISHETH \*."

ANTONINUS says, " He who fears death, either  
" fears that he shall be deprived of all sense, or that  
" he shall experience different sensations. If all sen-  
" sations cease, you will be no longer subject to pain  
" and misery; if you be invested with senses of ano-  
" ther kind, you will become another creature, and  
" will continue to exist as such ?."

SENECA, in his consolation to Marcia, daughter  
of the famous Cremutius Cordus the Stoic, is not at  
all behind him, in the frank avowal of the same  
principles. *Cogita, nullis defunctorum malis affici : illa que nobis inferos faciunt terribiles, FABULAM esse : nullas imminere mortuis tenebras, nec carcerem, nec flumina flagrantia igne, nec oblivionis amorem, nec tribunalia, & reos & in illa libertate tam laxa ullos*

μετανοής εἰς τὸν δενδρόν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ θάνατον, εἰς τὰ φίλα καὶ συγ-  
γένη, εἰς τὰ σωματία ὅστιν οὐτε σοὶ αὐτός, εἰς αὐτὸς αὐτοτινόν, οὐτε πά-  
γκλες, εἰς γένοντας οὐτον τοιεντατινόν, εἰς αἰώνατινον οὐτον υἱοτινόν, εἰς  
υδάτινον οὐδεὶς" : ὅπερ εὖλος Ἀχέρων, εὖλος Κακούτον, εὖλος Πυριφλεγέθων.  
Apud Arrian. lib. iii. c. 13.

\* " Ήδη καιρὸς διπολαρεῖν. μὴ τραγωδεῖ τὸ πιλαγμα, ἀλλ' εἴπεις  
τοῖς ήδη καιρός τῷ οὐλην, εἴ τοι οὐκηλεῖς, εἰς ἐκτὸν απολαβόντας,  
καὶ τὸ δενδρόν, τὸ μέλλον διπολατεύει τῶν εἰς τῷ κέσμῳ. I. iv. 7. 1.

γ) " Ο τὸν θανάτον φοβεσθεντος, ητοι διασθνοιαν φοβεσται, η δισθνοια  
ἔπεισοισι, ἀλλ' εἴτε οὐκέτι δισθνοι, εὖλος κακός τους αἰσθήσης, εἴτε αἰλούο-  
τέρας δισθνοι επήσῃ, ἀλλοιος ζωντανός, εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴ τοιοῦτον είσαι παντογ.

iterum tyrannos. Luserunt ista poëtæ, & vanis nos agitavere terroribus. Mors omnium dolorum & solutio est, & finis: ultra quam mala nostra non exeunt, quæ nos in illam tranquillitatem, IN QUA, ANTEQUAM NASCEREMUR, jacuimus, reponit <sup>z</sup>.

LUCIAN, who, of all the Ancients, best understood the intrigues and intricacies of ancient Philosophy, appears to have had the same thoughts of the Stoics upon the point in question. In his *Jupiter Tragicus* or *discourse on providence*, Damis, the Epicurean, arguing against providence, silences the Stoic, Timocles, when he comes to the *inequality of events*; because the author would not suffer his Stoic to bring in a *future state* to remove the difficulty. And, that nothing but decorum, or the keeping each sect to his own principles, made him leave the Stoic embarrassed, appears from his *Jupiter confuted*, or *discourse on destiny*; where when Cyniscus presses Jupiter with the same arguments against Providence, Jupiter easily extricates himself: “ You appear by “ this, Cyniscus, to be ignorant what dreadfull “ punishments await the wicked after this life, “ and what abundant happiness is reserved for the “ good <sup>a</sup>. ”

I will only observe in taking leave of this subject, that the famous STOICAL RENOVATION, (which hath been opposed to what is here represented) seems to have been conceived on the *natural Metempsychosis* of Pythagoras. Origen gives the following account of it: “ The generality of the Stoics “ not only subject every thing mortal to these RE-“ NOVATIONS, but the Immortals likewise, and “ the very Gods themselves. For after the confa-

<sup>z</sup> Cap. 19.

<sup>a</sup> Οὐ γὰρ οἰσθα, ὃ Κυνίκε, ἡλίκας, μετὰ τὸν Βίον, δι τοντοὶ τὰς κολόσσους ὑπομένεσσι, ἢ εἰ σοη ἐχεισθεὶς ἴδαιμενια διατριβεσσιν.

“ gration

“ gration of the Universe, which hath happened  
“ already, and will happen hereafter, in infinite  
“ successions, the same face and order of things hath  
“ been and ever will be preserved from the begin-  
“ ning to the end<sup>b</sup>. It is true, the men of this School  
to ease a little the labouring absurdity, contend for  
no more than the most exact resemblance of things,  
in one *renovation*, to those of another. Thus the next  
Socrates was not individually the same with the last,  
but one exactly like him; with exactly such a wife  
as Xantippe, and such accusers as Anytus and  
Melitus. Which, however, shews the folly of  
bringing this *renovation* for a proof, that the Stoicks  
believed a future state of rewards and punishments.

Having now gone through these FOUR FAMOUS SCHOOLS, I should have closed the section, but that I imagined the curious reader would be well pleased to know what CICERO thought, on this important point; Cicero, who finished the conquests of his countrymen in Greece, and brought home in triumph, those only remains of their ancient grandeur, their PHILOSOPHY and ELOQUENCE<sup>c</sup>. But there

<sup>b</sup> Στοικῶν οἱ πλείστες δὲ μόνοι τὴν τῶν θυητῶν περίσσον τοιαύτην εἶναι φασίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τῶν αἴθαντάν τοι τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν θεῶν, μετὰ γάρ τὴν τὴν παντὸς ἐπιπομπὰν απειράκις γεννησαντο, καὶ ἀπειράκις ἐπομένον, ἢ αὐτὴν ταχεῖς ἀπὸ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους πάσῃς γεγονέ τε καὶ ἔσται. πειρώμενοι μόνοι δε πεπίνενται τῷτε τὸ πεμφάστεις οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοικ., ἐκ οἰδὸς ὅπως, ἀπαγαγγαλλαχίες φοσίν ἔσθιαν καὶ περίσσον τοῖς διὸ τῶν πορτέρων πειράδαν πάντας· ἡ αὖ μη Συνεργίης πάντων γένηται, ἀπαγαγγαλλαχίος τις τῷ Σωκράτει, γαμήσων ἀπαγαγγαλλαχίον τῷ Σωκρ. πατρῷ, καὶ κατηγοροῦσθομόνεν· ὑπὸ ἀπορευταῖσιν Αὐτῶν καὶ Μελιτώ. Origenes contra Celijum, 1. iv. Ed. Spen. p. 208, 109. The nature of this *renovation* is examined at large, and admirably developed in the *Critical inquiry into the opinions of the ancient philosophers*.

— Γὸν δὲ Ἀπολλώνιον—εἰπεῖν, Σὲ μὲν ὁ Κικέρων, ἐπαινῶ καὶ θαυμάζω,  
ἥδε ἀλλάδειρος αἵρεσις τὸ τύχον, ὁρῶν, ἀ μόνα τὸ καλῶν ἡμῖν ὑπελείπετο,  
καὶ ταῦτα Ρωμαῖοις Διὸς σε προστήρομένται, ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑΝ τε καὶ ΛΟΓΟΝ.  
Plut. Vit. Cic.

are great difficulties in getting to his real sentiments. I shall mention some of the chief.

1. First, that which arises from the use of the *double doctrine*; a circumstance common to the Greek philosophy; of it's essence, and therefore, inseparable from it's existence. The Ancients who lived after Cicero, such as Clemens Alex. Origen, Synesius, Sallust the philosopher, Apuleius, do in fact speak of it as an instrument still in use; nor do any other ever mention it as a thing become obsolete. So that when Tully undertook to explain the Greek philosophy to his countrymen, he could not but employ so fashionable a vehicle of Science. But how much it contributed to hide the real sentiments of the user, we have seen above.

2. Another difficulty arises from the peculiar genius of the Sect he espoused, the *New Academy*; which, was entirely *sceptical*: It professed a way of philosophising, in which there was no room for any one to *interfere* with his own opinions; or, indeed, to *have* any. It is true, were we to consider Tully as a *strict Academic*, in the Grecian sense of adhering to a Sect, our enquiry would be presently at an end; or at least very impertinent: but he professed this philosophy in a much laxer way; as we shall now see.

3. And this leads us to another difficulty, arising from the manner, in which the Greek philosophy was received in Italy. The Romans in general were, by their manners and dispositions, little qualified for speculative science. When they first got footing, and had begun a commerce for arts, in Greece, they entertained great jealousies of the Sophists, and used them roughly: and it was long before they could be persuaded to think favourably of a set of men, who professed themselves always able and ready to dispute for or against VIRTUE indifferently<sup>d</sup>;

rently<sup>d</sup>: and even then, the Greek philosophy was introduced into Rome, but as a more refined species of luxury, and a kind of table-furniture, set apart for the entertainment of the Great; who were yet very far from the Grecian humour, *jurare in verba magistrorum*: they regarded the doctrines of the Sect they espoused, not as a *rule of life*, but only as a *kind of Apparatus for their rhetoric schools*; to enable them to invent readily, and reason justly, in the affairs of life. Tully, who best knew upon what footing it was received, says no less, when he ridicules Cato for an unfashionable fellow. *Hæc homo ingeniosissimus M. Cato auctoribus eruditissimis inductus, arripuit, NEQUE DISPUTANDI CAUSA, UT MAGNA PARS, sed ita vivendi*<sup>e</sup>. The least, then, we may conclude from hence is, that Cicero, laughing at those who espoused a Sect *vivendi causa*, did himself espouse the Academic, *causa disputandi*: which indeed he frankly enough confesses to his adversary, in this very oration: *fatebor enim, Cato, me quoque in adolescentia, diffissum ingenio meo, quæsiisse adiumenta doctrinæ*. Which, in other words, is, I myself espoused a Sect of philosophy, for it's use in disputation. This slippery way, therefore, of professing the Greek philosophy, must needs add greatly to the embarrass we complain of.

4. A fourth difficulty arises from Tully's purpose in writing his works of philosophy; which

<sup>d</sup> Cicero makes the famous orator, M Antonius, give this as the reason why he hid his knowledge of the Greek philosophy from the People.—*Sic decrevi [inquit Antonius] philosophari potius, ut Neoptolemus apud Ennium, paucis: nam omnino haud placet. Sed tamen hæc est mea sententia, quam videbar exposuisse. Ego ista studia non improbo, moderata modo sint: opinionem istorum studiorum, & suspicionem artificii apud eos, qui res judicent, oratori adversariam esse arbitror. Imminuit enim & oratoris auctoritatem & orationis fidem.* *De Orat.* l. ii. c. 37.

<sup>e</sup> *Orat. pro Muræna.* It must be owned, that these words, at first sight, seem to have a different meaning. And the *dispu-*

was, not to deliver his own opinion on any point of ethics or metaphysics, but to explain to his countrymen, in the most intelligible manner, whatsoever the Greeks had taught concerning them. In the execution of which design, no Sect could so well serve his turn as the NEW ACADEMY, whose principle it was, *not to interfere with their own opinions*: and a passage, in his Academic questions, inclines me to think, he entered late into this Sect, and not till he had formed his project. Varro, one of the dialogists, says to him: *sed de teipso quid est quod audio?* Tully answers: *quoniam de re?* Varro replies: *relictam a te VETEREM JAM, tractari autem NOVAM.* Varro hints at it again, where speaking afterwards to Tully, he says, *tuae sunt nunc partes, qui ab antiquorum ratione NUNC desercis, & ea, quae ab Arcesila novata sunt probas, docere &c.*<sup>f</sup>. This further appears from a place in his *Nature of the Gods* <sup>g</sup>, where he says, that his espousing

*tandi causa* look as if the observation was confined to Stoicism. For this Sect had so entirely engrossed the *Dialectics*, that the followers of Zeno were more frequently called *Dialectici* than *Stoici*. Notwithstanding this, it plainly appears, I think, from the context, that the other sense is the true. Tully introduces his observation on Cato's singularity in these words: *et quoniam non est nobis hæc oratio habenda aut cum imperita multitudine, aut in aliquo concentu agrestium, audacius paulo de studiis humanitatis, quæ & mibi & vobis nota & jucunda sunt, disputatione.* Here he declares, his design is not to give his thoughts of the Stoicks in particular, (though they furnished the occasion) but of the Greek philosophy in general, *de studiis humanitatis*. He then runs through the Stoical paradoxes, and concludes—*Hæc homo ingeniosissimus M. C. arripuit, &c.* But had it been his intention to confine the obserivation to the Stoicks, on account of their great name in logic, he must have said *hanc*, not *hæc*: it being their *logic*, not their *paradoxes*, which was of use in *disputatione*.

<sup>f</sup> Manutius and Davies, who, I suppose, did not attend to what passed before, agree to throw out the word *nunc*, as perfectly useless and insignificant.

<sup>g</sup> Lib. i. c. 3.

the New Academy, of a sudden, was a thing altogether unlocked for. *Multis etiam sensi mirabile videri, eam nobis potissimum probetam esse philosophiam, quæ lucem eriperet & quasi noctem quandam rebus offunderet, desertaque disciplinæ, & jam pridem reliæ patrocinium NEC OPINATUM a nobis esse susceptum.*

The change then was late; and after the ruin of the Republic; when Cicero retired from business, and had leisure, in his recess, to plan and execute this noble undertaking. So that a learned critic appears to have been mistaken, when he supposed the choice of the *New Academy* was made in his youth. *This Sect, (says he) did best agree with the vast genius and ambitious spirit of YOUNG CICERO<sup>h</sup>.*

5. But the principal difficulty proceeds from the several and various characters he sustained in his life, and writings; which habituated him to feign and dissemble his opinions: here, (though he acted neither a weak nor an unfair part,) he becomes perfectly inscrutable. He may be considered as an Orator, a Statesman, and a Philosopher; characters, all equally personated<sup>i</sup>; and no one more

<sup>h</sup> *Remarks upon a late discourse of freethinking*, Part. ii. Rem. 53.

<sup>i</sup> 1. As a STATESMAN, he discharged the office of a Patriot, *urbis conservator & parens*, in a Government torn in pieces by the dissensions between Senate and People. But could this be done by speaking his real sentiments to both? both were very faulty; and, as faulty men generally are, too angry to hear reason I have given an instance below, in the case of the *Catilene conspiracy*. And the issue of it declares the wisdom of that conduct. He saved the Republic. 2. As a PHILOSOPHER, his end and design in writing was not to deliver his own opinion, but to explain the Grecian philosophy. On which account he blames those as too curious, who were for knowing his own sentiments. In pursuance of this design he brings in Stoicks, Epicureans, Platonists, Academics new and old, in order to instruct the Romans in their various opinions, and several ways of reasoning. But whether it be himself or others that are brought upon the stage, it is the Academic, not Cicero; it is the Stoic, the Epicurean, not Balbus nor Velleius, who deliver their opinions.

the real man than the other: but each of them taken up, and laid down, for the occasion. This appears from the numerous inconsistencies we find in him, throughout the course of his sustaining them. In his oration *de Harusp. respon. in senatu*, when the popular superstition was inflamed by present prodigies, he gives the highest character of the wisdom of their ancestors, as Founders of their established religion: “*Ego vero primum habeo auctores ac magistros religionum calendarum majores nostros: quorum mihi tanta fuisse sapientia videtur, ut satis superque prudentes sint, qui illorum prudentiam, non dicam assequi, sed, quanta fuerit, perspicere possint.*” Yet in his treatise of *Laws*, as the reader has seen above<sup>k</sup>, he frankly declares, that *the folly of their ancestors had suffered many depravities to be brought into Religion*. Here the Philosopher confuted the Statesman; as, in another instance, the Statesman seems to have got the better of the Philosopher. He defends the paradoxes of the Stoicks in a philosophical dissertation: But in his oration for *Muræna*, he ridicules those paradoxes in the freest manner. Nor under one and the same character, or at one and the same time, is he more consistent. In *the orations against Catiline*, when he opens the conspiracy to the Senate, he represents it as the most deep laid design, which had infected all orders and degrees of men amongst them: Yet, when he brings the same affair before the *People*, he talks of it as only the wild and senseless escape of a few desperate wretches: it being necessary for his purpose, that the *Senate*

3. As an *ORATOR*, he was an *advocate for his client*, or more properly *personated* him. In this case, then, he was to speak the sentiments of his client, not his own.

<sup>k</sup> See book ii. sect. 6.

and People, who viewed the conspiracy from several stations, should see it in different lights.

We meet with numbers of the like contradictions, delivered in his own person, and under his philosophic character. Thus, in his *books of divination*, he combats all augury, &c. and yet, in his philosophic *treatise of laws*, he delivers himself in their favour; and in so serious and positive a manner, that it is difficult not to believe him to be in earnest. In a word, he laughed at the opinions of State, when he was amongst the Philosophers; he laughed at the doctrines of the Philosophers, when he was cajoling an Assembly; and he laughed heartily at both, when withdrawn amongst his friends in a corner. Nor, is this the worst part of the story. He hath given us no mark to distinguish his meaning: For, in his *Academic questions*<sup>1</sup>, he is ready to swear he always speaks what he thinks: Jurarem per Jovem Deosque penates, me & ardere studio veri reperiendi, & ea sentire quæ dicerem<sup>m</sup>: Yet, in his *Nature of the Gods*<sup>n</sup>, he has strangely changed his tone: Qui autem requirunt, quid quaque de

<sup>1</sup> Lib. iv. Sect. 20.

<sup>m</sup> Lucullus had been declaiming very tragically against the Academy, when Tully entered on its defence; in which he thought it proper to premise something concerning himself. Aggrediar igitur, (says he,) si pauca ante, quasi de FAMA MEA dixero. He then declares, that, had he embraced the Academy out of vanity, or love of contradiction, it had not only reflected on his sense, but on his honour. Itaque nisi ineptum putarem in tali disputatione id facere, quod cum de republica disceptatur fieri interdum solet: jurarem per Jovem &c. From hence, I gather that though the question here be of the Academic philosophy, and of Cicero as an Academic, yet, as he tells us, he is now to vindicate himself in a point in which his honour was concerned, the protestation is general, and concerns his constant turn of mind; which always inclined him, he says, to speak his sentiments.

<sup>n</sup> Lib. i. Sect. 5.

re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt quam necesse est.

If it be asked then, in which of his writings we can have any reasonable assurance of his true sentiments? I reply, scarce in any, but his EPISTLES. Nor is this said to evade any material evidence that may be found in his other works, in favour of a future state of rewards and punishment: on the contrary, there are many very signal instances of his disbelief, as far as we can hazard a judgment of his mind. As in his *Offices*, which bids the fairest of any to come from his heart, he delivers himself very effectually against it; as will appear in the next section. And in his oration for Cluentius to the Judges, he speaks with yet more force on the same side the question: “Nam nunc quidem quid tandem illi mali mors attulit? nisi forte ineptiis ac scialis ducimur, ut existimemus illum apud inferos inpiorum suppicia perferre, &c. Quæ si falsa sunt, id quod omnes intelligunt, quid ei tandem aliud mors eripuit praeter sensum doloris?

Nor will most of those passages, which are usually brought in support of the opinion, that Tully did really believe the *immortality of the soul*, stand in any account against these: Because, as will be shewn, in the next section, they best agree to a kind of *immortality* very consistent with a thorough disbelief of a future state of rewards and punishments °.

° As to the celebrated argument of Plato for the immortality of the soul, explained and enforced by Cicero, it is so big with impiety and nonsense, that one would wonder how any christian Divine could have the indiscretion to recommend it as doing credit to ancient Philosophy; or to extol the inventors and espousers of it, as having delivered and entertained *very just, rational, and proper notions* concerning the immortality of the human soul. If we examine this philosophy as it is delivered us by Plato in his *Phædrus*, or as it is translated by Cicero in

It is only then (as we say) in his EPISTLES to his friends, where we see the man divested of the *Poli-*

his first Tuscan, we shall find it gives the human soul the attributes of the Divine Being, and supposes it to have been from eternity, uncreated and self-existent. Speaking of the principle of motion, or the soul, it says, *Principii autem nulla est origo: nam e principio oriuntur omnia: ipsum autem nulla ex re aliâ nasci potest: nec enim esset id principium quod gigneretur aliunde.— Id autem nec nasci potest, nec mori.— Hæc est propria natura animi atque vis; quæ si est una ex omnibus, quæ se ipsa semper moveat, neque nata certe est, et æterna est.* i Tusc. c. 2, 3. It is plain too, that this argument assigns the human soul a NECESSARY immortality, or an immortality which arises from its nature and essence, or from its original and inherent powers; and not from the Will or appointment of God. We are told that the soul is immortal, because it is a self-moving substance; for that a self-moving substance can never cease to be, since it will always have a power of existing within itself, independent of any foreign or external cause. And what can be said more of God himself? *sentit igitur animus se moveri, quod cum sentit, illud una sentit et vi sua, non aliena, moveri; nec accidere posse, ut ipse unquam a se deseratur.* i Tusc. c. 23. Here its immortality is not supposed to arise from the influence of any foreign or external cause, but is resolved into the natural and inherent powers of the soul itself. Plato says, ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτέντοις οὐ καὶ αὐτόφερ τυχὸν αἴρενται — τέτοι δὲ οὐτε αὐτόλληγοις οὐτε γνωματοῖς οὐταῦ, οὐδὲ αἴρεντες οὐδὲ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲ ξῆραί οὐτε οὐτοις. The necessity here spoken of was supposed to arise from an internal faculty and power of the soul, or from the principle of self-motion. The force of all this, has been shuffled over by the writers against the D. L. with only repeating, that, Cicero inferred the immortality of the soul from its wonderful powers and faculties, on its principle of self motion, its memory, invention, wit and comprehension. As to self-motion the word is equivocal, and may either signify the power given to a being to begin motion; or a power inherent and essential to a being, who has all things within itself, and receives nothing from without. Now we have shewn, that Plato and his followers used self motion, when applied to the soul, in this latter sense; and from thence inferred a NECESSARY immortality in that being which had it; an immortality which implied increation and self-existence. As to the other powers and faculties of memory, invention, wit and comprehension, whatsoever immortality may be logically deduced from them, it is not that which Cicero deduces: For as we see his is a strict and proper immortality, an existence from all eterni-  
tician,

tician, the *Sophist*, and the *Advocate*: And there he professes his disbelief of a future state of rewards and punishments in the frankest and freest manner. To L. Mescinius he says: “Sed ut illa secunda moderatè  
 “ tulimus, sic hanc non solum adversam, sed fun-  
 “ ditus eversam fortunam fortiter ferre debemus;  
 “ ut hoc saltem in maximis malis boni consequa-  
 “ mur, ut mortem, quam etiam beati contemnere  
 “ debeamus, propterea quod nullum sensum esset  
 “ habitura, nunc sic affecti, non modo contemnere  
 “ debeamus, sed etiam optare <sup>p.</sup>.” In his epistle to Torquatus, he says: “Ita enim vivere ut non sit  
 “ vivendum, miserrimum est. Mori autem nemo  
 “ sapiens miserum dixit, ne beato quidem—sed  
 “ haec consolatio levis est; illa gravior, qua te uti  
 “ spero: Ego certe utor. Nec enim dum ero,  
 “ angar ulla re, cum omni vacem culpa: Et si non  
 “ ero, sensu omnino carebo <sup>q.</sup>.” Again, to the

ty, to all eternity: In a word, the immortality of the Supreme Being himself. Si cernerem (says Tully) quemadmodum nasci possent [animi hominum] etiam quemadmodum interirent viderem. <sup>1</sup> *Tusc.* c. 24. And again, when he proves the immortality of the soul against Panætius, he goes upon the principle that the soul cannot be shewn to be immortal, but on the supposition of its being actually ungenerated. Volt enim [Panætius] quod nemo negat, quicquid natum sit interire; — nasci autem animos, quod declareret eorum similitudo — nihil necessitatis, cur nascatur, animi similitudo.—<sup>1</sup> *Tusc.* c. 32, —3. I would therefore have the friends of REASON, not to say of REVELATION, consider whether these extravagant notions of the human soul, do any honour to ancient Philosophy? and whether Tully had not acted a more decent and modest part to have held consistently, even with Epicurus, the mortality of the soul, than with Plato that it was *uncreated, self-existent, and necessarily eternal?*

<sup>p</sup> *Fam. Ep.* 1. v. *Ep.* 21.

<sup>q</sup> *Lib. vi. Ep. 3.* Some have taken the *ero* and *non ero*, in this passage, to relate *generically*, to existence or non-existence *absolutely*; and not, as certainly Tully meant, *specifically*, to the state of existence or non-existence *hunc*, i. e. *life or death*. But if that were his meaning, that *if he had no being he should have fame*

same person<sup>r</sup>: “ Deinde quod mihi ad consolatio-  
 “ nem commune tecum est, si jam vocer ad exitum  
 “ vitæ, non ab ea republica avellar, qua caren-  
 “ dum esse doleam, præsertim cum id sine ullo  
 “ sensu futurum sit.” And again to his friend  
 Toranius<sup>s</sup>: “ Cum consilio profici nihil possit,  
 “ una ratio videtur, quicquid evenerit, ferre mo-  
 “ derate, præsertim cum omnium rerum mors sit  
 “ extreum.” That Cicero here speaks his real  
 sentiments, is beyond all doubt. These are letters  
 of consolation to his friends, when he himself, by  
 reason of the ill state of Public Affairs, much wanted  
 consolation; a season when men have least dis-  
 guise, and are most disposed to lay open their  
 whole hearts:

Nam veræ voces tum demum pectore ab imo  
 Ejiciuntur, & eripitur PERSONA, manet R.E.S.

Lucret.

Here his *real* sentiments<sup>t</sup> are delivered positively;  
 which in his *Tusculan disputationes* he advances only

*no sense*, Torquatus, for so wonderful, a discovery, might well  
 have returned him his proverb quoted in this Epistle, γνῶνεις;  
*Athenæc.* But the foregoing passage from the epistle to Mescinius,  
 in which we find the same thought, and in the same expression,  
 puts the meaning out of doubt. Add to this, that it was  
 the very language of the Epicureans, and used by Lucretius as  
 an antidote against the fear of death,

“ Scilicet haud nobis quidquam, qui NON ERIMUS tum,

“ Accidere omnino poterit SENSUMQUE movere.

But let it be observed, that when Cicero talks of death as of  
 the end of man, he does not make this conclusion on the Epicurean principle, that the soul was a mere *quality*, but on the  
 Platonic, that it was resolved into the substance from whence it  
 was extracted, and had no longer a *particular* existence.

<sup>r</sup> Lib. vi. Ep. 4.

<sup>s</sup> Lib. vi. Ep. 21.

<sup>t</sup> The learned Author of the exact and elegant *history of Cicero*, hath since turned this *circumstance* to the support of  
 the contrary opinion, with regard to his Hero's sentiments:—  
 “ But some (says he) have been apt to consider them [i. e. the

hypo-

hypothetically; but with a clearness that well comments the conciseness of the foregoing passages.

" passages in Tully's philosophic writings in favour of a future state] as the flourishes rather of his eloquence than the conclusions of his reason. Since in other parts of his works he seems to intimate not only a diffidence, but a disbelief of the immortality of the soul, and a future state of rewards and punishments, and especially in his letters, where he is supposed to declare his mind with the greatest frankness. But —in a melancholy hour, when the spirits are depressed, the same argument would not appear to him with the same force, but doubts and difficulties get the ascendant, and what humoured his present chagrin find the readiest admission. The passages alledged [*i. e.* in this place of the *Div. Leg.*] were all of this kind, written in the season of his dejection, when all things were going wrong with him, and in the height of Cæsar's power," &c. Vol. II. p. 561. Ed. 4<sup>o</sup>. Thus, every thing hath two Academical handles. But still, my candid friend will allow me to say they cannot both be right. It is confessed that a desponding temper, like that of Cicero's, will, in a melancholy hour, be always inclined to fear the worst. But to what are it's fears confined? Without doubt to the issue of that very affair, for which we are distressed. A melancholy hour would have just the contrary influence on our other cogitations. And this by the wise and gracious disposition of Nature; that the mind may endeavour to make up by an abundance of hope in one quarter, what through the persuasion of it's fears, it hath suffered itself, to part with, in another. So that unless Cicero was made differently from all other men, one might venture to say, his *hopes of future good* (had Philosophy permitted him to entertain any hopes at all) would have risen in proportion to his *fears of the present*. And this is seen every day in fact. For it is nothing but this natural disposition that makes men of the world so generally fly even to Superstition for the solace of their misfortunes. But the excellent author of the *critical inquiry into the opinions of the ancient philosophers* goes further. "Cicero (says he) very frankly declares in his *Tusculans* themselves that this [the mortality or the no separate existence of the soul] was the most real and effectual, the most solid and substantial comfort that could be administered against the fear of death. In his first *Tusculan*, he undertakes to prove, that death was not an evil; and this, 1<sup>st</sup>, Because it was not attended with any actual punishment, or positive and real misery. 2<sup>dly</sup>, He rises higher, and labours to prove, that

M. Video

“ M. Video te altè spectare & velle in cœlum mi-  
 “ grare. A. Spero fore, ut contingat id nobis.  
 “ Sed fac, ut iſti volunt, animos NON remanere  
 “ post mortem.—M. Mali vero quid affert ista  
 “ sententia? Fac enim sic animum interire, ut  
 “ corpus. Num igitur aliquis dolor, aut omnino

“ men ought to look upon death as a blessing rather than an  
 “ evil, as the soul, after its departure from the body, might be  
 “ happy in another life. In the first part he supposes the mor-  
 “ tality and extinction of the soul at death; in the second he  
 “ plainly supposes, that it will survive the body. Now the  
 “ question is, on which doctrine does he lay most stress; or,  
 “ which of these two notions, in the opinion of Cicero, would  
 “ serve best to fortify and prepare men against the fear of death?  
 “ And luckily Cicero himself has long since determined this  
 “ point for us; having in the first Tusculan brought several rea-  
 “ sons to prove the immortality of the soul, he after all very  
 “ frankly declares, that they had no great *validity* and *force*;  
 “ that the most solid and substantial argument, which could be  
 “ urged against the fear of death, was the very consideration ad-  
 “ vanced in his letters, or *the doctrine which makes it the utter*  
 “ *period of our being*: And in the remaining part of the book he  
 “ proceeds to argue chiefly on this supposition, as *being the best*  
 “ *calculated to support men against the fear and terror of Death*.  
 “ The arguments which he urged to prove the immortality of  
 “ the soul, seem sometimes to have had great weight with the  
 “ person, to whom they were immediately address'd; he de-  
 “ clares himself fond of the opinion, and resolves not to part  
 “ with it. *Nemo me de immortalitate depellet*. To this Cicero  
 “ replies, *laudo id quidem*; *etsi nihil nimis oportet confidere*:  
 “ *movemur enim sœpe aliquo acute concluso*: *labamus muta-*  
 “ *musque sententiam clarioribus etiam in rebus*: *in his est enim*  
 “ *aliqua obscuritas*. *Id igitur si acciderit, simus armati*. c. 32.  
 “ He does not seem to lay any great stress on the notion of a  
 “ future state; *nihil oportet nimis confidere*. He owns that  
 “ the arguments, alledged in support of it, were rather speci-  
 “ ous than solid: *movemur enim sœpe aliquo acutè concluso*.  
 “ That they were not plain and clear enough to make any  
 “ strong and lasting impression: *Labamus mutamusque senten-*  
 “ *tiam clarioribus etiam in his rebus*; *in his est enim aliqua*  
 “ *obscuritas*.—That therefore the best remedy at all events,  
 “ would be the notion that the soul dies with the body: *id igi-*  
 “ *tur si acciderit, simus armati*. Having then explained what

“post mortem SENSUS in corpore est?—Ne in ani-  
 “mo quidem igitur SENSUS remanet, ipse enim  
 “nusquam est.—Hoc premendum etiam atque  
 “etiam est argumentum, confirmato illo, de quo,  
 “si mortales animi sunt, dubitare non possumus,  
 “quin tantus interitus in morte sit, ut ne minima  
 “quidem suspicio SENSUS relinquatur.” Now,  
 this is the very language of the Epicureans, as ap-  
 pears from the following words of Pliny: “Post  
 “sepulturam aliæ atque aliæ manium ambages.  
 “Omnibus a suprema die eadem, quæ ante pri-  
 “mum: nec magis a morte SENSUS ullus aut cor-  
 “pori aut animæ quam ante natalem. Eadem  
 “enim vanitas in futurum etiam se propagat,—  
 “alias immortalitem animæ, alias transfiguratio-  
 “nem, alias sensum inferis dando, & manes co-  
 “lendo, deumque faciendo, qui jam etiam homo  
 “esse desierit.—Quæ (malum) ista dementia, ite-  
 “rari vitam morte? Quæve genitis quies unquam,  
 “si in sublimi SENSUS animæ manet.”

“he had to say on the immortality of the soul, he proceeds to  
 “shew that death could not be considered as an evil, on the sup-  
 “position that the soul was to perish with the body.

“When therefore he would teach men to contemn the ter-  
 “rors of death, he grounds his main argument on the morta-  
 “lity of the soul. As to the notion of a future state, it was  
 “maintained by arguments too subtle to work a real and lasting  
 “conviction; it was not thought clear enough to make any  
 “deep and strong impression. He has therefore recourse to the  
 “extinction of the soul, as the most comfortable consideration  
 “that could be employed against the fear of death. This was  
 “not then a topic that was peculiar to the season of dejection  
 “and distress; it was not thrown out only accidentally, when  
 “he was not considering the subject, but was used in the works  
 “that were deliberately and professedly written on this very  
 “point. It could not therefore be *occasional* only, and suited to  
 “the present circumstances, as Dr. Middleton in his reasoning  
 “all along supposes.”

• *Tusc. Disp.* lib. i. c. 34—36.

† *Nat. Hist.* lib. vii. c. 55.

PLUTARCH was amongst the Greeks, what Cicero was amongst the Latins, as far as concerned the business of delivering and digesting the various opinions of the Philosophers. In his famous tract of SUPERSTITION he uses their COMMON arms to combat that evil; and expresses himself with uncommon force where he speaks of a *future state* as an error essential to *superstition*, and what the general voice of Reason, interpreted by sound Philosophy, disclaims. “Death is the final period of our “being. But SUPERSTITION says no. — She “stretches out life beyond life itself. Her fears “extend further than our existence. She has joined “to the idea of death, that other inconsistent idea of “eternal life in misery. For when all things come to “an end, then, in the opinion of Superstition, they “begin to be endless.” —

I will beg leave to conclude this section with two observations relative to the general argument.

1. We have just given a passage from the oration for Cluentius, in which, Tully having ridiculed the popular fables concerning a future state, he subjoins, *if these are false, as all men see they are, what bath death deprived him of, besides a SENSE of pain?*

— πίστις δὲ βίος τάσσεται αὐθεάπνειος ὁ θάνατος· τῆς δὲ δεισιδαιμονίας, οὐδὲ ἔτερη. ἀλλ᾽ υπερβαλλεῖ τοὺς ὄρους ἐπέκεντα τὴς ζῆν, μακρότερογε τὴς βίος τωνῦτα τὸν φόβον, καὶ συναπλουσα τῷ θανάτῳ κακῶν ἐπίνοιαν αὐθαίρατων καὶ ὅτε παντελεῖται πραγμάτων, ἀρχεῖται δοκούσα μὴ πανομένων.

“Quæ si falsa sunt, id quod omnes intelligunt, quid ei tandem aliud mors eripuit præter SENSUM doloris? — Seneca reasons in the same manner. Mors contemni debet magis quam solet: multa enim de illa credimus. Multorum ingenii certatum est ad augendam ejus infamiam. Descriptus est carcer infernus, & perpetua nocte oppressa regio, in qua

— “ingens janitor orci, &c.

Sed etiam cum persuaderis istas fabulas esse, nec quicquam defunctis superesse quod timeant, subit alias metus, æque enim timor ne apud inferos sint, quam ne nusquam. Ep. 83.

From this inference of the Orator it appears, that we have not concluded amiss, when, from several quotations, interspersed throughout this work, in which a disbelief of the *common notion* of a future state of rewards and punishments is implied, we have inferred the writer's disbelief of a future state of rewards and punishments in *general*. 2. We have seen the Philosophers of every sect, one while speaking directly for, and at another, as directly against a future state of rewards and punishments, without intimating the least change in their principles, or making the least hesitation in their professions: So that either we must hold them guilty of the most gross and impudent contradictions, which their characters will not suffer us to conceive of them; or else admit the explanation given above of the DOUBLE DOCTRINE, and the different methods of their *exoteric* and *esoteric* discipline.

Yet to all this it hath been said, “ If the Philosophers disbelieved the popular Divinities, and yet really believed the being of a God; why might they not reject the popular opinions of a future state, and yet, at the same time, hold a future state of real rewards and punishments? Now as they who did not believe Hercules and Æsculapius to be Gods, did not for that reason disbelieve the existence of a governing Mind; so they, that did not believe Æacus or Minos to be judges of Hell, did not for that reason disbelieve all future rewards and punishments.” I answer, the two cases are nothing alike; and this is my solution of the difficulty.

1. At the very time the Philosophers discard the popular Divinities they declare for the being of a God. Thus when Varro had said that Hercules

\* Dr. Sykes.

and

and Æsculapius, Castor and Pollux were not Gods; he adds, *they only have a right notion of God, who conceive him to be a Soul, actuating and governing all things by his power and wisdom*<sup>\*</sup>. But when these Philosophers exploded Styx, Acheron, and Cocytus did they ever substitute any other future state of rewards and punishments in their place?

2. The Philosophers give the popular stories of the infernal regions as the *only foundation and support* of future rewards and punishments; so that, if they explode the popular stories, they must explode the things themselves. And what is more, they tell us that they did so. But was this the case concerning their popular Divinities? Do they ever represent *these* as the *only foundation and support* of the belief of a Deity?

3. Again, The Philosophers held a PRINCIPLE (and we are now about to enter upon that matter) which was inconsistent with a future state of rewards and punishments: in consequence of which they formally, and in express words, disclaim and reject all *such state* and condition. But I know of no principle they held, inconsistent with the belief of a God; nor of any declarations they ever made against such belief. We conclude, therefore, that the two cases are altogether unlike and unrelated.

<sup>y</sup> Quæ sunt autem illa, quæ prolatæ in multitudinem nocent? Hæc, inquit, non esse Deos Herculem, Æsculapium, Castorem, Pullucem. Proditur enim a doctis, quod homines fuerint, et homana conditione defecerint.—But the same Varro says,—Quod hi foli ei videantur animadvertisse, quid esset Deus, qui crediderunt eum esse animam, motu et ratione mundum gubernantem. Apud August. de Civ. Dei, l. iv. c. 27—31.

## S E C T. IV.

**N**O TWITHSTANDING this full evidence against the Philosophers; I much doubt, the *general prejudice* in their favour, supported by the *reasonableness* of the doctrine itself, will be yet apt to keep the reader's opinion undetermined.

I shall therefore, in the last place, explain the CAUSES which withheld the Philosophers *from believing*: and these will appear to have been certain fundamental PRINCIPLES of the ancient Greek Philosophy, altogether inconsistent with the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments.

But to give this its due force, it will be proper to premise, that the constitution of that Philosophy, being above measure refined and speculative, it was always wont to judge and determine rather on METAPHYSICAL than on MORAL maxims; and to stick to all consequences, how absurd soever, which were seen to arise from such considerations.

Of this, we have a famous instance in the ancient Democritic Philosophy: which holding, that not only *sensations*, but even the *cogitations* of the mind, were the mere passion of the Thinker; and so, all *knowledge* and understanding, the same thing with *sense*; the consequence was, that there could not be any error of false judgment; because all passion was true passion, and all appearance true appearance. From hence it followed, that the sun and moon were no bigger than they seemed to us: and these men of reason chose rather to avow this conclusion, than to renounce the metaphysic principle which led them into it.

So just, we see, is that censure which a celebrated

ted French writer passes upon them: *when the Philosophers once besot themselves with a prejudice, they are even more incurable than the People themselves; because they besot themselves not only with the prejudice, but with the false reasonings employed to support it<sup>y</sup>.*

The regard to *metaphysic* principles being so great, we shall see, that the Greek Philosophers must needs reject the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, how innumerable and invincible soever the *moral* arguments are which may be brought to support it, when we come to shew, that there were two METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES concerning GOD and the SOUL, universally embraced by all, which necessarily exclude all notion of a future state of reward and punishment.

The FIRST PRINCIPLE, which led the philosophers to conclude against such a future state was, THAT GOD COULD NEITHER BE ANGRY NOR HURT ANY ONE. This, Tully assures us, was held universally; as well by those who believed a providence, as by those who believed not: "At hoc quidem COMMUNE EST OMNIUM PHILOSOPHORUM, non eorum modo, qui Deum nihil habere ipsum negotii dicunt, & nihil exhibere alteri: sed eorum etiam, qui Deum semper agere aliquid & moliri volunt, NUMQUAM NEC IRASCI DEUM NEC NOCERE<sup>z</sup>." What conclusion the Epicureans drew from hence, (those who, he here says, held, Deum nihil habere ipsum negotii) he tells us in another place, by the mouth of Vel-

<sup>y</sup> Quand les philosophes s'entêtent une fois d'un préjugé, ils sont plus incurables que le peuple même; parce qu'ils s'entêtent également & du préjugé & des fausses raisons dont ils le soutiennent. Fontenelle *Hist. des Oracles*.

<sup>z</sup> *Offic.* lib. iii. cap. 28.

\* *De Nat. Deor.* I. i. c. 17.

leius their spokesman. Intelligitur enim, (an expression denoting that, in this point, the philosophers were agreed) “ à beata, immortalique na-  
“ tura, & iram & gratiam segregari: quibus re-  
“ motis, nulos a superis impendere METUS<sup>a</sup>. And that the other Sects drew the same conclusion (which infers the denial of *a future state of rewards and punishments*) we shall now see by Cicero himself, who speaks for them all.

He is here commanding Regulus for preferring the public good to his own, and the *honest* to the *profitable*; in dissuading the release of the Carthaginian prisoners, and returning back to certain misery, when he might have spent his age at home in peace and pleasure. All this, he observes, was done out of regard to his oath. But it may, perhaps, says he, be objected, what is there in an oath? The violator need not fear the wrath of Heaven; for all Philosophers hold, that *God cannot be angry or hurt any one*. He replies, that, indeed, it was a consequence of the principle of *God's not being angry*, that the perjured man had nothing to fear from divine vengeance: but then it was not this *fear*, which was really *NOTHING*, but justice and good faith, which made the sanction of an oath. The learned will chuse to hear him in his own words: “ M. Atilius Regulus Carthaginem rediit:  
“ neque eum caritas patriæ retinuit, nec suorum.  
“ Neque vero tum ignorabat se ad crudelissimum  
“ hostem, & ad exquisita supplicia proficisci: Sed  
“ jusjurandum conservandum putabat. Quid est  
“ igitur, dixerit quis, in jurejurando? Num ira-  
“ tum timemus jovem? At hoc quidem commune  
“ est omnium philosophorum.—NUMQUAM NEC  
“ IRASCI DEUM, NEC NOCERE.—Hæc quidem ra-  
“ tio non magis contra Regulum, quam contra  
“ omne jusjurandum valet: Sed in jurejurando,  
“ non

“ non qui metus, sed quæ vis sit, debet intelligi.  
 “ Est enim jusjurandum affirmatio religiosa: Quod  
 “ autem affirmatè, quasi Deo teste, promiseris,  
 “ id tenendum est: Jam enim non ad iram Deo-  
 “ rum, quæ NULLA EST; sed ad justitiam & ad fi-  
 “ nem pertinet<sup>b</sup>. ”

Here we see, Tully owns the consequence of this universal principle; that it overthrew the notion of divine punishments: And it will appear presently, that he was not singular in this concession; but spoke the sense of his Grecian masters.

A modern reader, full of the philosophic ideas of these late ages, will be surprized, perhaps, to be told, that this consequence greatly embarrassed Antiquity; when he himself can so easily evade it, by distinguishing between the human passions of anger and fondness, and the divine attributes of justice and goodness; on which the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments is invincibly established. But the Ancients had no such precise ideas of the divine Nature: They knew not well how to sever anger from its justice, nor fondness from its goodness<sup>c</sup>.

<sup>b</sup> Cap. 26, 27, 28, 29. It is true, the same Tully says, ii. 3. deos placatos pietas efficiet et sanctitas; which looks as if he thought the Gods might be angry: and that, therefore, by, quæ nulla est, in the quotation above, he did not mean, what the words imply, quæ vana et commentitia est; but, quæ nihil ad rem pertinet, which they do not imply. But placatos is not here used in the strict specific sense of appeased, which implies preceding anger; but in the more loose generic sense of propitious, which implies no such preceding displeasure. And my reason for understanding the word in this sense, is, that, two or three lines afterwards, he declares it to be the opinion of the Philosophers (to which he agrees) Deos non nocere: But this opinion was founded on that other, in question, Deos non irasci.

<sup>c</sup> Dacier, who understood the genius of antiquity very well, is plainly of this opinion, as appears from his comment on these

This we shall now shew, by an illustrious instance, lest the reader should suspect that, of an obscure speculative Principle, we have feigned one of general credit and influence.

LACTANTIUS having set up for the defender of Christianity, found nothing so much hindered its reception with the Learned as the doctrine of a FUTURE JUDGMENT, which their universal principle, *that God could not be angry*, absolutely opposed. To strike at the root of this evil, he composed a discourse, which Jerom calls, *pulcherrimum opus*, intituled, DE IRA DEI: For he had observed, he tells us, that this Principle was now much spread amongst the common People<sup>d</sup>; he lays the blame of it upon the Philosophers<sup>e</sup>; and tells us, as Tully had done before, that all the Philosophers agreed to exclude the passion of anger from the Godhead<sup>f</sup>.

So that the general syllogism, Lactantius proposed to answer, was this:

*If God hath no affections of fondness or hatred, love or anger; he cannot reward or punish.*

words of Antoninus—*If there be Gods, then leaving the world is no such dreadfull thing; for you may be sure they will do you no harm.*—*εἰ μὲν θεοί εἰσιν, εἴδετε δεινόν. κακῷ γάρ τε οὐκ ἀνθελέσετε.*—Comme les Stoïciens n'avoient aucune idée ni de peines, ni de récompenses éternelles après la mort, et que le plus grand caractère qu'ils reconnoissoient en Dieu, estoit une bonté infinié, ils estoient persuadez qu'apres cette vie on n'avoit rien à craindre, et que c'estoit une chose entierement opposée à la nature de Dieu, de faire du mal. La véritable religion a tiré les hommes d'une sécurité si pernicieuse, &c. — The learned Critic, indeed, expresses himself very ill, confounding the premisses and conclusion, the cause and effect, all the way, one with another; but his meaning is plain enough.

<sup>d</sup> *Animadvertisi plurimos existimare non irasci Deum.*

<sup>e</sup> *Iudem tamen a philosophis irretiti, & falsis argumentationibus capti.*      <sup>f</sup> *Ita omnes philosophi de ira consentiunt.*

*But he bath no affections; —*

*Therefore, &c.*

Let us see then how he manages: For although he knew Christianity but imperfectly, he was exquisitely well skilled in the strong and weak side of Philosophy. A modern answerer would certainly have denied the *major*; but that was a Principle received by all parties, as Lactantius himself gives us to understand, when he says, that the Principle of God's not being angry destroyed all religion, by taking away a future state <sup>g</sup>. He had nothing left then but to deny the *minor*: And this, he tells us, is his purpose to undertake <sup>h</sup>.

His business then is to prove, that God hath human passions: And though, by several expressions, dropped up and down, he seems to be fully sensible of the grossness of this Principle; yet, on the other hand, all Philosophy agreeing to make it the necessary support of a future state, he sets upon his task in good earnest, avoids all refinements, and maintains that there are in God, as there are in man, the passions of *love* and *hatred*. These indeed are of two kinds in man, *reasonable* and *unreasonable*; in God, the *reasonable* only is to be found. But to make all sure, and provide a proper subject for these passions, he contends strongly for God's *having a human form*: No discreditable notion, at that time, in the Church; and which, if I might be indulged a conjecture, I would suppose, was first

<sup>g</sup> Qui sine ira Deum esse credentes, dissolvunt omnem religionem—Sive igitur gratiam Deo, sive iram, sive utrumque detraxeris, religionem tolli necesse est.

<sup>h</sup> Hæc [nempe ut *irascatur Deus*] tuenda nobis, & afferenda sententia est: in ea enim summa omnis & cardo religionis pietatisque versatur.

introduced for that very purpose, to which, Lactantius here enforces it<sup>i</sup>.

But it is very observable, that our author introduceth this monstrous notion of God's having a *human form*, with an artful attempt, supported by all his eloquence, to discredit *human reason*; so as the reader may be disposed to take his word, that nothing could be known of God but by *Revelation*. This is an old trick of the disputers of all times, to make reprisals upon Reason; which when found too stubborn to yield, must be represented as too weak to judge. And when once we find an author, who would be valued for his logic, begin with depreciating Reason; we may be assured he has some very unreasonable paradox to advance<sup>k</sup>.

I. But it may be objected, perhaps, that this principle, of God's not being angry, only concluded

<sup>i</sup> We see here how the *Orthodox* evaded this conclusion of pagan philosophy, against a state of future punishment. Would you know how the *Heretics* managed? They went another way to work, which it may be just worth while to mention. The Creator of the *invisible* world (or the first cause) the Marcionites called the *good*; and the creator of the *visible* world, the *just*. Si de Marcionis argueris hæresi, quæ alterum *bonum*, alterum *justum* Deum ferens, illum invisibilium, hunc visibilium creatorem.—*Hieron. Ep. ad Pammach.* Now they agreed in this, with the Pagans, that the *Good* could not; but that the *Just* would punish; whose office it was to execute vengeance on the wicked. And, at the same time, holding an **EVIL PRINCIPLE**, they called this *Just* the **MIDDLE**, whose office is thus described in the *dialogue against Marcion*.—*To those who conform themselves to the GOOD, the MIDDLE PRINCIPLE gives peace; but to those who obey the EVIL, the MIDDLE inflicts tribulation and anguish.* Ή μίστην αρχὴν ὑπηκόεσσι τῷ ἀγάθῳ ἀνεστὸν διδώσῃ, ὑπηκόεσσι δὲ τῷ πονηρῷ θεῖσιν διδωσι. Thus did these Heretics divest the first Cause, or the *Good*, of his attribute of *justice*; and gave it to the *Middle principle*, because they were not able to sever it from *anger*.

<sup>k</sup> So when the learned Huetius would pass upon his readers a number of slight chimerical conjectures for *Demonstrations*, he introduces his work by cavilling at the certainty of the principles of Geometry.

against a future state of *punishments*, and not of *rewards*: Many of the philosophers holding the affection of grace and favour; though they all denied that of anger; as Laetantius expressly assures us: *Ita omnes philosophi de ira consentiunt, de gratia discrepant.* To this it may be replied,

I. That, when the sanction of *punishment* is taken off, the greatest influence of a future state is destroyed. For while the ancients made the rewards of Elysium only *temporary*,

Has omnes, ubi mille rotam volvere per annos, &c.  
they made the punishments of Tartarus *eternal*.

Sedet, æternumque sedebit

Infelix Theseus.

This Plato teaches us in several places of his works<sup>1</sup>. And Celsus, is so far from rejecting it, that he ranks it in the number of those doctrines which should never be abandoned, but maintained to the very last<sup>m</sup>.

It is true, that, several passages of Antiquity may be objected to what we say against the *eternity of rewards*; particularly this of Cicero: “Omnibus “qui patriam conservarint, adjuverint, auxerint, “certum esse in cœlo ac definitum locum, ubi be-“ati ÆVO SEMPITERNO fruantur n.” But we are

<sup>1</sup> Οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες δίξωτοι ἀνάτως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τὰ μεγέθη τῆς αἰμαζήημάτων, η̄ ιεροσυλίας πολλὰς η̄ μεγάλας, η̄ φόνους ἀδίκεις η̄ ταῦτανόμεις πολ-λάς ἐξειρῆσασθεῖσι, η̄ ἀλλα στα τυχάνεις ὅπλα τοιαῦτα, τέττας ἢ η̄ προστίκευσι ποιῆσαι ἕπειται εἰς τὸ Τάξις, ἔθεις ἐποίεις ἐκβαίνεισιν. *Phædo*, p. 113. — “Αλλοι δὲ ὄντεις οἱ τέττας ὅρῶντες οὐδὲ τὰς αἰμαζήιας τὰ μεγίστα καὶ ὁδωπορότατα η̄ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχουσι; το-αὶ Χρόνον. *Gorgias*, p. 525.

<sup>m</sup> Τέττο μέν γε ὅπτως νομίζεσσι, οἷς οἱ δὲ διὰ βιώσαντες δύσαιμονή-σταιν, οἱ δὲ ἀδίκοι πάμπαν αἰνίσις κακοῖς συνέξενται η̄ τέττας δὲ τῆς δύσηματος μήδε θτοι, μήδε ἀλλοι αἰθέρωπαν μηδέσι πολεις δύπτειν, δύπτεινοις. *Apud Orig. cont. Cels. lib. viii.*

<sup>n</sup> *Somn. Scip. cap. 3.*

to know, that the Ancients distinguished the souls of men into three species: the HUMAN, the HEROIC, and the DEMONIC. The *two last*, when they left the body, were indeed, believed to enjoy eternal happiness, for their public services on earth; not in *Elysium*, but in *heaven*. Where they became a kind of demi-gods. But all, of the *first*, which included the great body of mankind, were understood to have their designation in *purgatory*, *Tartarus*, or *Elysium*: The *first* and *last* of which abodes were *temporary*; and the *second* only *eternal*. Now those who had greatly served their country, in the manner Tully there mentions, were supposed to have souls of the *heroic* or *demonic* kind <sup>o</sup>.

2. But *secondly*, in every sense of a future state as a moral designation, rewards and punishments necessarily imply each other: So that where one is wanting, the other cannot possibly subsist. This is too evident to need a proof; or not to be seen by the ancient philosophers: Lactantius thus argues with them, on common principles. “*If God be not provoked at impious and wicked men, neither is he pleased with the good and just.* For contrary objects must either excite contrary affections, or no affections at all. So that he who loves good men, must at the same time hate ill; and he who hates not ill men, cannot love the good: Because both to love good men proceedeth from an abhorrence of ill; and to hate ill men from a tenderness to the good.” And so concludes, with

<sup>o</sup> Eusebius speaking of the political Gods of Egypt, supports what is here delivered of those *heroic* or *demonic* souls, αλλες δὲ ἐν τέτων ἀπογείες φυέσθαι, φασίν, ὑπάρχειντας μὲν θνήτους, διὰ δὲ οὐκέτων καὶ κοινῷ αἰνθεωπών διεργοῖς τελεχότας τὸ ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΑΣ.—*Præp. Evang.* 1. iii. c. 3.

<sup>p</sup> Si Deus non irascitur impiis & injustis, nec pios utique jus-  
tosque diligit: In rebus enim diversis, aut in utramque  
those

those he argues against, that the denying God's attribute of anger, which removes the punishments of a future state, overturns the state itself. " Sive igitur gratiam Deo, sive iram, sive utrumque detraxeris, religionem tolli necesse est."

In this (as we say) he does not at all misrepresent the common conclusions of philosophy. Plutarch delivering its sentiments on this head, expressly makes the denial of *future misery*, to infer the denial of a *future state*. " Death is the final period of our being. " But Superstition says, no. She stretches out life beyond life itself. Her fears extend further than our existence. She had joined to the idea of death, that other inconsistent idea of eternal life in misery. For when all things come to an end, then, in the opinion of Superstition, they begin to be endless. Then, I can't tell what dark and dismal gates of Tartarus fly open: then, rivers of fire, with all the fountains of Styx are broken up, &c. — Thus doth cursed Superstition oppose the voice of God, which hath declared death to be the end of suffering.<sup>9</sup>" Death, says he, is the end of suffering, therefore the end of being. Only with the οὐεγον ὥροτερον of the rhetoricians he has here, in the most rhetorical of all his discourses, put the conclusion before the premisses.

3. But *lastly*, we shall shew (under the next head, to which we are going) that the Philosophers did not consider the attribute of grace and favour, (which they allowed) to be a *passion or affection*; though

partem moveri necesse est, aut in neutram. Itaque qui bonos diligit, & malos odit; & qui malos non odit, nec bonos diligit: Quia & diligere bonos, ex odio malorum venit; & malos odisse, ex bonorum caritate descendit.

<sup>9</sup> ἀδου τινὲς ἀνόησιαι πένλαι βαθεῖαι, καὶ πολαροὶ πυρὶς ὅμοι ἐγγύοι δπορρωγής αναπετάνουσιαι—ὕτως ἡ χακεδαιμώνια δεσιδαιμονία καὶ θεῶν τὸ μὴ παθεῖν ικπέφευγε.—*De Superst.*

they considered *anger* (which they allowed not) under that idea.

II. As the foregoing objection would insinuate that the universal Principle of *God's not being angry*, doth not prove enough; so, the next pretends, that it proves *too much*: For, *secondly*, it may be objected, that this principle destroys God's providence here, as well as a future state of rewards and punishments hereafter; which providence several of the theistical Philosophers, we know, did believe.

This will require consideration.

Lactantius says: "All the philosophers agree about the *anger*; but concerning the *grace* or *favour* they are of different opinions." And taking it for granted, that they considered the *grace* or *favour*, which they held, as well as the *anger*, which they denied, to be *a passion or affection*, he thus argues as above: and adds, "Therefore the error of those who take away both *grace* and *anger* is the most consistent." But methinks, the absurdity of the error here imputed, should have taught Lactantius, that the Philosophers, who had rejected *anger* because it was an human passion, could never give their God another human passion: For though they sometimes dogmatized like lunatics, they never syllogized like idiots; though their principles were often unnatural, their conclusions were rarely illogical. He should therefore have seen, that those, who held the *gratia* or benevolence of the divine Nature, considered it not as a *passion or affection*, but as an *efflux from its essence*<sup>t</sup>; on which they built their notion of a general providence. So that when he says,

<sup>r</sup> Omnes philosophi de *ira* consentiunt, de *gratia* discrepant.  
<sup>s</sup> Ergo constantior est error illorum, qui & iram simul, & *gratiam* tollunt.

<sup>t</sup> See the following quotation from Sallust the philosopher.

concerning the grace or favour, they are of different opinions, we are to understand no more, than that some of them held a Providence, and others denied it.

Let us see then what kind of providence the theistical Philosophers believed. The PERIPATETICS and STOICS went pretty much together in this matter. It is commonly imputed to Aristotle, that he held no providence to be extended lower than the moon: But this is a calumny that Chalcidias raised of him. What Aristotle meant by the words, which gave a handle to it, was *that a particular providence did not extend itself to individuals*: For being a fatalist in natural things, and at the same time maintaining free-will in man, he thought, if Providence were extended to individuals, it would either impose a necessity on human actions, or, as employed on mere contingencies, be it self frequently defeated; which would look like impotency: And not seeing any way to reconcile free-will and prescience, he cut the knot, and denied that providence extended to individuals. Zeno's notion of Providence, over the human kind, seems to have been yet more general<sup>t</sup>; and, indeed, better supported, for he denied free-will in man: Which was the only difference in this matter between him and Aristotle.

Here we have a Providence very consistent with a disbelief of a future state of rewards and punishments; nay, almost destructive of it.

But the PYTHAGOREANS and PLATONISTS will not be put off so: They held a particular providence, extending itself to Individuals: A provi-

<sup>t</sup> Cotta, in Cicero, explaining the doctrine of the Stoics, says, Non curat [Deus] singulos homines. Non mirum, ne civitates quidem. Non eas? Ne nationes quidem et gentes. N. D. iii. 39.

dence, which according to ancient notions, could not be administered without the *affections of love and anger*. Here then lies the difficulty: These sects removed all passions from the Godhead, especially anger; and, on that account, rejected a future state of rewards and punishments; while yet they believed a Providence, which was administered by the exercise of those very passions. For the true solution of this difficulty, we must have recourse to a prevailing principle of Paganism, often before hinted at, for the clearing up many obscurities in Antiquity: I mean, that of *local tutelar deities*. Pythagoras and Plato were deep in the Theology which taught, that the several regions of the earth were delivered over, by the Creator of the Universe, to the vicegerency and government of inferior Gods. This opinion was originally Egyptian; on whose authority these two Philosophers received it; though it had been long the popular belief all over the pagan world. Hence, we see the writings of the Pythagoreans and Platonists so full of the **DOCTRINE OF DEMONS**: A doctrine, which even characterized the theology of those Sects. Now these *Demons* were ever supposed to have *passions and affections*. On these principles and opinions the Greeks formed the name of that mixed mode, *Superstition*: they called it *Δεισιδαιμονία*, which signifies the fear of Demons or inferior Gods. And these being supposed, by the *Philosophers*, to have *passions*; and, by the *people*, to be *capricious* in the exercise of those passions, it gave birth to all the extravagant Rites of attonement: the practice of which, as we say, they called *δεισιδαιμονία*; intimating, in the very term, the *passion* which gave birth to them; and by which alone, the Ancients understood a particular Providence could be administered. And here it is worthy our observation, that Chalcidias gives *this* as the very reason

reason why the Peripatetics rejected a particular Providence, (he says indeed, though falsely, all Providence below the moon) namely, because they held nothing of the administration of inferior Deities. His words are these: “ Aristotle holds that the “ providence of God descends even to the region “ of the moon; but that, below that orb, things “ were neither governed by the decrees of God, “ nor upheld by the wisdom and aid of *Angels*. “ Nor does he suppose any providential interven-“ tion of *Demons*.” So closely united, in the opinion of this writer, whom Fabricius calls *gnar-  
rissimus veteris philosophiae*<sup>w</sup>, was the doctrine of a particular Providence, and the doctrine of Demons and subaltern Deities.

But when now the Soul is disengaged from the body, it is no longer, in their opinion, under the government of Demons; nor consequently subject to the effects of the Demonic passions. And what becomes of it then, we shall see hereafter. A remarkable passage in Apuleius, will explain and justify the solution here given: “ God (*scith this au-  
thor*) cannot undergo any *temporary* exercise of “ his power or goodness: And therefore cannot be “ affected with indignation or anger; cannot be “ depressed with grief, or elated with joy. But, “ being free from all the passions of the mind, he “ neither sorrows nor exults; nor makes any *in-  
stantaneous* resolution to act, or to forbear acting. “ Every thing of this kind suits only the middle “ nature of the Demons: For they are placed be-“ tween Gods and Men; as well in the frame and “ composition of their minds, as in the situation

<sup>v</sup> Aristoteles Dei providentiam usque ad lunæ regionem pro-  
gredi censet; infra vero neque providentia scitis regi, nec ange-  
lorum ope consultisque sustentari: nec vero Dæmonum propi-  
cientiam putat intervenire. *Com. in Platonis Timæum.*

<sup>w</sup> *Bib. Lat.* 1. iii. c. 7.

" of their abodes, having immortality in common  
 " with the former, and *affections* in common with  
 " the latter. For they are subject, like us, to be  
 " every way irritated and appeased; so as to be  
 " inflamed by anger, melted by compassion,  
 " allured by gifts, softened by prayers, exasper-  
 " rated by neglect, and soothed again by observance.  
 " In a word, to be affected by every thing that  
 " can make impression on the human mind x." Plutarch says the same thing, but with this remarkable addition, that it was the very doctrine of PLATO and PYTHAGORAS y.

On the whole then it appears, that the Principle of God's not being angry, which subverted the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, did not at all affect a particular Providence here; and that the *grace or favour* which some of

x---Debet Deus nullam perpeti vel operis vel amoris temporalem persunctionem; & idcirco nec indignatione nec ira contingi, nullo angore contrahi, nullà alacritate gestire: sed ab omnibus passionibus animi liber, nec dolere unquam, nec aliquando lètari, nec aliquid repentinum velle vel nolle. Sed & hæc cuncta, ut id genus cætera, Dæmonum mediocritati congruunt. Sunt enim inter homines & deos, ut loco regionis, ita ingenio mentis intersit, habentes communem cum superis immortalitatem, cum inferis passionem. Nam perinde ut nos, pati possunt omnia animorum placamenta vel incitamenta; ut & ira incitentur, & misericordiâ flectantur, & donis invitentur, & precibus leniantur, & contumeliis exasperentur, & honoribus mulceantur, aliisque omnibus, ad similem nobis modum varientur. *De Deo Socratis.*

y Βέλτιον ἐν οἱ τὰ τῷ Τυφῶι καὶ Ὀπίρι καὶ τοῖσι ισορέμβρα, μήτε θῶν παθήματα, μήτε αἰθρωπαν, ἀλλὰ ΔΑΙΜΟΝΩΝ ΜΕΓΑΛΩΝ ἐν τομίζοντες, ὡς καὶ ΠΛΑΤΩΝ, καὶ ΠΥΘΑΓΟΡΑΣ, καὶ Σενοκράτης, καὶ Χρύσιππος, ἐπόρθου τες ΠΑΛΑΙ ΘΕΟΛΟΓΟΥΣ, ἐξωρεύεται μὲν αἰθρώπων γενέσαι λέγεται, καὶ πωλῆται τῇ διωδεψιᾳ τῷ φυσιν ὑπερφέρειντας ἕρμην, τὸ δὲ θεῖον ἐν τοῖς ἀμιγεῖς, ἐν τοῖς ἄκραισιν ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ φυχῆς φύσει καὶ σύμβολῳ αἰδήσει ἐνσπειρηγμένες, ἥδοντας δεχομένην καὶ πάνον καὶ στατικαὶ εἴδησιν πατεῖνταις πάθη, τες μὲν μαλλαν, της δὲ ἥτιον ἐπιλαρυγγίας γίνονται ὡς ἐν αἰθρώποις, καὶ δικιστιν, σχεῖταις Διαφοραῖς κακίας. *De II. Σ. Oſ. p. 642.*

them

them left unto the Deity was no passion or affection, like the *anger*, which they took away; but only a simple benevolence, which, in the construction of the Universe, was directed to the best; but did not interfere to prevent disorders in particular Systems. A benevolence too, that went not from the *will*, but the *essence* of the supreme Being<sup>a</sup>.

SALLUST, the Philosopher, writing of the *Gods and the World*, proposes in his fourteenth chapter, to speak to this question, *how the immutable Gods may be said to be angry and appeased*<sup>a</sup>? In the first place, he says, that God hath no human passions; he *neither rejoices, is angry, nor appeased with gifts*<sup>b</sup>: So far is certainly agreeable to truth. But how then? Why, the Gods are eternally *beneficent* (that is, as Seneca says below, *causa Diis benefaciendi NATURA*) and *beneficent only, and never hurtful*<sup>c</sup>. Thus having avoided one extreme, he falls into another; and supposeth it to be *blind Nature*, and not *Will*, which determines God's beneficence. The inference from which is, that the rewards and punishments of Heaven are the *natural and necessary effects of actions; not positive, arbitrary consequences, or the designation of Will*: And so our Philosopher maintains. For now the difficulty being, that if *nature be the cause of the beneficence of the Godhead*, how can Providence bestow good on the virtuous man, and evil on the wicked? Our Sophist resolves it thus: “While

<sup>a</sup> So Seneca informs us: *Quæ causa est Diis bene faciendi?* NATURA. Errat, si quis putat illos nocere velle: Non possunt. Nec accipere injuriam queunt, nec facere; lædere etenim lædique conjunctum est. Summa illa ac pulcherrima omnium natura, quos periculo exemit, nec periculoso quidem fecit. Ep.95.

<sup>b</sup> Μῶνοι οἱ Θεοί μὴ μεταβαλλόμενοι, ἐργάζονται καὶ θεραπέυονται λεγονται.

<sup>c</sup> Οὐ καίρετε Θεούς—οὐδὲ ἐργίζεται—οὐδὲ δύσκις θεραπεύεται.

<sup>c</sup> Εκεῖνοι πάντες αὐτοῖς τε εἰσιν ΑΕΙ, καὶ ὀφελεῖται μόνον βλαπτεῖται δὲ οὐδέποτε.

" we are good, we are joined by similitude of nature to the Gods; and when evil, separated, by dissimilitude. While we practice virtue, we are in union with them; but defection to vice makes them our enemies: not because they are *angry* at us, but because our crimes interpose between us and their divine irradiations, and leave us a prey to the avenging Demons.—So that to say, God is turned away from the wicked is the same as to say, THE SUN IS HID FROM A BLIND MAN<sup>d</sup>." An apt comparison: and very expressive of the principle of this philosophy; which supposes the influence of the *Deity*, to be like that of the *Sun*, physical and necessary; and, consequently all reward and punishment not the *moral*, but the *natural*, issue of things. A Platonic notion, entirely subversive of the proper doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, as conceived everywhere by the people, and taught by the Christian Religion. Which holds, that they arise out of God's Goodness and Justice, not by way of emanation, as light from the Sun, but as the designation of *Will*; which disparts freely, though not fancifully or capriciously; as, with equal malignity and folly, my reasoning in this place hath been represented.

On the whole, then, we find, that the Pagans in taking away *human passions* from God, left him nothing but that kind of natural excellence, which went not from his *will*, but his *essence* only; and consequently, was destitute of *morality*: this was one extreme. The primitive *Fathers*, (as Laetantius)

<sup>d</sup> Ήμεῖς δὲ ἀγαθοὶ μὲν ὄλεις δι' ὁμοίωτα Θεοῖς συναπλόμεθα, κακοὶ δὲ γενόμενοι δι' αὐτούσιν ταχαριζόμεθα· καὶ κατ' ἀρετὰς ζῶντες, ἔχόμεθα τῶν θεών, κακοὶ δὲ γενόμενοι ἐχθροὺς ἡμῖν ποιῶμεν ἐκείνους· οὐκ ἐκείνων ὅργιζομένων, αλλὰ τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων Θεούς μὲν ἡμῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐλλαζόπειν, Δαιμοῖς δὲ κολαζοῦσι συναπλόνων.—Ἄρτε ἴμοιον τὸν Θεὸν λέγειν τὴς κακοὶς ἀποστέφεται, ηγή τὸν ΗΛΙΟΝ τοῖς ἵστερημένοις τῶν ὅψεων ψεύπλεσθαι.

understanding clearly that the Platonic notion of God overturned a *future judgment*, and not finding the medium, which their masters in science, the *Philosophers*, had missed, supposed (as we have seen) that God had *human passions*: and this was the other extreme. And whence, I would ask, did both these extremes arise, but from neither party's being able to distinguish between *human passions* and the divine attributes of **GOODNESS AND JUSTICE**? the true medium between *human passions* on the one hand, and a *blind excellence of nature*, on the other.

II. We proceed now to the OTHER CAUSE, which kept the philosophers from believing a future state of rewards and punishments. As the first was a *erroneous notion concerning the nature of God*, so this was a much more absurd *one concerning the nature of the Soul*. For, as our epic Poet sings,

“ Much of the Soul they talk, but all awrye.”

There are but two possible ways of conceiving of the *soul*: we must hold it to be, either a **QUALITY**, or a **SUBSTANCE**.

1. Those Ancients who believed it to be only a *Quality*, as Epicurus, Dicæarchus, Aristoxenus, Asclepiades, and Galen, come not into the account; it being impossible that these should not believe its total annihilation upon death.

2. But the generality of the Philosophers held it to be a *Substance*; and ALL who so held, were unanimous that it was a **DISCERPED PART OF A WHOLE**; and that this *Whole* was **GOD**; into whom it was again to be *resolved*.

But concerning this *Whole* they differed.

SOME held that there was only *one Substance* in Nature; others held *two*.

THEY who maintained the *one Universal Sub-*

stance, or TO "EN, in the strictest sense, were ATHEISTS; and altogether in the sentiments of the modern Spinozists; whose master apparently catched this epidemical contagion of human reason from Antiquity.

The OTHERS, who believed there were *two* general Substances in nature, GOD and MATTER, were taught to conclude, by their way of interpreting the famous maxim of *ex nihilo nihil fit*, that they were both *eternal*. These were their THEISTS; though approaching sometimes, on the one hand, to what is called *Spinozism*; sometimes, on the other, to *Manicheism*.

For they, who held *two* Substances, were again subdivided.

Some of them, as the Cyrenaics, the Cynics, and the Stoicks, held *both* these Substances to be *material*; which gave an opening to Spinozism: Others, as the Pythagoreans, the Platonists, and Peripatetics, only *one*; which gave the like opening to *Manicheism*.

Lastly the maintainers of the *immateriality* of the divine Substance, were likewise divided into two parties; the first of which held but *one* person in the Godhead; the other, *two* or *three*. So that as the former believed the Soul to be part of the supreme God; the latter believed it to be part only of the second or third *Hypostasis*<sup>f</sup>.

As they multiplied the Persons of the Godhead, so they multiplied the subsistence of the Soul; some giving *two*, and some more liberally, *three* to every

<sup>f</sup> Origen speaking of the Greek philosophers, says, "They plainly suppose the whole world to be God. The Stoicks make it the *first* God. As to the followers of Plato, some make it the *second*, and some the *third* God. Σαφῶς δὲ τὸν ἡλον κόσμον λέγεται εἶναι θεόν. Στωικοὶ μὲν τὸν φεῦτον. Οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος τὸν δεύτερον τοὺς δὲ αὐτὰς τὸν τρίτον. *Cont. Cels.* l. v.

man. But it is to be observed, that they esteemed only one of these to be part of God; the others were only elementary matter, or mere qualities.

These things are but just hinted at, as what is sufficient to our purpose: A full explanation of them, tho' both curious and useful, would take up too much room, and lead us too far from our subject.

Now, however They, who held the Soul to be a real substance, differed thus in circumstantialis, yet in this consequence of its substantiality, *that it was part of God, disperced from him, and would be resolved again into him*, they all, we say, agreed. For those who held but *one* substance, could not but esteem the soul a part of it; and those who held *two*, considered those *two* as conjoined, and composing an *Universe*; just as the soul and body composed a *man*. Of which Universe, God was the soul; and matter, the body. Hence they concluded, that as the human body was resolved into its parent Matter, so the soul was resolved into its parent Spirit.

Agreeably to what is here explained, Cicero delivers the common sentiments of his Greek masters on this head: “A natura Deorum, ut doctissimis sapientissimisque placuit, HAUSTOS animos & LIBATOS habemus<sup>g</sup>.” And again: “Humanus autem animus DECEPPTUS EX MENTE DIVINA, cum alio nullo nisi cum ipso Deo (si hoc fas est dictu) comparari potest<sup>h</sup>.”

<sup>g</sup> *De Divin.* I. i. c. 49.

<sup>h</sup> *Tusc. Disp.* I. v. c. 13. The words, *si hoc fas est dictu*, had been omitted by accident. But Answerers saw a mystery in this omission, which could be nothing but the author's consciousness that they made against him. They are now inserted to shew that they make entirely for him, and that Cicero used the word *deceptor* in the *literal* sense; for, if only in a *figurative*, he had no occasion to soften it with a *salva reverentia*.

And, in another place, he says,—“ animos ho-  
“ minum quadam ex parte extrinsecus esse tractos  
“ & haustos, ex qua intelligimus esse extra divinum  
“ animum humanus unde ducatur<sup>i</sup>. ” He after-  
wards gives the whole system, from Pacuvianus,  
more at large,

Quicquid est hoc, omnia animat, format, alit,  
    auget, creat,  
Sepelit, recipitque in se omnia, omniumque  
    idem est Pater;  
Indidemque, eademque oriuntur de integro,  
    atque eodem occidunt<sup>k</sup>.

And St. Austin did not think them injured in this representation. In his excellent work of the *City of God*, he thus exposes the absurdity of that general principle.—“ Quid infelicius credi potest, quam  
“ Dei partem vapulare, cum puer vapulat? Jam  
“ vero partes Dei fieri lascivas, iniquas, impias,  
“ atque omnino damnabiles quis ferre potest, nisi  
“ qui prorsus infant<sup>l</sup>? ”

Now, lest the reader should suspect that these kind of phrases, such as, *the soul's being part of God*; *discerped from him*; *of his Nature*; which perpetually occur in the writings of the Ancients, are only *highly figurative expressions*, and not measurable by the severe standard of metaphysical propriety; he is desired to take notice of one consequence drawn from this principle, and universally held by Antiquity, which was this, *That the soul was eternal, à parte ANTE*, as well as, *a parte POST*; which the Latins well expressed by the word *SEMPITERNUS<sup>m</sup>*.

<sup>i</sup> *De Divin.* l. i. c. 32.

<sup>k</sup> *De Divin.* l. i. c. 57.

<sup>l</sup> L. iv. c. 13.

<sup>m</sup> It properly signifies, *what hath neither beginning nor end*; though frequently used in the improper sense of *having no end*. And indeed, we may observe in most of the Latin writers, an

For

For this we shall produce an authority above exception: "It is a thing very well known (says "the accurate Cudworth) that, according to the "sense of Philosophers, these two things were al- "ways included together, in that one opinion of the "Soul's immortality, namely, its *pre-existence*, as "well as its *post-existence*. Neither was there ever "any of the Ancients, before *Christianity*, that "held the Soul's future permanency after death, "who did not likewise assert its pre-existence; "they clearly perceiving that if it was once granted, "that the Soul was generated, it could never be "proved but that it might be also corrupted: And "therefore the assertors of the Soul's immortality "commonly began here; first to prove it's pre- "existence, &c." What this learned man is quoted for, is the *fact*: And for that we may safely take his word: As to the *reason* given, *that*, we see, is visionary; invented, perhaps, to hide the enormity of the Principle it came from. The true *reason* was its being a natural consequence of the opinion, that *the Soul was part of God*. This Tully plainly intimates, where, after having quoted the verses from Pacuvianus given above, he subjoins, "Quid est igitur, cur domus sit omnium una, ea- "que communis, cumque animi hominum *semper*

unphilosophic licence in the use of *mixed modes* by substituting one for another: The providing against the ill effects of this abuse, to which, these sort of words are chiefly liable, gave the ancient Roman lawyers great trouble; as appears from what one of them observes, "Jurisconsultorum summus circa ver- "borum PROPRIETATEM labor est." The abuse arose in a good measure, from their not being early broken and inured to abstract reasoning: It is certain at least, that the Greeks, who were eminent for speculation, are infinitely more exact in their use of *mixed modes*: not but something must be allowed for the superior abundance of the Greek language.

<sup>n</sup> *Intel. System*, p. 38.

"fuerint

"fuerint futurique sint, cur hi, quid ex quoque eve-  
 "niat, & quid quamque rem significet, perspicere  
 "non possint?" And again as plainly, "Animo-  
 "rum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest:—His  
 "enim in naturis nihil ineſt, quod vim memorie,  
 "mentis, cogitationis habeat; quod & præterita  
 "teneat, & futura provideat, & complecti possit  
 "præſentia; quæ ſola divina ſunt. Nec invenie-  
 "tur unquam, unde ad hominem venire poſſint,  
 "niſi a Deo.—Ita quicquid eſt illud, quod ſentit,  
 "quod ſapit, quod vult, quod viget, cœleſte &  
 "divinum eſt; OB EAMQUE REM ÆTERNUM SIT  
 "NECESSE Eſt°.

It hath been obſerved, in the laſt ſection, that the famous argument of Plato, explained, and ſtrongly recommended by Cicero, ſuppoſes the Soul to have been from eternity, because it is a ſelf-exiſtent ſubſtance; which is plainly ſuppoſing it to have been eternal *a parte ante*, because it is *a part of God*.

Here then is a confeſſion, universally acknowledged, which will not allow the principle, from whence it proceeded, to be understood in any other ſeſſe than ſtrictly metaphysical. Let us conſider it a little. We are told they held the ſoul to be *eternal*: If eternal, it muſt be either independent on God, or part of his ſubſtance. Independent it could not be, for there can be but one independent of the ſame kind of ſubſtance: The ancients, indeed, thought it no abſurdity to ſay, that God and Matter were both ſelf-exiſtent, but they allowed no third; therefore they muſt needs conclude that *it was part of God*.

And in that ſeſſe, indeed, they called it (as we ſee in the laſt ſection) *independent*, when, on account of it's

• *Fragm. de consolatione.*

origi-

original, they gave it the attribute of the Deity; and, with that, joined the others of *ungenerated*, and *self-existent*.

But when the Ancients are said to hold the *pre-* and *post-existence* of the Soul, and therefore to attribute a proper eternity to it, we must not suppose that they understood it to be eternal in its *distinct* and *peculiar existence*; but that it was *dispersed* from the substance of God, *in time*; and would, *in time*, be rejoined, and *resolved* into it again. This they explained by a bottle filled with sea-water, which swimming awhile upon the ocean, does, on the bottle's breaking, flow in again, and mingle with the common mass. They only differed about the time of this reunion and resolution: The greater part holding it to be at death<sup>p</sup>; but the Pythagoreans, not till after many transmigrations. The Platonists went between these two opinions; and rejoined pure and unpolluted souls immediately to the universal spirit: but those which had contracted much defilement, were sent into a succession of other bodies, to purge and purify them, before they returned to their parent Substance<sup>q</sup>. And these were the two sorts of the NATURAL METEMPSYCHOSIS, which we have observed above, to have been really held by those two Schools of philosophy.

That we have given a fair representation of the ancient belief in this matter, we appeal to the

<sup>p</sup> See the *Critical inquiry into the opinions and practice of ancient philosophers*, p. 125, et seq. 2d Edition.

<sup>q</sup> Nec enim omnibus iidem illi sapientes arbitrati sunt eundem cursum in cœlum patere. Nam vitiis & sceleribus contaminatos deprimi in tenebras, atque in cœno jacere docuerunt: castos autem, puros, integros, incorruptos, bonis etiam studiis atque artibus expolitos, levi quodam ac facilis lapsu ad Deos, id est, ad naturam sui similem pervolare. *Fragm. de consolatione.*

learned Gassendi: “ Interim tamen vix ulli fuere  
 “ (quæ humanæ mentis caligo, atque imbecillitas  
 “ est) qui non inciderint in errorem illum de REFU-  
 “ SIONE IN ANIMAM MUNDI. Nimirum, sicut ex-  
 “ istimârunt singulorum animas particulas esse ani-  
 “ mæ mundanæ, quarum quælibet suo corpore,  
 “ ut aqua vase, includeretur; ita & reputârunt  
 “ unamquamque animam, corpore dissoluto, quasi  
 “ diffracto vase, effluere, ac animæ mundi, e qua  
 “ deducta fuerit, iterum uniri; nisi quod plerum-  
 “ que ob contractas in impuro corpore sordeis, vi-  
 “ tiorumque maculas, non prius uniantur, quânt  
 “ sensim omneis sordeis exuerint, & aliæ seriùs,  
 “ aliæ ocyùs repurgatæ, atque immunes ab omni  
 “ labo evaserint.” A great authority; and the  
 greater, for that it proceeded from the plain view  
 of the fact only; Gassendi appearing not to have  
 been sensible of the consequence here deduced from  
 it, namely, *that none of the ancient philosophers could believe a future state of rewards and punishments.* Otherwise, we may be sure, he had not failed to urge that consequence, in his apology for Epicurus; whose monstrous errors he all along strives to palliate, by confronting them with others as bad, amongst the Theistic Sects of philosophy.

Thus we see, that this very opinion of the *Soul's eternity*, which hath made modern writers conclude that the ancient Sages believed a future state of reward and punishment, was in truth the very reason why they believed it not.

The primitive christian writers were more quick-fighted: They plainly saw, this principle was destructive of such future state, and therefore opposed it with all their power. Thus Arnobius (not indeed attending to the *double doctrine* of the an-

<sup>r</sup> *Animadv. in decimum librum Diogenis Laertii*, p. 550.

cient philosophy) accuses Plato of contradiction, for holding this principle, and yet, at the same time, preaching up a future state of reward and punishment<sup>s</sup>.

But it must be confessed, some of the *Fathers*, as was their custom, ran into the opposite extreme; and held the Soul to be naturally *mortal*; and, to support this, maintained its *materiality*: Just as in the case before, to support *human passions* in the Godhead, they taught he had a *human form*. Tatian, Tertullian, and Arnobius fell into this foolish error. Others indeed, as Justin Martyr, and Irenæus, went more soberly to work; affirming only, against the notion of its *eternity*, that it was *created* by God, and depended continually upon him for its duration. In the heat of dispute, indeed, some unwary words may now and then drop from the soberest of them, which seem to favour the doctrine of the Soul's *materiality*: But it is but candid to correct them by the *general tenor* of their sentiments.

This was the true original of every thing looking that way, in the writings of the *Fathers*: which

<sup>s</sup> Quid? Plato idem vester in eo volumine, quod de animæ immortalitate composuit, non Acherontem, non Stygem, non Cocytum fluvios, & Pyriphlegetontem nominat, in quibus animas asseverat volvi, mergi, exuri? Et homo prudentiæ non pravæ, & examinis judicijque perpensi, rem inenodabilem fuscipit, ut cum animas dicat immortales, perpetuas, & corporali soliditate privatas; puniri eas dicat tamen, & doloris afficiat sensu. Quis autem hominum non vidit, quod sit immortale, quod simplex, nullum posse dolorem admittere; quod autem sentiat dolorem, immortalitatem habere non posse? Et qui poterit territori formidinis alicujus horrore, cui fuerit persuasum, tam se esse immortalē quam ipsum Deum primum; nec ab eo judicari quidquam de se posse, cum sit una immortalitas in utroque, nec in alterius altera conditionis possit æquilitate vexari? *Adver. Gentes*, l. ii. p. 52---64. Ed. Lug. Bat. 1651. Quarto.

had Mr. Dodwell considered, he had never written so weak a book as his *epistolary discourse* against the Soul's immortality, from the *judgment of the Fathers*; whose opinions he hath egregiously mistaken, or at least, misrepresented.

Having now seen that the Philosophers in general, held *the Soul to be part of God, and resolvable into him*; lest any doubt should remain, I shall shew in the next place, that it was believed particularly by the famous PHILosophic QUATERNION.

Cicero, in the person of Velleius, the Epicurean, accuses PYTHAGORAS, for holding that the human soul was discerped from the substance of God, or the universal nature. “*Nam Pythagoras, qui censuit animum esse per naturam rerum omnem intentum & commeantem, ex quo nostri animi carcerarentur, non vidit distractione humanorum animalium discerpi & lacerari Deum*.” Here, Velleius does not (as hath been represented) exaggerate or strain matters, to serve his purpose. Pythagoras held the old maxim *ex nihilo nihil fit*, and, therefore, must needs hold the soul to be taken from some sovereign and external substance. But he allowed only two substances, *God and Matter*; therefore, as he taught the Soul was immaterial, he could not possibly conceive it to be any other than a part of God. So that Velleius’s consequence naturally follows, that as Pythagoras held the soul to be a Substance not a Quality, he must suppose it to be torn and discerped from the Substance of God. To the same purpose, Sextus Empiricus:—Pythagoras and Empedocles, and the whole company of the Italic school, hold that our Souls are not only of the same nature with one another, and with the Gods, but likewise with the irrational souls of brutes: For that there is one spirit

<sup>2</sup> *Nat. Deor.* l. i. c. 11.

that pervades the universe, and serves it for a soul, which unites us and them together<sup>v</sup>. Lastly, Laertius tells us, that Pythagoras supposed the soul to be different from the life; and immortal; for that the Substance, from which it was disperced, was immortal<sup>w</sup>.

If we go to the ancient christian writers, we shall find they charge the Pythagoreans with these very principles. Jerom says, —“ Juxta Pythagorico-“ rum dogmata, qui hominem exæquant Deo, et “ de ejus dicunt esse *substantia*<sup>x</sup>. ” Austin speaks to the same purpose—“ Cedant et illi quos quidem “ puduit dicere Deum corpus esse, verumtamen “ ejusdem nature, cuius ille est, animos nostros esse “ putaverunt; ita non eos movet tanta mutabilitas “ animæ, quam Dei naturæ tribuere nefas est<sup>y</sup>. ”

PLATO, without any softening, frequently calls the soul, God; and part of God, ΝΟΥΝ ΑΕΙ ΘΕΟΝ. Plutarch says, *Pythagoras and Plato held the soul to be immortal: For that launching out into the Soul of the universe, it returns to its parent and*

<sup>v</sup> Οἱ δὲ ἐν τοῖς τὸν Πυθαγόραν καὶ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα, καὶ τῷ Ἰταλῷ αἰλιθῷ, φασὶ μὴ μάνα οἷον τοῖς αἰλίλαις καὶ τῷς τὰς θεὰς εἶναι τινὰ κοινωνίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷς τὰ ἀλογα τῷ ζωῷ. ἐν γὰρ σύνδεσμοις τοντοῖς, τὸ διὰ τὸ συντὸς τὸ κύριον δίκηνον φυχῆς τρόπον, τὸ δὲ εἴδην ἡγεῖς τοῖς ἑκεῖνοι, lib. ix. *Adv. Physic.* § 127. That Pythagoras and Plato held the *human* soul to be of the same nature with God, has been seen at large; that they supposed the *brutal* soul to be of the same nature with the human, which is the other particular here asserted by Sextus Empiricus, appears from the testimony of Plutarch. —Πυθαγόρας, οὐλατῶν, λογικὰς μὲν εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀληγρῶν ζωὴν καὶ νοῦν, τὰς φυχὰς, οὐ μὴ λογικῶς ἐπεργάσσεις ὁ δῆμος τὸν δυσκολεῖται τῶν σωμάτων.—*Plac. Phil.* l. v. c. 2c. For the Ancients taught that this universal Spirit, the *Anima mundi*, or whatsoever name they gave it, acted with different degrees of activity and force, according to the different nature and disposition of the Matter with which the several parts of this Spirit were invested.

<sup>w</sup> Διαφέρει τε φυχὴν, ζῶντας αἴτια αἴτιον, ἐπειδήπερ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον διαφέρει τοῖς αἴτιοις. *Vit. Phil.* l. viii. § 28.

<sup>x</sup> *Ctesiphon. adver. Pelag.*

<sup>y</sup> *De civ. Dci.* viii. 5.

original<sup>a</sup>. Tertullian charges this opinion home upon him. “ Primo quidem oblivionis capacem “ animam non cedam, quia tantam illi concessit “ divinitatem, ut *Deo adæquetur*<sup>a</sup>.” Arnobius does no less, where he apostrophises the Platonists in this manner: “ Ipse denique animus, qui immor- “ talis à vobis & Deus esse narratur, cur in ægris “ æger sit, in infantibus stolidus, in senectute de- “ fessus? Delira, & fatua, & insana<sup>b</sup>!” Euse- bius expressly says, that Plato held the soul to be ungenerated, and to be derived by way of emanation from the first cause; as being unwilling to allow that it could be made out of nothing. Which necessarily implies, that, according to Plato’s doctrine, God was the material cause of the soul, or that the soul was part of his substance<sup>c</sup>.

There is indeed a passage in Stobæus, which hath been understood by some, to contradict what it here delivered as the sentiments of Plato. It is where Speusippus, the nephew and follower of

<sup>a</sup> Πτθαγέας. Πλάτων, ἀρθαξειτοῦ τῷ τῷ φυχήν εἰδέσσαν γότες τῷ τῷ παντὸς φυχὴν, ἀναγκαῖην ωρὸς τὸ ὑμογένες. *De Plac. Phil.* l. iv. c. 7.

<sup>a</sup> *De anima*, c. xxiv.

<sup>b</sup> *Adv. Gentes*, l. ii. p. 47. The latter part of the sentence is commonly read thus; — *Cur in ægris æger sit, in infantibus stolidus, in senectute defessus, delira, & fatua, & insana?* The Critics think something is here wanting before the three last words. But it appears to me only to have been wrong pointed; there should be a note of interrogation instead of a comma at *defessus?* — *Delira, & fatua, & insana*, making a sentence of itself, by means of *narratis* understood. Hermias in his *Irrit. Gent. Phil.* expresses himself, on the same occasion, pretty much in the same manner: *ταῦτα δὲ τι καὶ ναλεῖν; ὡς μὲν ἐμοὶ δουεῖ, τερατεῖται, οὐδούται, οὐ μανία, οὐ τάσιν.*

<sup>c</sup> Ο δέ γε Πλάτων, ἀσωμάτες μὲν καὶ ψυχάς ἔσταις, τὰς λογικὰς φύ- σεις ὅμοιας Εὔσοδος ὄφεστοι, διαπίπει δὲ τὸ ἀκλονθίας τερῶν μὲν, σύγχυτος εἶναι φάσκων αὐτὰς ὥστε τῇ πᾶσσα φυχής ἔπειτα εἴ τοι ἔροις τοῖς τῷ μὴ ὄντος αὐτὰς γνωματιαὶ διδοῦσι βεβλεπται. *Præp. Evang.* l. viii. c. 15.

Plato, says, that the MIND was neither the same with THE ONE, nor THE GOOD; but had a peculiar nature of its own<sup>d</sup>. Our Stanley supposes <sup>e</sup> him to speak here of the *human mind*: And then, indeed, the contradiction is evident. But that learned man seems to have been mistaken, and misled by his author, Stobæus; who has misplaced this *placit*, and put it into a chapter with several others, which relate to the *human mind*. I conceive it to be certain that Speusippus was here speaking of a different thing; namely, of the nature of the third hypostasis in the Platonic Trinity; the ΝΟΥΣ, or λόγος, so intitled by his uncle; which he would, by the words in question, personally distinguish from the ΤΟ' ΕΝ, the ONE, the *first person*; and from the ΤΑΓΑΘΟΝ, the GOOD, the *second* in that Trinity.

ARISTOTLE thought of the Soul like the rest, as we learn from a passage quoted by Cudworth<sup>f</sup> out of his Nichomachean *ethics*; where having spoken of the sensitive soul, and declared it to be immortal, he goes on in this manner: *It remains that the mind or intellect, and that alone (pre-existing) enter from without, and be only DIVINE*<sup>g</sup>.

But then he distinguishes again concerning this *Mind* or *intellect*, and makes it two-fold; *agent* and *Patient*: The former of which, he concludes to be *immortal*, and the latter *corruptible*. *The agent intellect is only immortal and eternal, but the passive is corruptible*<sup>h</sup>. Cudworth thinks this a very doubtful and obscure passage; and imagines Aristotle was led to write thus unintelligibly, by his

<sup>d</sup> Σπευσίππους δὲ νῦν ἔτε τῷ εἰναι, ἐτε τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ αὐτὸν, οἰδιαφεν  
δι. Eccl. Phys. 1. i. c. 1.

<sup>e</sup> Hist. of Phil. Part v. Art. SPEUSIPPUS, c. 2.

<sup>f</sup> Intell. System, p. 55.

<sup>g</sup> Λεπτίζει δὲ τὸ νῦν μονον θύραθεν ἐπεισεισάται, καὶ θεῖον δὲ μόνον.

<sup>h</sup> Τέτο μονον αὐταναλογον καὶ αἰδον, δὲ παθητικος νος φθαρίζεις.

doctrine of *forms* and *qualities*; which confounds corporeal, with incorporeal substances: But had that excellent person reflected on the general doctrine of the ΘΕΟΝ, he would have seen, the passage was plain and easy; and that Aristotle, from the common principle of the human soul's being part of the Divine Substance, draws a conclusion against a future state of separate existence; which, though (as it now appears) all the philosophers embraced, yet all were not so forward to avow. The obvious meaning of the words then is this: *The agent Intelligent* (says he) *is only immortal and eternal, but the passive, corruptible, i. e.* The particular sensations of the soul (*the passive intelligent*) will cease after death; and the substance of it (*the agent intelligent*) will be resolved into the Soul of the universe. For it was Aristotle's opinion, who compared the soul to a *rāsa tabula*, that human sensations and reflections were passions: These therefore are what he finely calls, *the passive intelligent*; which, he says, shall cease, or is corruptible. What he meant by the *agent intelligent*, we learn from his commentators; who interpret it to signify, as Cudworth here acknowledges, the DIVINE INTELLECT; which glosseth Aristotle himself fully justifies, in calling it ΘΕΙΟΝ, *divine*. But what need many words? The Learned well know, that the *intelletus agens* of Aristotle was the very same with the *anima mundi* of Plato and Pythagoras.

Thus, this seeming extravagance in dividing the human mind into *agent* and *patient*, appears very plain and accurate: But the not having this common key to the ancient Metaphysics, hath kept the followers of Aristotle long at variance amongst themselves, whether their master did, or did not believe the soul to be immortal. The anonymous writer of the life of Pythagoras, extracted by Photius,

Photius, says, that Plato and Aristotle with one consent agree that the soul is immortal: Though some, not fathoming the profound mind of Aristotle, suppose that he held the soul to be mortal<sup>i</sup>; that is, mistaking the passive intelligent (by which Aristotle meant the present partial sensations) for the soul itself, or the agent intelligent. Nay, this way of talking of the passive intelligent, made some, as Nemesius, even imagine that he held the soul to be only a quality<sup>k</sup>.

As to the STOICS, Stobæus tells us that Cleanthes held, every thing was made out of one, and would be again resolved into one<sup>l</sup>. But let Seneca speak for them all. And why should you not believe something divine to be in him, who is indeed PART OF THE GODHEAD? That WHOLE, in which we are contained, is ONE, and that one is GOD; we being his companions and members<sup>m</sup>.

Epictetus says, the souls of men have the nearest relation to God, as being parts, or fragments of him, disperced and torn from his Substance<sup>n</sup>.

<sup>i</sup> "Οτι πλάτων, φησι, οὐ Αριστολέως, αθανάτου ἐμοίως λέγεται τῷ ψυχήι καὶ τῷ εἰς τὸν Αριστολέαν; νῦν τούτοις ἐμβαθυσθεῖται, διητεῖται τοις γενέσιοις αὐτὸν λέγεται. Phot. Bibl. Cod. 259.

<sup>k</sup> Οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι: τῷ ψυχῇ τῷ λέγεται σοις, Ἀριστολέως δὲ καὶ Διερεψεῖς οὐδέστιον. De Nat. Hom.

<sup>l</sup> Eclog. Phys. c. 20.

<sup>m</sup> Quid est autem, cur non existimes in eo divini aliquid existere qui Dei pars est? Totum hoc, quo continemur, & unum est, & Deus: & socii ejus sumus, & membra. Ep. 92.

<sup>n</sup> Σωματεῖς τῷ θεῷ, ὡς τε αὐτῆς μόρια ἔσσαι καὶ ἀποστάσματα. This passage amongst others, equally strong, is quoted by the learned Dr. Moor, in his *Immortality of the soul*, book iii. chap. 16. And one cannot but smile at the good Doctor's reflection on a general principle which he could by no means approve. These expressions, (says he) make the soul of man a ray or beam of the soul of the world, or of God. But we are to take notice, THEY ARE BUT METAPHORICAL PHRASES. So, the Socinian, to texts of scripture full as strong for the doctrine of the redemption. And so, indeed, men of all Parties, when they would remove what stands in their way; They first change things into figures; and then, figures into nothing.

Lastly, Marcus Antoninus, as a consolation against the fear of death, says, *To die is not only according to the course of nature, but of great use to it. We should consider how closely man is united to the godhead, and in what part of him that union resides; and what will be the condition of that part or portion when it is resolved into the anima mundi* <sup>o</sup>.

He is here indeed a little obscure; but we have his own comment upon it in another place. “ You “ have hitherto existed as a PART (or have had a “ particular existence) you will hereafter be absorbed “ and LOST in the substance which produced you : “ or rather, you will be assumed into the Divine na- “ ture, or the Spermatic Reasons <sup>P.</sup>” And again, “ Every body will be soon lost and buried in the “ universal Substance. Every soul will be soon ab- “ sorbed and sunk in the Universal Nature <sup>q.</sup>”

After all this, one cannot sufficiently admire how

<sup>o</sup> Τέτο μάρτοις εὶς μόνον φύσεως ἔργον ἐσιν, αὐλὰ καὶ συμφέρου αὐτῇ πάσι ἀπειδή θεῖαι αἰθρίαπο, καὶ τί αὐτῷ μέρος, καὶ πῶς ἔχη ὅταν οὐλεχθῆται τὸ τε ἕιναπε τέτο μόνον. Eis ξαντὸν, L. ii. c. 32. Here the doctrine of the τὸ ἔν is hinted at; but writing only to adepts, he is a little obscure. The editors have made a very confused comment and translation: The common reading of the latter part of the passage is, καὶ ὅταν πῶς ἔχῃ οὐλεχθῆται τὸ τε αἴθρια πε τέτο μόνον. which is certainly corrupt. Gataker very accurately transposed the words thus: Καὶ πῶς χρη ὅταν, and for οὐλεχθῆται, read διέκηται Mer. Caſaubon, more happily, οὐλεχθῆται. They have the true reading between them: But not being aware that the doctrine of the refusion was here alluded to, they could not settle the text with any certainty. The last word MITION can signify nothing else but a dispersed particle from the Soul of the world. Epictetus uses it in that sense, in the passage above; and it seems to be the technical term for it.

Ρ ΕΝΥΠΕΣΤΗΣ ΩΣ ΜΕΡΟΣ· ΕΝΑΦΑΝΙΣΘΗΣ ΤΩ ΓΕΝΝΗ-  
ΣΑΝΤΙ· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναληφθήσῃ εἰς τὸν λόγον αὐτῆς τὸν απεγματικὸν καὶ  
μειαζοῦντ. 1. iv. c. 14.

<sup>q</sup> Πλὴν τὸ ἔνυλον ἐναφανίζεται τάχιστα τῇ τῶν ὄλων ἁσίᾳ, καὶ πᾶν αἰτί-  
αγε εἰς τὸν τῶν ὄλων λόγον τάχιστα αἰαλαμβάνεται. L. vii. c. 10.

Cudworth<sup>r</sup> came to say,—“ All those Pagan philosophers who asserted the incorporeity of souls, must of necessity, in like manner, suppose them not to have been made out of pre-existing matter, but by God, out of nothing. Plutarch being only here to be excepted, by reason of a certain odd hypothesis which he had, that was peculiarly his own, of a third principle besides God and matter, an evil Demon, self-existent; who therefore seems to have supposed all particular human souls to have been made neither out of nothing, nor yet out of matter or body pre-existing, but out of a certain strange commixture of the substance of the evil Soul, and God blended together; upon which account he does affirm souls to be not so much ἐγένονται, as μέρος θεῶν, not so much *the work of God*, as *part of him*.<sup>s</sup>”

I. He thinks those Philosophers, who held the incorporeity of the soul must of necessity believe it to be made by God out of nothing. Why so? Because they could not possibly suppose it to be made our of pre-existing matter. But is there no other pre-existing Substance in being, besides matter? Yes the divine. Out of this, then, it might have been made. And from this, in fact, the Philosophers did suppose it to be made. The learned author, therefore, has concluded too hastily.

<sup>r</sup> *Intell. System*, p. 741.

<sup>s</sup> The words of Plutarch are these: “ The soul is not so much the work and production of God, as a part of him—nor is it made by him, but from him, and out of him.” Η δὲ ψυχὴ—εἰκὸν εἴτε τὰ θεῖα μόνον αἱλλακτὸν μέρος—εἰδὸς γηπέδου, αὐτοῦ, αἱλλακτοῦ, καὶ ΕΞ αὐτοῦ γέγονεν. *Plat. Quest.* On which I will only make this observation: If Plutarch called the Soul *a part of God*, only in a figurative or popular sense, what hindered him from considering it as the *mere work and production of God*? Nay how could it have been considered otherwise? for figurative expression relates not to the *nature of ideas*, but only to the *mode of conveying them*.

2. He thinks Plutarch was *single*, in conceiving the soul to be a *part*, rather than a *work* of God ; and that he was led into that error by the Manichean principle : But how this principle should lead any one into such an error is utterly inconceivable. It is true, indeed, that he who already believes the soul to be μέρος, or μέρον θεός, a part or particle of the Divinity, if at the same time he hold *two principles*, will naturally suppose the soul to take a part from each. And so indeed did Plutarch : And in *this only*, differed from the rest of the Philosophers : who, as to the general tenet of μέρος, and not ἔργον θεός, that the soul was *rather a part, than a work of God*, were all of the same opinion with him.

Such was the general doctrine on this point, before the coming of *Christ* : But then, those Philosophers, who held out against the *Faith*, after some time, new modelled both their Philosophy and Religion ; making their Philosophy more religious, and their Religion more philosophical : Of which I have given several occasional instances, in the course of this work. So, amongst the many improvements of Paganism, the softening this doctrine was one ; The modern Platonists confining the notion of the soul's being *part of the divine Substance*, to *those of brutes*<sup>t</sup>. *Every irrational power* (says PORPHYRY) *is resolved into the life of the whole*<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>t</sup> Λύτρι ἐκάστη δώδαμις ΑΛΟΓΟΣ εἰς τὴν ζωὴν τὴν παιδίος. But the elder Platonists talked another language ; if Virgil may be allowed to know what they said :

Esse apibus partem divinæ mentis, & haustus  
Ætherios dixere. Deum namque ire per omnes.

<sup>v</sup> But they were not content to speak a language different from their Master. They would, sometimes, make him speak theirs. So Hierocles tells us, *Plato* said, that " When God made the " visible world, he had no occasion for pre-existent matter to " work upon. His will was sufficient to bring all creatures in " to being." Αρχεῖν γὰρ αὐτῷ εἰς ὑπόστασιν τῶν ὄντων τὸ δικεῖον έσθητα. *De fato & prov. ap. Phot.* But where Plato said this we are yet to learn.

And, it is remarkable, that then, and not till then, the Philosophers began *really* to believe a future state of rewards and punishments. But the wiser of

Terasque, tractusque maris, cœlumque profundum.

Hinc pecudes, armenta, VIROS, genus omne ferarum,

Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas.

Scilicet huc reddi deinde, ac RESOLUTA referri

Omnia:

Georg. iv. § 220.

But now what temptation could the later Platonists have to make this alteration in favour of paganism, if their master and his first followers called the human soul, *a part of God* only in a loose metaphorical sense? for such a sense could have reflected no disgrace upon their systems.

But a passage of Plutarch will shew us the whole change and alteration in this system in one view; where speaking of the opinions of the philosophers, he says, “ PYTHAGORAS and PLATO held the soul to be immortal; for that launching out into the soul of the universe, it returns to its parent and original. The Stoicks say, that on its leaving the body the more infirm (that is, the soul of the ignorant) suffers the lot of the body: But the more vigorous (that is, the soul of the wise) endures to the conflagration. Democritus and Epicurus say, the soul is mortal and perishes with the body: PYTHAGORAS and PLATO, that the reasonable soul is immortal (for that the soul is not God but the workmanship of the eternal God) and the irrational, mortal.” Πυθαγόρας, Πλάτων, ἀφελοὶ εἴναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐξισουν γάρ εἰς τὸ τε παντὸς ψυχὴν ἀναχωρεῖν πρὸς τὸ ὅμογενές. Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ἐξισουν τῶν σωμάτων υποφέρεσθαι τῷ μὲν αὐθεντέραν ἄμα τοῖς συγχείμασι γείσθαι (ταῦτη δὲ εἴναι τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων) τῷ δὲ ἰσχυροτέραν, ὅια ἐν τοῖς σοφεσ, καὶ μέχει τῷ ἐπιπερίσσεως. Δημόκριτος, Ἐπίκερπτος φθαρτήν, τῷ σώματι σύναλλαγματορέννην. Πυθαγόρας καὶ Πλάτων τὸ μὲν λογικὸν, ἀφελοτον (καὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν, & θεὸν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔγει τῷ αἰδεθεῶν ὑπάρχειν) τὸ δὲ ἀλογον, φθαλόν. Περὶ τῶν Αρεσ. τοις φιλ. Βιβλ. δ. κ. 5.

There is something very observable in this passage. He gives the opinions of the several Philosophers concerning the Soul. He begins with Pythagoras and Plato; goes on to the Stoicks, Democritus and Epicurus; and then returns back to Pythagoras and Plato again. This seems to be irregular enough; but this is not the worst. His account of the Pythagorean and Platonic doctrine concerning the soul, with which he sets out, contradicts that with which he concludes. For, the launching out into the soul of the universe, which is his first account, implies, and is the language of those who say, that the soul was *part of the substance of God*: whereas his second account expressly declares them

them had no sooner laid down the Doctrine of the TO' EN than the Heretics, as the Gnostics, Manicheans, and Priscillians, took it up. These delivered it to the Arabians, from whom the Atheists of these ages have received it.

Such then being the general notion concerning the nature of the Soul, there could be no room for the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments : and how much the Ancients understood the disbelief of the one to be the consequence of holding the other, we have a remarkable instance in STRABO. This excellent writer speaking of the

that the soul was *not* God, that is, *part* of God, but only his *workmanship*. Let me observe too, that what he says further, in this *second* account, of the rational soul's being immortal, and the irrational, mortal, contradicts what he in another place of the same tract, quoted above, tells us, was the doctrine of Pythagoras and Plato concerning the soul ; namely, that the human and brutal, the rational and irrational, were of the same nature, Πνευματικός, Πλάτων λογικός μὲν εἶναι τὸν ἀληθινὸν τὰς φυχάς ī μὲν λογικῶς ἐνεργούσας εἴδετο τὸν δυνητικὸν τὸν σωμάτων. How is all this to be accounted for ? Very easily. This tract of the *placits of the philosophers* was an extract from the author's common-place : in which, doubtless, were large collections from the Pythagoreans and Platonists, both before and after Christ. It is plain then, that in the passage in question he begins with those *before* ; and ends with those *after*. And it was the language of those *after*, to call the human soul, not (like their predecessors) a *part* of God, but his *workmanship* : so Plotinus, who came still later, tells us, that *the soul is from God, and yet has a different existence*: It was in their language to call the *brutal soul, mortal*: and so afterwards Porphyry, we find, says, *every irrational power is resolved into the life of the whole* : for, this *resolution* or *λύσις* was qualified with the title of *ἀφθαρτία*, or *φθαρτία* indifferently, as they were disposed to hide or to reveal its real nature. While they held all souls subject to this *resolution*, they would, of course, keep it amongst their *SECRETS*, and call it *immortality*. When they began to make a distinction, and only subjected the *irrational soul* to this *resolution*, as in the passage of Porphyry, then they would call it *mortality*, as in this passage of Plutarch: a passage though hitherto esteemed an indigested heap of absurdity and contradiction, is now, we presume, reasonably well explained and reconciled to itself.

Mosaic Religion, thus expresseth himself: *For he [Moses] affirmed and taught that the Egyptians and Libyans conceived amiss, in representing the Divinity under the form of beasts and cattle: and that the Greeks were not less mistaken, who pictured him in a human shape; for God was that only ONE, which contains all mankind, the earth, and sea, WHICH we call HEAVEN, THE WORLD AND THE NATURE OF ALL THINGS*<sup>v</sup>. This, indeed, is the rankest *spinozism*: But very unjustly charged on the Jewish Lawgiver, who hath delivered, in his divine writings, such an idea of the Deity, that had he drawn it on set purpose to oppose to that absurd opinion, he could not have done it more effectually. What then, you will say, could induce so ingenuous a writer to give this false representation of an author, whose Laws he was no stranger to? The solution of the difficulty (which Toland has written a sensible dissertation<sup>w</sup> to aggravate and envenom) seems to be this: Strabo well knew, that all who held the TO<sup>x</sup> EN, necessarily denied a future state of reward and punishment; and finding in the Law of Moses so extraordinary a circumstance as the omission of a future state in the national Religion, he concluded backwards, that the reason could be no other than the author's belief of the TO<sup>x</sup> EN: For these two ideas were inseparably connected in the imagination of the Greeks.

But now, though the notion is shewn to be so malignant, as, more or less, to have infected all the ancient Greek philosophy; yet no one, I hope, will suspect, that any thing so absurd and unphil-

<sup>v</sup> "Ἐφη γὰρ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἐδόσασκεν, ὡς οὐκ ὀξεῖς φρονῶσιν οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι θρησίοις εἰκάζοντες, καὶ βοσκήμασι τὸ Θεῖον· γέδειοι δὲ οἱ Λίθινοι οὐκ εἴπει δὲ γέδειοι οἱ Ἑλληνες, αὐθαπομόρφως τυπεῦντες· εἴη γάρ ἐν τῷτο μόνον Σεῖδῃ τὸ πεζίχον ημᾶς ἀπαντάς, καὶ γῆν καὶ θαλασσὰν, ἀ καλεμόρι ἔργα· ἐν κόσμον καὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν φύσιν. *Geog.* lib. xvi.

<sup>w</sup> See his *Origines Judaicae*.

sophical will need a formal confutation. Mr. Bayle thinks it even more irrational than the plastic atoms of Epicurus: *The atomic system is not, by a great deal, so absurd as spinozism<sup>x</sup>*: And judges it cannot stand against the demonstrations of Newton: *In my opinion the spinozists would find themselves embarrassed to some purpose, if one obliged them to admit the demonstrations of Mr. Newton<sup>y</sup>*. In this he judged right; and we have lately seen a treatise, intituled, *An enquiry into the nature of the human soul, &c.* so well reasoned on the principles of that philosophy, as totally to dispel the impious phantasim of *spinozism*. He who would have just and precise notions of God and the *soul*, may read that book; one of the best pursued of the kind, in my humble opinion, that the present times, greatly advanced in true philosophy, have produced.

But it will be asked from whence the Greeks had this strange opinion; for we know they were not ΑΤΤΟΔΙΔΑΚΤΟΙ. It will be said, perhaps, from Egypt; where they had their learning; and the books which go under the name of TRISMEGISTUS, and pretend to contain a body of the ancient Egyptian wisdom, being very full and explicit in favour of the ΤΟ' EN, have very much confirmed this opinion: And though that imposture hath been sufficiently exposed<sup>z</sup>, yet on pretence, that the writers of those books took the substance of them from the ancient Egyptian physiology, they preserve, I don't know how, a certain authority amongst the learned, by no means due unto them.

<sup>x</sup> Le Systeme des atomes n'est pas à beaucoup près aussi absurde que le spinozism. *Crit. Diđ. Article DEMOCRITE.*

<sup>y</sup> Je croi que les spinozistes se trouveroient bien embarrassés, si on les forçoit d'admettre les démonstrations de Mr. Newton. *Eid. Ar. LEUCIPPE. Rem. (G) à la fin.*

<sup>z</sup> *J. Caiſaubon cont. Bar. Exerc. 1. N° 18.*

However, I shall venture to maintain, that the notion was purely Grecian.

I. For first, it is a refined, remote, and far fetched, though imaginary, conclusion from true and simple principles. But the ancient Barbaric philosophy, as we are informed by the Greeks, consisted only of detached placits or tenets, delivered down from tradition; without any thing like a pursued hypothesis, or speculation in a system<sup>a</sup>. Now refinement and subtlety are the consequence only of these inventions.

But of all the Barbarians, this humour would be least seen in the Egyptians; whose Sages were not sedentary scholastic *Sophists*, like the Grecian; but employed and busied in the public affairs of Religion and Government. Men of such characters, we may be sure, would push even the most solid sciences no farther than the uses of life. In fact, they did not, as appears by a singular instance, in the case of Pythagoras. Jamblichus tells us, that he spent two and twenty years in Egypt, studying astronomy and geometry<sup>b</sup>: And yet after his return to Samos, he himself discovered the famous 47<sup>th</sup> prop. of the first book of Euclid. This, though a very useful, is yet a very simple theorem; and not being reached by the Egyptian geometry, shews they had not advanced far in such speculations. So again, in astronomy: Thales is said to be the first who predicted an eclipse of the sun; nor did the Egyptians, nor any other Barbarians, pretend to dispute that honour

<sup>a</sup> Αλλ' εὖ οἱ πατρίταλοι τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐπὶ τὸ ἀμφισβητεῖν καὶ απορεῖν ἐφέρουσι—οἱ μὲν γάρ νεωτεροι τὰν παξεῖν “Ἐνίκοι φιλοσόφων ἐπὸ φιλοσοφίας κενῆς τε καὶ ἀτελῆς, ἐλεῖτικῶν, ὅμα καὶ ἔριτικῶν, εἰς τὴν ἄχεντον ἐξάγονται φιλοσοφίαν ἐμπαλιν δὲ ἡ βαρύτατος φιλοσοφία, την πάταν ἔριν ἐκβάλλεται.—Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. viii. in prin.

<sup>b</sup> Διὸ δὴ καὶ εἴκοσι ἔτη καὶ τὸν Αἴγυπτον ἐν ταῖς αὐτοῖς διελέλισαν ἀρρώμα. καὶ γεομετρίαν.—Vit. Ptole. c. 4.

with him. To this it may be said, that the Egyptians certainly taught Pythagoras the true constitution of the Solar system in general: and, what is more extraordinary, the doctrine of Comets in particular, and of their revolving like the other planets round the sun<sup>c</sup>; which is esteemed a modern discovery; at least it needed the greatest effort of Newton's genius to render probable; and still the periods of their revolutions are only guessed at. We grant they taught him this: but it is as true, that they taught it not scientifically, but dogmatically, and as they received it from tradition; of which one certain argument is, its being so soon lost after the Greeks began to hypothesise<sup>d</sup>.

It will be asked then, in what consisted this boasted Wisdom of Egypt; which we have so much extolled throughout this work; and for which li-

<sup>c</sup> It is recorded by Aristotle and Plutarch: and thus expressed by Amm. Marcellinus.—“*Stellas quasdam, ceteris similes, quarum ortus, obitusque, quibus sint temporibus præstituti humanis mentibus ignorari.*” l. xxv. c. 10.

<sup>d</sup> *Fixas in supremis mundi partibus immotas persistere, & planetas his inferiores circa solem revolvi, terram pariter moveri cursu annuo, diurno vero circa axem proprium, & solem ceu focum universi in omnium centro quiescere, antiquissima fuit philosophantium sententia.* Ab *Egyptiis autem astrorum antiquissimis observationibus propagata esse hanc sententiam verisimile est.* Et etiam ab illis & a gentibus conterminis ad Græcos gentem magis philologicam quam philosophicam, philosophia omnis antiquior juxta & senior manasse videtur. Subinde docuerunt Anaxagoras, Democritus, & alii nonnulli, terram in centro mundi immotam stare, & astra omnia in occasum, aliqua celerius, alia tardius moveri, idque in spatiis liberrimis. Namque orbes solidi postea ab Eudoxo, Calippo, Aristotele, introducti sunt; declinante in dies philosophia primitus introducta, & novis Græcorum commentis paulatim præalentibus. Quibus vinculis antiqui planetas in spatiis liberis retineri, deque cursu rectilineo perpetuo retraetos, in orbem regulariter agi docuere, non constat. In hujus rei explicationem orbes solidos excogitatos fuisse opinor. *Newton. de mundi systemate,*

berty we have so large warrant from *holy Scripture*? I reply, in the science of LEGISLATION and CIVIL POLICY: But this only by the way.

That the Egyptians did not philosophise by hypothesis and system, appears farther from the character of their first Greek disciples. Those early *Wise men*, who fetched their Philosophy from Egypt, brought it home in detached and independent *placits*; which was certainly as they found it. For, as the fine writer of the *enquiry into the life of Homer* says, *there was yet no SEPARATION of WISDOM; the philosopher and the divine, the legislator and the poet were all united in the same person.* Nor had they yet any Sects, or succession of Schools. These were late; and therefore the Greeks could not be mistaken in their accounts of this matter.

One of the first, as well as noblest systems of Physics, is the Atomic theory, as it was revived by Des Cartes. This, without doubt, was a Greek invention; nothing being better settled, than that Democritus and Leucippus were the authors of it. But Posidonius, either out of envy or whim, would rob them of this honour, and give it to one Moschus a Phenician. Our excellent Cudworth has gone into this fancy; and made of that unknown Moschus, the celebrated Lawgiver of the Jews. But the learned Dr. Burnet hath clearly overthrown this notion, and vindicated the right of the discovery to the two Greeks <sup>c.</sup>.

<sup>c</sup> " Præterea non videtur mihi sapere indeolem antiquissimorum temporum iste modus philosophandi per hypotheses & principiorum systemata; quem modum, ab introductis atomis, statim sequebantur philosophi. Hæc Græcanica sunt, ut par est credere, & sequioris ævi. Durasse mihi videtur ultra Trojana tempora philosophia traditiva, quæ ratiociniis & causarum explicatione non nitebatur, sed alterius generis & originis doctrinâ, primigeniâ & πατριαρχâ." *Archæol. Phil.* 1. i. c. 6.

This

This being the case, we may easily know what Plato meant in saying, that *the Greeks improved whatever science they received from the Barbarians*<sup>f</sup>. Which words Celsus seems to paraphrase, where he says, the Barbarians were good at INVENTING OPINIONS, but the Greeks only were able to PERFECT and SUPPORT them<sup>g</sup>. And Epicurus, whose spirit was entirely systematic as well as atheistic, finding none of these delicacies amongst the Barbarians, used to maintain that *the Greeks only knew how to philosophise*<sup>h</sup>. So much was the author of *the voyage of Cyrus* mistaken in thinking that *the Orientalists had a genius more subtile and metaphysical than the Greeks*<sup>i</sup>. But he apparently formed his judgment in this matter, from the modern genius of that people, since the time they learnt to speculate, of the Greek Philosophers; whose writings, since the Arabian conquests, have been translated into the languages of the east.

It appears therefore, from the nature of the Barbaric philosophy, that such a notion as the ΤΟἘΝ could not be Egyptian.

2. But we shall shew next, that it was in fact a Greek invention; by the best argument, the discovery of the inventors.

TULLY, speaking of PHEREKYDES SYRUS, the master of Pythagoras, says, that he was the first

<sup>f</sup> Διὸ καὶ ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησί, ὅτι ἀν καὶ ἀρχὴ βαρβάρων μάθημα  
λάζων εἰς Ἑλλήνες, τότο αμέντοι ἐφέρεται. Anon. de Vit. Pyth.  
ap. Photium, Cod. 249.

<sup>g</sup> Καὶ δύγναμες γε τὸν ὄντος ὅπῃ τῇ ἀπὸ βαρβάρων ἀρχῇ τῷ  
λέγω, ἐπανῶ ὡς ἵκανες βῆσσον δύγναμα τὰς βαρβάρας, προτίθεσθαι  
δὲ τοτε, ὅτι κεῖναι καὶ βιβαίωσανται τὰ ἵππα βαρβάρων δύρθενται  
ἀμείνοντες εἰς τὸν Ἑλλήνες. Orig. cont. Celsium, p. 5.

<sup>h</sup> Ο δέ Ἐπίκεφρος ἔμπαλιν, ἵπολαμέαντο μόνες φιλοσοφῆσαι Ἑλληνας  
ἔντασι. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. i. p. 302, Ed. Morel. 1629.

<sup>i</sup> Volez Disc. sur la mythologie.

who affirmed the souls of men to be ETERNAL,  
 "Quod literis extet, Pherecydes Syrus primum  
 "dixit animos hominum esse SEMPITERNOS; an-  
 "tiquus fane; sicut enim meo regnante gentili.  
 "Hanc opinionem discipulus ejus Pythagoras ma-  
 "xime confirmavit."<sup>k</sup> This is a very extraordi-  
 nary passage. If it be taken in the common sense  
 of the interpreters, that Pherecydes was the first, or  
 the first of the Greeks, who taught the IMMORTALITY  
 of the soul, nothing can be more false or groundless.  
 Tully himself well knew the contrary, as appears  
 from several places of his works, where he repre-  
 sents the *immortality of the soul*, as a thing taught  
 from the most early times of memory, and by all  
 mankind; the author and original of it, as Plutarch  
 assures us, being entirely unknown; which indeed  
 might be easily gathered, by any attentive considerer,  
 from the very early practice of deifying the  
 dead. Tully therefore, who knew that Homer  
 taught it long before; who knew that Herodotus  
 recorded it to have been taught by the Egyptians  
 from the most early times, must needs mean a differ-  
 ent thing; which the exact propriety of the word  
*sempiternus* will lead us to understand. Donatus  
 the grammarian, says, that *SEMPITERNUS* properly  
 relates to the Gods, and *PERPETUUS* to men; *Sempiter-*  
*nus ad Deos, perpetuum proprie ad homines pertinet*<sup>1</sup>:  
 So that, a proper ETERNITY is attributed to the  
 Soul; a consequence that could only spring, and does  
 spring necessarily, from the principle of the Soul's  
 being part of God. Here then Cicero hath given  
 us a very curious piece of history; which not only  
 fixes the doctrine of the TO' EN to Greece, but  
 records the Inventor of it: and this is farther con-

<sup>k</sup> *Tusc. Disp.* l. i. c. 16.<sup>1</sup> In *And. Ter.* A&t. v. Sc. v.

firmed by what he adds, that Pythagoras, the scholar of Pherecydes, took it from his master ; and by the authority of his own name added great credit to it ; so great indeed, that, as we have seen, it soon over-spread all the Greek philosophy. And I make no question but it was Pherecydes's broaching this impiety, and not hiding it so carefully as his great Disciple did afterwards, by the *double doctrine*, which made him pass with the people, for an Atheist. And if the story of his mocking at all religious worship, which *Ælian*<sup>m</sup> mentions, be true, it would much confirm the popular opinion.

Tatian is the only ancient writer I know of, who seems to be apprized of this intrigue ; or to have any notion of *Pherecydes*'s true character. Tatian writing to the Greeks, against their Philosophers, says, Aristotle is the heir of Pherecydes's *Doctrine* ; and traduces the notion of the soul's immortality<sup>n</sup>. How true this is, and how exactly Aristotle's opinion agrees with what we have here delivered as *Pherecydes*'s, may be seen above in the Interpretation of a passage in the *Nicomachean ethics*<sup>o</sup>. But the singularity of Tatian's censure hath much embarrassed his commentators to know on what it was grounded.

That *Pherecydes* was the inventor of this notion, and not barely the original author of it to the Greeks, may not only be collected from what hath been said above of the different genius of the Greek and Barbaric philosophy, but from what *Suidas* tells us of his being self taught, and having no master or director of his studies<sup>p</sup>.

<sup>m</sup> *Var. Hist.* l. iv. c. 28,

<sup>n</sup> 'Ο δὲ Ἀριστολεὺς τὰ Φερεκύδεις δόγματα κληρονόμως εἶναι, καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς οὐ γένεται λειτήν αθανασίαν. *Orat. ad Gr.* c. 412,

<sup>o</sup> See p. 211.

<sup>p</sup> Ἡτέρως δὲ οὐκ ἐσχημάτισε καθηκότην, ἀλλ᾽ ἑαυτὸν αἰσηκάσας. *Voc. Φερεκύδης*.

But as the Greeks had two inventors of their best physical principle, Democritus and Leucippus; so had they two likewise of this their worst metaphysical. For we have as positive attestation for THALES, as we have seen before for Pherecydes. There are (says Laertius) who affirm, that Thales was the first who held the souls of men to be IMMORTAL<sup>q</sup>; ΑΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ an epithet, in the philosophic ages of Greece, properly designing the immortality of the gods; as ἀφθαρτος signified that of men<sup>r</sup>. The same objection holds here against understanding it in the common sense, as in the case of Pherecydes.

The sum then of the argument is this: Thales and Pherecydes, who, we are to observe, were contemporaries, are said to be the first who taught the *immortality of the soul*<sup>r</sup>. In the common sense of this assertion, they were not the first; and known not to be so, by those who affirmed they were the first. The same antiquity informs us, they held the doctrine of the ΤΟ<sup>s</sup> EN; which likewise commonly went by the name of the doctrine of the *immortality*. Nor is there any person earlier than these on record for holding that principle. We conclude therefore, that those who tell us they were the first who taught the *immortality of the soul*, necessarily meant that they were the first who held it to be *part of the divine substance*. This, I say, we may conclude, altho' Plutarch had not expressly affirmed it of one of them, where he says, that Thales was the FIRST who taught the soul to be an eternal-moving, or a self-mov-

<sup>q</sup> Εἰοι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν πρῶτον εἰπεῖν φασίν αὐτανάτες ταῖς ψυχάς. 1. i.  
§ 24

<sup>r</sup> So Eusebius speaking of the political Gods of Egypt, says: ΑΛΛΑΣ δὲ ἐκ τέτων ἐπιγειες γενέσθαι φασὶν, ὑπάξενιας μὲν ΟΝΗΤΟΙΣ,  
ἄλλα δὲ συνεστιν καὶ κοινὴν αὐθιζώπων ἐνεργεσίαν τετευχότας τῆς ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΑΣ — Præp. Evang. I. iii. c. 3.

<sup>s</sup> Suidas speaking of Pherecydes says: Εξηλοτύπει δὲ τὴν Θάλην δοξαν. Voc. Φερεκύδ.

ing Nature<sup>t</sup>. But none but God was supposed to be such a Nature: Therefore the Soul, according to Thales, was part of the divine Substance; and he, according to Plutarch, was the first who held that opinion.

3. But though the Greeks were the inventors of this impious notion; yet we may be assured, as they had their first learning from Egypt, it was some Egyptian principles which led them into it. Let us see then what those principles were.

The Egyptians, as we are assured by the concurrent testimony of Antiquity, were amongst the first who taught the *immortality of the soul*: And this not, like the Greek Sophists, for speculation; but for a support to their practical doctrine of a future state of reward and punishment: and, every thing being done in Egypt for the sake of Society, a future state was inforced to secure the general doctrine of a Providence. But still there would remain great difficulties concerning the **ORIGIN OF EVIL**, which seemed to affect the moral attributes of God. And it was not enough for the purposes of Society, that there was a divine Providence, unless that Providence was understood to be perfectly *good* and *just*. Some solution therefore was to be given; and a better could not be well found, than the notion of the **METEMPSYCHOSIS**, or transmigration of Souls; without which, in the opinion of Hierocles<sup>v</sup>, the ways of Providence are not to be justified. The necessary consequence of this doctrine was, that the Soul is elder than the Body: So having taught before, that the Soul was eternal, *a parte post*; and now, that it had an existence before it came into the Body, the Greeks, to give a roundness to their system, taught,

<sup>t</sup> Θαλῆς ἀποφήνατο ΠΡΩΤΟΣ τὴν ψυχὴν, φύσιν ΑΕΙΚΙΝΗΤΟΝ ή ΑΙΓΙΚΙΝΗΤΟΝ. *Plac. Phil* 1. iv. c. 2.

<sup>v</sup> *Lib. de Prov.* apud Phot. *Bib. Cod.* 214.

on the foundation of its pre-existence, that it was eternal too, *a parte ante<sup>w</sup>*.

Having thus given the Soul *one* of the attributes of Divinity; another Egyptian doctrine soon taught them to make a perfect God almighty of it.

We have observed, that the *mysteries* were an Egyptian invention; and that the great *secret* in them was the *unity of the Godhead*. This was the first of the *anūppīlā*; in which, we are told, their kings, and magistrates, and a select number of the best and wisest were instructed. It is clear then that the doctrine was delivered in such a manner as was most useful to society; but the principle of the TO' EN is as destructive to Society, as Atheism can well make it. However, having no gross conceptions of the Deity thus *found*, they represented him, *as a spirit diffusing itself through the world, and intimately pervading all things*<sup>x</sup>. And thus, the Egyptians, in a figurative and moral sense, teaching that GOD WAS ALL THINGS<sup>y</sup>; the Greeks drew the conclusion, but in a literal and metaphysical; that ALL THINGS WERE GOD<sup>z</sup>; and so ran headlong

<sup>w</sup> This is no precarious conjecture; for Suidas, after having told us that Pherecydes (whom we have shewn above to be one of the inventors of the notion of the soul's *proper eternity*) had no master, but struck every thing out of his own thoughts; adds, that he had procured certain *secret Phenician books*, Αγιὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐσχημάτου καθηνίτην, ἀν' εἰτίν ἀσκῆσαι, κίνσαμεν τὰ ΦΟΙΝΙΚΩΝ ἀπίκεντρα βιβλία. Now we know from Eusebius's account of Sanchoniatho, and the famous fragment there preserved, that these secret Phenician Books contained the Egyptian wisdom and learning.

<sup>x</sup> Παρ' αὐτοῖς τε πατούς κύρσης τὸ διῆκόν θητοῦντα. *Horapoll.* And Virgil, where he gives, as we have shewn, the *ἀπόρετην* of the Mysteries, describes the Godhead in the same manner:

SPIRITUS intus alit, totamque infusa per artus

MENS agitat molem, & magno se corpore miscet.

<sup>y</sup> Δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς δόχα θεοὺς μηδὲν ὄλως συνεγένεται. *Idem.*

<sup>z</sup> In the writings going under the name of Orpheus, we find these words: "Εστι τα πάντα.

into what we now call *spinozism*. Both these propositions the Greeks afterwards father'd upon the Egyptians<sup>a</sup>; and, if we may trust the general opinion, rightly fathered them.

4. But this mistake, for a mistake it is, being chiefly supported by the books, which go under the name of Hermes Trismegistus, it will be proper to say something to that matter.

The most virulent enemies the Christian Faith had to encounter, on its first appearance in the world, were the Platonists and Pythagoreans. And *national paganism*, of which, these Sects set up for the defenders, being, by its gross absurdities, obnoxious to the most violent retortion. Their first care was to cover and secure it, by *allegorizing* its GODS, and *spiritualizing* its WORSHIP. But lest the novelty of these inventions should discredit them, they endeavoured to persuade the world, that all their refinements were agreeable to the ancient mysterious wisdom of Egypt: in which point, several circumstances concurred to favour them. 1. As first, that known, uncontroverted fact, that the Greek RELI-

<sup>a</sup> The Asclepian dialogue translated into Latin by Apuleius, says, OMNIA UNIUS ESSE, ET UNUM ESSE OMNIA. And again: Nonne hoc dixi OMNIA UNUM ESSE, ET UNUM OMNIA? Μόγια τὴς θεᾶς πάντα δῆν· εἰ δὲ πάντα μέρα, πάντα αρχαὶ θεοῖς πάντα δημιουρῶν, ἕκαν δὲ πολεῖς. — Εάν τις ἐπιχειρηστὴ τὸ πάντα καὶ ἐν χρείσαι, τὸ πάντα τὴς ἀνθρώπων λύσας κατέλει· εἰ τὸ πάντα, πάντα γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ δεῖ. Lib. xvi. of the works of Trismegist. published by Ficinus. This passage cannot be well understood without recollecting what we have observed above: That the Egyptians saying, in a figurative and moral sense, that God was all things, the Greeks drew the conclusion in a literal and metaphysical, that all things were God. Now the Platonist, who forged these books, being conscious, that this was a Greek conclusion, artfully endeavours, in the words above, to shew it a necessary consequence of the Egyptian premisses; which, he pretends, conveyed an imperfect representation of the Universe without it. If any man (says he) go about to separate the All from the One, he will destroy the All; for all ought to be One.

GION and PHILOSOPHY came originally from Egypt. 2. The state of the Egyptian *philosophy* in these times. The power of Egypt had been much shaken by the Persians; but totally overturned by the Greeks. Under the Ptolemies, this famous Nation suffering an entire revolution in their learning and religion, their priests, as was natural, began to philosophise in the Grecian mode; and at the time we speak of, had for several ages, accustomed themselves so to do; having neglected and forgot all the old Egyptian learning: which, considering their many subversive revolutions, will not appear at all strange to those who reflect, that this learning was conveyed from hand to hand, partly by unfaithful tradition, and partly by uncertain *Hieroglyphics*. However an opinion of Ægypt's being the repository of the true old Egyptian wisdom, derived too much honour to the colleges of their priests, not for them to contrive a way to support it. 3. This they did (and it leads me to the third favourable circumstance) by forging books under the name of HERMES TRISMEGISTUS, the great hero and law-giver of the old Egyptians. They could not have thought of a better expedient: For, in the times of the Ptolemies, the practice of forging books became general; and the art arrived to its utmost perfection. But had not the Greeks of this time been so universally infatuated with the delusion of mistaking their own Philosophy for the old Egyptian, there were marks enough to have detected the forgery. Jamblichus says, *the books that go under the name of Hermes do indeed contain the Hermaic doctrines, though they often use the language of the Philosophers: For they were translated out of the Egyptian tongue by men not unacquainted with PHILOSOPHY.*

PHY<sup>b</sup>. Whether this writer saw the cheat, or was himself in the delusion, I cannot say; but he has owned all we want; and made the matter much worse by a bad vindication. But the credit of these forgeries, we may well imagine, had its foundation in some genuine writings of Hermes. There were in fact, such writings: and, what is more, some fragments of them are yet remaining; sufficient indeed, if we wanted other proof, to convict the *books that go under the name of Hermes*, of imposture. For what Eusebius hath given us, from SANCHONIATHO, concerning the *cosmogony*, was taken from the genuine works of Thoth or Hermes: and in them we see not the least resemblance to that genius of refinement and speculation, which makes the character of those forged writings: every thing is plain and simple, free of all hypothesis or metaphysical reasoning. Those inventions of the later Greeks.

Thus the Pythagoreans and Platonists, being supplied both with *prejudices* and *forges*, turned them, the best they could, against Christianity. Under these auspices, Jamblichus composed the book just before mentioned, of THE MYSTERIES; meaning the profound and recondite doctrines of Egyptian wisdom: Which, at the bottom, is nothing else but the *genuine Greek philosophy*, imbrowned with the dark fanaticism of eastern cant.

But their chief strength lay in the *forgery*; And this forgery they even interpolated; the better to serve their purpose against *christianity*.

It is pleasant enough to observe how some primitive *Apologists* defended themselves against the au-

<sup>b</sup> Τὰ μὲν φερόμενα, αἱ Ἐγμῆ ἐγμαῖκας πεπέλεχει δόξας, εἰ καὶ τὴν φιλοσόφων γλώττην τολλάκις χείται, μητρίσεπται γαρ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀιγυπτίας γλώττης ὑπὲ ἀδεῶν φιλοσοφίας οὐκ ἀπείρως ἔχοιτων.  
*De Mys.*

thority of these books. One would imagine they should have detected the fraud: which, we see, was easy enough to do. Nothing like it: Instead of that, they opposed fraud to fraud: for some heretics <sup>c</sup> had added whole books to this noble collection of *Trismegist*: In which they have made Hermes speak plainer of the mysteries of the christian Faith, than even the Jewish prophets themselves <sup>d</sup>.

<sup>c</sup> The learned Beaufsobre in his *history of manicheism* very reasonably supposes a gnostic to have had a hand in it.

<sup>d</sup> But this was the humour of the times: for the Grammarians, at the height of their reputation under the Ptolemies, had shamefully neglected *critical learning*, which was their province, to apply themselves to *forging books* under the names of old authors. There is a remarkable passage in Diogenes Laertius, which is obscure enough to deserve an explanation; and will shew us how common it was to oppose forgery to forgery. He is arguing against those who gave the origin of Philosophy (which he would have to be from Greece) to the Barbarians; that is, the Egyptians. Λαερτίου δὲ αὐτὲς τὰ τῷ Ἑλλήνων κατεξωμάτα, ἀφ' ἣ μηδέ τι γε φιλοσοφία, αλλὰ καὶ γένεσιν ἀνθρώπων ἔχει, Βαζεύεις, περιστάλιες. οὐδὲ γεννώντι μὲν Ἀθηναῖς γένεσιν Μεσσαῖος, αὐτῷ δὲ Θηβαῖος; Λίνος: καὶ τὸν μὲν, Ευμόλε ταῦτα φασί, τωνῆσται δὲ θεούσιαν καὶ σφαιραῖς περιτονεῖσθαι τοῖς τε οὐρανοῖς ταῖς ωκεανίσιαι, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα οὐκανέσθαι. Lib. i. §. 3. But these ignorantly apply to the Barbarians the illusrious inventions of the Greeks; from whence not only Philosophy, but the very race of mankind had its beginning. Thus we know Musæus was of Athens, and Linus of Thebes: The former of these, the son of Eumolpus, is said to be the first, who wrote, in verse, of the sphere, and of the generation of the gods; And taught, that ALL THINGS PROCEED FROM ONE AND WILL BE RESOLVED BACK AGAIN INTO IT. To see the force of this reasoning, we must suppose, that they whom Laertius is here confuting, relied principally on this argument, to prove that Philosophy came originally from the Barbarians. namely, that the great principle of the Greek Philosophy, the TO "EN and the REFUSION, was an Egyptian notion. To this he replies, not so: Musæus taught it originally in Athens. The dispute, we see, is pleasantly conducted: His adversaries, who supported the common, and indeed, the true opinion of philosophy's coming first from the Barbarians, by the false argument of the τῷ οὐ's being originally Egyptian, took this on the authority of the forged books of *Trismegist*; and Laertius opposes it by as

With

With a spirit not unlike that of the two law-solicitors, of whom the story goes, that when one of them had forged a bond, the other, instead of losing time to detect the cheat, produced evidence to prove it paid at the day.

These are my sentiments of the imposture. Caſaubon ſuppoſes the whole a forgery of ſome Platonic Christians: But Cudworth has fully ſhewn the weakneſs of that opinion. This latter author is ſometimes inclined to give them to the pagan Platoniſts of *those times*; which ſeems highly improbable,

1. Because they are always mentioned, both by *christian* and *pagan* writers, as works long known, and of ſome conſiderable ſtanding. 2. Because, had *those platonists* been the authors, they would not have delivered the doctrine of the ſoul's conſubſtantiality with the deity, and its refuſion into him, in the groſs manner in which we find it in the books of *Trismegift*. For, as we have ſhewn above by a paſſage from Porphyry<sup>e</sup>, they had confined that irreligious notion to the ſouls of brutes. At other times, this great Critic ſeems diſpoſed to think that they might indeed be genuine, and tranſlated, as we ſee Jamblichus would have them, from old Egyptian originals: But this, we preſume, is ſufficiently overthrown by what has been ſaid above.

In a word, these forgeries paſſing unſuſpected on all hands, and containing the rankeſt *spinozism*<sup>f</sup>, it went cuſtently, at that time, for an Egyptian

great a forgery, the fragments which went under the name of *Muſæus*.

<sup>e</sup> See note (<sup>t</sup>) p. 216.

<sup>f</sup> As in the following paſſage: Οὐκ ἔκειται ἐν τοῖς Γενικοῖς, ὅτε ἀπὸ μιᾶς ψυχῆς τῆς τῶν παντὸς πάσσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ εἰσιν; — As where it is affirmed of the world, πάντα ποιεῖ, καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀποποιεῖ. — Of the incorruptibility of the ſoul; πᾶς μέρος τι δύναται φθαρῆναι τῷ ἀφθάρτῳ, οὐδὲπολέστεροι τι τῷ θεῷ—οὐδὲ τοὺς οὐκ ἀπολίμηνοι τῷ θεῷ στήνουσι τῷ θεῷ, ἀλλ' ὥστε τῷ πατέρι καθάπερ τὸ τῷ θεῷ φῶς.

principle: And though, since the revival of learning, the cheat hath been detected, yet the false notion of their original hath kept its ground.

Why I have been thus solicitous to vindicate the pure EGYPTIAN WISDOM from this opprobrium, will be seen in its place.

And now, to sum up the general argument of this last section. These two errors in the *metaphysical* speculations of the philosophers, concerning *the nature of GOD, and of the SOUL*, were what necessarily kept them from giving credit to a doctrine, which even their own moral reasonings addressed to the people, had rendered highly probable in itself. But as we observed before, it was their ill fate to be determined rather by *metaphysical* than *moral* arguments. This is best seen by comparing the belief and conduct of Socrates with the rest. He was singular, as we said before, in *confining* himself to the study of morality; and as singular in *believing* the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. What could be the cause of his belief but this restraint; of which his belief was a natural consequence? For having confined himself to morals, he had nothing to mislead him: Whereas the rest of the philosophers applying themselves, with a kind of fanaticism, to *physics* and *metaphysics*, had drawn a number of absurd, though subtil conclusions, which directly opposed the consequences of those moral arguments. And as it is common for parents to be fondest of their weakest and most deformed issue, so these men, as we said, were easier swayed by their *metaphysical* than *moral* conclusions.

Thus, as the Apostle PAUL observes, PROFESSING THEMSELVES TO BE WISE, THEY BECAME FOOLS. Well therefore might he warn his fol-

lowers lest they should be spoiled through vain philosophy<sup>b</sup>: and one of them, and he no small fool neither, is upon record for having been thus spoiled; SYNESIUS bishop of Ptolemaïs. He went into the Church a *Platonist*, and a *Platonist* he continued when he was there, as extravagant and absurd as any he had left behind him<sup>i</sup>. This man, forsooth, could not be brought to believe the *Apostle's* doctrine of the resurrection: and why? because he believed with *Plato* that the Soul was before the Body; that is, eternal, *a parte ante*: and the consequence of this, we have shewn, was the very thing which disposed the *Platonists* to reject all future state of rewards and punishments. However, he was not for shaking hands with *Christianity*, but would suppose some grand and profound mystery to lie hid under the Scripture account of the RESURRECTION. This again was in the very spirit of *Plato*; who, as we are told by *Celsus*, concealed many sublime things of this kind, under his popular doctrine of a future state<sup>k</sup>.

But it was not peculiar to the *Platonists* to allegorize the doctrine of the resurrection. It was the humour of all the *sects* on their admission into *Christianity*<sup>l</sup>. For being, in their moral lectures

<sup>b</sup> COLOSS. ii. 8.

<sup>i</sup> See a full account of this man, his principles, his scruples, and his conversion, in the critical Inquiry into the opinions of the Philosophers, &c. c. xiv.

<sup>k</sup> See note (F) p. 158. It was just the same with the Jewish *Platonists* at the time when the doctrine of a future state became national amongst that people. And *Philo* himself seems disposed to turn the notion of Hell into an allegory, signifying an impure and sinful life. See his tract *De congregatu querendæ eruditioñis causa*.

<sup>l</sup> Et ut carnis restitutio negetur, de una omnium philosophorum schola sumitur. Tertul. de præsc. adv. Hæret. So, in another place, he makes every Heresy to have received it's seasoning in the school of *Plato*. Doleo bona fide Platonem factum hæreticorum omnium Condimentarium. De Anim. c. 23.

in their schools (in imitation of the language of the *Mysteries*, whose phraseology it was the fashion to use both in *Schools* and *Courts*) accustomed to call vicious habits, *death*; and reformation to a good life 'ANA'ΣΤΑΣΙΣ or a *resurrection*, they were disposed to understand the RESURRECTION OF THE JUST in the same sense. Against these pests of the Gospel it was <sup>m</sup> that the learned apostle Paul warned his son Timothy. SHUN (says he) PROFANE AND VAIN BABBLINGS, *for they will encrease unto more ungodliness. And their word will eat as doth a canker: of whom is Hymenæus and Philetus, who concerning the Truth have erred, saying that THE RESURRECTION IS PAST ALREADY; and overthrow the faith of some*<sup>n</sup>.

And here I will beg leave to observe, that whenever the holy Apostles speak of, or hint at the Philosophers or Philosophy of Greece, which is not seldom, they always do it in terms of contempt or abhorrence. On this account I have not been ashamed nor afraid to shew, at large, that the reasons they had for so doing were just and weighty. Nor have I thought myself at all concerned to manage the reputation of a set of men, who, on the first appearance of *Christianity*, most virulently opposed it, by all the arts of sophistry and injustice: and when, by the force of its superior evidence, they were at length driven into it, were no sooner in than they began to deprave and corrupt it<sup>o</sup>. For from their *profane and vain babblings*, Tertullian assures us, every heresy took its birth. *Ipsi illi*

<sup>m</sup> Hinc illæ fabulæ & genealogiæ indeterminabiles, & quaæfiones infuctuosæ, & Sermones serpentes velut cancer: à quibus nos Apostolus refrænans, nominatim philosophiam, &c. *Tertul. de præsc. adv. Hæret.*

<sup>n</sup> 2 TIM ii. 16.

<sup>o</sup> See the Introduction to *Julian, or a discourse concerning his attempt to rebuild the Temple.*

SAPIENTIÆ PROFESSORES, *de quorum ingenii omnis hæresis animatur*<sup>p</sup>. And, in another place he gives us their genealogy. “ *Ipsæ denique hærefes à PHILosophia subornantur. Inde Æones & formæ, nescio quæ, & trinitas hominis apud Valentinum: PLATONICUS fuerat. Inde Marcionis deus melior de tranquillitate, a STOICIS venerat; & uti anima interire dicatur, ab EPICUREIS observatur: ET UT CARNIS RESTITUTIO NEGETUR, DE UNA OMNIUM PHILOSOPHORUM SCHOLA SUMITUR; et ubi materia cum deo æquatur, ZENONIS disciplina est: et ubi aliquid de igneo deo allegatur, HERACLITUS intervenit. Eadem materialiæ apud hæreticos & philosophos voluntantur; iidem retractatus implicantur. Unde malum, & quare? & unde homo, & quomodo? & quod proximè Valentinus proposuit, unde deus? Scilicet & de Enthymesi, ectromate inferunt ARISTOTELEM, qui illis dialecticam instituit, artificem struendi & destruendi, versipellem in sententiis coactam, in conjecturis duram, in argumentis operariam, contentione molestam, etiam sibi ipsi omnia retractantem, nequid omnino tractaverit. Hinc illæ fabulæ & genealogiæ indeterminabiles, & quæstiones infructuosæ & SERMONES SERPENTES VELUT CANCER, a quibus nos apostolus refrænans<sup>q</sup>, &c.” One would almost imagine, from these last words, that Tertullian had foreseen that ARISTOTLE was to be the founder of the SCHOOL DIVINITY.*

<sup>p</sup> *Adv. Marc.* l. i. The author of a fragment concerning the Philosophers going under the name of Origen, says the same thing: ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τοὺς αὐτοῖς [Αἰφείκοις] τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἀρχὴν μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλήνων σοφίας λαβόντα, ἐπιδομάτων φιλοσοφεύμεναν, καὶ ΜΥΣΤΗΡΙΩΝ ἐπικεχειρημένων καὶ ἀσχολόγων ἐμβομένων.

<sup>q</sup> *De præsc. adv. Hærct.* p. 70, 71. Ed. par. 1580.

He observes, that the Heresy, which *denies the Resurrection of the Body*, arose out of the whole School of Gentile philosophy. But he omits another, which we have shewn stood upon as wide a bottom; namely, that which *holds the HUMAN SOUL TO BE OF THE SAME NATURE AND SUBSTANCE WITH GOD*: Espoused before his time by the Gnostics, and afterwards, as we learn by St. Austin, by the Manichæans and Priscillianists<sup>r</sup>.

Why the heathen Philosophers of our times should be displeased to see their ancient brethren shewn for knaves in practice, and fools in theory, is not at all strange to conceive: but why any else should think themselves concerned in the force and fidelity of the drawing, is to me a greater mystery than any I have attempted to unveil. For a stronger proof of the necessity of the Gospel of Jesus Christ cannot, I think, be given than this, That the SAGES OF GREECE, with whom all the WISDOM of the world was supposed to be deposited<sup>s</sup>, had PHILOSOPHISED themselves out of the most evident and useful truth with which mankind hath any concern.

Besides, what greater regard could be shewn to the authority of the Sacred Writers than to justify their censure of the Greek Philosophy; which *Deists* and *Fanatics*, though for different ends, have equally concurred to represent as a condemnation of human learning in general?

In conclusion, it is but fit we should give the

<sup>r</sup> Priscillianistæ quois in Hispania Priscillianus instituit, maxime Gnosticorum & Manichæorum dogmata permixta sectantur; quamvis et ex aliis hæreticibus in eas fordes, tanquam in sentinam quandam horribili confusione confluxerint. Propter occultandas autem contaminationes & turpitudines suas habent in suis dogmatibus & hæc verba, Jura, perjura, secretum prodere noli. *Hi, ANIMAS DICUNT EJUSDEM NATURÆ ATQUE SUBSTANTIÆ CUJUS EST DEUS.* Aug. *De Hæretibus.*

<sup>s</sup> 1 COR. i. 20.

reader some account why we have been so long and so particular on this matter.

One reason was (to mention no other at present) to obviate an objection, that might possibly be urged against our proof, of the *divine legation of Moses, from the omission of a future state*. For if now the Deists should say (and we know they are ready to say any thing) that *Moses did not propagate that doctrine, because he did not believe it*; we have an answer ready: having shewn from fact, *that the not believing a doctrine so useful to society, was esteemed no reason for the Legislator not to propagate it*. I say, having shewn it from the practice of the Philosophers: For as to the Lawgivers, that is, those who were not Philosophers professed, it appears, by what can be learnt from their history and character, that they *all believed, as well as taught, a future state of rewards and punishments*. And indeed how should it be otherwise? for they were free from those *metaphysical whimsies*, concerning God and the Soul, which had so besotted the Philosophers. And I know of nothing else that could hinder any man's believing it.

### S E C T. V.

BUT it may now perhaps be said, “ Though I have designed well, and have obviated an objection arising from the present question; yet Was it not imprudent to employ a circumstance for this purpose, which seems to turn to the discredit of the Christian doctrine of a future state? For what can bear harder on the REASONABleness of this doctrine, than that the best and wisest of Antiquity did not believe a future state of rewards and punishments?”

To this I reply,

1. That if the authority of the *greek Philosophers* have found weight with us in matters of religion, it is more than ever the *sacred writers* intended they should do; as appears from the character they have given us of them, and of their works.

2. Had I, indeed, contented myself with barely shewing, that the Philosophers rejected the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, without explaining the grounds on which they went, some slender suspicion, unfavourable to the Christian doctrine, might perhaps have staggered those weak and impotent minds which cannot support themselves without the crouch of AUTHORITY. But when I have at large explained those grounds, which, of all philosophic tenets, are known to be the most absurd; and the reader hath seen these adhered to, while the best moral arguments in the world for it were overlooked and neglected, the authority of their conclusions loses all its weight.

3. But had I done nothing of this, and had left the Philosophers in possession of their whole authority, that authority would have been found impertinent to the point in hand. The supposed force of it arises on a very foolish error. Those, who mistake Christianity for *only a republication of the religion of nature*, must, of course, suppose the doctrine it teaches of a future state, to be one of those which *natural religion* discovers. It would therefore seem a discredit to that *republication*, had the doctrine been undiscoverable by human reason; and some men would be apt to think it was, when the Philosophers had missed of it. But our holy religion, (as I hope to prove in the last book) is quite another thing: and one consequence of its true nature will be seen to be this, that *its* doctrine of a future state is not in the number of those which *natural religion* teaches. The authority of the Phi-

losophers, therefore, is entirely out of the question.

4. But again, it will be found hereafter, that this *fact* is so far from weakening the doctrines of Christianity, that it is a strong argument for the truth of that dispensation.

5. Yet as we have often seen writers deceived in their representations of *Pagan Antiquity*; and, while zealously busy in giving such a one as they imagined favourable to Christianity, they have been all along diserving it; Lest I myself should be suspected of having fallen into this common delusion, I shall beg leave, in the last place, to shew, that it is just such a representation of Antiquity as this, I have given, which can possibly be of service to our holy religion. And that, consequently, if what we have here given be the *true*, it does our religion much service.

This will best appear by considering the two usual views men have had, and the consequent methods they have pursued, in bringing in *Pagan Antiquity* into the scene.

THEIR design has been, either to illustrate the REASONABLENESS, or to shew the NECESSITY of Christianity.

If the REASONABLENESS, their way was to represent this Antiquity, as comprehending all the fundamental truths, concerning God and the Soul, which our holy Religion hath revealed. But as greatly as such a representation was supposed to serve their purpose, the Infidels, we see, have not feared to join issue with them on the allowed *fact*; and with much plausibility of reasoning, have endeavoured to shew, that THEREFORE Christianity was not NECESSARY: and this very advantage, TINDAL (under cover of a principle, which some modern divines seemed to have afforded him, of Christianity's being only a re-publication of the Religion of nature) obtained over some writers of considerable name.

If THEIR design was to shew the NECESSITY of Christianity, they have then taken the other course, and (perhaps out of a sense of the former mischief) run into the opposite extreme; in representing Pagan Antiquity as ignorant even of the first principles of religion, and moral duty. Nay, not only, that it knew nothing, but that nothing could be known: for that human reason was too weak to make any discoveries in these matters. Consequently, that *there was never any such thing as natural Religion:* and what glimmerings of knowledge men have had of this kind, were only the dying sparks of primitive tradition. Here again the Infidels turned their own artillery upon them, in order to dismount that boasted REASONABLENESS of Christianity, on which they had so much insisted: And indeed, what room was there left to judge of it, after human reason had been represented as too weak and too blind to decide?

Thus while they were contending for the *reasonableness,* they destroyed the *necessity;* and while they urged the *necessity,* they risked the *reasonableness* of Christianity. And these infidel retortions had an almost irresistible force on the principles our Advocates seemed to go upon; namely, that Christianity was only a republication of a primitive Religion.

It appears then, that the only view of Antiquity which gives solid advantage to the christian cause, is such a one as shews natural Reason to be clear enough to PERCEIVE truth, and the necessity of its deductions when proposed; but not generally strong enough to DISCOVER it, and draw right deductions from it. Just such a view as this, I have here given of Antiquity, as far as relates to the point in question; which I presume to be the TRUE; not only in that point, but likewise with regard to the state of NATURAL RELIGION in general:

neral; where we find human Reason could penetrate very far into the essential difference of things; but wanting the true principles of religion, the Ancients neither knew the origin of obligation, nor the consequence of obedience. REVELATION has discovered those principles, and we now wonder, that such prodigies of parts and knowledge could commit the gross absurdities, which are to be found in their best discourses on morality. But yet this does not hinder us from falling into a greater and a worse delusion. For having of late seen several excellent systems of Morals, delivered as the *principles of natural Religion*, which disclaim, or at least do not own, the aid of *Revelation*, we are apt to think them, in good earnest, the discoveries of natural Reason; and so to regard the extent of its powers as an objection to the *necessity* of any further light. The pretence is plausible; but sure, there must be some mistake at bottom; and the great difference in point of excellence, between these *supposed* productions of mere reason, and those *real* ones of the most learned Ancients, will increase our suspicion. The truth is, these modern system-makers had aids, which as they do not acknowledge, so, I will believe, they did not perceive. These aids were the true principles of religion, delivered by *Revelation*: principles so early imbibed, and so clearly and evidently deduced, that they are now mistaken to be amongst our first and most innate ideas: but those who have studied Antiquity, know the matter to be far otherwise.

I cannot better illustrate the state and condition of the *human mind*, before *Revelation*, than by the following instance. A summary of the ATOMIC PHILOSOPHY is delivered in the *Theætetus* of *Plato*: yet being given without its principles, when *Plato's* writings, at the revival of learning, came

to be studied and commented, this summary remained absolutely unintelligible: for there had been an interruption in the succession of that school for many ages; and neither Marcilius Ficinus, nor Serranus could give any reasonable account of the matter. But as soon as DES CARTES had revived that philosophy, by excogitating its principles anew, the mist removed, and every one saw clearly (though Cudworth, I think, was the first who took notice of it) that Plato had given us a curious and exact account of that excellent physiology. And Des Cartes was now thought by some, to have borrowed his original ideas from thence; though, but for the revival of the Atomic principles, that passage had still remained in obscurity. Just so it was with respect to RELIGION. Had not *Revelation* discovered the true principles of it, they had without doubt continued altogether unknown. Yet on their discovery, they appeared so consonant to human reason, that men were apt to mistake them for the production of it.

Cicero (and I quote him as a man of greatest authority) understood much better the true limits and extent of human knowledge. He owns the state of natural Reason to be just what I have here delivered it; clear enough to perceive truth, when proposed, but not, generally, strong enough to discover it. His remarkable words are these—“ Nam  
 “ neque tam est acris acies in naturis hominum,  
 “ & ingenii, ut res tantas quisquam, NISI MON-  
 “ STRATAS, possit videre: neque tanta tamen in  
 “ rebus obscuritas, ut eas non penitus acri vir in-  
 “ genio cernat, si modo adspicerit.”

*E. De Orat. l. iii. c. 31.*

## S E C T. VI.

I Have now gone through the second general proposition, which is, THAT ALL MANKIND, ESPECIALLY THE MOST WISE AND LEARNED NATIONS OF ANTIQUITY, HAVE CONCURRED IN BELIEVING, AND TEACHING, THAT THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS WAS NECESSARY TO THE WELL-BEING OF SOCIETY. In doing this, I have presumed to enter the very *Penetralia* of Antiquity, and expose its most venerable secrets to open day ; some parts of which having been accidentally and obscurely seen by owl-light by such as Toland, Blount, and Coward, were imagined, (as is natural for objects thus seen by false Braves) to wear strange gigantic forms of terror, with which they have endeavoured to disturb the piety of many sober *Christians*.

The ridiculous use these men have made of what they did not understand, may perhaps revive in the reader's mind that stale atheistical objection, that RELIGION IS ONLY A CREATURE OF POLITICS, a State-engine, invented by the Legislator, to draw the knot of Civil society more close. And the rather, because *that* objection being founded on the apparent use of Religion to Civil policy I may be supposed to have added much strength to it, by shewing in this work, in a fuller manner than, perhaps, was ever done before, the EXTENT of that utility ; and the large sphere of the Legislator's agency, in the application of it.

For thus stood the case : I was to prove *Moses's* divine assistance, from his being ABLE to leave out of his Religion, the doctrine of a future state. This required me to shew, that this doctrine was naturally of the utmost importance to Society. But of all the

the arguments, by which that importance may be proved, the plainest, if not the strongest, is the conduct of LAWGIVERS. Hence the long detail of circumstances in the second and third books.

But indeed it not only served to the purpose of my particular question, but, appeared to me, to be one of the least equivocal proofs of the truth of Religion in general; and to deserve, in that view only, to be carefully examined and insisted on. I considered this volume, therefore, and desire the reader would so consider it, as a *whole* and separate work of itself, TO PROVE THE TRUTH OF RELIGION IN GENERAL, FROM ITS INFINITE SERVICE TO HUMAN SOCIETY, though it be but the *introduction* to the truth of the MOSAIC.

Let us examine it: Lawgivers have unanimously concurred in propagating Religion. This could be only from a sense and experience of its utility; in which they could not be deceived: Religion therefore has a general *utility*. We desire no more to establish its *truth*.

For, TRUTH AND GENERAL UTILITY NECESSARILY COINCIDE; that is, Truth is *productive* of Utility; and Utility is *indicative* of Truth. That truth is *productive* of utility, appears from the nature of the thing. The observing truth, is acting as things really *are*: he who acts as things really are, must gain his proper end; all disappointment proceeding from acting as things *are not*: Just as in reasoning from true or false principles, the conclusion which follows must be necessarily right or wrong. But gaining the proper end of acting is utility or happiness; disappointment of that end, hurt or misery. If then truth *produce* utility, the other part of the proposition, that utility *indicates* truth, follows necessarily. For not to follow, supposes

two different kinds of general utility relative to the same creature, one proceeding from truth, the other from falsehood; which is impossible; because the *natures* of those utilities must then be different, that is, one of them must, at the same time, be, and not be, utility. Wherever then we find general utility, we may certainly know it for the product of truth, which it indicates. But the practice of Legislators shews us, that this utility results from Religion. The consequence is, that *Religion, or the idea of the relation between the creature and creator, is true.*

However, as the unanimous concurrence of Lawgivers to support religion, hath furnished matter for this poor infidel pretence, I shall take leave to examine it to the bottom.

Our adversaries are by no means agreed amongst themselves: Some of them have denied the truth of Religion, because it was of NO UTILITY; others, because it was of so GREAT. But commend me to the man, who, out of pure genuine spight to Religion, can employ these two contrary systems at once, without the expence even of a blush<sup>v</sup>. However the System most followed, is the political invention of religion for its use: the other being only the idle exercise of a few dealers in paradoxes.

I have begun this volume with an examination of the first of these systems; and shall now end it with a confutation of the other. For the unbeliever being driven from his first hold, by our shewing the usefulness of religion, he preposterously retires into this, in order to recover his ground.

CRITIAS of Athens, one of the thirty tyrants, and the most execrable of the thirty, is at the head of

<sup>v</sup> See Blount's *Anima Mundi*, and *Original of Idolatry*.

this division; whose principles he delivers in the most beautiful Iambics. His words are to this purpose: "There <sup>w</sup> was a time when man lived

w Ήν χρόνος ὅτε ἦν ἀτακίς αὐτέρωπων βίοι,  
Καὶ θηριώδης, ισχύος θ' ὑπηρέτης.  
Οὐτ' ἂδειον ἀθλοῦ ἔτε τοῖς ἐθλοῖσιν ἦν,  
Οὕτ' αὖ κέλασμα τοῖς κακοῖς ἐγίνετο.  
Κάπειτά μοι δοκεῖσιν ἀνθερποις νόμος  
Θέδαι κολαξάς, ἵνα Δίκη τύχαινος ἦ  
Γένες βροτείς, τὼν δ' οὐτείν δέλην ἔχει  
Εὔημιστο, δ' εἴ τις ἐξαραχίζεται.  
Ἐπειτ', ἐπειδὴ ταῦμφανή μὲν οἱ νόμοις  
Απῆγον αὐτοῖς ἔξια μὴ πράσσοντεν βίοι,  
Δάθρα δ' ἐπρεσόν, τηλικαῦτά μοι δοκεῖ  
Πυκνός τις ἄλλος καὶ σοφός γνώμην ἀντεῖ  
Γεγονέναι, οἷς θηριοῖσιν ἐξενέρων, σπους  
Εἴη τι δεῖμα τοῖς κακοῖσι, καὶ λάθρα  
Πράσσοντεν, ηδέ λέγωσιν, ηδέ φρονῶσι το·  
Ἐλεύθερον δὲν τὸ θεῖον εἰσηγήσαλο·  
Ως ἐσὶ Δάιμον αὐθίτω δάλλων βίῳ,  
Νόω τ' ἀκάνθων, καὶ βλέπων φρονῶν τε, καὶ  
Προσέχων τε ταῦτα, καὶ φύσιν θείαν φορῶν·  
(Αφ' εἰς) σῶν μὲν τὸ λεχθὲν ἐν βροτοῖς ἀκεῖται.  
Ος δράμψιον δὲ σῶν ίδεῖν διωκεῖται.  
Ἐάν τε σῶι σιγῇ τι βελτύνης κακὸν,  
ΤἙτ' εὖχι λήστε τὰς θεάς· τὸ γὰρ φρονῶ  
Ἐνετοι. Τέστε τὰς λόγυς αὐτοῖς λέγων  
Διδάματάν οὐδεὶς εἰσηγήσαλο  
Ψύδει καλύψας τὼν αἰλούτειαν λόγω  
Εἴναι δ' ἐφασκε τὰς θεάς ἐνταῦθ', οὐκ  
Μάλιστα γ' ἐπιλήξειεν αἰθρώπεις ἀγων,  
Οθεν τερροῦντες τῷ φόβῳ εἴναι βρότοις,  
Καὶ τὰς πονήσεις τῷ ταλαιπώρῳ βίῳ,  
Ἐκ τῆς ψερθε τερροῦσας, οὐδὲ ἀγρυπνα;  
Κατεῖδεν θόρα, δεινά τε κίνηματα  
Βροντῆς, τότε ἀγερωπὸν ἥξανθ δέμας,  
Χρόνος καλὸν τούκιδμα, τέκιον σοφεῖς  
Οθεν τε λαμπρὸς αἰσέρων σείχειο χορὸς,  
Ο, οὐντος εἰς γηνὸν ὄμβρεις εἰσπορθύεται.  
Τοιέστε τερριέστησεν αἰθρώποις φόβος.  
Διέθεις καλῶς τε τῷ λόγῳ κατέκισε  
Τὰς δαίμονας καὶ ἐν πρέποντι καρεῖσι  
Τὼν ἀνομίαν τε τοῖς νόμοις κατέσθετε.  
Οὐτω δὲ τρωτον οἴομαι τείσαι τινα  
Θιητὴς νομίζειν δικιμίων εἴναι γῆν.

"like

“ like a savage, without government or Laws, the  
“ minister and executioner of violence ; when there  
“ was neither reward annexed to virtue, nor pu-

There are many variations in the reading of this fragment ; and I have every where chosen that which appeared to me the right. That Critias was the author, how much soever the critics seem inclined to favour the claim of Euripides, I make no scruple to assert. The difficulty lies here : Sextus Empiricus expressly gives it to Critias ; and yet Plutarch is still more express for Euripides ; names the *Play* it belonged to ; and adds this farther circumstance, that the poet chose to broach his impiety under the character of Sisyphus, in order to keep clear of the Laws. Thus two of the most knowing writers of Antiquity are supposed irreconcileable in a mere matter of fact. Mr. Petit, who has examined the matter at large [*Observ. Miscell. 1. i c. 1.*] declares for the authority of Plutarch. And Mr. Bayle has fully shewn the weakness of his reasoning in support of Plutarch's claim. [*Crit. Dict. Art. CRITIAS, Rem. H.*] Petit's System is to this effect, that there is an *hiatus* in the text of Sextus : That a Copist, from whom all the extant MSS. are derived, when he came to Critias, unwarily jumped over the passage quoted from him, together with Sextus's observation of Euripides's being in the same sentiments, and so joined the name of Critias and the *Iambics* of Euripides together. But this is such a liberty of conjecturing, as would unsettle all the monuments of antiquity. I take the true solution of the difficulty to be this : Critias, a man, as the Ancients deliver him to us, of atheistic principles, and a fine poetic genius, composed these *Iambics* for the private solace of his fraternity ; which were not kept so close but that they got air, and came to the knowledge of Euripides : to whom the general stream of antiquity concurs to give a very virtuous and religious character, notwithstanding the iniquitous insinuations of Plutarch to the contrary. And the Tragic Poet, being to draw the Atheist Sisyphus, artfully projected to put these *Iambics* into his mouth : for by this means the sentiments would be sure to be natural, as taken from real life ; and the poet safe from the danger of being called to account for them. And supposing this to be the case, Plutarch's account becomes very reasonable ; who tells us, the Poet delivered this atheistic doctrine by a dramatic character, to evade the justice of the Areopagus ; but, without this, it can by no means be admitted : For, thinly to cover impiety by the mere interposition of a Drama, which was an important part in their festivals, and under the constant eye of the Magistrate, was a poor way of evading the penetration and severity of that formidable judicature, how

“ nishment

" nishment attendant upon vice. Afterwards, it  
" appears, that men invented civil Laws to be a  
" curb to evil. From hence, Justice presided over

good a shift soever it might prove against modern penal Laws. But the giving the known verses of Critias to his Atheist, was a safe way of keeping under cover. For all resentment must needs fall on the real author; especially when, it was seen, they were only produced for condemnation, as will now be shewn. Without doubt, the chief motive Euripides had in this contrivance, was the satisfaction of exposing a very wicked man; in which he had no apprehensions to deter him from his adversary's power: for Critias was then a private man; the *Sisyphus* being acted in the 91<sup>st</sup> Olymp. and the tyranny of the Thirty not beginning till the latter end of the 93<sup>d</sup>. But what is above all, the genius and cast of that particular Drama wonderfully favoured his design: for the *Sisyphus* was the last of a tetralogy (*τελεαλογία τραγικῶν δραμάτων*) or a satyric tragedy, in which species of poetry, a licence something resembling that of the old comedy, of branding ill citizens, was indulged; and where, the same custom of parodying the verses of rival poets was in use. And we may be sure that Euripides, who was wont to satyrize his fellow-writers in his serious tragedies (as where in his *Electra* he ridicules the *discovery* in the *Choëphoroi* of *Aeschylus*) would be little disposed to spare them in this ludicrous kind of composition. Admitting this to be the case; it could not but be, that, for a good while after, these *Iambics* would be quoted by some as Critias's, whose *property* they were; and by others, as Euripides's, who had got the *use*, and in whose *Tragedy* they were found; and by both with reason. But in after-times, this matter was forgotten or not attended to; and then some took them for Euripides's, exclusive of the right of Critias; and others, on the contrary: And as a Copist fancied this or that man the author, so the read the text. Of this, we have a remarkable instance in the 35<sup>th</sup> verse, where a transcriber, imagining the fragment to be the Tragic Poet's, chose to read,

"Οθεν τε λαμπρὸς ἀσέρεως σείχει μύδες.

Because this expresses the peculiar Physiology of Anaxagoras, the preceptor of Euripides; which Mr. Barnes thought a convincing proof of the fragment's being really his: whereas that reading makes a sense defective and impertinent; the true being evidently this of Grotius:

Λαμπρὸς ἀσέρεων σείχει χορός.

And thus, I suppose, Plutarch and Sextus may be well reconciled.

" the

“ the human race ; force became a slave to right,  
“ and punishment irremissibly pursued the trans-  
“ gressor. But when now the laws had restrained  
“ an open violation of right, men set upon contriv-  
“ ing, how to injure others, secretly. And then it  
“ was, as I suppose, that some CUNNING POLITI-  
“ CIAN, well versed in the knowledge of mankind,  
“ counterplotted this design, by the invention of a  
“ Principle that would hold wicked men in awe,  
“ even when about to say, or think, or act ill in  
“ private. And this was by bringing in the BE-  
“ LIEF OF A GOD ; whom, he taught to be immor-  
“ tal, of infinite knowledge, and of a nature su-  
“ perlatively excellent. This God, he told them,  
“ could hear and see every thing said and done by  
“ mortals here below : nor could the first conce-  
“ ption of the most secret wickedness be concealed  
“ from him, of whose nature, knowledge was the  
“ very essence. Thus did our Politician, by in-  
“ culcating these notions, become the author of a  
“ doctrine wonderfully taking ; while he hid truth  
“ under the embroidered veil of fiction. But to  
“ add terror to this impressed reverence, the Gods,  
“ he told them, inhabited that place, which he found  
“ was the repository of those Mormo’s, and panic  
“ horrors, which man was so dextrous at feigning,  
“ to fright himself withal, while he adds imagina-  
“ ry miseries to a life already over-burthened with  
“ disasters. That place, I mean, where the swift  
“ coruscations of enkindled meteors, accompanied  
“ with horrid bursts of thunder, run through the  
“ starry vaults of heaven ; the beautiful fret-work  
“ of that wise old Architect, TIME. Where a  
“ social troop of shining orbs perform their regu-  
“ lar and benignant courses : and from whence  
“ refreshing showers descend to recreate the thirsty  
“ earth. Such was the habitation he assigned for  
“ the

" the Gods ; a place most proper for the discharge  
 " of their function : And these the terrors he ap-  
 " plied, to circumvent secret mischief, stifle disor-  
 " der in the seeds, give his Laws fair play, and  
 " introduce religion, so necessary to the magistrate.—  
 " This, in my opinion, was the TRICK, whereby  
 " mortal man was first brought to believe that there  
 " were immortal Natures."

How excellent a thing is justice, said somebody or other, on observing it to be practised in the dens of thieves and robbers ? How useful, how necessary a thing is Religion, may we say, when it forces this confession of its power, from its two most mortal enemies, the Tyrant and the Atheist ?

The account here given of RELIGION is, that it was A STATE INVENTION : that is, that the idea of the relation between the creature and Creator was formed and contrived by politicians to keep men in awe <sup>x</sup> : From whence the Infidel concludes it to be VISIONARY and GROUNLESS.

<sup>x</sup> From the Magistrate's large share in the establishment of ancient national Religions, two consequences are drawn: the one by Believers; the other by Infidels. The first conclude that therefore these national Religions were of political original: and this the ancient Fathers of the Church spent much time and pains to prove. The second conclude, from the same fact, that therefore Religion in general, or the idea of the relation between the creature and the Creator, was a politic invention, and not founded in the nature of things. And if in confuting this, I strengthen and support the other conclusion, I suppose, that, in so doing, I give additional strength to the cause of revelation; otherwise the Fathers were very much out. And though Infidels, indeed, in their writings, affect to dwell upon this conclusion, that Superstition was a state invention; it is not, I presume, on account of any service, that they imagine this can do their cause; but because it enables them to strike obliquely, under that cover, at Religion in general, when they do not care to appear without their mask. But if ever they should take it into their head to deny that there is any better proof of Superstition's being a mere politic invention than of Religion in general's being so, I

I shall prove then, and in a very few words, that the *fact or position* is *first, IMPERTINENT, and secondly, FALSE*. For,

## I.

Were it true, as it certainly is not, that *Religion was invented by Statesmen*, it would not therefore follow that *Religion is false*. A consequence that, I don't know how, has been wrongly taken for granted on all hands. It must be proved by one or other of these mediums, or it will not be proved at all.

I. Either because *Religion was not found out as a truth, by the use of reason*.

II. Or, because it was invented only for its utility.

III. Or lastly, because the inventors did not believe it.

I. As to its not being found out as a truth by the use of reason, we are to consider, that the finding out a truth by reason, necessarily implies the exercise of that faculty, in proportion to the importance and difficulty of the truth sought for: so that where men do not use their reason, truths of the utmost certainty and highest use will remain unknown. We are not accustomed to reckon it any objection to the most useful civil truths, that divers savage nations in Africa and America, remain yet ignorant of them.

Now the objection against the truth of Religion, is founded on this pretended fact, that the Lawgiver taught it to the people from the most early times. And the Infidel System is, that man from his first appearance in the world, even to those early times

have here answered them beforehand. On the whole then, if I prove that Religion in general was not a politic invention, I enervate all the force of the Atheist's argument against *Revelation*, taken from the *invention of Religion*. For that *Superstition* was of human original both parties seem to be agreed in: though not *all* of it the invention of statesmen, as we shall see presently, when we come to shew that *one species of Idolatry was in use before the institution of civil Society*.

of his coming under the hands of the Civil Magistrate, differed little from brutes in the use of his rational faculties; and that the improvement of them was gradual and slow: for which, antiquity is appealed to, in the account it gives us concerning the late invention of the arts of life. Thus, according to their own state of the case, Religion was taught mankind when the generality had not begun to cultivate their rational faculties; and, what is very remarkable, it was TAUGHT BY THOSE FEW WHO HAD.

It is true, our holy Religion gives a different account of *these first men*. But then its account of the origin of Religion is still more wide. And let our adversaries prevaricate as they will, they must take *both or neither*. For that very thing which was only able to make the first men so enlightened, as they are represented in Scripture, was *revelation*; and, this allowed, the dispute is at an end.

If it should be said, That supposing Religion to be true, it is of so much importance to mankind, that God would never suffer us to remain ignorant of it: I allow the objection: but then we are not to prescribe to the Almighty his way of bringing us to the knowledge of his Will. It is sufficient to justify his goodness, that he hath done it; and whether he chose the way of REVELATION, or REASON, or the CIVIL MAGISTRATE, it equally manifests his wisdom.

And why it might not possibly happen to this truth, as it hath done to many others of great importance, to be first hit upon by chance, and mistaken for a mere utility, and afterwards seen and demonstrated to be what it is, I would beg leave to demand of these mighty masters of reason.

II. *As to Religion's being invented only for its utility*: This, though their palmary argument, is the most

most unlucky that ever was employed : it proceeds on a supposed inconsistency between *utility* and *truth*. For men perceiving much of this inconsistency between private partial utility and truth, were absurdly brought to think there might be the same between general utility and some truths. This it was that led the ancient Sages into so many errors. For neither *Philosopher* nor *Lawgiver* apprehending that truth and utility coincide ; the first, while he neglected utility, missed (as we have seen) of the most momentous truths : and the other, while little solicitous about truth, missed in many instances (as we shall see hereafter) of utility. But general utility and all truth, necessarily coincide. For truth is nothing but that relation of things, whose observance is attended with universal benefit. We may therefore as certainly conclude that *general utility* is always founded on *truth*, as that *truth* is always productive of *general utility*. Take then this concession of the Atheist for granted, that *Religion is productive of public good*, and the very contrary to his inference, as we have seen above, MUST follow : namely, that *Religion is true*.

If it should be urged, That experience maketh against this reasoning ; for that it was not *Religion*, but *Superstition*, that, for the most part, procured this public utility : And superstition, both sides agree to be *erroneous* : To this we reply, that *Superstition* was so far from procuring any good in the ancient world, where it was indeed more or less mixed with all the national Religions, that the good which Religion procured, was allayed with evil, in proportion to the quantity of Superstition found therein. And the less of Superstition there was in any national Religion, the happier, *cæteris paribus*, we always find that people ; and the more there was of it, the unhappier. It could not be other-

otherwise, for, if we examine the case, it will appear, That all those *advantages* which result from the *worship of a superior Being*, are the consequences only of the *true principles of Religion*: and that the *mischiefs* which result from thence, are the consequences only of the *false*; or what we call *Superstition*.

The wiser Ancients, in whose times SUPERSTITION had so involved it self about the trunk of RELIGION, and so intangled her noblest branches, in it's malignant embrace, as to poison her best qualities, deform all her comeliness, and to usurp her very NAME, were so much struck and affected with what they saw and felt, that some of them thought, even ATHEISM was to be preferred before it. PLUTARCH hath composed a fine rhetorical discourse in favour of this strange paradox; which hath since given frequent occasion to much sophistical declamation. M. BAYLE hath supported Plutarch's Thesis at large, in an *historical and philosophical Commentary*. Yet, by neglecting, or rather confounding, a real and material DISTINCTION, neither the ancient nor the modern Writer hath put the reader fairly into possession of the question. By this means, both the SUBJECT and the PREDICATE of the proposition are left in that convenient state of ambiguity which is necessary to give a *paradox* the air and reputation of an *oracle*.

The ambiguity in the *subject* ariseth from the word, SUPERSTITION's being so laxly employed as to admit of two senses: either as a THING ADVENTITIOUS TO RELIGION, with which it is fatally apt to mix itself; Or as a CORRUPT SPECIES OF RELIGION. In the first sense, Superstition is of *no use at all*, but of infinite mischief; and worse than Atheism itself: In the second sense, of a corrupt Religion, it is of *great service*: For, by teaching

a Providence, on which mankind depends, it imposeth a necessary curb upon individuals, so as to prevent the mischiefs of mutual violence and injustice. It is likewise, indeed, of *great disservice*; For, by begetting wrong notions of the moral attributes of God, it hinders the progress of Virtue; or, at least, sets up a false species of it. However, in the sense of a *corrupt Religion*, the Reader sees, it is infinitely preferable to Atheism: As in a Drug of sovereign efficacy, the application even of that which by time or accident is become decayed or viciated, is, in desperate disorders, greatly to be preferred to the forbearance; though it may engender bad habits in the Constitution, it preserves, which, the sound and entire species would never have endangered. Now one of the leading fallacies, which runs thro' PLUTARCH's little Tract, keeps under the cover of this ambiguity in the SUBJECT.

The ambiguity in the PREDICATE does Falsehood as much service. "Superstition, they say, *is worse than Atheism.*" They do not tell us, TO WHOM; but leave us to conclude, that they mean, both to PARTICULARS and to SOCIETY; as taking it for granted, that if worse to *one*, it must needs be worse to the *other*. But this is a mistake. And therefore, from this ambiguity arises a *new fallacy*, which mixes itself with the other. The degree of mischief caused by Superstition is different, as it respects its objects, *individuals or societies*. Superstition, as it signifies only a CORRUPT RITE, is more hurtful to societies than to individuals; and to both, *worse than Atheism*. But as it signifies a CORRUPT RELIGION, it is less hurtful to societies than to individuals; and, to both, *better than Atheism*. The confounding this *distinction* makes the ambiguity which Bayle principally delights in. And this, by he assistance of the other from Plutarch, supports him

in all his gross equivocations, and imperfect estimates : Till at length, it encourages him to pronounce, in the most general terms, that *Superstition is worse than Atheism*<sup>a</sup>.

BAYLE is a great deal too diffused to come within the limits of this examination. But as PLUTARCH led the way ; and hath even dazzled BACON himself<sup>b</sup>, with the splendor of his discourse ; I propose to examine his arguments, as they lie in order : Whereby it will appear that, besides the capital fallacies above detected, it abounds with a variety of other sophisms, poured out with a profusion which equals, and keeps pace with the torrent of his wit and eloquence.

This famous Tract is, as we have observed, a florid declamation, adorned with all the forms and colouring of Rhetoric ; when the question demanded severe reasoning, and philosophical precision. At the same time, it must be owned, that it is of a genius very different from those luxuriant, and, at the same time, barren Dissertations of the Sophists. It is painted all over with bright and lively images, it sparkles with witty allusions, and strikes with amusing similes : And, in every decoration of spirit and genius, is equal to the finest compositions of Antiquity : Indeed, as to the solidity and exactness of the Logic, it is on a level with the meanest. His REASONING is the only part I am concerned with : and no more of this, than lies in one continued COMPARISON between Atheism and Superstition : For, as to his positive proofs, from fact, of the actual mischiefs of Superstition, I am willing they should be allowed all the force they pretend to.

<sup>a</sup> Pensées diverses érites à un Docteur de Sorbonne à l'occasion de la comète qui parut au mois de Decembre 1680. Et continuation des Pensées diverses, &c.

<sup>b</sup> See his *Essays* ; where this paradox of Plutarch is supported.

It will be proper, in the first place, to observe, That it is hard to say, What Plutarch intended to infer from this laboured *comparison between Atheism and Superstition*; in which, he, all the way, gives the preference to *Atheism*: For though, throughout the course of the argument, he considers each, only as it affects *particulars*, yet, in his conclusion, he makes a general inference in favour of *Atheism with regard to society*. But, it will not follow, that, because *Atheism* is less hurtful to *particulars*, it is therefore less hurtful to *Societies* likewise. So that, to avoid all sophistical dealing, it was necessary these two questions should be distinguished, and considered separately.—However, let us examine his reasoning on that side where it hath most strength, *The effects of Atheism and Superstition on PARTICULARS*.

He sets out in this manner—“Ignorance concerning the nature of the Gods, where it meets with a bold and refractory temper, as in a rough and stubborn foil, produces *ATHEISM*; where it encounters flexible and fearful manners, as in rank and low land, there it brings forth *SUPERSTITION*.”

— This is, by no means, an exact, or even generally true account of the origine of these evils. There are various causes which incline men to *Atheism*, besides fool-hardiness; and, to *Superstition*, besides cowardice. The affectation of singularity; the vanity of superior knowledge; and, what Plutarch himself, in another place of this very Tract, assigns as a general cause, *the sense of the miseries of Superstition*, have frequently inclined men to this fatal obliquity of judgment. On the other hand, ignorance of *Nature*; impatience to pry into futurity; the

<sup>c</sup> Τὴς τερῆς θεῶν αὐτούς καὶ ἀγνοίας εὐθὺς ἐξ αἰχνὸς δίχα ἔνισσε, τὸ μὲν ὑπερέει ἐν χωρίοις τοῖς σκληροῖς καὶ αἰλιτύποις, ἦθεις τὸν αἴθετηλα, τὸ δὲ, ωσπερ ἐν ὑγροῖς καὶ απαλοῖς, τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν ἐμπεποίησεν.—τερῆς θεῶν. Steph. Ed. Svo. vol. i. p. 286.

unaccountable turns in a man's own fortune, to good or bad; and, above all, a certain reverence for things established, carry them into *Superstition*. And as *these* considerations are equally adapted to affect the hardy and the pusillanimous; so the *other* as soon get possession of the fearful as of the bold. Nay, **FEAR** itself is often the very passion which most forcibly inclines a wicked man, who hath nothing favourable to expect from divine Justice, to persuade himself that there is none to fear. Plutarch owns as much; and says expressly, that "the end the Atheist proposes in his opinions is to exempt himself from all *fear* of the Deity"<sup>4</sup>—Again, we find, by the Histories of all times, that Superstition seizeth, along with the weak and fearful, the most daring and determined, the most ferocious and untractable: Tyrants, Conquerors, Statesmen, and Great Generals, with all the savage tribes of uncivilized Barbarians, submit tamely to this galling Yoke.

But our Author's account of the births of Atheism and Superstition was no more than was necessary to support his Thesis. He all along estimates the two evils by the miseries they bring on those who are under their dominion: These miseries arise from the passions they create: But, of all the passions, **FEAR** is the most tormenting: The pusillanimous mind is most subject to fear: And it is over the fearful that Superstition gains the ascendent. This, therefore, was to be laid down as a postulatum. The rest follows in order.

For now coming to his parallel, he begins with a confession—"That both errors are very bad. But as Superstition is accompanied with passion or affection, and Atheism free from all passion, Superstition must needs be the greater evil; as in a broken

<sup>4</sup> Τέλος εἰπεν αὐτῷ τῷ μὴ νομίζειν θεός, τὸ μὴ φεύγειν. p. 287.

limb, a *compound* fracture is much worse than a *simple*. Atheism (he says) may pervert the mind, but Superstition both *ulcerates* and perverts. A man who believes no God hath none to fear; but he who believes God to be a capricious or vindictive Being hath a great deal to fear." — This is wittily said: but Nature talks another language. We should beware how we credit poetical similes; or even philosophical analogies; which, indeed, is but Poetry, once removed.

They both have their hopes and fears. Though the Atheist has no God to fear, yet the miserable forlorn condition of a World without a Ruler must keep him under perpetual alarms, in the apprehension of the dismal effects which Chance and Hazard may produce in the material system; either by removing the parts of it, (whose present position supports the harmony of the whole) too far from, or else by bringing them too near to, one another.

And now again, the rapidity of Plutarch's invention throws him on a Comparison, to support his reasoning, which entirely overturns it.— "He (says our author) who thinks Virtue a *corporeal being* is only absurd. Here we have an error without passion. But he who thinks Virtue a *mere name* is miserable; for his error is attended with passion." — How so? Because such a one lies under the sad reflection of having lost his ablest support. But must not a man's being deprived of the *LAWGIVER* be as sensible a mortification, as his being deprived of the *LAW*, whose existence depends upon the *Lawgiver*?

On the other side, Though Superstition hath its fears, it hath its *hopes* also; which, upon the whole,

<sup>e</sup> "Απαστα μὴ δύν κείσις φύσιδης, ἀλλως τε καὶ οὐ περὶ ταῦτα μοχθηδόν, τῇδε καὶ πάθει πρόσεστι μοχθηστέρους" πῶν γὰρ πάθει ἔσκει  
ἀπατη φλεγμαχίναται εἶναι, &c. p. 286—7.

<sup>i</sup> Πάλιν οὖν τινες εἶναι σώμα τὴν ἀρεστὴν, &c. p. 286.

I think

I think, to be more eligible than that supposed freedom of the Atheist (even as our author draws it) from all passion and affection. For though the superstitious man may think perversely concerning the means whereby the Deity is appeased, yet he thinks him placable; and supposeth he has the means in his own power. So that he is not under the tyranny of that *pure and unmixed fear*, which Plutarch represents in such a manner as if all Nature furnished out provision to the superstitious man, for food and exercise to this passion. Whereas the affection of Superstition is equal between hopes and fears: It is the natural temper of the superstitious man, which inclines him more towards one than to the other. But Plutarch had before laid it down as an axiom, “That the essential temperament of the superstitious man is fear and cowardice.”

But, all this would not have been sufficient to support the weakness of his declamatory reasoning, without the assistance of two commodious sophisms, to set it off. The first however, is of a very slender sort, and hath little more in it than found. He says “the very name shews, the essence of superstition to be *Fear*: For the Greek name of this moral mode *θεοφροσυνα*, signifies, a *fear of the gods*.<sup>s</sup>” A Roman might with the same pretence aver, that the essence of superstition is *Love*: For that the Latin word hath relation to the *love we bear to our children*<sup>f</sup>, in the desire that they should survive us; being formed upon the observation of certain religious practices deemed efficacious for procuring that happy event.

The other sophism is more material; and consists in putting the change upon us, and representing the superstitious man’s God, by whom he supposes

<sup>f</sup> *Superflitio.*

<sup>s</sup> ——Οἰόμενόν τ’ εἶναι θεός, εἶναι δὲ λυπηγές καὶ βλαβερές. p. 287.  
S 4 the

the world to be governed, in false and foul colours as a Being, *envious and hurtful to man<sup>s</sup>*; For it is not the *good*, but the *evil* Demon whom the superstitious man thus represents: Not the Being which he worships; but the Being which he avoids and detests. The superstitious man indeed, foolishly enough, supposeth, that the God whom he acknowledgeth to be good, is capricious, inconstant, and vindictive. But then, from that essential quality of **GOODNESS**, which belongs to him as God, he concludes, that this Being may be appeased by submission, and won upon by oblations and attonements. All this, Plutarch himself confesseth; and in words which directly contradict the account he here gives of the superstitious man's God. *Superstition* (says he) *agitated by many contrary passions suffereth itself to suspect that THE Good itself may be evil<sup>h</sup>*. Plutarch has therefore acted unfairly, and to serve a purpose, in thrusting in the superstitious man's *evil Demon*, in the place of his *God*. This conduct will bear the harder upon his ingenuity as he held the doctrine of the **TWO PRINCIPLES**: and, therefore, can hardly be supposed to have changed the object inadvertently, or without design.

Having made the superstitious man's God, a Devil, he hath, consistently enough, represented the superstitious man's condition to be the very state of the damned; “That his pains have no remission; that he carries Hell in his bosom, and finds the Furies in his dreams<sup>i</sup>. ” The terms of the original are very elegant: But as they plainly allude to the *shews*

<sup>h</sup> Η δέ δειπνάμωνί πολυπάθεια κακὸν τὸ αγαθὸν ὑπονοῆσα· φο-  
ῖται τές θεός καὶ καλαθύγεστον ἐπὶ τές θεός. p. 291.

<sup>i</sup> —“Ωσπερ ἐν ἀστεῖῳ χώρᾳ, τῷ ὅπνῳ τῶν δειπνάμων, εἰδωλα  
φρικώδη καὶ τεράστια φαεμάκων, καὶ τοινάς τινας ἔγειρεσσα καὶ σροθεῖσαι  
τὴν ἀθλίαν φυχὴν ἐπὶ τῶν ὕπνων ἐκδιάκει τοῖς ὄνειροις, ματζόρισιν καὶ  
κολαζομένην αὐτὴν οὐφ' αὐτῆς, ὡς οὐφ' ἐτίρη, καὶ δεινὰ προσάγρατα, καὶ  
αλλόκοτα λαμβάνεσσαν.—p. 288.

of the *Mysteries*, I think the author should have been so fair to recollect, that there was an *ELYSIUM* as well as *TARTARUS* in those *Shews*: And that both being alike the fictions of Superstition, the superstitious man might as well dream of *one* as of the *other*. His natural temperament and the redundancy of a particular humour would determine the colour of the Scene. The Atheist therefore, who, he says, enjoys the benefit of repose, might have his sleep disturbed by the cries of *the damned* as well as the superstitious man, whom he represents to be kept, by this passion, in perpetual alarms; because the *habit of the body* makes the very same impressions on the fancy, that the *state of the mind* does on the imagination.

But, “ from the tyranny of Superstition, he says, there is no escape nor respite ; because, in the opinion of the superstitious man, all things are within the jurisdiction of his God ; and this God is *inexorable and implacable*<sup>k</sup>.” From such a Being, indeed, there can be no escape, nor respite from torment. But, as was said before, this is not the superstitious man’s God, but his Devil. Besides, the attribute of *implacability* totally removes, what our Author makes the other half of the miseries of Superstition ; its slavish attention to the foolish and costly business of expiations and attonements : A practice arising from the idea of *placability*, and necessarily falling with it.

But, as if conscious of this prevarication, he adds : “ That the superstitious man fears even his best conditioned Gods, the *Beneficent*, the *Preservers* : that the Gods, from whom men seek gran-

<sup>k</sup> — Ο γέ τὸν τῶν Δεῶν ἀρχὴν ὡς τυγανίδα φοβόμεθα σκυθεωπήν καὶ ἀπαραιτητικόν, τῷ μελαγῆ, τῷ φυγῆ, τῷσαν γῆν ἄθεον δέην, ποίαν δελασσαν. p. 289.

deur, affluence, peace, concord, and success, are the objects of his dread and terror!." Here we see the superstitious man is at length confessed to have Gods very different from those before assigned unto him. However, we must not think that even these will afford him any solace or consolation. It is well that the whole proof of this cruel exclusion lies in the ambiguity of the terms, Φείτλων and

<sup>1</sup> — Ο φοβόμεθα τὰς πατρέων καὶ γηγενέας, οἱ φείτλων τὰς σωμῆς καὶ τὰς μειδικέας, τρέμων καὶ δεδοκιώσ ταράζ ἀν αἰτάμεθα ταλάτου, δύπο-  
ριαν, ὁμώνιαν, ἐισήνην, ὄφθωσιν λόγων καὶ ἔργων τῶν ἀστι-  
ων. p. 289.  
 It is remarkable, that these *good-conditioned Gods*, here described, are called by our author πατρέων καὶ γηγενέας; *his native and country Gods*. Yet if we consider the stories of Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, Bacchus, Diana, &c. we shall find no great reason to extol their morals. But here lay the stress of the affair. Plutarch was a Priest of this class of Deities; and *Greece*, at that time, being over-run with strange Gods, and labouring under Eastern superstitions, it was proper to blacken this *foreign* worship, for the sake of the *national*: So that Plutarch, like the fair trader, in an ill humour with interlopers, reckons all Eastern rites as even worse than Atheism. Hence his famous exclamation to his Countrymen, which the noble author of the *Characteristics* quotes with much exultation, and transferred bitterness.  
 " O wretched Greeks (says Plutarch, speaking to his then declining countrymen) who in a way of superstition ran so easily into the relish of barbarous nations, and bring into Religion that frightful mien of sordid and vilifying devotion, ill-favoured humiliation and contrition, abject looks and countenances, consternations, prostrations, disfigurations, and in the act of worship distortions, constrained and painful postures of the body, wry faces, beggarly tones, mumpings, grimaces, cringings, and the rest of this kind. — A shame indeed to us *Grecians!* — Shall we, while we are nicely ob-servant of other forms and decencies in the Temple, shall we neglect this greater decency in voice, words, and manners; and with vile cries, fawnings, and prostitute behaviour, betray the natural dignity and majesty of that divine Religion, and NATIONAL WORSHIP, delivered down to us by our forefathers, and purged from every thing of BARBAROUS and savage kind." Misch. Refl. vol. III. Misch. ii. c. 3. — Such then were the circumstances of the time; and these, together with the personal views of our Author, were, I suppose, what gave birth to this famous Tract, OF SUPERSTITION.

τρέμων; which, when they signify the fearing slavishly, do indeed imply misery: But when they signify fearing religiously, do as certainly imply a blessing; because they deter the subject, they influence, from evil. Now, when these terms are applied to the Gods confessedly beneficent, they can signify only a religious fear; unless when Plutarch hath defined, SUPERSTITION to be, the fearing slavishly we will be so complaisant to allow that the SUPERSTITIOUS MAN<sup>1</sup> cannot fear religiously. And where is the absurdity in flying for refuge to Gods, so feared? Tho' Plutarch puts it among the contradictions of Superstition<sup>m</sup>.

Another advantage of *Atheism* over *Superstition*, in Plutarch's reckoning, is, " that the Atheist is secured from the impressions of a future state."<sup>n</sup> It is no wonder that we find this in the number of the Atheist's blessings, when we consider that our Author regarded a future state as a Fable, at best, invented for the restraint of evil. Yet, whatever pleasure the Atheist may take in his security from this terror, it is certain Society would suffer by the taking off so useful a curb upon the manners of the multitude.

Our Author then proves, and indeed proves it to some purpose, " That superstition is much worse than the true knowledge of the Deity<sup>o</sup>."

He considers next the different effects of Atheism and Superstition on their subjects, *in the disastrous accidents of life*. And here again, Atheism, as usual, is found to have the advantage. " The

<sup>1</sup> See p. 274.

<sup>m</sup> — Φοβεῖν: αἱ τὰς θεὰς, καὶ καταφεύγεσσιν ἐπὶ τὰς θεάς. p. 291.

<sup>n</sup> Τί δεῖ μακρὰ λέγεν, πέρας ἐπὶ τῇ βίᾳ πᾶσιν αὐθεώποις ὁ θάνατός τῆς δὲ δεισιδαιμονίας οὐδὲ ἔτει. ἀλλ' ἵπερ Σάλλει τὰς ὅρες ἐπικενα τῇ ζῆν, μακροτερον τῇ βίᾳ ποιέσσα τὸν φόβον, καὶ συνάπλεστα τῷ θανάτῳ γακῶν ἐπίσοιαν ἀθανάτων, &c. p. 289—90.

<sup>o</sup> Φιλοσόφων δὲ καὶ Πολιτικῶν ἀνδέων καταφεύγεσιν, &c. p. 291.

Atheist indeed curses Chance, and blasphemers Providence ; but the superstitious man complains of his Gods, and thinks himself hated or forsaken of them<sup>p.</sup>" The Atheist is well come on. Hitherto Plutarch had represented his Favorite as unruffled by all unruly passions : Indeed, he makes one great part of the Atheist's advantage over Superstition to consist in his freedom from them. Here, they both alike labour under their tyranny. Well, but some passions make their owner more miserable than others. It is confessed, they do. But, Is that the case here ? Or if it be, Is it to the advantage of the Atheist ? By no means. The disasters of life are supposed to have betrayed them both into *passion*. But he surely is least oppressed by the commotion, who sees a possibility of getting out of his distresses. It is impossible the Atheist can have any such prospect. There is no Fence against blind *Chance* : The superstitious man may easily hope to appease the irritated Deity : for though *he fears and dreads the Gods, yet*, as Plutarch acknowledges, *he flies to them for refuge*. I might mention another advantage the superstitious man hath over the Atheist in the disasters of life, namely, that he is frequently *bettered* by his misfortunes ; which the Atheist never is : Because the superstitious man may suppose them sent by the Gods in punishment for his crimes ; which the Atheist, never can.

" But (says our Author) If the disaster in question be disease or sickness, the Atheist referring it to the right cause, *intemperance*, seeks out for the proper cure. While the superstitious man imagining it to be a *judgment from Heaven*, neglects to

F—Πάντας ἐπὶ τὸν τύχην καὶ τὸ αὐτόμαλον ἀπεγιδεμένος τὰς ἔργυ-  
μάς, καὶ βοῶντος ὡς εὐδὲν καλὰ δίκην, ἐδὲ ἐπ τὸ σφονδίας, ἀλλὰ πάντας  
συγκεχυμένως καὶ ἀκρίτως φέρεται, καὶ σταθεῖται τὰ τὸν αὐθεωπω-  
πάντων τὸν θεὸν αἰτιάται—καὶ ὡς δὲ ἀντικῆς ἦν, ἀλλὰ διεμόντος τις αὐ-  
θεωπών. p. 291—2.

have

have recourse to medicine<sup>q.</sup>” The delusion here is evident. It is built on that false position, which the experience of all ages hath discredited, namely, That men always act according to their principles. In this case especially, of avoiding or freeing themselves from instant physical evil, men of all principles go all one way; and however divided in their religious opinions they all meet in an uniformity to medicinal practice. It is an idle sophism which would persuade us, that, because the superstitious man useth sacred Rites to remove what he esteemeth a sacred disease, that, therefore he employs no other means<sup>r.</sup> The early mixture of medicinal drugs with religious charms and incantations, in the first state of Physic, might have taught our Author, how naturally men are wont to lend a helping hand to the supposed efforts of Religion. But this reasoning is utterly discredited by his own instance of the *Mariners*; the most superstitious of mortals; who, in the distresses of a storm, while they pour out their vows to their *Saviour Gods*, at the same time fall lustily to their tackle, and pump without intermission<sup>s.</sup> Indeed, he seems fully sensible of its weakness, when he catches at an occurrence in the *Jewiſh*<sup>t</sup> history, to

¶ Νοτῶν τε ὁ ἀθεός ἐκλογίζεται καὶ αὐτομνήσκεται τὸν σφινχὸν αὐτῷ καὶ οἰνώσεις, καὶ ἀταξίας περὶ δίαιταν, η κόπες υπερβάλλοντας, η μεια-  
σοδας αἴρων αἴθεις καὶ ἀτόπες—Τῶ δὲ δειπνάδιμοι καὶ σάμαλος ἀρρώ-  
σια πᾶσσα—πληγαὶ δέ καὶ προσβολαὶ δαιμονῶν λέγονται. οὗτοι γάρ  
τελμῆ Βοηθεῖν, γάρ δὲ πλεύσειν τὸ συμβεβηκός, γάρ δὲ θεραπεύειν, οὐδὲ αὐτο-  
ταῖς θεοῖς, μὴ δέξῃ θεομαχεῖν καὶ αὐτοτείνεν κολαζόμενος. p. 292.

<sup>r</sup> Plutarch makes the superstitious man say, Ταῦτα πάσχεις,  
ἄποκόδαιμον, ἐκ προσοίσας καὶ θεῶν κελεύοντο· ἐξέψιψε πάσαν ἐπιπέδα προ-  
νέστο, ἔαντὸν—p. 293.

<sup>s</sup> Τέτοιοι δέ τοι κυβερνήτης εὑχεῖται μὲν υπερφυγεῖν, καὶ θεός ἐπικαλεῖται  
τωιῆρας, εὐχόμενος δὲ τὸν οἴκακα προσταγεῖ, τὴν κεραίαν υφίστασθαι—  
p. 294.

<sup>t</sup>—Αλλὰ Ιεδαιοὶ σαββάτων ὅντων ἐν ἀγγείμοις καθεζόμενοι, τῶν πο-  
λεμίων κλίμακας προσθέντων, καὶ τὰ τείχη κατειλαμβανόντων, ὡς αἴ-  
στοσαν, &c. p. 294.

support it; where, we know, tho' he did not, that all things were extraordinary, and nothing to be brought into example, any more than to imitation.

To disgrace Superstition still more, our Author urges “the misfortune of Nicias the Athenian; who frightened by an eclipse of the Moon, delayed his retreat till He and his army were invested, and cut in pieces by the enemy.” But this kind of superstitious observance is as well adapted to encourage as to dismay armies and bodies of men, and hath just as often done the one as the other. So that, under this article, Plutarch should have fairly stated, and balanced the account.

From the *miseries* of life, He comes to the *pleasures* of it. And here too the Atheist must have the place of honour. He confesseth, “that the pomps and ceremonies of religious Festivals abound with complacency and joy. He owns “his Atheist can receive no further amusement from such a scene than to laugh at it: But to the superstitious man (he says) they are the subject of distress and misery.”—Not to allow the *relaxations* of the superstitious man’s mental terrors to have their effect is hard indeed. It is much the same as not to suffer us to *feel* the remissions of our bodily pains. If the superstitious man fancies the Gods are often angry, he sometimes, at least, believes them to be appeased. And when can he hope to find them in good humour, if not at their Festivals? To draw him, therefore, at this season, with pale looks and trembling gestures, is certainly over-charging the picture. The truth is, the superstitious man hath as strong paroxysms of joy as of grief; though

\* Υπότα δὲ τοῖς αὐθεώποις ἐσθλαί, &c. ἐλαῦθα τοίνυν σκοπεῖ τὸν ἀθεόν,  
γελῶντα μὲν μανικὸν καὶ σαρδάνιαν, γέλωντα τύτοις ποιεμένοις — ἄλλο δὲ  
ζόδεν ἔχοντα κακόν· οὐ δέ δεισιδαιμων βελτεῖται μὲν, ὃ δύναται δὲ χαίρειν, οὐδὲ  
ηδεῖται — ἐγερασμένος ὡχρία, θύει καὶ φοβεῖται. &c. p. 294—5.  
perhaps

perhaps neither so frequent nor so lasting. Yet to deny them to him at the celebration of his religious Festivals is a contradiction to all common sense.

Our author next attempts to shew, That “the *crime of impiety* is rather to be charged upon the superstitious man than the Atheist: for Anaxagoras, he says, was accused of impiety, for holding the Sun to be only a red-hot stone: But no body challenged the Cimmerians of that crime for denying its existence<sup>w.</sup>” By this, our Author would insinuate, that it is more injurious to the Gods, to hold dishonourable notions of their *Nature*, than to call in question their *Being*. The opposition of these cases is witty and ingenious: but very defective, in the integrity of the application. Plutarch’s Philosophic atheist in question, corresponds no more with the *Cimmerians*, than his Theist does with *Anaxagoras*.—The Atheist, after having had a *full view* of the works of God, denies the existence of the Workman. The Cimmerians, because debarred the use of that sense which alone could inform them of the Sun’s nature, have no conception of his being. In the first case, the conclusion being derogatory to the nature of the Power denied, the Denier is justly charged with *impiety*; In the latter, as no such derogation is implied, no such crime can be reasonably inferred. But this brisk folly was only to introduce the famous declaration which follows, and hath been so often quoted<sup>x</sup> by the modern advocates of this paradox.

<sup>w.</sup> Ὅθεν ἔμοιγε καὶ θαυμάζειν ἐπεισ τὸς τὴν αἰδεῖτην φάσκοντας ἀξέ-  
σειν εἶναι, μὴ φάσκοντας ὃς τὴν δεσμωτηρίαν· καίτοι γε Αναξαγόρας  
δίκην ἐφύγειν αἰτεῖταις ἐπὶ τῷ λίθῳ εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἡλιον· Κιρμεσίας δὲ εὐεῖς  
εἴπειν αἰτεῖταις ὅτι τὸν Ἡλιον ἔδειν εἶναι τοπαράπαν νομίζεται. p. 295.

<sup>x</sup> “ It were better (says BACON) to have no opinion of God  
“ at all, than such an opinion as is unworthy of him.—Plu-  
“ tarch faith well to that purpose. Surely, faith he, I had rather  
“ a great deal men should say there was no such man as Plutarch,  
“ than that they should say there was one Plutarch that would eat his  
“ Children, &c.—Essays civil and moral, c. xviii.

" For my own part I had rather men should say of " me, That there neither is nor ever was such a " one as Plutarch; than they should say, there " was a Plutarch, an unsteady, changeable, easily- " provoked, and revengeful man." These, says the noble author of the *Characteristics* <sup>y</sup>, are the words of *honest Plutarch*.

And, without doubt, did God stand only in that relation to the rest of Beings in which one creature stands to another; and was his existence no more necessary to the universal system than the existence of *honest Plutarch*, every body would say the same. But the knowledge of a Creator and Governor is so necessary to the rational oeconomy, that a merciful Lord would chuse to have it retained and kept alive, though it might happen to be dishonoured by many false and absurd opinions of his Nature and Attributes. A private man of generous morals might rather wish to continue unknown than to be remembered with infamy. But a supreme Magistrate, who loved the Community he governed, would certainly prefer the being known to his Subjects, even at the hazard of their mistaking him for a Tyrant: because, if the members of a Community, through ignorance of their having a Ruler, should think themselves free from subjection, every one would consult his passions and appetites, till he brought the whole into confusion. Whereas, while they knew they had a Master, their actions would be so conformed to the general measures of obedience as to support the order of Society: though their perverse notions of his Character might indeed obstruct many of those blessings which Government produces, under a Ruler of acknowledged justice and goodness.

Our author proceeds; and observes next, " that the Atheist, it is true, believes there is no God;

<sup>y</sup> *Charact. Letter conc. Enthusiasm*, sect. 5.

but

but the superstitious man wishes there were none : That the Atheist is averse to Superstition ; but the superstitious man, if he could, would shelter himself in Atheism <sup>z</sup>." It is by no means true that the superstitious man ever desires to be free of the sense of a superior Being, to whom he may be accountable for his actions ; as appears plainly from his abhorrence and persecution of Atheism : All that he wisheth is, to render such a Being propitious, and easily placable.

As to our author's inference, concerning the better condition of Atheism, because "the Atheist never wisheth to be superstitious, though the superstitious man wisheth to be an Atheist," it is a mere sophisin : The proposition, on which it standeth, amounting to no more than this, That the Atheist doth not wish what is afflictive in Superstition : And the superstitious man doth wish what is easy in Atheism. And from those restrained premises no such general conclusion can be logically inferred.

But he hath found out another reason for preferring Atheism to Superstition. "Atheism, he says, was never the cause of Superstition : but, on the contrary, Superstition has very often given birth to Atheism <sup>a</sup>." This is utterly false in fact : And the assertion betrays great ignorance of human nature ; whose essential weakness it is, to run continually from one extreme to another. *Modum tenere nescia est*, saith the great Philosopher<sup>b</sup> very truly. And the phenomenon is no mystery. The mind, as soon as ever it becomes sensible of it's excesses striveth, for it's innate abhorrence of what is wrong, to

<sup>z</sup> Νυνὶ δὲ τῷ μὴ ἀθέω δεισιδαιμονίας ψόδεν μέτεστιν· οὐ δὲ δεισιδαιμονία τῇ προαιρέσει ἀθεόῳ ἡν, αἰδενέσερός ἐστιν η τῷ δοξάζειν τοιεὶ θεῶν οἱ βεβλεῖαι. p. 297.

<sup>a</sup> Καὶ μήν οἱ ἀθεός δεισιδαιμονίας ψόδαιη συνάπτεται· οὐ δὲ δεισιδαιμονία τῇ ἀθεότητι καὶ θνέται ταξέσχεν αἴχνην — p. 297.

<sup>b</sup> BACON.

break away from them. And the force, with which it is then impelled, being increased by the struggle between its old prejudices, which would restrain it, and its new aversion, which drives it on, rarely remits, till it arrives to the OPPOSITE EXTREME. The behaviour of all Ages supports this observation; and of none, more than the Present. Where a *contempt of Revelation* having for some time spread amongst the People, we see them now become an easy prey to *fanaticism* and *superstition*: and the Methodist and the Popish Priest succeed, with great ease and silence, to the Libertine and the Freethinker.

I have now gone through our Author's various arguments in support of his Paradox; or, to call them by their right name, a group of ill-combined sophisms, tricked off by his eloquence, or varnished over with his wit.

But there is one MASTER-SOPHISM still behind, that animates the Whole, and gives a false vigour to every Part. Let us consider the question which Plutarch invites his reader to debate with him. It is not, What the *simple* qualities of Atheism and Superstition, if found *alone* in man, are severally capable of producing: but What each really doth produce, as each is, in fact, found mingled with the rest of man's passions and appetites. He should not, therefore, have amused us with inferences from the *abstract ideas* of *Atheism* and *Superstition*; but should have examined their effects in the *concrete*, as they are to be found in the *Atheist*, and in the *superstitious man*. For, nature having sown in the human breast the seeds of various and differing passions and appetites, the *ruling passion*, in each Character, is no more in its *simple*, unmixed state, than the predominant colour in a well-worked picture: Both the *passion* and the *colour* are so darkened or dissipated by surrounding light and shade, so changed and varied by the reflection of neighbouring tints, as

to

to produce very different effects from what, in their separate and simple state, whether real or imaginary, they were capable of affording<sup>c</sup>. Let the reader apply this observation to any part of Plutarch's *Declaration*, who considers Atheism and Superstition not in the *concrete*, but in the *abstract*, only, and it will presently expose the inconsequence of his reasoning.

<sup>c</sup> The exquisitely learned Author of the *English commentary and notes on Horace's art of poetry*, has, with admirable acumen, detected and exposed the same kind of mistake in the dramatic Poets. Who when, as he observes, they were become sensible of the preference of *Plays of character* to *Plays of intrigue*, never rested till they ran into this other extreme. But hear this fine writer in his own words,—“ The view of the comic scene being “ to delineate characters, this end, I suppose, will be attained “ most perfectly by making those characters as *universal* as pos-“ sible. For thus the person shewn in the drama being the repre-“ sentative of all characters of the same kind, furnishes, in the “ highest degree, the entertainment of *humour*. But then this “ universality must be such as agrees not to *our idea of the possible* “ effects of the character, as conceived in the *abstract*; but to the “ *actual* exertion of its powers which experience justifies, and com-“ mon life allows. MOLIERE, and before him, PLAUTUS, had “ offended in this; that, for a picture of the *avaritious man*, they “ presented us with the phantastic unpleasing draught of the *pas-*“ *sion of avarice*.—This is not to copy Nature: which affords no “ specimen of a man turned all into a single passion. No meta-“ morphosis could be more strange or incredible. Yet portraits “ of this vicious taste are the admiration of common starers.— “ But if the reader would see the extravagance of building dra-“ matic manners on *abstract ideas* in its full light, he need only “ turn to B. Johnson's *Every man out of his humour*; which, un-“ der the name of a play of character, is, in fact, unnatural, “ wholly chimerical, and unlike any thing we observe in real “ life. Yet this Comedy has always had its admirers. And “ Randolph, in particular, was so taken with the design, that he “ seems to have formed his *Muse's looking-glass* in express imitation of it.” *Dif. on the several provinces of the Drama*, p. 239. When Pliny therefore compliments Silarion for giving one of his statues the expression not of an *angry man* but of *anger itself*, either it is a mere flight of rhetoric, to shew the just force of the artist's expression: or, if, indeed, the ferocious air did exceed the traces of humanity, the Philosopher's praise was misapplied, and the Statuary's figure was a *Caricature*.

I will but just give an example, in one instance. He prefers Atheism to Superstition, “ because *this* is attended with passion ; *that* is free from all passion.” Now the only support of this remark is the sophism in question. Consider the ideas of Atheism and Superstition in the *abstract*, and there is a shew of truth : for Superstition, simply, implying *the fear of the gods*, is of the essence of *passion* ; and Atheism, simply, implying the *denial of their existence*, includes nothing of the idea of *passion*. But consider these moral modes in the *concrete*, as in this question we ought to do, and Atheism will be always found accompanied with passion or affection ; and of as uneasy a kind perhaps, as Superstition. It is of no moment, to this discourse, whether Plutarch hath here imposed upon himself or h<sup>t</sup> reader. It is possible, that, in the drawing his two characters, he might imitate, or be misled by, THEOPHRAS-TUS : Whose various pourtraits have all this fundamental defect<sup>d</sup>. But, if this were the case, he shewed as little judgment as that painter would be found to do, who should apply his simple colours just as he received them from the colour-man ; without forming them into those curious

— Lights and shades, whose well accorded strife

Gives all the strength and colour of our life.

To proceed with our author’s Argument : It tends, we see, to shew the advantage of Atheism above Superstition, only as these opinions and practices regard PARTICULARS : Though, by the turn and

<sup>d</sup> That is, if we understand them as given for copies of any thing actually existing. But, I apprehend, this is not their true character. I consider this curious fragment of Antiquity but as the remains of a Promptuary for the use of the COMIC POET, from whence he might be supplied with his materials, the *simple passions* ; in order to blend, and shade, and work them into his pictures of *real life and manners*.

management of his reasoning, he seems willing you should infer that the same advantage holds equally, with regard to SOCIETY also: And therefore he concludes, “ That it had been better for the Gauls and Scythians to be without any Religion, than to have had such a one as taught them to believe that the Gods delighted in the blood of human victims: And much better for Carthage to have had the Atheists, Critias and Diagoras, for Lawgivers, than such as those who authorized the Sacrifices performed to Saturn<sup>b</sup>. ” The sophisms which support these assertions are fully detected in the introductory observation to these remarks; and so will stand in need of no further censure.

Lord BACON’s chapter on *Superstition*, in his *Essays civil and moral*, is no other than an epitome of this tract of Plutarch. Now whether that great man thought his Original defective, in not attempting to shew the advantage of Atheism over Superstition, as well with regard to society as to particulars; Or whether he thought, that tho’ his Author did attempt it, yet he was too concise and obscure; and therefore judged it expedient to comment on his hints; It is remarkable, that he addresses himself very strenuously, to make out this important point.  
 “ Atheism (faith his lordship) did never perturb States; for it makes men wary of themselves,  
 “ as looking no farther: And we see, the times  
 “ inclined to Atheism, as the time of Augustus  
 “ Cæsar, were civil times. But Superstition hath  
 “ been the confusion of many States; and bring-

<sup>b</sup>—Οὐκ ἄμεινον οὐκ ἔν τοι Γαλάταις ἐκείνοις καὶ Σκύθαις τοπαράπτων μήτε ἔνοισαν ἔχειν θεῶν, μήτε φαντασίαν, μήτε ἴσοργίαν, η δὲ εἰναὶ νομίζειν χαίροντας αὐθεώπων φατίνηρίων αἴρυσι — τί δὲ Καρχηδονίοις οὐκ ἐλυτριέλεις Κριτίαν λαβεῖσιν η Διαγόρεαν τουοβεττὸν ἀπ’ αἰχνῆς, μήτε τινὰ θεῶν μήτε δαιμόνων τομίζειν, η τοιαῦτα θυσιαὶ οἷα τῷ Κρινῷ ιθυσι;

— p. 297.

"eth in a new *primum mobile*, that ravisheth all  
"the spheres of Government. The Master of Su-  
"perstition is the People."

This is a paragraph totally unworthy so great a genius. *Atheism*, he says, *did never perturb States*. The observation is true. But to make it to his purpose, he must suppose, that this negative advantage ariseth from the *essential* nature and intrinsic genius of Atheism; and not from mere *accident*. And so he plainly insinuates, in the reason subjoined:—*For it makes men wary of themselves, &c.* But the truth is, it is not from the nature of things, but by mere accident, that *Atheism never perturbed States*; it having rarely, or never, spread amongst the People, but hath been confined to a few speculative men. If ever it should become thus extensive, it must not only *perturb States*, but, as we have shewn at large<sup>c</sup>, would certainly *overturn Society*. Indeed his Lordship himself fairly confesseth thus much, where, charging this very mischief on Superstition, he subjoins the *cause* of its malignity—*the master of superstition is the people*, i. e. the people are they who are infected with this error. *Atheism*, he says, *makes men wary of themselves as looking no further*: This argument in favour of Atheism seems to have been borrowed from CARDAN; and hath been considered in its place<sup>d</sup>.

*The times, inclined to Atheism*, he says, *were civil times*: I know of no times inclined to Atheism; that is, when the people had a *propensity* to it, unless, perhaps, two or three centuries ago in Italy; and then the times were as miserable as civil distractions could make a bad government. His Lordship, indeed, refers to the age of Augustus Cæ-

<sup>c</sup> Book I. sect. iv.

<sup>d</sup> See the first part of this Vol. p. 34.

sar. But it is certain, that, at that time, no Roman troubled his head with Grecian principles, (and Atheism was then to be had nowhere else) except it were a few of the Nobility : Then, indeed, part of their Grandees, to make themselves easy under Servitude, espoused the principles of EPICURUS : But a much larger part followed the doctrine of the PORCH. Either served their turn. If they could persuade themselves to believe, that their miseries were *inevitable*, it was just as well as if they could force themselves to think that they were *no evils*. The soft, the delicate, the luxurious, espoused the *first* : The more rigid, and severe of morals, the *latter*. But still we must observe, that their PRINCIPLES were the *consequence* of their acquiescence in a state of Servitude ; not the *cause* ; as his lordship would insinuate : And did then, in reality, no more affect the Public, than their different tastes for *wild-boar or mullets*.

*The time of Augustus Cæsar*, he says, *was a civil time*. And this must be placed to the score of Atheism, although the real cause be so very obvious : The miseries of the preceding civil wars, often renewed, with still greater violence, and still less effect, made men weary both of struggling and suffering ; and willing at last, to thrust their necks under the yoke of a well-established master. And this, and this only, was the thing, which, in the ceaseless rotation of human affairs, produced that still calm of real Slavery, after a long tempestuous season of nominal Liberty.

However, the general observation we made on PLUTARCH may be properly applied to BACON : What he wants in fact an argument, he makes up in wit, and the ornaments of fancy : as where he says, *Superstition bringeth in a new primum mobile, that ravisheth all the spheres of government*. By which

pompous expressions no more is meant than the *Churchman's destructive claim of independency on the State*: Which conceals a vile ambition under the cloak of Religion: A claim, which, at that time, those two capital enemies of the established Church, the PAPIST and the PURITAN, alike pursued; as then, to the disturbance, so wherever they succeed, to the certain ruin of civil Government.

But to return to Plutarch, and conclude. The only sage part of his Declamation is in his last words; where he observes, “That, for the reasons he hath given, we ought to shun and avoid SUPERSTITION; but so cautiously, as not to fall into the other extreme of ATHEISM; like those giddy travelers, who flying from wild beasts and robbers, fall down rocks and precipices, where they perish<sup>a</sup>.” But to infuse so plain a conclusion, there was no need of all that expence of wit and sophistry to prove, (what the conclusion did not want) That *Atheism was in all things preferable to Superstition*. To proceed;

III. *As to the Inventors not believing what they taught of a principle of Religion*, which is the last pretence, This comes with an ill grace from an Atheist, who, under cover of an unquestionable maxim, *That, in matters of speculation, reason and not authority should determine the judgment*, despiseth all authority, so as to oppose his own singularities against the common sense of mankind. Was it true then that the Inventors did not believe what they taught, this would be seen to be a very poor argument against its truth.

<sup>a</sup> Φεύκίδεον δι' αὐτὴν ασφαλῶς τε καὶ συμφερόντως, ὃχι ἀσπεργεῖ οἱ ληστῶν θηρίων ἔφυσον, οὐ πᾶντας ἀπερισκέπτως καὶ αἰλογίτως πελεψύγοντες, ἐμπίπλουν εἰς αὐρδίας βίξεασθανεῖ καὶ κηρυκίως ἐχύσσασι. Οὗτος δὲ ἐνιαὶ φεύγοντες τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν, ἐμπίπλουν εἰς ἀθέοτητα τρεχεῖσαν καὶ ἀνίτυπον, ἐπειποδίσαντες ἐν μέσῳ κοιμέσιν τὴν ισοτέσσαν. p. 298.

But indeed, the supposition is absolutely false ; and betrays gross ignorance of the true character of the ancient lawgivers. The idea, our adversaries have formed of these civilizers of mankind (as men are but too apt, in their representations of others, to copy from themselves) is of a species of fly cold-headed cheats, whose capacity arose only from the predominancy of their phlegm. But the History of all times might have told them, that, amongst the infirmities of Heroes, a deficiency of faith is not one. Diodorus was so sensible of their propensity to be on the believing side, that he makes it a question, Whether those ancient Lawgivers, whom he there enumerates, did not *really believe* the divine mission they professed to execute ? “ They “ did this (says he) either because they really thought “ that the conceptions which they had formed, so “ productive of public good, must needs be strict-“ ly supernatural and divine<sup>e</sup>,”—And I may venture to affirm, That there never was a great *Conqueror*, a *Founder of Civil Pol. y*, or the *Preacher up of a new Religion*, (if he succeeded by mere human means,) but who was naturally much inclined to ENTHUSIASM. Not that I suppose the heat of *Enthusiasm* is not always tempered, in Heroes, with an equal share of CRAFT and policy. This extraordinary composition makes their true character : A character so much better conceived than expressed, that it hath embarrassed the pen even of a LIVY to delineate correctly<sup>f</sup>. Tacitus indeed, hath spoken

<sup>e</sup> Εἴτε Θαυματήν καὶ θείαν ὄλως ἐννοιαν τῇ κρίναντις τὴν μέλλεσσαν ὑφελήσειν αἰθερώπων πλάνθει, εἴτε—l. i. p. 59. S. E.

<sup>f</sup> Whose picture of Scipio Africanus, is, however, so very curious, that the learned reader will not be displeased to find it in this place :—Quam, ubi ab re tanto impetu acta sollicitudinem curamque hominum animadvertisit, advocata concione, ita deestate sua imperioque mandato, et bello quod gerendum esset, somo-

somewhat clearer of this mysterious mixture, where he tells us, that the operation of the whole machine is no more than this, **FINGUNT, SIMUL CREDUNT-QUE.**

But the necessity of this odd paired alliance appears plainly from the nature of things. A mere *cold-headed Contriver*, without any tincture of natural enthusiasm can never succeed in his designs; because such a One can never furnish out those surprizing appearances, which a heated imagination, working on a *disordered*, though, for this purpose, *fitly-framed* constitution, so speciously produces. For the spirits of the **PEOPLE**, who are necessarily to be taken in, can be only captivated by raising their admiration, and keeping up their confidence, of a supposed supernatural power. St. Jerom seems to have had something of this in his head, when he said *nullus potest Hæresin struere, nisi qui ARDENTIS INGENII est, et habet DONA NATURÆ*. Besides,

magno elatoque animo differuit, ut impleret homines certioris spei, quam quantam fides promissi humani, aut ratio ex fiducia rerum subjicere solet. Fuit enim **Scipio**, non veris tantum virtutibus mirabilis, sed arte quoque quadam ab juventa in ostentationem earum compositus: pleraque apud multitudinem, aut per nocturnas visa species, aut velut divinitus, mente monita, agens: *sive ut ipse capti quadam superstitione animi, sive ut imperia consiliaque, velut sorte oraculi missa, sine cunctatione asequeretur*. Ad hæc jam inde ab initio præparans animos, ex quo togam virilem sumpsit, nullo die prius ullam publicam privatamque rem egit, quam in Capitolium iret, ingressusque ædem consideret, & plerumque tempus solus in secreto ibi tereret. Hic mos, qui per omnem vitam servabatur, *seu consulto, seu temere, vulgatae opinioni fidem apud quosdam fecit, stirpis eum divinæ virum esse, retulitque famam, in Alexandro Magno prius vulgatam, & vanitate & fabula parem, anguis immanis concubitu conceputum, & in cubiculo matris ejus persæpe visam prodigii ejus speciem, interventuque hominum evolutam repente, atque ex oculis elapsam*. His miraculis numquam ab ipso elusa fides est; quin potius aucta arte quadam, nec abnuendi tale quicquam, nec palam affirmandi. *Hift. lib. xxvi.*

new notions, or new manners are never so readily received as when the Propagator of them is in earnest, and believes himself: For then, there is something so natural in his behaviour, as easily conciliates wavering opinions; something so alluring, that it looks like a kind of fascination. Which made an ingenious French writer not scruple to say;

“ Give me but half a dozen men whom I can  
 “ thoroughly persuade that it is not the Sun makes  
 “ the day, and I would not despair of seeing  
 “ whole nations brought over to the same opi-  
 “ nion.”

On the other hand, a mere *Enthusiast*, who, by virtue of this power, hath gone so far in his design, as to raise the admiration, and captivate the spirits of the Populace, must *here* fail for want of the other quality. For his enthusiasm not being under the government of his judgment, he will want the necessary dexterity to apply the different views, tempers, and constitutions of the People, now enflamed, and ready to become his instruments, to the purpose of his project.

But when these two talents of *cunning* and *enthusiasm* unite to furnish out a Hero, great will be the success of his undertakings. The fallies of enthusiasm will be so corrected by his cunning, as to strengthen and confirm his supernatural pretences: And the cold and slow advances of a too cautious policy, will be warmed and pushed forward by the force of his fanaticism. His *craft* will enable him to elude the enquiries and objections of the *more rational*; and his *visions* will irrecoverably subdue all the *warmer noddles*. In a word, they will mu-

<sup>s</sup> Donnez moi une demi-douzaine de personnes, à qui je puisse persuader que ce ne'st pas le Soleil qui fait le jour, je ne desesperai pas que des nations entieres n'embrassent cette opinion. *Fontavelle Hist. des Oracles*, cap. xi.

tually strengthen and inforce each others power ; and cover and repair each others defects. And indeed, there are so many powerful and opposite interests to overcome and reconcile, so much caprice and humour to cajole, and artfully to apply ; that it is not strange, that no one ever yet succeeded in any great design, where a whole People was the instrument, who had not reconciled in himself, by a happy union, these two, seeming, and commonly speaking, really incompatible qualities.

One might here shew, by an historical deduction from ancient and modern Times, that all those fortunate *Disturbers* or *Benefactors* of mankind, who have prospered in their designs, were indebted for their success to the mutual assistance of these two Qualities. By this operation, under the management of such as MAHOMET, IGNATIUS LOIOLA, and OLIVER CROMWELL, great and powerful Empires have been created out of nothing.

And again, it might be shewn, that those, who are upon the records of History for having failed, were either *mere Enthusiasts*, who knew not how to push their projects, when they had disposed the People to support them ; or else *mere Politicians*, who could never advance their wise schemes so far, as to engage the Populace to second them ; or lastly, which most deserves our observation, such as had the two qualities in conjunction, but in a reverted order. Of each of which defects, we have a domestic example in the three great Companions of the last successful Impostor, mentioned above ; I mean in FLEETWOOD, LAMBERT, and VANE.—CROMWELL had prepared the way for their succession to his power, as thoroughly as Mahomet had done for that of Abubeker, Omar, and Othman. Yet these various wants defeated all their efforts, and rendered

rendered all his preparations fruitless. *Fleetwood* was a frank enthusiast, without parts or capacity; *Lambert* a cool cheat, without fanaticism; and Sir *Harry Vane*, who had great parts, and as great enthusiasm, yet had them, and used them, in so preposterous an order as to do him no kind of service. For the history of those times informs us, that he began a sober and sedate plotter: But, when now come in view of the goal, he started out the wild-est and most extravagant of Enthusiasts: In a word, he ended just where his MASTER began. So that we need not wonder his fortune proved so different. But this was a course as rare as it appears to be retrograde. The affections naturally take another turn. And the reason is evident. *Enthusiasm* is a kind of ebullition, or critical ferment of the Mind; which a vigorous nature can work through; and, by slow degrees, be able to cast off. Hence the most successful Impostors, as we say, have set out in all the blaze of Fanaticism, and completed their schemes amidst the cool depth and stillness of Politics. Though this be common to them all, yet I don't know any who exemplifies the case so strongly as the famous *IGNATIUS LOIOLA*. This illustrious personage, who confirms the observation of one who came after him<sup>b</sup>, and almost equalled him in his trade, "that a man never rises so high as when he does not know whither he is going," began his extasies in the mire: and completed his schemes with the direction and execution of Councils, that, even in his own life-time, were ready to give the law to Christendom.

But these things belong rather to the History of the human Mind than to the work I have in hand: and besides, would keep me too long from

the conclusion of the volume, to which I am now hastening. I will only observe, that this high Enthusiasm was so conspicuous in the character of ancient Heroism, and so powerful in making easy the most difficult undertakings, that the learned Varro scruples not to say, “ It is of great advantage to “ Society, that Heroes should believe themselves “ the offspring of the Gods, whether indeed they “ be so or not. That by this means, the mind, “ confiding in its divine original, may rise above “ Humanity; so as more sublimely to project, “ more boldly to execute, and more happily to “ establish the grand schemes it labours with, for “ the service of mankind ! ”

Hence it appears, that if Religion were a cheat, the LEGISLATORS themselves were among the first who fell into the deceit.

On the whole then we see, That of all these *mediums*, whereby our adversaries would infer that Religion is false, because invented by Statesmen, the *third*, which is most to their purpose, proves nothing: While, of the other *two*, the *first* is a high presumption; and the *second*, a demonstration of the truth of Religion.

I have said, that it was (I don't know how) taken on all hands for granted, *that the invention of Religion by Politicians inferred its falsehood*. But, on second thoughts, I am persuaded, the too great facility in agreeing to this conclusion arose from hence; The popular argument of the *innate idea of God*, had been for many ages esteemed a demonstration of his Being and Attributes: And the *political origin of*

<sup>i</sup> Utile est civitatibus, ut se viri fortes, etiam si falsum sit, ex diis genitos esse credant, ut eo modo animus humanus, velut divinæ stirpis fiduciam gerens, res magnas aggrediendas præsumat audacius, agat vehementius, & ob hoc impletat ipsa securitate felicius. Apud Aug. Civ. Dei, l. iii. c. 4.

*Religion overthrowing that argument, it was too hastily concluded that it overthrew the truth of Religion in general: For prejudice had established this consequence, If no innate idea of God, Then no God at all.*

## II.

But now, though (as hath been proved) the granting this infidel pretence doth not at all affect the truth of NATURAL RELIGION; yet it doth by accident, and by accident only, affect the truth of REVELATION: Because Holy Scripture hath given us a different account of *the origin of divine worship.*

I shall shew therefore, in the next place, that the Notion is as *false and visionary*, as it is vain and *impertinent*; first, by examining the circumstances from which it's pretended truth is inferred; and secondly, by producing plain matter of fact to the contrary.

I. The first of these circumstances is, *That the Lawgiver employed his utmost pains and labour in teaching, propagating, and establishing Religion.* But what can be inferred from hence besides this, That he employed his pains from a full conviction of its utility? And how should he come by that conviction but from observing the effects of its influence on the actions of men? Which must needs suppose him to have *found*, and not to have *invented Religion.*

If this argument against Religion hath any weight, we must conclude the Magistrate was not only the inventor of *natural RELIGION*, but of *natural JUSTICE* likewise; for he took the same pains in teaching, propagating, and establishing both. But will any one pretend to say, that men, in a state of nature, had no ideas of *justice*? Indeed, both one and the other had lost much of their efficacy, when

men

men applied to the civil Magistrate for relief: And this explains the reason why, on their entering into Society, the Legislator was always so intent upon RELIGION; namely, that he might recover it from the powerless condition, to which it was then reduced.

It will be said, perhaps, that the Atheist doth, in fact, contend, that *natural justice* was an invention of Politicians, as well as *Religion*. We have seen, indeed, a countryman of our own, who hath made this proposition the foundation of his Philosophy, *that Just and Unjust arose from the Civil Magistrate*. But then, he never supposed, that men, before Society, had no idea of these things: All he would contend for was, that the idea was merely fantastic.

II. The other, and more peculiar circumstance from which our adversaries infer their paradox, is, *that the first and original idolatry was the worship of DEAD MEN*: And these being Lawgivers, Magistrates, and public Benefactors, Religion appears to have been a political institution. So amongst the Ancients, EUHEMERUS, surnamed the *Atheist*, wrote a treatise to prove that *the first gods of Greece were dead men*; which TULLY, who saw his drift, rightly observed, tended to overturn all Religion<sup>k</sup>. And so, amongst the Moderns, TOLAND, the pious author of the PANTHEISTICON, with the same design, wrote a pamphlet, intitled, *Of the origin of Idolatry, and reasons of Heathenism*. It is not unpleasant to observe the uniform conduct of this noble pair of writers, which one never fails to find in authors of a like character, how distant soever in time or country. Euhemerus pretended his design was only to expose the popular religion of Greece;

<sup>k</sup> *Nat. Deor.* 1 i. c. 42.

and Toland, that his prodigious learning was only pointed against Pagan idolatry: While the real end of both, was the destruction of Religion in general.

It must be owned, that this circumstance, *of the first and original idolatry*, hath a face of plausibility; but then it hath only a face, being manifestly founded on this sophism, That the *first idolatry*, and the *first religious worship*, are one and the same thing. Whereas, it is not only *possible* that the *worship of the first Cause* of all things should be prior to any *Idol worship*; but, in the highest degree, *probable* that it was: *Idol worship* having none of the marks of an original practice; and all the circumstances attending a depraved and corrupt institution.

But it being utterly false that the *worship of dead men* was the *primitive Idolatry*, We shall endeavour to convince these men of a *FACT* they are so unwilling to see or acknowledge.

I was pleased to find a book, like this of Toland's, written professedly on the subject; being in hopes to meet with something like argument or learning that would justify an examination of it: For an answer to a licentious writer arrests the attention of common readers, better than general reasoning, though this goes more directly to the fact, and determines the question with greater precision. But I had the mortification to find nothing there but an indigested heap of commonplace quotations from the *Ancients*; and an unmeaning collection of common-place reflexions from *modern infidels*; without the least seasoning of logic or criticism, to justify the waste of time to the Reader, or to make the labour supportable to one's self. And the authority of the man, which is nothing, could not engage me to any farther notice of his book. But another, whose name stands justly highest in the learned world, and whose heart

was as unlike this writer's as his head, seems to be of the same opinion concerning the primitive idolatry. It is the incomparable NEWTON in his *Chronology of the Greeks*. His words are these: “Æacus the son of Ægina, who was two generations older than the Trojan war, is by some reputed one of the first who built a temple in Greece. Oracles came first from Egypt into Greece about the same time, as also did the custom of forming the images of the gods, with their legs bound up in the shape of the Egyptian mummies: For IDOLATRY began in Chaldæa and Egypt, and spread thence, &c.—The countries upon the Tigris and the Nile being exceeding fertile, were first frequented by mankind, and grew first into kingdoms, and therefore began first to adore their dead kings and queens<sup>1</sup>.” This great man, we see, takes it for granted, that the worship of dead men was the FIRST kind of idolatry: And so only insinuates a reason for this supposed fact, namely, that the worship of dead men introduced image worship: For, the Egyptians first worshiped dead men in person, that is, in their mummies<sup>m</sup>; which when lost, consumed, or destroyed, were worshiped by representation, under an image made with its legs bound up, in likeness of the mummies. The reader now will be curious to know how this infers the other, that the worship of dead men was the primitive idolatry? All I can say to it is, that the excellent Person seems to have put the change upon himself, in supposing image worship inseparably attendant on idolatry in general; when it was but commonly attendant on Hero-worship; and rarely upon the Elementary. As to the elementary, Hero-

<sup>1</sup> *Chron. of ancient kingdoms*, p. 160.

<sup>m</sup> See vcl. II. plate V. fig. 1, 2, and 3 compared together.

dous<sup>n</sup> tells us that the Persians, who worshiped the celestial bodies, had no statues of their gods at all : And as to *Hero-worship*, we are assured by Dionysius Halicarnasseus, that the Romans, whose Gods were *dead men deified*, worshiped them, during some ages, without statues.

But to come closer to the point : Our Adversaries overturn their position, on the very entrance on the question. The grand symbol of the Atheistic school is, that **FEAR FIRST MADE GODS** :

“ Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor.

And yet, if we will believe them, these first gods were *dead men*, deified for their PUBLIC BENEFITS to their country, or mankind : “ Not only (says “ Toland) kings and queens, great generals and “ legislators, the patrons of learning, promoters “ of curious arts, and authors of useful inventions “ partook of this honour ; but also such private “ persons, as by their virtuous actions had distin- “ guished themselves from others.”

But to pass this over. Their great principle of **FEAR** is every way destructive of their system : For those very ages of the world, in which **FEAR** most prevailed, and was the predominant passion of mankind, were the times BEFORE civil society ; when every man’s hand was against his brother. If fear then was the origin of Religion, Religion, without question, was BEFORE civil Society.

But neither to insist upon this : Let us hear what the ancient *Theists* thought of the matter. They said it was **LOVE**, and not **FEAR**, which was the origin of Religion. Thus Seneca : “ Nec in hunc “ furorem omnes mortales consensissent alloquendi “ surda numina & inefficaces deos ; nisi noscent il-

<sup>n</sup> See p. 96, 97. note (q).

• Letters to Serena, Tract of the origin of Idolatry, p. 73.

“lorum BENEFICIA nunc ultro oblata, nunc oran-  
 “tibus data; magna, tempestiva, ingentes minas  
 “interventu suo solventia. Quis est autem tam  
 “miser, tam neglectus, quis tam duro fato, & in  
 “pœnam genitus, ut non tantam deorum munifi-  
 “centiam senserit? Ipsos illos complorantes for-  
 “tem suam, & querulos circumspice, invenies  
 “non ex toto beneficiorum cœlestium expertes;  
 “neminem esse, ad quem non aliquid ex illo BE-  
 “NIGNISSIMO FONTE manaverit<sup>P</sup>. ”

But as HOPE and FEAR, LOVE and HATRED, are the cardinal hinges, on which all human actions and cogitations turn, I suppose it was neither one nor other of these passions alone, but both of them together, which opened to those early Mortals (whose uncultivated reason had not yet gained the knowledge, or whose degenerate manners had now lost the tradition of the TRUE GOD) the first idea of superior Beings.

I. Such men, in a state of nature, whose subsistence was *immediately* to be supplied by the product of the earth, would be exact observers of what facilitated or retarded those supplies: So that of course, the grand genial Power of the system, that visible God the sun, would be soon regarded by them as a most beneficent Deity: And *thunder* and *lightning*, *storms* and *tempests*, which his Qualities produced, would be considered as the effects of his anger. The rest of the celestial Orbs would, in proportion to their use and appearance, be regarded in the same light. That noble fragment from SANCHONIATHO, quoted above<sup>q</sup>, as part of the *History* rehearsed in the *απόρρητα* of the *Mysteries*, gives this very original to Idolatry. It tells us that “*Genos*

<sup>P</sup> *De Benef.* 1. iv. c. 4.

<sup>q</sup> *Div. Leg.* vol. I. part i. p. 168.

and *Genea* (begotten of the two first mortals, *Protagonus* and *Æon*) in the time of great droughts, stretched out their hands towards the sun, whom they regarded as a God, and sole Ruler of the heavens. After two or three generations, came *Upsouranios* and his brother *Oufous*. These consecrated two pillars to FIRE and WIND, and then offered bloody sacrifices to them, as to Gods.” This is a very natural account of the origine and FIRST species of Idolatry. That it is the true, we shall now endeavour to shew.

1. Those ancient people of the North and South, the Suevi, the Arabs, and Africans, who lived long uncivilized, and in tribes, were all worshipers of the celestial Bodies. The same appears to have been the case of the Chinese; of the North Americans; and of the People of Mexico and Peru; as may be collected from what is said above, of their first Lawgivers pretending to be the offspring of the Sun and Heaven<sup>r</sup>: For we may be assured they had the sense to chuse a well established authority, under which to set up their own Pretensions.

2. But all Antiquity concurs in asserting, that *the first religious adoration, paid to the creature, was the worship of heavenly Bodies*. This was so evident, and so universally acknowledged, that CRITIAS himself, as we see<sup>s</sup>, was forced to allow its truth. And this being the entire overthrow of his system of the origin of religion, nothing but the fullest evidence could have extorted the confession from him.

To support so manifest a point with a long heap of quotations, would be trifling with the reader’s patience.

<sup>r</sup> Le SOLEIL est la divinité des peuples de l’Amerique, sans en excepter aucun de ceux qui nous sont connus. *Lafitau, Mœurs des sauvages Ameriquains*, tom. i. p. 130.

<sup>s</sup> See his Lambics above.

To cut the matter short, EUSEBIUS expressly affirms, and attempts to strengthen his position by an etymology of the word ΘΕΟΣ, that no Beings were anciently accounted Gods or divine, neither dead men, nor demons good or bad; but the STARS of heaven only<sup>s</sup>.

But as GREECE and EGYPT, the two Countries where civil Policy took deepest root, and spread its largest influence, had, by [the long custom of deifying their public Benefactors, so erased the memory of a prior idolatry, as to have this second species of it, by some moderns, deemed the first; I shall produce an ancient testimony or two, of the highest credit, to shew that the adoration of the celestial Bodies was the first idol-worship in those two grand Nurseries of Superstition, as well as in all other places.

1. IT APPEARS TO ME (says PLATO in his *Cratylus*) THAT THE FIRST MEN WHO INHABITED GREECE, HELD THOSE ONLY TO BE GODS, WHICH MANY BARBARIANS AT PRESENT WORSHIP; NAMELY, THE SUN, MOON, EARTH, STARS, AND HEAVEN<sup>t</sup>. The *barbarians* here hinted at, were both such as remained in, and such as had got out of, the *state of nature*. As first, the civilized Persians, of whom HERODOTUS gives this account: “They worship the Sun, Moon, and “Earth, Fire, Water, and the Winds: And this

<sup>s</sup> Αλλ' ὅτι μὲν οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ παλαιότατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἔτε ναῦν οἰκουμενίας προσεῖχον—ὅτι δὲ ὁδὸς τῶν μητρῶν ταῦτα καθηγομασμένων θεῶν τε καὶ ἡγών μνήμην τις τοῖς τούτοις παρεῖν, ὅτε δὲ τις ἦν αὐτοῖς Ζεὺς, ἢ Κρόνος, &c.—ἀλλὰ δὲ δάιμον τις ἀγαθός, ἢ φαῦλος ἐν αἰθρίῳ ποιεῖθαι μάζην· μόνα δὲ τὰ φαινόμενα τῶν ἥρανίων Αἰγαίων, παρὰ τὸ θέειν, ὅπερ εἶνι τείχειν, θεῶντες προστηγορίας, ὡς αὐτοῖς φασιν ἐπύγχανε.

*Prap. Evang.* l. i. c. 9.

<sup>t</sup> Φαινότατοι μοι οἱ πρῶτοι τῷ ἀνθρώπων πεδίῳ τῷ Ἑλλάδα τέτες μόνιμες θεᾶς ἡγεῖσθαι, ὡσπερ νῦν πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων, “Ηλιον, καὶ Σελήνην, καὶ Γῆν, καὶ Ἀρεαν, καὶ Οὐρανόν.

" adoration they have all along paid from the very beginning. Afterwards, indeed, they learned to worship Urania", &c." And so goes on to speak of their later idolatry of dead mortals. Secondly, the savage Africans, of whom the same Herodotus says, " They worship only the " Sun " and Moon : The same do all the Africans ". "

2. DIODORUS SICULUS, speaking of the EGYPTIANS, tells us, THAT THE FIRST MEN LOOKING UP TO THE WORLD ABOVE THEM, AND TERRIFIED AND STRUCK WITH ADMIRATION AT THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE, SUPPOSED THE SUN AND MOON TO BE THE PRINCIPAL AND ETERNAL GODS <sup>x</sup>. The reason which the historian assigns, makes his assertion general ; and shews he believed this idolatry to be the *first* every where else, as well as in EGYPT. But that it was so *there*, we have likewise good internal evidence, from a circumstance in their hieroglyphics, the most ancient method of recording knowledge : Where, as we are told by Horus Apollo, *a star denoted or expressed the idea of the Deity* <sup>y</sup>.

Such was the genius and state of Idolatry in the UNCIVILIZED world. So that the author of the book called, *The wisdom of Solomon*, said well, " Surely vain are all men by nature who are ignorant of God ; and could not by considering the *Work*, acknowledge the *Work-master* : but deemed either FIRE or WIND, or the *swift air*, or the

<sup>x</sup> Θύεσις δὲ Ἡλίῳ τε καὶ Σελήνῃ, καὶ Γῇ, καὶ Πυρὶ, καὶ Ὑδαῖς, καὶ Ἀνέμοισι· τάτοισι δὲ δὴ μάνοισι θύεσι ἀεχθῆται· ἐπειρεμαθήκασι δὲ καὶ τῷ Οὐρανῷ θύειν.—l. i. c. 131.

<sup>y</sup> Θύεσις δὲ Ἡλίῳ καὶ Σελήνῃ μάνοισι· τάτοισι δὲ νῦν τάντης Λίθους θύεσι. l. iv. c. 188.

\* Τὰς ἀνθεώπεις τὸ παλαιὸν γλωσσάριας ἀναβλέψαντας εἰς τὸ κόσμον, καὶ τὴν τὸ ὅλων φύσιν καταπλαγχύτας καὶ θαυμάσαντας, ὑπολαβεῖν τῷ Σίδης αἰδίοις τε καὶ περώτες, τόν τε Ἡλίον καὶ Σελήνην.—l. i.

Y Ἀσῆρ παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις γραφόμενος. Θεὸν σημαίνει. l. ii. c. i.

"circle of the stars, or the violent water, or the  
 "LIGHTS OF HEAVEN, to be the GODS which go-  
 "vern the World <sup>z</sup>."

II. But when now SOCIETY had produced those mighty blessings, which exalt our brutal nature to a life of elegance and reason; and, in exchange for penury, distress, and danger, had established safety, and procured all the accommodations of civil intercourse, the RELIGIOUS system received as great, though far from so advantageous, a change as the *political*.

1. GRATITUDE and ADMIRATION, the warmest and most active affections of our nature, concurred to enlarge the object of Religious worship; and to make men regard those BENEFACTORS OF HUMAN NATURE, the Founders of Society, as having more in them than a common ray of the Divinity. So that, god-like benefits bespeaking, as it were, a god-like mind, the deceased PARENT OF A PEOPLE easily advanced into an IMMORTAL. From hence arose, though not till some time after, their metaphysical distribution of Souls into the several classes of *human*, *heroic*, and *demonic*. A distinction which served greatly to support this species of Idolatry.

2. When the religious bias was in so good a train, NATURAL AFFECTION would have its share in advancing this new system of Adoration. PIETY TO PARENTS would easily take the lead; as it was supported by *gratitude* and *admiration*, the primum mobile of this whole machine: The natural Father of the Tribe often happening to be the political Father of the People, and Founder of the State.

3. FONDNESS FOR THE OFFSPRING would next have its turn. And a disconsolate Father, at the

<sup>z</sup> Chap. xiii. 1, 2,

head of a People, would contrive to sooth his grief for the untimely death of a favorite child, and to gratify his pride under the want of Succession, by paying divine honours to its memory. “ For a Father afflicted with untimely mourning, when he had made an image of his child, soon taken away, now honoured him as a God, which was then a dead man, and delivered, TO THOSE THAT WERE UNDER HIM, ceremonies and sacrifices <sup>a</sup>. ”

4. Lastly, the SUBJECT’S REVERENCE for his Master, the CITIZEN’S VENERATION for the Law-giver, would not be far behind to complete this religious Farce of mistaken gratitude and affection.

This was the course of the SECOND species of Idolatry; as we may collect from ancient history both sacred and profane: And, especially, from the famous fragment of *Sanchoniatho*, which partakes so much of both; where these various motives for this species of Idolatry are recounted in express words: “ After many generations came Chrysor; and he INVENTED many things useful to civil life; for which, after his decease, he was worshiped as a God. Then flourished Ouranos and his sister Ge; who deified and offered sacrifices to their FATHER *Upsilonos*, when he had been torn in pieces by wild beasts. Afterwards Cronos consecrated Muth his SON, and was himself consecrated by his SUBJECTS <sup>b</sup>. ”

III. But Idolatry did not stop here. For when men, as the Apostle says, would not retain God in their knowledge, He gave them up to their own vain imaginations, whereby they changed the truth of God into a lye,—into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and to four-footed beasts, and to creeping things <sup>c</sup>. How this last monstrous change was

<sup>a</sup> *Wisd. of Sol.* c. xiv. 15.

<sup>b</sup> See p. 169 of the first part of this vol.

<sup>c</sup> *Rom.* ch. i. 23.

effected, I have discoursed of at large, elsewhere<sup>d</sup>. It is sufficient to observe at present, that it was begun in EGYPT, and was propagated from thence: Where the method of their Learned, to record the history of their Hero-gods, in *improved hieroglyphics*, gave birth to BRUTE-WORSHIP. For the characters of this kind of writing being the figures of animals, which stood for marks of their Elementary Gods, and principally of their HEROES, soon made their hieroglyphics sacred. And this, in no great space of time, introduced a SYMBOLIC worship of their Gods, under hieroglyphic Figures. But the People, how naturally, we may see by the practice of saint-worship in the church of Rome, presently forgot the *symbol* or *relation*; and depraved this superstition still farther, by a *direct* worship: till at length, the animals themselves, whose figures these hieroglyphic marks represented, became the object of religious adoration. Which species of Idolatry, by the credit and commerce of the EGYPTIANS, and their carriers the PHOENICIANS, in course of time, spread amongst many other nations. And this was the THIRD and last species of Pagan Idolatry.

And here again, as well for the *original* as the *order* of this Idolatry, we have the confirmation of Sanchoniatho's authority: "Ouranos (says he) was "the Inventor of the *Bætylia*, a kind of ANIMATED "STONES framed with great art. And Taautus " [the Egyptian] formed ALLEGORIC FIGURES, "CHARACTERS AND IMAGES of the celestial Gods "and Elements<sup>e</sup>."

By these *animated stones* (as is observed above) must needs be meant, *stones cut into a human figure*.

<sup>d</sup> Book IV. sect. iv.

<sup>e</sup> P. 170, of the first part of this vol.

For, before this invention, brute, uninformed, or pyramidal Stones, were consecrated and adored. The *allegoric figures and characters* more plainly describe Hieroglyphic writing: From whence, as we say, this species of Idolatry was first derived.

This is a plain, consistent account of the RISE and PROGRESS of PAGAN IDOLATRY; equally supported by the scattered evidence of Antiquity, and the certain reason of things. I say, “the *scattered evidence of Antiquity:*” For I know of no writer who hath given us a direct, or so much as consistent, account of this matter. And it is no wonder. For a system of Religion, of which the MORTAL Gods are so considerable a part, would appear too hard even for the digestion of the People. An expedient therefore was soon found, and in a very natural incident, to throw a veil over this shocking absurdity; and this was by pretending one while, to those who grew inquisitive concerning the nature of the *Hero-Gods*, that these Gods were only SYMBOLIC of the Celestial: and at another, to those who pried too closely into the *elementary worship*, that this was only SYMBOLICAL of their Heroes: who were not *dead men*, as might be suspected, but a species of superior Beings, which, in affection to mankind, had once been conversant on Earth: and whom, now, a deification had reinstated in their original Rights. Thus the popular belief presented nothing but one *uniform order of IMMORTALS*: The SECRET of the *human original* of one part of them being reserved for the private instruction of the MYSTERIES.

This cover for these absurd Idolatries, would naturally produce two orthodox Parties of symbolizers in the Pagan Church. They, who most favoured *Hero-worship*, would find the Symbol in *Elementary*:

tary: And they, who liked best of the *Elementary*, would find the Symbol in the *Heroic*. Both parties, as usual, laid claim to primitive Antiquity. For true it is, that the DEGREES and MANNER by which the early Mortals SUPERINDUCED the worship of dead men on the primary idolatrous worship of the heavenly Bodies, gave countenance to either side. This was the *natural incident* I spoke of above, as favouring the expedient employed to hide the dishonours of Paganism. The matter is worth knowing; and I shall endeavour to explain it.

i. The first step to the APOTHEOSIS was the complimenting their Heroes and public Benefactors, with the Name of that Being, which was most esteemed and reverenced. Thus a King, for his beneficence, was called the *Sun*; and a Queen, for her beauty, the *Moon*. Diodorus relates, that SOL FIRST REIGNED IN EGYPT; CALLED SO FROM THE LUMINARY OF THAT NAME IN THE HEAVENS<sup>f</sup>. This will help us to understand an odd passage in the fragment of Sanchoniatho, where it is said, “that Cronus had seven sons by “Rhea, the youngest of which was made a God, “as soon as born<sup>g</sup>.” The meaning, I suppose, is, that this youngest son was called after some luminary in the Heavens, to which they paid divine honours: and these honours, came, in time, to be transferred to the terrestrial name-sake. The same Historian had before told us, that the sons of Guenos, mortals like their father, were

<sup>f</sup> Περῶν μὲν Ἡλιον βασιλεῦσας τῶν κατ' Αἴγυπτον, ὁμάνυμνος ὅντες τῷ κατ' ἔργον ἀτέξω. i. i. In the language of Egypt called *men*, as we see in Herod. i. ii. c. 99. The practice of Assyrian superstition was the same; their king Belus being named from *Baal* the Sun.

<sup>g</sup> —Τῷ αὐτῷ [Κείνῳ] γίνοντο διὸ Πίας ταῖς οἰνοῖς πολέοντας ἦν ὁ νεώτατος οὐρανός τῆς θύεστος αὐτοφέρθη.

called

called by the names of the elements, *light*, *fire*, and *flame*, whose use they had discovered<sup>h</sup>.

2. As this adulation advanced into an established worship, they turned the compliment the other way: And now the planet or Luminary was called after the Hero; I suppose, the better to accustom the people, even in the act of *Planet-worship*, to this new adoration. Diodorus, in the passage quoted a little before, having told us that the *SUN* and *Moon* were the first Gods of Egypt, adds, THE FIRST OF WHICH, THEY CALLED OSIRIS, AND THE OTHER ISIS<sup>i</sup>. But this was the general practice. So the Ammonites called the *SUN*, *Moloch*; the Syrians, *Adad*; the Arabs, *Dionysius*; the Assyrians, *Belus*; the Persians, *Mithra*; the Phœnicians, *Saturn*; the Carthaginians, *Hercules*; and the Palmyrians, *Elegabalus*<sup>k</sup>. Again, the *Moon*, by the Phrygians was called *Cybele*, or the mother of the Gods; by the Athenians, *Minerva*; by the Cyprians, *Venus*; by the Cretans, *Diana*; by the Sicilians, *Proserpine*; by others, *Hecate*, *Bellonia*, *Urania*, *Vesta*, *Lucinia*<sup>l</sup>, &c. Philo Byblus, in Eusebius, explains this practice: “ It is remarkable (says he) that they [the ancient idolaters] imposed on the ELEMENTS, and on those parts of nature which they esteemed Gods, the NAMES OF THEIR KINGS: For the natural Gods, which they acknowledged, were only the Sun, Moon, Planets, Elements, and the like; they being, now,

<sup>h</sup> Εὗται, φοσιν, ἀπὸ Γένες γνωθῆναι αὐθίς παῖδας Σιηλάς, οἷς τῷ ἐνόματα Φῶς καὶ Πῦρ, καὶ Φλόξ. οὗτοι φοσιν, ἐκ παρεπτικῆς ξύλων εὑρετοῦσι, καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν ἐδίδαξαν. Euseb. præp. Evang. l. i. c. 10.

<sup>i</sup> — Υπολαβεῖν τῇ θεῷ αἰδίνῃς τε καὶ πρωτεῖς, τὸν τε Ἡλιον καὶ Σελήνην, ὃν τὸν μὲν Ὀσιέν, τὴν δὲ Ἰσιν ὄνομάσαι. l. i.

<sup>k</sup> See Macrob. *Saturn.* l. i. c. 17. & seq.

<sup>l</sup> See Apl. *Met.*

"in the humour of having Gods of both classes,  
"the MORTAL and the IMMORTAL <sup>m</sup>."

3. As a further proof that Hero-worship was thus superinduced upon the planetary, let me add a very singular circumstance in the first formation of STATUES, consecrated to the *Hero-Gods*; Of which circumstance, both ancient <sup>n</sup> and modern <sup>o</sup> writers have been at a loss to assign a reason. It is, that these first Statues were not of *human* form, but CONICAL and PYRAMIDAL. Thus the Scholiaſt, on the Vespæ of Aristophanes, tells us, that the Statues of Apollo and Bacchus were *conic* pillars, or *Obelisks*<sup>p</sup>: and Pausanias, that the Statue of Jupiter Meilichius represented a *Pyramid*<sup>q</sup>: That of the Argive Juno did the same, as appears from a verse of Phoronis<sup>r</sup>, quoted by Clemens, intimating, that these *pyramidal* columns were the first Statues of the Gods: And this practice was universal, as well amongst the early Barbarians as Greeks. Now it is well known that the Ancients represented the rays of Light under pillars of this form: And we find, from the fragment of Sancho-niatho, that Usous consecrated two COLUMNS to the *Wind* and *Fire*: Hence, the erecting them as representatives of their *Hero-gods* shews how These succeeded to the titles, rights, and honours, of the *natural and celestial* Deities.

<sup>m</sup> Ἐξαιρέτως δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν σφελέρων βασιλέων, τοῖς κοσμικοῖς σοιχείοις, καὶ τισι τῶν νομιζομένων θεῶν τὰς ὄνουμασίας ἐπέθεσαν, φυσικές δὲ, ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην, καὶ τές λοιπές ωλαντάς ἀρέσας, καὶ τὰ σοιχεῖα, καὶ τὰ τέτοις συναφῆ Θεᾶς μόνας ἑγίνωσκον· ὡς' αὐτοῖς τές μὲν θυητές, τές δὲ ἀθανάτες θεός εἴτε. *Præp. Evang.* 1. i. c. 9.

<sup>n</sup> See Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 1. i. p. 348. *Par. Ed.*

<sup>o</sup> See Spencer de Leg. *Heb. Rit.* 1. ii. c. 28. *sect. 3.*

<sup>p</sup> Περὸ τῶν θυεῶν ἔνθειχον κίονας εἰς ὁξὺ λήγοντας, ὡς ὁβελίσκος; ιδεύειν εἰς τιμὴν Ἀπόλλωνος Αγγέως—ιδεῖς δὲ φασὶν αὐτές εἴτε Ἀπόλλωνος· οἱ δὲ Διονύσος· οἱ δὲ ἀμφοῖν. *Sph. ver.* 870.

<sup>q</sup> In Corin. p. 132.

<sup>r</sup> — Ηγεις Αργείνες, ἡ σέρμασι καὶ θυσάνοισι,

Περώτη ἐκόπιζεν περὶ κίονα μηκὺν ἀνάστην.

*Strom.* 1. i.

To

To explain this matter at large would require a Volume: It is sufficient to have given this hint; which, if pursued, might perhaps direct us to the clew of that hitherto inexplicable labyrinth of PAGAN MYTHOLOGY. The Reader sees clearly, by what has been already said, that this unheeded, but very natural way of superinducing *Hero-worship* on the *Planetary*, easily confounded the different specieses: and afforded a plausible pretence for the two Parties mentioned above, to make either, SYMBOLICAL of the other.

Here matters rested: and the vulgar Faith seems to have remained a long time undisturbed. But as the Age grew refined, and the Greeks became inquisitive and learned, the common MYTHOLOGY began to give offence. The speculative, and more delicate were shocked at the absurd and immoral stories of their Gods; and scandalized, to find such things make an authentic part of their history. It may indeed be thought matter of wonder how such stories, taken up in a barbarous age, came not to be dropt as the age grew more knowing; from mere abhorrence of their indecencies, and shame of their absurdities. Without doubt, this had been their fortune, but for an unlucky circumstance: The great POETS of Greece who had most contributed to refine the public taste and manners, and were now grown into a kind of sacred authority, had sanctified these silly tales in their Writings, which Time had now consigned to immortality.

Vulgar Paganism, therefore, in such an Age as this, lying open to the attacks of curious and inquisitive men, would not, we may well think, be long at rest. It is true, FREE-THINKING then lay under great discouragements. To insult the Religion of one's Country, which is now the mark of learned distinction, was esteemed in the ancient world a

brand of public infamy. Yet Free-thinkers there were: Who (as is their use) together with the public worship of their Country, threw off all reverence to Religion in general. Amongst these was EUHEMERUS, the Messenian; and, by what we can learn, the most distinguished. This man, in mere wantonness of heart, began his attacks on Religion, by divulging the *secret of the Mysteries*. But as it was capital to do this directly and professedly, he contrived to cover his perfidy and malice by the intervention of a kind of *Utopian Romance*. He pretended, that in a certain City, to which he came in his travels, he found this GRAND SECRET, of the Gods being *dead men deified*, preserved in their sacred writings; and confirmed by monumental records, inscribed to the Gods themselves; who were there said to be interred. So far was not amiss. But then, in the genuine spirit of his tribe, who never cultivate a truth but in order to graft a lye upon it, he pretended, that DEAD MORTALS were the FIRST GODS: And that an imaginary Divinity in these early Heroes and Conquerors *created* the idea of a superior Power; and *introduced* the practice of religious worship amongst men. Hence indignant Anti-

<sup>9</sup> Ευήμερος ἦ, ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς "Αθεό, φησίν ὅτ' οὐτακτονούνθαι· πάνθρα-  
πων βίοι, οἱ τελευτώρωροι τῶν ἀλλων ισχύοις τε καὶ σωέσεις ὡςει πρὸς τὰ  
ὑπὸ αὐτῶν κελευσόρρα τάνιστας βιοῖν, απεδάξαντες μετίζοντο. θαυμαστῆς  
καὶ σεμνοτῆς τυχεῖν, αὐτέπλασταν περὶ αὐτὸς ὑπερβάλλεστάν τινα καὶ  
σείαν δύναμιν, ἔνθεν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐνοιδότοις θεοῖ. Sext. Empir. adv.  
*Mathem.* The learned reader sees, that our *Atheist* is true to his Cause, and endeavours to verify the fundamental principle of his Sect, that FEAR first made Gods, even in that very instance where the contrary passion seems to have been at its height, the time when men made Gods of their deceased BENEFACTORS. A little matter of address hides the shame of so perverse a piece of malice. He represents those Founders of Society, and Fathers of their Country, under the idea of destructive Conquerors, who by

quity

quity concurred in giving him the proper name of ATHEIST: which, however, he would hardly have escaped, though he had done no more than divulge the *Secret of the Mysteries*; and had not poisoned his discovery with this impious and foreign addition, so contrary to the true spirit of that *Secret*.

This detection had been long dreaded by the orthodox Protectors of pagan Worship: And they were provided of a temporary defence in their intricate, and properly perplexed, system of SYMBOLIC adoration. But this would do only to stop a breach for the present, till a better could be provided; and was too weak to stand long alone, against so violent an attack. The PHILOSOPHERS, therefore, now took up the defence of Paganism, where the PRIESTS had left it: And, to the other's SYMBOLS, added their own ALLEGORIES, for a second cover to the absurdities of the ancient Mythology<sup>t</sup>. For, all the genuine Sects of Philosophy, as we have observed, were steady Patriots. LEGISLATION making one essential part of their Philosophy. And, to legislate without the foundation of a national Religion, was, in their opinion, building castles in the air. So that we are not to wonder, they took the alarm; and opposed these Insultors of the public Worship with all their vigour. But, as they

mere force and fear had brought men into subjection and slavery.

<sup>t</sup> So, MINUCIUS FELIX—ZENON, interpretando Junonem Aëra, Jovem Cœlum, Neptunum Mare, Ignem esse Vulcanum, et ceteros similiter vulgi Deos elementa esse monstrando, publicum arguit graviter et revincit errorem. Eadem fere CHRYSIPPUS, vim divinam, rationalem naturam, et mundum interim, et fatalem necessitatem Deum credit; ZENONEMQUE interpretatione Physiologiæ in HESIODI, HOMERI, ORPHEI-que carminibus imitatur. Babylonio etiam DIOGENI disciplina est exponendi et differendi, Jovis partum et ortum Minervæ et hoc genus cetera, rerum vocabula esse non Deorum. OCTAVIUS, c. xix.

never lost sight of their proper character, they so contrived, that the defence of the national Religion should terminate in a recommendation of their philosophic speculations. Hence, their support of the public worship, and their evasion of *Eukemerus's* charge, turned upon this proposition, “That the whole ancient MYTHOLOGY was no other than the vehicle of PHYSICAL, MORAL, and DIVINE knowledge.” And, to this it is that the learned *Eusebius* refers, where he says, “That a new race “of men refined their old gross THEOLOGY; and “gave it an honester look; and brought it nearer “to the truth of things.”

However, this proved a troublesome work; and, after all, little effectual for the security of men’s PRIVATE MORALS; which, the *example* of the licentious story according to the letter, would not fail to influence, how well soever the allegoric interpretation was calculated to cover the PUBLIC HONOUR of Religion: So that the more ethical of the Philosophers grew peevish with what gave them so much trouble, and answered so little to the *interior* of religious practice: this made them break out, from time to time, into hasty resentments against their capital Poets; unsuitable, one would think, to the dignity of the Authors of such noble reconcile truths, as they would persuade us to believe of them. Hence it was that PLATO banished *Homer* from his *Republic*: and that PYTHAGORAS, in one of his extramundane adventures, saw both *Homer* and *Hesiod* doing penance in Hell, and hung up there, for examples, to bleach and purify from the grossness and pollution of their ideas.

ν Τοιαῦτα ἦν τὰ δὲ ταλαιπῶς Θεολογίας, ὃν μέλαθαλόντες πέσει τινὲς, χθὲς καὶ σφάντης ἀποφυέντες λογικώτερον τε φιλοσοφεῖν αὐχθύντες, τὸν δὴ Φυσικώλεπτον τε τερψί Θεῶν ισοξίας δόξαν εἰσηγήσασθο, σεμνόλεπτας ἐνεργο-  
λογίας τοῖς μύθοις αργοστεπικοῦσαίτες. *Præp. Evang.* l. ii. c. 6.

The first of these Allegorizers, as we learn from Laertius<sup>w</sup>, was Anaxagoras ; who, with his friend Metrodorus, turned Homer's Mythology into a system of *Ethics*. Next came Hereclides Ponticus, and, of the same fables made as good a system of *Physics* : which, to shew us with what kind of spirit it was composed, he intitled Ἀνίστροις τῶν οὐκτὸντος [Ομήρου] βλασφημούσιων. And last of all, when the necessity became more pressing, Proclus undertook to shew that all Homer's Fables were no other than *physical*, *ethical*, and *moral ALLEGORIES*. For we are to observe, that the Philosophers INVENTED and REVIVED this way of interpretation, as at two different times, so on two different occasions.

I. It was invented to encounter such men as *Euhemerus*, who attempted to overthrow all Religion, by this pretended fact, That the FIRST Worship was paid to dead men deified ; which they supported on a *real* one, namely, that the greater Gods of Greece were only dignified Mortals ; as appeared from HOMER and the other early Greek Poets : whose writings being become a kind of *Scripture* in the popular Religion, the Defenders of the common faith had it not in their power to REPUDIATE their fables as only the idle visions of a poetic fancy : Nothing was left but to SPIRITUALIZE the sense, by allegorical interpretations. And this proved so lucky an expedient, that, at the same time that it covered their fables from the attacks of their adversaries, it added new reverence and veneration both to them and their Authors<sup>x</sup>.

<sup>w</sup> Lib. ii. *Anaxag. vit.*

<sup>x</sup> So TERTULLIAN. Ipsa quoque vulgaris superstitionis communis Idololatriæ, cum in simulacris de nominibus et fabulis veterum mortuorum pudet, ad interpretationem naturalium refutat, et decus suum ingenio obumbrat, figurans Jovem in substancialiter fervidam, et Junonem ejus in acream, &c. *Adv. Marc.* l. i.

2. What *These* began for the sake of their THEOLOGERS, their successors continued for the sake of their THEOLOGY. For it is to be noted, that the first CHRISTIAN APOLOGISTS took up so much of the argument of Euhemerus and his fellows, as concerned the real nature and original of the greater Gods of Greece. And as they had disengaged this truth of the false consequence with which those audacious Freethinkers had loaded it, they were enabled to urge it with superior force. But if the CHRISTIANS added new vigour to this attack, the PHILOSOPHERS became still more animated in their defence: for they hated this new Sect as an enemy equally to the PHILOSOPHY and to the RELIGION of Greece. And their *accidental* advantages in the application of this revived method of *allegory*, were not inferior to their *most studied* arts of improving it: For their christian Adversaries could with no grace object to a way of interpretation which they themselves had just borrowed from Paganism, to SPIRITUALIZE, forsooth, their sacred Scriptures, which the Philosophers had long used with more pretence and better judgment, to make theirs, REASONABLE.

But here we are to take notice of this difference between the Philosophic Allegorizers BEFORE, and those AFTER the time of Christ. The first were principally employed in giving a *physical*<sup>y</sup> or *moral* interpretation of the fables; the latter, a *theological*. As we may see in the case of PLUTARCH; who was both Priest and Philosopher in one. His famous tract, OF ISIS AND OSIRIS, is directly written

<sup>y</sup> So ARNOBIUS. *Vulnusari, vexari, bella inter se gerere furia-*  
*lum memorantur ardore discriminum: Vobis illa est descriptio*  
*voluptati, atque ut scriptorum tantam defendatis audaciam, ALLE-*  
*GORIAS res illas, et NATURALIS SCIENTIAE mentimini esse do-*  
*ctrinas. Adv. Gent. l. iv. p. 150. Ed. quarto,*

to support the national Religion, which had just taken the alarm, and not without reason. His purpose in it is to shew, That all its MULTIFORM worship was only an address to the SUPREME BEING, under various names and covers. But then ancient history, which acquaints us with the origine of their Gods, stood in his way. He denies therefore, what these histories invariably attest: He calls *Euhemerus*, who inforsed their evidence, an Impostor<sup>a</sup>; and hath many other evasions to elude such circumstances as are most decisive. Thus, when he cannot deny, that, what is recorded of their Gods shews them to be subject to *human* passions, he will not yet allow the inference for their *humanity*; because the Genii and Demons are agitated by the like passions<sup>a</sup>. Thus again, the *bewailing* and *lamenting* gestures, in many of their established Rites, which looked so like mourning for the dead, signified, he assures us, no more than an allegorical representation of *cōrn sown and buried*<sup>b</sup>. In this manner, the postulate having sup-

<sup>a</sup> ——“Ος αὐτὸς [Εὐημερός] αὐτίγραφα συνθεὶς ἀπίστε καὶ αὐτοπάρκεις μυθελογίας, τῶσαν ἀθετήσα κατασκεδάνωσι τῆς εἰκεμένης, ταῖς νομιζομέναις θεᾶς τάντας ὑμαλῶς Διεγράψαν, εἰς ὄνομα Στρατηγῶν καὶ Ναυαρχῶν καὶ Βασιλέων, ὡς δὴ τάλαι γειούστων. p. 641.

<sup>a</sup> Βέλιον ἔν, οἱ τὰ τῷ τὸν Τυφῶνα καὶ “Οστειν καὶ” “Ισιν ἰσοξύμφρα, μήτε Θῶν παθήσατα, μήτε ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ Δαιμόνων μυγάδων ἐπιτομίζοιες, ὡς καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Πυθαγόρεας καὶ Σενοκεχάτης καὶ Χερύτιππος, ἐπόμενος τοῖς τάλαις Θεολόγοις, ἐρζωμενεγέρες μὲν ἀνθρώπων γείνεις αιλέγγοται καὶ τολλῆται τῇ δυνάμει τὴν φύσιν ὑπερφέροντας ἡμῶν, τὸ δὲ θεῖον εἰκασίαργες, τὸ δὲ ἀκεῖτον ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχῆς φύσει καὶ σώματοι αἰδίστεοι ἐν συνειληχός ἴδοντες δεχομένους καὶ τόπον καὶ στάτην ἐγκενόμενα ταῖς μεταβολαῖς τάθη, τὰς μὲν μεταλλου, τὰς δὲ ἥπτον ἐπιπλαράτες γίνονται τὸ δὲ ὡς ἐν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ Δαιμόσιον, αἱρεῖται Διεγροφαὶ κακίας. p. 642.

<sup>b</sup> This ingenious conceit of SEED-CORN did not escape the Abbé Pluche (for every man's property is his treasure, and he bringeth forth out of it, as he hath occasion, things old and new) who in his *Histoire du Ciel*, hath judiciously employed it for the foundation of a reformed system on this matter; which, how-

ported the allegories ; the allegories come, in good time, to the assistance of the postulate.

Thus stood the matter in the ancient World. Let us see now what use the Moderns have made of what they found recorded there. Our *Freethinkers*, such as *Toland* and his tribe, have revived the old rank doctrine of *Euhemerus*<sup>c</sup>. And this was natural ; and to the purpose of their cause. But our *Religionists* generally, have not been so happy in the choice of their arms, nor in their sagacity of distinguishing their friends. The excellent G. J. Vossius, to mention him amongst a multitude, hath, in his very learned collection of *Gentile Theology*, gone, *bona fide*, into the old pagan method of *allegorizing* their Theology ; as if it were doing service to true Religion to shew, that the Pagan Idolatry was, at bottom, tolerably reasonable.

It is true, a late ingenious Person seems to have understood his subject better, and to know where

ever, brings us to the same place, by a back way ; and ends in this, that the Gods were not dead men deified.

<sup>c</sup> See a Tract called, *The origin of Idolatry, and reasons of Heathenism*, by *Toland*. Our PANTHEISTIC Philosopher's understanding had so strong a bias to impiety, that it seemed rather a natural sympathy than an acquired habit (though he had that too) which drew him to it at all distances. Hear how awkwardly he represents *Euhemerus*'s system to us : and yet he labours hard to set it off. *The FIRST Idolatry* (says he) did not proceed, as is commonly supposed, from the beauty, or order, or influence of the STARS. But men observing Books to perish [before their invention] by fire, worms, or rottenness ; and Iron, Brass, and Marble, not less subject to violent hands or the injuries of the weather, they IMPOSED ON THE STARS, as the only everlasting monuments, the proper names of their HEROES, or of something memorable in their History. p. 74. All this, his predecessors, the *Freethinkers* of Antiquity, who knew how to express themselves, informed us of when they said, That Star-worship was only symbolical of Hero-worship ; and, consequently, of later date : the thing they aimed at, to induce their conclusion, that therefore Religion was a political invention.

all this tends ; I mean the learned Writer of the *Letters concerning Mythology*. We have observed, that the ancient defenders of Paganism had by their *Symbols* and *Allegories* resolved the *Hero-gods* into the *Elementary* ; and these again, into the various attributes of the *first Cause*. The ancient *FATHERS* of the Church are very copious in exposing this subterfuge : In which service they employed all that was found in the system of *Euhemerus* ; that is to say, 'That the *Greater Gods of Greece and Rome, the Dii majorum Gentium, were Dead men deified*'. And I have endeavoured throughout this work to support their Cause. There are hardly now, I believe, two opinions on this matter, amongst knowing men. But the learned Author of the *Inquiry into the life and writings of Homer* attempts, in these *Letters*, (I presume as an exercise of his wit) to bring us back again to the old *MUMPSIMUS*. He saw, I suppose, the necessary connexion between *Allegories* and *ideal Gods* : between *These*, and no more than a *shadowy Idolatry* : And therefore, in honour of Antiquity, hath laid it down as an axiom, *That the powers producing, and parts composing the Universe, were their GREATER GODS<sup>d</sup>* ; or the *Dii majorum Gentium*. This, the ingenious Writer calls, *the grand Key of Mythology*<sup>e</sup>.

<sup>d</sup> P. 409. of the *Letters concerning Mythology*.

<sup>e</sup> It is worth our notice, (to observe it by the way, only) that the admirers of the wisdom of *profane* Antiquity, are not so favourable to that of *sacred*: but are generally amongst the first to laugh at what Divines call the *DOUBLE SENSE* in *Scripture prophecies*. And yet they make the greatest part of *pagan wisdom* to consist in the use and invention of *DOUBLE SENSES* : " Witness (says this learned writer) the DOUBLE " view you have already had of the rise of things, and govern-  
" ment of the world from *Orpheus*, in the description of *Pas* :  
" and from *Hesiod* in his borrowed Theogony : and still plainer  
" in the *DOUBLE moral* of *Prometheus*, as signifying either the  
" divine Providence in the formation of the world, and parti-  
" cularly of man, or human foresight perpetually on the track,

As these LETTERS seem chiefly to be written in opposition to what is here, and elsewhere throughout this work, advanced concerning the rise, progress, and various fortunes, of ancient Idolatry ; as well as in favour of the now exploded interpretation of Mythology ; invented, and kept improving, as we say by the early, middle, and later Philosophers, to hide the deformities of vulgar Polytheism, I shall beg leave to consider what he hath to say in support of such an undertaking.

Now against my various reasoning in *confutation* of this *System*, I find not so much as one argument opposed ; and in *support* of the *System*, but one ; which is this, “ *Euhemerus and his FOLLOWERS*, ere “ we join with them in *mortalizing* the first Divini- “ ties, must satisfy us, Why the Poetical Sages, the “ Instructors of mankind, termed their grand “ Work, the basis of their doctrine, not only a *THE-* “ *OLOGY*, or an account of the birth and pedigree “ of the *Gods*, but a *COSMOGONY*, or an account of “ the birth and creation of the *World*? Or, plainer “ still, a *COSMOPOEIA*, a making or framing of “ the *Universe*? The *PLATONIC Philosophy* had no “ hand in the Cosmogonies, or histories of the “ Creation written by *Taaut* or *Thoth*, by *Linus*, “ by *Orpheus*, &c. It was plain, therefore, the *Al-* “ *legory did not come too late*, &c<sup>f</sup>. ”

If this *Euhemerus* supposed, as it appears he did, that the *first pagan Divinities* were *mortal Men*, he would have found it difficult to answer this ingenuous objection. But his *Followers*, here hinted at, “ for the necessities and conveniences of life.” p. 120—1. The difference is, The *pagan double sense* connects together two things that are foreign to one another in the constitution of Nature : The *scripture double sense* connects together two things that are as nearly related, as the various parts of one moral Dispensation.

<sup>f</sup> P. 211, 212.

who suppose no such thing, but have evinced the contrary, will find no difficulty at all. For they hold<sup>s</sup>, that the *first* Gods of Greece were the *heavenly Bodies*. And if the makers of these *Cosmogonies*, such as *Thoth*, *Linus*, and *Orpheus*, held the same, then their *THEOGENIES*, or accounts of the birth and pedigrees of these Gods, could be no other than *COSMOGENIES*, or accounts of the birth and creation of the world; these Gods being parts of it.

But things seem here to be confounded. These *Cosmogonies* have just as much, and no more, to do with *Platonic allegories*, than the elements of speech with the ornaments of *Rhetoric*.

There are two errors likewise, in this matter, which the learned Mythologist seems to have laboured under. The one is, that *Euhemerus* was the *Inventor* of the *mortalizing system*: Whereas, I had shewn, it was taught in all the *Mysteries* long before *Euhemerus* was born. He, indeed, maliciously carried it much further than the *Mysteries*; He made *planetary worship symbolical of the Heroic*. And from thence, inferred the *political origin of Religion*: for which, he passed with Antiquity, and very justly, for an Atheist. Whereas the *Mysteries*, as we see from the fragment of *Sanchoniatho*<sup>b</sup>, kept these two species of Idolatry distinct; and assigned the proper order of time to each of them.

The other error this learned Person falls into, is his supposing, that these *modern followers of Euhemerus*, against whom he writes, hold all the *first*, as well as *last*, Gods of Greece to have been *mortal men*: Whereas they distinguish between the Gods of civilized and uncivilized Greece: The first, they suppose to have been *heavenly bodies*; and the latter only, *dead men deified*.

<sup>s</sup> See above.

<sup>b</sup> See above, and likewise p. 168 of the first part of this vol.

From censuring the *Learning* of Euhemerus's *Followers*, the ingenious Author proceeds to censure their *Morals*. "It is not easy (he says) to ascertain what should make some warm Ecclesiastics, for the wiser are far above such weakness, so angry at the Allegories of ancient Poets, now, when all danger from their Deities is over. Of old, indeed, when Temples and *Revenues* belonged to them; when *wealth, and Dignities of the Church* were annexed to the allegorical Devotion, and vested in its Teachers, no wonder the *good FATHERS* should fulminate against the wild and impious Worship. But now, when the struggle is long since over, when the Father of Gods and men has not so much as a lamb offered, nor his *Daughter* [i. e. Minerva or WISDOM] a single grain of incense burnt upon her altar for near a thousand years, it is hard to tell what should awake this *preposterous* zeal, or make them so eager to *mortalize* the *EMBLEMS* of Antiquity. Is there not, as I was hinting, some *infestation* in the case?—Has not the reading the *FLAMING INVENTIVES*<sup>i</sup> of the primitive Fathers, who were actually in the struggle, a little *infected* their Followers with the same firey spirit and *INDECENT LANGUAGE* <sup>k</sup>?"

<sup>i</sup> The ingenious Writer seems to lie under a small mistake. Though *flaming inventives* may perhaps be thought characteristic of the *FATHERS*' zeal, the *terms* are not here in their place. They reserved their *inventives* for a better occasion, to fulminate the malice of their Enemies, and the follies of their Friends. On this point, viz. the *mortalizing the emblems of antiquity*, I can assure him, they appeared much at their ease; and more disposed to quibble than to rail; as he may see by one of the most serious of them, and who least understood raillery when he was pressed, I mean St. Austin; who in his confutation of Varro and his *emblems*, could afford to be thus jocular: "Sed, hæc omnia inquit [Varro] referuntur ad *mundum*; videatne potius ad *immundum*." Civ. Dei, l. vii. c. 27.

"P. 226 — 7.

This indecent language is to be found in the second volume of the *Divine Legation*; where it is said, that the Ancients adopted into the number of their greater Gods, Ravishers, Adulterers, Pathics, Vagabonds, Thieves, and Murderers<sup>1</sup>. But it is pleasant to hear this learned person talk of decency to a set of Phantoms, Emblems, and Symbols; for such he esteems these Greater Gods to be; and yet observe it so little to the Ministers of the Christian Religion. For he is at a loss, the Reader sees, to account for their warmth, where their *private interest* is not concerned. And in seeking for the cause of it, when he cannot fix it on their *avarice* and *ambition*, rather than allow them a motive becoming their character and office, he will throw it upon their *passions* and *prejudices*. He supposes, they *catched the infection from the Fathers*, whose worldly interests, he imagines, were much concerned in the quarrel. But I have that opinion of his candour and love of virtue as to believe, that he will be pleased to find his suspicions ill grounded: And that the *Ecclesiastics*, who engage so warmly in this question, do it on important reasons, becoming their character of Ministers of the Truth.

The Bible represents ancient Idolatry, in the most odious colours; and the whole Gentile World as given up to its delusions. A species of modern Mythologists, hinted at above, and whom a late French writer hath well described<sup>m</sup>, had endeav-

<sup>1</sup> Book IV. sect. iv.

<sup>m</sup>—Au commencement du Seizieme Siecle quelques-uns des Savans, qui contribuerent au retablissement des lettres, etoient, dit en, Païens dans le coeur, plus encore par PEDENTERIE, que par libertinage: ensorte qu'il n'eût pas tenu à eux de ramener le culte des Dieux d'HOMERE et de Virgile——ils employoient ce qu'ils avoient de littérature et d'esprit, pour donner au Paganisme un tour plausible, et en former un système moins insensé. Ils avoüoient que la MYTHOLOGIE etoit insoutenable youred

voured to evade this charge, by borrowing the defences of the ancient Philosophers; who allegorized the fables of the popular Religion, to screen it from the contempt of the more knowing Vulgar; as *Learning*, at one time, and *Christianity*, at another, had severally shaken the Seat of Superstition<sup>n</sup>. In those *Allegories*, all the national Gods were reduced to mere *SYMBOLS*, expressive of the Attributes of the first Cause: and, consequently, the Scripture-charge against the Gentiles, of *worshiping the Creature for the Creator*, rendered groundless, or at least, uncandid. In this state and representation of things, some *Ecclesiastics* have thought it of their office to *MORTALIZE* these pretended *emblems of Antiquity*; and to shew, that their *greater national Gods* were *dead men deified*: and, consequently, that their worshipers were real Idolaters; and of the worst sort too, as they frequently had for their objects the worst kind of men.

But so little of this matter entered into the learned Author's views, that he says, " This, which " was formerly a grand religious controversy, is " now turned to a point of pure speculation. What, " in the days of Polytheism, raised the indignation " of the Priests, and inflamed the *rival* zeal of " the Fathers of the Church, now raises *a little* " *squabble amongst the Antiquaries*, as a question of " mere curiosity: to wit, whether all the Gods of " *Antiquity were not mortal men* o."

Now, if a man will needs suppose, that where the Clergy have no oblique and interested designs, they

prise à la lettre: mais, en même tems, elle contenoit, selon eux, sous l'EMBLEME des fictions les profondeurs de la PHYSIQUE, de la MORALE et de la THEOLOGIE. *Vie de L'Emp. Julien.* p. 48—9.

<sup>n</sup> See p. 307. of this part.

<sup>o</sup> P. 208.

have no reasonable ones, he will be often out in his reckoning: And (what to be sure is greatly to be lamented) unequal to the office of a Censor on their Manners.

After all, perhaps we understand the learned Writer as little, as he appears to have understood us, if we think him in earnest. The whole of his *Letters*, if one may judge by hints dropt here and there, seems to be a mere sportive exercise of Wit; and just such an *encomium* on the WISDOM OF THE ANCIENTS as Erasmus's was, on the FOLLY OF THE MODERNS. It is certain, at least, that in the prosecution of his argument, his chief concern is for FICTION and its interests. Thus, in one page, he tells us, "That this eager zeal to *mortalize* these emblems of Antiquity is *destructive of all true Poetry*."<sup>p</sup> And in another, "That *this prevailing prosaic taste has neither dignity of manners, nor strength of genius, nor extent of fancy*".<sup>q</sup> But he explains himself more fully, where speaking of SYMBOLS and ALLEGORIES, and the *inseparable* as well as *accidental marks* by which they may be unravelled, he illustrates his subject by Ab. Pluche's Hypothesis: Which, however, in several places, he treats for what it is, an idle and a groundless fancy. "Sym-  
"bols (says he) carry natural marks that strike a fa-  
"gacious mind, and lead it, by degrees, to their real  
"meaning. A hint in one author brightens the  
"obscurities in many others; as one single obser-  
"vation of Macrobius proved the *clue* to, Abbé  
"Pluche's (*how justly I say not*) to *unravel* the  
"whole mystery of Egyptian, Assyrian, and Gre-  
"cian Gods."<sup>r</sup> He had no occasion to consider

<sup>p</sup> P. 215. <sup>q</sup> P. 214.

<sup>r</sup> As our learned Critic would *immortalize* the Pagan Deities in reverence to the CLASSICS, so this Abbé Pluche (of whom he speaks with so much honour) has attempted to draw *horæ*

*how justly*, if he was in jest. Otherwise, a man would see, that the *justness of unravelling* depended on the *reality of the Clue*: Which, too, tho' dignified with this name, is indeed no other than a number of *odd ends*, that wanted to be made *consistent*, rather than to be *unravelled*.

But as if all this had not been enough to shew us that his concern was not for TRUTH but FICTION, he gravely professes to credit all BACON's visions, as the genuine *Wisdom of the Ancients*, which every body else admires as the sportive effort of modern wit. As he is in so pleasant an humour he may not be displeased to hear the *Determination* of DOCTOR RABELAIS upon this question, who thus addresses the Allegorizers of his time,

“ Croyez-vous, en vostre foy, qu'onques Ho-  
 “ MERE, escripvant l'Illiade & l'Odyssée, pensast  
 “ és ALLEGORIES lesquelles de luy ont calefreté  
 “ Plutarche, Heraclide de Ponticq, Eustatie, Phor-  
 “ nute, et ce que d'iceulx POLITIAN<sup>s</sup> ha descrobé?  
 “ Si le croyez, vous n' approchez ne de piedz, ne  
 “ de mains à mon opinion ; qui DECRETE icelles  
 “ aussi peu avoir esté songées de Homere, que  
 “ d'Ovide en ses Metamorphoses, les Sacremens  
 “ de l'Evangile, lesquelz ung Frere Lubin, vray  
 “ croquelardon, s'est efforcé demonstrer si d' ad-  
 “ venture il rencontroit gens aussi folz que luy.”

them out of their *mortal state*, in order to cover the disgraces of POPERY ; to which that superstition is obnoxious from the parallels between *Saint* and *Hero-worship* ; and by a new system, begot by a delirious imagination on the dream of a lethargic Pedant\*, to make the *Dii majorum Gentium* the mere cyphers of an ancient Alphabet.

\* This facetious Satyrift had here in his eye those very Mythologists of the sixteenth Century, whom the learned Author of *the life of Julian*, quoted above, so very justly censures.

\* Macrobius.

And thus much for this grand *Key of Mythology*, as this learned Writer is pleased to call his Work <sup>t</sup>.

To return to the Patrons of the other extreme, That the *heavenly bodies* were only *SYMBOLS* of the *Hero-Gods*. Having thus shewn, the worship of the *elements* to be prior to that of *dead men*, I have not only overthrown *this argument*, for the proof of the *atheistic notion of the origin of Religion*, but likewise the *notion itself*. For if (as our adversaries own) the worship of dead men was the first religious institution after entering into civil society ; and if (as I have proved) the worship of the *heavenly bodies* preceded that of dead men ; the consequence is, that *Religion* was in use before the *Civil Magistrate* was in *Being*. But I need not our adversaries' concession for this consequence ; having proved from ancient testimony, that *planetary worship* was the only *Idolatry long before Civil Society* was known ; and continued to be so, by all unpoliced nations, *long after*.

II. I come, in the next place, to direct *Fact* : from whence it appears, *that the Lawgiver, or Civil Magistrate, did not invent Religion*.

Here the Atheist's gross prevarication ought not to pass uncensured.—From the notoriety of the Magistrate's care of *Religion*, he would conclude it to be *his invention* : And yet, that very Antiquity which tells him *this*, as plainly and fully tells him *this other* ; namely, *that Religion was not invented by him* : For, look through all Greek, Roman, and Barbarous Antiquity ; or look back on what we have extracted from thence in the second section of the foregoing book, and it will appear, that not one single Lawgiver ever found a people, how wild or unimproved soever, *without a Religion*,

gion, when he undertook to civilize them. On the contrary, we see them all, even to the Lawgivers of the Thracians and Americans, addressing themselves to the savage Tribes, with the credentials of that God who was there professedly acknowledged and adored. But the truth of this will be farther seen from hence : It appears by the *history* of the Lawgivers, by the *sayings* recorded of them, and by the *fragments* of their writings yet remaining, that they perceived the error and mischief of the gross idolatries practised by those People, whom they reduced into Society ; and yet, that they never set upon reforming them : From whence we reasonably conclude, that they found the People in possession of a Religion which they could not unsettle ; and so were forced to comply with inveterate prejudices. For, that they were willing and desirous to have reformed what they found, appears not only from the PROEMS to their Laws, spoken of above, but from the testimony of one of the most knowing Writers of Antiquity, I mean *Plutarch* ; who, in his Treatise of *Superstition*, speaking of the intractable temper of the People, says, they ran headlong into all the follies which the makers of Graven images propagated ; and in the mean time, turned a deaf ear to their Lawgivers, who endeavoured to inform them better<sup>v</sup> : and this forced even Solon himself to establish the Temple-worship of *Venus the Prostitute*<sup>w</sup>. But the reform was seen to be so impossible, that Plato lays it down as an axiom in his *Republic*, That nothing ought to be changed in the received Religion which the Lawgiver finds already established : and that a man

<sup>v</sup> Φιλοσόφων δὲ καὶ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ ἀνδρῶν καταφεύγοντι, διποδεκτούντι τὴν τῆς θεᾶ σεμνότητα μεία κατεργάτησθαι καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνης, μεία βίας καὶ αὐθεμονίας.

<sup>w</sup> παρδήμας Αφροδίτης. Athenæi Deip. I. xiii.

must have lost his understanding to think of such a project. All they could do, therefore, when they could not purify the *Soul of Religion*, was more firmly to constitute the *Body* of it. And this they did by NATIONAL RITES AND CEREMONIES. Indeed, in course of time, though insensibly, the genius of the Religion, as we observed before<sup>x</sup>, followed that of the civil Policy; and so grew better and purer, as it did in ROME; or more corrupt and abominable, as it did in SYRIA. But had the Legislators given an entire NEW RELIGION, in the manner they gave LAWS, we should have found *some* of those, at least, nearly approaching to the purity of natural Religion. But as we see no such, we must conclude they FOUND Religion, and did not MAKE it.

On the whole then, I have proved, what the most judicious HOOKER was not ashamed to believe, before me, That “ a politique use of Religion there is. “ Men fearing GOD are thereby a great deal more “ effectually, .than by positive Laws restrayned, “ from doing evil; inasmuch as those Laws have no “ further power than over our outward actions only; “ whereas unto mens’ inward cogitations, unto the “ privie intents and motions of their hearts, Reli-“ gion serveth for a bridle. What more savage, “ wilde, and cruell than man, if he see himselfe “ able, either by fraude to over-reach, or by power “ to over-beare, the Laws whereunto he should be “ subject? Wherefore in so great boldnes to of-“ fend, it behoveth that the World should be held “ in awe, not by a Vaine SURMISE, but a TRUE “ APPREHENSION of somewhat, which no man “ may think himselfe able to withstand. THIS IS “ THE POLITIQUE USE OF RELIGION.” Thus far

<sup>x</sup> See p. 98. of the first part.

<sup>y</sup> *Eccl. Pol.* Book V. sect. ii.

this great man ; where he takes notice how certain Atheists of his time, by observing this use of Religion to Society, were fortified in their folly, in believing Religion to have been invented by politicians to keep the World in awe. An absurdity, I persuade myself, now so thoroughly exposed, as to be henceforth deemed fit only to go in rank with the tales of Nurses, and the dreams of Free-thinkers.

I HAVE now at length gone through the two first *Propositions* :

1. THAT THE INculcating THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, IS NECESSARY TO THE WELL-BEING OF CIVIL SOCIETY.

2. THAT ALL MANKIND, ESPECIALLY THE MOST WISE AND LEARNED NATIONS OF ANTIQUITY, HAVE CONCURRED IN BELIEVING, AND TEACHING, THAT THIS DOCTRINE WAS OF SUCH USE TO CIVIL SOCIETY.

*The next Volume begins with the proof of the third ; namely,*

3. THAT THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, IS NOT TO BE FOUND IN, NOR DID MAKE PART OF, THE MOSAIC DISPENSATION.

Hitherto we have been forced to move slowly, to grope our way in the dark, through the thick confusion of many irrational RELIGIONS, and mad schemes of PHILOSOPHY, independent of, and inconsistent with one another : Where the labour of the search, perhaps, has been much greater to the Author, than the pleasure will be to the Reader, in

in finding this chaos reduced to some kind of order ; the PRINCIPLES developed, from whence the endless diversity and contradiction have arisen ; and the various USE that may be made of these discoveries for our *demonstration* of the truth of *revealed Religion*.

We now emerge into open day :

“ Major rerum mihi nascitur ordo,  
“ Majus opus moveo.

And having gotten the PROMISED LAND in view, the labour will be much easier, as the discoveries will be more important, and the subject infinitely more interesting : For having now only one single System and Dispensation to explain, consistent in all its parts, and absolute and perfect in the Whole, which though, by reason of the profound and sublime views of its Author, these perfections may not be very obvious, yet, if we have but the happiness to enter rightly, we shall go on with ease, and the prospect will gradually open and enlarge itself, till we see it lost again in that IMMENSITY from whence it first arose.

Full of these hopes, and under the auspices of these encouragements, let us now shift the Scene from GENTILE to JEWISH Antiquity ; and prepare ourselves for the opening of a more august and solemn Theatre.

*The end of the Third Book.*



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— the *Lesser* taught, by certain *secret rites* and *shows*, the origin of society, and the doctrine of a *future state*—were preparatory to the *Greater*, and might be communicated easily to all, 149.

— the *Greater*, into which after four years of probation, the initiated were admitted, taught the *Απόγεντα* or *hidden Doctrines*; namely, the detection of *Polytheism*, that the *vulgar Gods* were only *dead men*; and the discovery of the *unity*, that there was but *one supreme God*, the *Creator* of all things, by whom the inferior *local tutelary Gods* were set over the several parts of the world, 154—167.

— gave the name of ΜΥΣΤΗΣ to the initiated into the *Lesser* and that of ΕΠΟΠΤΗΣ (i. e. *one that sees things as they are*) to those that were admitted to the *Greater*, 155.

— celebrated openly by the *Cretans*, and why, 182.  
— highly extolled by the *Antients*, 184—190.

— revealed by *Diagoras* (for which he was deemed an *Atheist* and proscribed by the city of *Athens*) and also by *Eudemus* in a more artful manner, 181, 182.

— celebrated with a *Hymn* concerning the *unity*, sung by the *Hierophant* in the habit of the *Creator*, supposed to be the little *Orphic Poem* quoted by *Clemens Alexander*, 177.

— degenerated at last, and became horribly subservient to *lust* and *revenge*.—Causes of it, 190—197,

— continued however to teach the doctrine of a *future state*, even in the most debauched celebrations of *Cupid* and *Bacchus*, the most *obscene* parts of the *mysterious rites* being introduced under the pretence of being *emblems* of *regeneration* and a *new life*, 192.

— abolished

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- abolished, except the *Eleusinian*, by *Valentinian's edict against Nocturnal sacrifices*, 188.  
— *Eleusinian* totally abolished afterwards by *Theodosius the elder*, 189.  
— exclaimed against by the *Fathers* as *impious and immoral* in their very original (which was not true,) and yet, after this, they studiously transfer the *Terms, Phrases, Rites, Ceremonies, and Discipline* of these very *mysteries* into our holy Religion, the effects of which have been severely felt, 197, 200, note (n).  
— alluded to by *Virgil in the descent of Æneas into Hell*, which is shewn to be an *allegorical description of an initiation*, and a very exact picture of the *Specacles, Shows and Representations* in the *Eleusinian Mysteries*, 210—296.  
— alluded to likewise by *Apuleius* (the gravest, most virtuous, and most learned Philosopher of his age) in his *Metamorphosis or story of the Golden ass*, and particularly in his *Episode of Cupid and Psyche*, which are shewn to be *allegorical recommendations* of the *mysteries*, 304—326.  
**MYTHOLOGY**, the *Old Pagan* only the corruptions of historical tradition, 103. See FABLES.

## O

- OBLIGATION** founded on the *Will* of God, which alone can make a compliance with the essential difference in actions, a *Duty*, 38. See MORALITY.  
— necessarily implies an *oblier* different from and not the same with the *obliged*, otherwise there would be no obligation at all, 46.  
— moral, or of a *free agent*, implies a *law* to enjoin and forbid; but a *law* is the imposition of a *superior*, who hath power to exact obedience, 47.  
— cannot arise from the *perception* of the *fitness* and *unfitness* of things, which is only a *motive*, but not an *obligation* to action. For till a man is made sensible that he hath received his Being from the *Will* of another, and is accountable to him for it, he can be under no *obligation* to prefer *good* to *evil*, 46, 47.  
— arises in the *independent first cause* of all things from his own *Wisdom*, and can mean, when applied to God, no more than *direction*, 50.  
— arises in all intelligent dependent Beings, from the *Will* of the first cause; of which *Will*, the *sense of right and wrong*, so strongly implanted in us, and the *essential differences* of things, are the plainest *indication* as well as the *rule*, 52, 54.

OVID

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OVID, his *Metamorphosis*, a popular history of Providence, 138.  
See FABLES.

## P

PHILOSOPHERS, THEISTICAL, unanimous, as well as the Law-givers, that the doctrine of a future state was necessary to the well being of Civil Society, ii. 77—85.

\_\_\_\_\_ did not believe that future state, which they so industriously propagated to the world, ii. 86.

\_\_\_\_\_ taught that every one should conform to the Religion of his country, tho' they saw the gross errors of the national Religions, ii. 90, 91.

\_\_\_\_\_ led to this by the opinion, That Utility, and not Truth, was the end of Religion, ii. 91.

\_\_\_\_\_ concluded from thence that Utility and Truth do not coincide, and therefore held that it was lawful and expedient to deceive for the publick good, ii. 91, 92, 256.

\_\_\_\_\_ did, accordingly, say one thing when they thought another, ii. 92.

\_\_\_\_\_ had a twofold or double doctrine; the exoteric, external or vulgar; and the esoteric, internal or secret, ii. 92.

\_\_\_\_\_ taught the first openly to all, and the other to a select number, ii. 92. See DOUBLE-DOCTRINE.

\_\_\_\_\_ practised the double-doctrine, in reference to the doctrine of a future state, ii. 109.

\_\_\_\_\_ professed that doctrine as Lawgivers and in public, but rejected it in their private speculations, ii. 109.

\_\_\_\_\_ the Pythagoric, the Platonic, the Peripatetic, the Stoic, did not believe, tho' all sedulously taught, the doctrine of a future state, ii. 126. See PYTHAGORAS, PLATO, ARISTOTLE, and ZENO.

\_\_\_\_\_ were always wont to judge and determine on metaphysical rather than on moral maxims, ii. 182.

\_\_\_\_\_ held principles inconsistent with the doctrine of a future state, so could not believe it, ii. 183, 235.

\_\_\_\_\_ believed that God could neither be angry nor hurt any one, which principle destroys God's Providence here as well as a future state of rewards and punishments hereafter, ii. 183—198.

\_\_\_\_\_ held universally that the soul was a part or particle of God disperced from him, and would be rejoined to him again, ii. 199—218.

\_\_\_\_\_ consequently could not believe the soul to have a separate existence after death in a future state of rewards and punishments, ii. 218. See SOUL.

\_\_\_\_\_ their disbelief of a future state, brings no discredit to the Christian Doctrines, but, instead of weakening, is a strong argument for their truth, 240—242.

\_\_\_\_\_ could

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- could by natural reason perceive Truth and its deductions when *proposed*, but could not generally discover it, and draw right deductions from it, ii. 243.
- could penetrate very far into the *essential difference* of things, but knew not the origin of *obligation*, nor the consequence of obedience, ii. 244.
- guilty therefore of gross absurdities in their best discourses on *morality*, ii. 244.
- modern have published excellent systems of morals, as built on the *Principles of natural religion*, but in reality founded on the principles of *Revelation*, early imbibed, ii. 244.

PHILOSOPHERS, Greek, the NATURALISTS who bore the name of SOPHISTS, were the second after the *Legislators* that went into *Egypt*, where they learnt *Physics* and *Mathematics*, as *Thales*, *Anaximander*, *Anaximenes*, *Xenophanes*, *Parmenides*, and *Leucippus*, who had little regard to the *Double-doctrine*.

— properly so called, compounded of the *Lawgiver*, and *Naturalist*, were the last that went into *Egypt* for instruction, of whom *Pythagoras* was the first and chief—they joined in one the studies of *law-giving* and *philosophy*, and began to cultivate the belief of a future state, and at the same time, the practice of the *Double-doctrine*, the two distinguishing badges of their character, ii. 106.

PHILOSOPHY, Greek, ranged in the *Eleatic* line (composed of different kind of Atheists) the *Italic* (derived from *Pythagoras*) and the *Ionic* composed of naturalists or *Sophists*, till the time of *Socrates*, ii. 114.

— divided by *Plato* into *Physics*, *Morals*, and *Logic*, ii. 107.

PLATO more famous for his *Philosophy* than his *Politics*, ii. 150.

— espoused the *Double-doctrine* which he brought from *Egypt*, and the division of his auditors into the *exoteric* and *esoteric* classes, ii. 151.

— founded the *Old Academy*, See ACADEMICS.

— avowed the principles on which the *Double-doctrine* was founded, *That some truths are not fit for the people to know*; — *that the world is not to be intrusted with the true notion of God*, &c. ii. 151.

— had a twofold character. As the *Disciple* and *Historian* of *Socrates*, he appears a *sceptic* and *affirms nothing*: as the *Head of a Sect*, and master of *Xenocrates* and *Aristotle*, he is a *Dogmatist*, ii. 122, note (k).

— in his books of laws he defends the popular opinion of the *Planetary Gods*, but in his *Cratylus* laughs at the

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the Antients for worshiping the Sun, and Stars, ii. 152.  
— treats of the doctrine of a future state, in his exoteric books, ii. 152.

— is the first who brought reasons for the eternity or immortality of the soul, which concluded only for the soul's permanency, ii. 155. See SOUL.

— refined upon the natural or Pythagorean Metempsychosis, by adding that those transitions were the purgations of impure minds, unfit to rejoin that substance from whence they were disperced, and consequently pure minds were exempt from this transmigration, ii. 155.

— inculcated a future state of rewards and punishments, always in the gross popular sense, but did not believe it, ii. 156.

— is understood by the most intelligent of the antients, to speak of such a future state only in the exoteric way to the people, and not as his real sentiments, ii. 157—160.

POMPONIUS falsely reckoned by Bayle among those that deny the usefulness of Religion to civil society, 26, 27.

— ranks mankind into four classes:

1. Those that are so framed by nature, as to be brought to the practice of virtue by the consideration of its dignity.
2. Those that are worked upon chiefly by fame and honours, by infamy and disgrace.
3. Those that are virtuous in hope of a reward or out of fear of punishment.
4. Those that are intractable, for whom the Politician contrived the doctrine of a future state, where eternal rewards are reserved for the virtuous, and eternal punishments (the more powerful influence of the two) for the wicked, 28—30.

PROVIDENCE, as believed by the Theistical Philosophers, very consistent with a disbelief of a future state of rewards and punishments, ii. 193.

— denied by the Peripatetics and Stoicks to extend to particulars.

— held by the Pythagoreans and Platonists to extend to individuals, ii. 193.

— administered by local tutelary Deities, inferior Gods or Demons, ii. 194. See DEMONS.

PYTHAGORAS the only Greek, who was properly both Law-giver and Philosopher: most famous for his legislating character, ii. 126—128.

— learnt his Legislation from Orpheus, and his Philosophy from Pherecydes Syrus, ii. 126.

— cultivated

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— cultivated the double doctrine (which he brought from Egypt, where he sojourned twenty two years) and divided his scholars into the esoteric and the exoteric classes, ii. 127.

— instituted mysteries, in which was taught as usual the unity of the divine nature, and brought not only their principles but some of their observances into the schools, as abstinence from beans and some animals, which caused the secret Doctrines and the Mysteries to be a little confounded, ii. 127, 128.

— grew so famous, that almost every eminent Law-giver before, after, and during his time, was numbered amongst his disciples, ii. 130.

— delivered in his school the Metempsychosis or migration of the soul from one body to another, by a physical necessity among his esoteric or secret doctrines, ii. 145.

— taught the same doctrine in the sense of a moral designation of Providence amongst his exoteric or popular doctrines, whose end was utility and not truth, ii. 145.  
See METEMPSYCHOSIS.

— reputed generally, tho' falsely, the author of the moral Transmigration (which he learnt in Egypt) as well as the natural, which was peculiarly his, ii. 145.

— introduced by Ovid, openly declaring to the Crotoniates his esoteric doctrine of his own Metempsychosis, and consequently denying a future state of rewards and punishments, ii. 145.

## R

RELIGION founded among all nations, except the Jewish, upon the doctrine of a future state, 25.

— could not be supported without it, ii. 23.

— necessary to Civil Society, 25.

— supplies the defects of Civil Laws, ii. 11, 22. See FUTURE STATE.

— has not the care of the body, but only of the soul, ii. 5, 8.

— has no coercive power, as unnecessary for the attainment of its ultimate end, the salvation of souls, ii. 7.  
See CHURCH.

— cannot exert its influence, nor subsist, without the support and protection of the State, ii. 9—11.

— when united to the State becomes a national or established Religion by law, which is the voice of nature, ii. 2, 18, 27. See ALLIANCE.

— deemed by unbelievers, from its usefulness to Civil Society, to be a State invention, and consequently visionary and groundless, 25. ii. 248.

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— elegantly described as such by *Critias* in his *Lan-*  
*bics*, ii. 249—253. by *Polybius*, *Strabo*, and *Pliny*, ii.  
79—85.

— tho' invented by Statesmen, it would not therefore follow, that *Religion is false*, ii. 254—256, 280—287.

— must be proved to be so by one or other of these arguments; 1. Because not found out as a truth by the use of reason (which is a high presumption;) 2. or, Because it was invented only for its utility (which is a demonstration of its truth;) 3. or, Because the inventors did not believe it; (which, tho' most to the purpose, proves nothing) ii. 254—286.

— blended with *superstition*, thought to be worse than Atheism, particularly by *Plutarch*, whose arguments are examined and answered, ii. 257—280.

— not invented by the *Lawgiver* or *Magistrate*, but found by him even amongst the most uncultivated people, ii. 219.

— could not be reformed by the Lawgiver, how gross soever he found it, but only strengthened with national rites and ceremonies, ii. 320, 321.

**RELIGION, Pagan**, an aggregate of several distinct Religions derived from so many pretended revelations, which were not laid on the foundation of one another, but each local tutelary Deity, according to the nature given him, had his peculiar worship: nor were they raised on the destruction of one another, as not consisting in matters of belief, but in practical Rites and Ceremonies, ii. 37—40.

— admitted of an inter-community of the several worships or universal Toleration, ii. 40. See TOLERATION.

— liable to no disputes but whose God was most powerful, except when by accident it was contested who was truly the tutelar God of the place, which happened once in Egypt, ii. 40—43.

— continued always to be without a dogmatic theology or formulary of faith, and consequently, preserved its principle of inter-community, even to this day, ii. 44—46.

— abhorred the Jewish and Christian Religions for their unsociableness, and refusal of inter-community of worship, which gave rise to persecution, ii. 46, 47.

**RELIGION, Jewish**, had no future state for its support, therefore must be supported by an extraordinary Providence, 8.

— taught the belief of one God in contradistinction to all the gods of the Pagans, which produced a dogmatic Theology, and consequently a prohibition from all fellowship with the Gentiles, ii. 46, 47.

— esteemed

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- esteemed as a true one by the neighbouring nations, and from their principle of *inter-community of worship*, joined by them with *their own*: Thus the Jews of Jerusalem added the *Pagan* idolatries to their Religion, while the *Pagans* of Samaria added the *Jewish* Religion to their Idolatries, ii. 49.
- growing more rigid after the *Captivity*, and refusing all *communion* with the *Gentiles*, it was treated with the utmost contempt for its *unsociableness*; but as it was not obtruded on the rest of mankind, it escaped *Persecution*, ii. 49, 50.
- RELIGION, the *Christian*, founded upon the *Jewish*, 5. ii. 47, 50.
- not national, like the *Jewish*, but given to all mankind, and therefore had a *more compleat dogmatic Theology*, ii. 47.
- was received at first with complacency by the *Pagans*, who knew nothing of its dependency on the *Jewish*, ii. 50.
- introduced by one Emperor among his *closet Religions*, and proposed to the *Senate* by another to be *publicly received*, ii. 51.
- when found to claim the title of *the only true one*, and to urge the necessity of forsaking all others, the *Pagans* were shocked, and persecution for Religion (hitherto unknown) quickly arose, ii. 52.
- not persecuted to make the Professors renounce their Religion, but for its destroying the natural (as was thought) and fundamental principle of *inter-community of worship*, ii. 53—56.
- enjoins and forbids nothing in moral practice, but what *natural Religion* had before enjoined and forbid, 83.
- does not contain a regular system of *moraüs*, but refers for a general knowledge of moral duty to the *law of nature*, which is made the *rule* to explain the occasional precepts of the *Gospel*, 83, 84.
- is not merely a *re-publication of the law of nature*, 7.
- affected, by accident only, with the assertion that Religion is a *State-invention*, because it gives a different account of the origin of divine worship, ii. 287. See IDOLATRY.
- REWARDS cannot properly be called one of the *sanctions of Civil Government*, 16, 20.
- they neither were or could be established as such, 19.
- can only be supplied by Religion, 22. See CIVIL SOCIETY.

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## S

- SOCRATES turned Philosophy from *Physics* to *Morals*, ii. 115.  
 — brought in, for that end, the principles of *doubt* and *uncertainty*, that *nothing could be known*, and that *every thing was to be disputed*, ii. 116.  
 — confined these principles to *Physics*, whilst his followers, *Arceslaus* and *Carnéades*, extended them to all *Philosophical inquiries*, ii. 116, 121.  
 — founded the *Socratic school*, whose subdivisions were the *Platonic or Old Academy*, the *Peripatetic*, the *Stoic*, the *middle and new Academies*, ii. 116. See *ACADEMICS*.  
 — was a *dogmatist in morals*, as appears by *Xenophon*, and the less fabulous parts of *Plato*, ii. 121.  
 — his method of confuting the *Sophists* by *advancing nothing of his own*, and turning their own principles and concessions against them, produced the *Socratic way of disputing by interrogation*, and gave birth to the famous *Attic Irony*, ii. 121.  
 — refused to be initiated into the *Eleusinian Mysteries*, (which exposed him to much censure) being deterred from it by the *mischief attending the communication of the secret doctrines*, ii. 181.  
 — was singular in confining himself to *morals*, and in believing a future state of rewards and punishments, ii. 235.  
 — declares it as his opinion before his Judges, that *every one should conform to the Religion of his country*, ii. 90.  
 — confirms this opinion by his practice just before his death, in ordering his friends to sacrifice a cock to *Aesculapius*, due from him according to the customs of his country—a fact that much puzzles the critics, ii. 90. accounted for, ii. 91.  
 SOUL believed to be only a *quality* by *Epicurus* and others, and consequently, to be annihilated after death, ii. 199.  
 — held by the generality of Philosophers, to be a *substance* and a *dispersed part of a whole, or God*, in whom it was again to be *resolved*, ii. 199, 208—214.  
 — believed to *pre-exist* as well as *post-exist*, thence called *God, eternal, ungenerated, self-existent*, ii. 204, 210.  
 — not believed to be *eternal* in its *distinct existence*, but *dispersed from God in time*, and would *in time* be rejoined to him again, ii. 205.  
 — supposed, by the greatest part, to be rejoined at death, but by the *Pythagoreans*, not till after many transmigrations.  
 — when *pure*, believed by the *Platonists* to be rejoined immediately on death, but when *polluted* to be sent into a succession

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succession of other bodies, to be purified before it returned to its *parent substance*, ii. 205. See METEMPSYCHOSIS.

— affirmed first to be immortal by *Pherecydes Syrus*, and *Thales*. Their opinion explained, ii. 224—228.

STOICS held that the soul died with the body, ii. 162. Thus *Epicetus, Seneca, Antoninus*, ii. 163.

— believed a *renovation*, or that after numberless conflagrations of the universe, the same face and order of things will ever be preserved from the beginning to the end, ii. 165.

## T

TEST-LAW necessary for the support of an *established or national church*, ii. 24.

— is due from the *state* to the *church*, as the sole condition of their alliance, ii. 25. See ALLIANCE.

— is not unjust in debarring *Dissenters* from places of trust, ii. 26.

— prevents the church from being at the mercy of her enemies, ii. 26.

— secures the *state* from *religious quarrels*, and their consequent mischiefs, ii. 26, 27.

— in use among the politest and freest nations, ii. 27—39.

TOLERATION allowed by the antient Lawgivers; 1. because religion seldom makes any real impression on those that are forced into it, and therefore the profession of it should be free; 2. because the warmth of religious impressions were kept up by the introduction of new Religions, ii. 33—35.

— very different in *Paganism* from what it is among us, ii. 36.

— did not imply *disension* from the established religion, but an *inter-community* in the different rites and ceremonies of the several *local tutelary Deities*, ii. 35, 40.

— agreeable to the nature of the *Pagan* religion, and therefore easily brought about by the *Civil Magistrate*, ii. 36. See RELIGION.

— this absurd species of toleration inconsistent with a *dogmatic Theology*.

— could not therefore have place among the *Jews*, who were obliged by their religion, to hold no *communion* with the *Gentiles*, ii. 46, 47. Yet so strong was the prejudice of *inter-community*, that nothing could hinder the *Jews* from running into the idolatrous worship of other nations, in conjunction with their own, ii. 47.

— could not be admitted by the *Christians*, who had a more complete *dogmatic Theology*, and consequently, they must

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must not only think *Judaism* abolished, and *Paganism* false, but endeavour to propagate their religion on the destruction of all the rest, ii. 47.

— violated and destroyed by civil tyranny, which introduced *uniformity* and *intolerance*, ii. 68, 69.

### Z

ZENO, founder of the *Porch*, writ of *Laws* and a *Republic*, and taught a future state in the very words of *Plato*, ii. 161.

— held, however, as the *Stoics* all did, that God governed the world only by his general Providence, which did not extend to *individuals, cities, or people*, ii. 161. See *STOICS*.

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